Patricia J. Coppage, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 14, 2000
01a00038 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 14, 2000)

01a00038

09-14-2000

Patricia J. Coppage, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.


Patricia J. Coppage v. United States Postal Service (S.E./S.W. Region)

01A00038

September 14, 2000

.

Patricia J. Coppage,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(S.E./S.W. Region),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A00038

Agency No. 4-H-310-0132-97

Hearing No. 110-98-8292X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The

appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges

she was discriminated against on the bases of race (White) and sex

(female)<2> when she received a Notice of Removal letter dated March 7,

1997, for exhibiting threatening behavior towards a Supervisor (S-1). For

the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Rural Carrier, PS-5, at the

agency's Valdosta, GA Main Post Office facility, filed a formal EEO

complaint with the agency on April 8, 1997, alleging that the agency

had discriminated against her as referenced above. At the conclusion

of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

race and sex discrimination because three male employees who allegedly

had made similar threats were not terminated as complainant was. The

AJ concluded that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. S-1 testified that he felt threatened by

complainant's driving by him, pointing her index finger at him with her

thumb raised as if to form an imaginary pistol, and asking him where his

bodyguard was. Her actions were thus in violation of the agency's zero

tolerance in the workplace of threats and applied threats of violence,

and for that reason the Postmaster terminated her.

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely

than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ noted

that none of complainant's witnesses testified as to complainant's being

discriminated against because of her race or sex, and complainant herself,

when asked why she named race as a basis for discrimination, indicated

that she really didn't know. The agency's final order implemented the

AJ's decision. Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the

agency requests that we affirm its final decision.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted).

A finding that discriminatory intent did not exist is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

In this regard, the AJ found that the record indicated, without rebuttal,

that half the employees hired by the Postmaster were female, that 25 of

those 30 were white females, that of two supervisors he promoted one was

female, and that of four employees he fired only one, the complainant,

was a female. Similarly, S-1 testified that of seven employees he was

involved in firing, complainant was the only female.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant

failed to present evidence that the agency's issuance of the Notice of

Removal was motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race

or sex. In this regard, complainant alleged that a male supervisor had

threatened a union steward with physical violence yet was not terminated,

and that S-1 himself had physically laid hands on a black male employee

and threatened him, yet also was not terminated. The Postmaster refuted

these allegations, however, pointing out that grievances filed by both

the union steward and the Black employee failed to mention any physical

threats or laying on of hands and an independent investigation of the

second incident also did not uncover any threats having being made.

Although the AJ did not find credible the assertion of S-1 and the

Postmaster that they took complainant's threat seriously enough to warrant

her removal, he also noted that this conclusion did not compel a finding

in complainant's favor, since she did not show by a preponderance of the

evidence that she was issued the Notice of Removal for discriminatory

reasons. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore,

after a careful review of the record, including arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0800)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

_____________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 14, 2000

__________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 Prior to the hearing, complainant withdrew the purview of age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.