Pasco-Kennewick Building and Construction Trades Council

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1955

111 N.L.R.B. 1255 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1255
The Board having found no merit in the Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the Petitioner herein, be, and it hereby is, denied.
By direction of the Board:
OGDEN W. FIELDS,
Associate Executive Secretary.
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL AND
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST INSULATORS AND
ASBESTOS WORKERS, LOCAL No. 82; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
BOILERMAKERS , IRON SHIPBUILDERS , BLACKSMITHS AND DROP FORGERS
AND HELPERS , LOCAL No. 104; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOIL-
ERMAKERS , IRON SHIPBUILDERS , BLACKSMITHS AND DROP FORGERS
AND HELPERS , LOCAL No. 541 ; BRICKLAYERS , MASONS AND PLASTERERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA , LOCAL No. 7; OPERATIVE PLAS-
TERERS AND CEMENT MASONS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL
No. 478 ; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOCAL No. 112; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE , STRUCTURAL
AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, LOCAL No. 14; INTERNATIONAL
HOD CARRIERS , BUILDING AND COMMON LABORERS UNION OF AMERICA,
LOCAL No. 348; INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,
LOCAL No. 370 ; UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS
OF AMERICA , LOCAL No. 1849 ; MILLWRIGHTS ' AND MACHINE ERECTORS'
LOCAL No. 1699; BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS , DECORATORS AND PAPER-
HANGERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL No. 427; BROTHERHOOD OF SIGN AND
PICTORIAL PAINTERS OF AMERICA , LOCAL No. 1777; UNITED ASSOCIA-
TION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE-
FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA , LOCAL No.
598; UNITED SLATE, TILE AND COMPOSITION ROOFER, DAMP AND
WATERPROOF WORKERS ASSOCIATION , LOCAL No. 231; SHEET METAL
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION , LOCAL No. 242 ; INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS LOCAL NO. 839, MEMBER LOCALS OF RESPONDENT COUN-
CIL AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
LOCAL No. 77 , NONMEMBER OF RESPONDENT COUNCIL and Cisco CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY. Case No. 19-CC-60. March 31, 1955
Decision and Order
On July 30, 1954, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondents had not engaged in the alleged violations of Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) and (B) of the Act and recommending that the complaint
be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
111 NLRB No. 192.
1256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Report attached hereto. Thereafter the General Counsel and Cisco,
the Charging Party, filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and
the Respondents and Cisco filed briefs. The Respondents also re-
quested oral argument. This request is denied, as the exceptions and
briefs in our opinion adequately present the positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings of evi-
dentiary facts but not his conclusions or recommendations.
As found by the Trial Examiner, the evidentiary facts in this case
are as follows : For many years the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, an arm of the United States Government, has been oper-
ating the vast Hanford Works Project in the interest of national
security. Since about January 1953 the Council has been demanding
that Cisco, an employer, recognize it or its appropriate constituent
unions, although not certified by the Board.' In the latter part of
1953 the AEC awarded certain contracts to Cisco for construction
work at the Project. The Council on or about April 7, 1954, de-
manded, in vain, that Cisco sign a "Memorandum of Understanding,"
in part agreeing to assign to union members all the work called for
by its contracts with the AEC.' On May 4, 1954, Cisco subcontracted
some of the work to Schultz Electric Company. On May 5, Schultz'
nonunion employees began work on the Project pursuant to the sub-
contract with Cisco, and the Council was so advised. On that evening
and the following day, the Council repeatedly announced over the radio
that its members who were working for the many other employers at
the Project were not to continue working as long as nonunion men
were employed there by Cisco. Because some 8,500 employees at the
Project refused to continue working and the Project was at a stand-
still, the AEC asked the Council what its terms were for ordering the
employees to return-to work. The Council replied that it would do
so if the AEC issued a stop order on Cisco's contracts. Accordingly,
the AEC instructed Cisco to stop work at the Project, whereupon the
Council notified the striking employees to return to work, and they
did so. We note that no exceptions were filed to these factual
findings.
The Trial Examiner nevertheless concluded that the Council, in
calling employees off the Project, did not have as an object forcing
Cisco either to cease doing business with Schultz or to bargain with the
Council. Although the Trial Examiner conceded (as do the Re-
1 See Cliff Schiel Plumbing and Heating Co, 109 NLRB 783
2 Although the Trial Examiner failed to make a finding, the Council's secretary admitted
that from April 12 to May 6 the Council picketed certain public approaches to the Project
with banners reading "Cisco unfair "
. PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1257
spondents in their brief) that the Council's object was forcing the
AEC to remove the nonunion employees working on the Cisco con-
tract and thus to cease doing business with Cisco, he concluded that
the AEC was not a "person" within the protection of the Act.3 Ac-
cordingly, the Trial Examiner found that the Council did not violate
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) or (B) of the Act as alleged.
The General Counsel and Cisco, the Charging Party, except to the
Trial Examiner's dismissal of the complaint. We find merit in the
exceptions.
It seems clear to us that the Council would not have called the strike
of employees at the Project if Cisco had yielded to the Council's
bargaining demands. It is thus obvious that an object of the strike
was to force Cisco to bargain with uncertified labor organizations, in
violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (B). It also is apparent that the
Council, in furtherance of this object of beating Cisco into submis-
sion, intended to force Cisco to cease doing business with Schultz,
in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). The Trial Examiner has ad-
vanced no reason for his contrary conclusions, and we perceive none.
In view of the violations we have found, it is unnecessary to pass
on the reasoning of the Trial Examiner that the AEC is not a person
within the protection of Section 8 (b) (4) (A).4
The record fails to sustain the General Counsel's burden of proof,
however, that the strike was in fact called by authority of any of the
other Respondents. Although most of the Respondents are members
of the Council, mere membership in a lawful organization, without
more, does not create an agency relationship between the members and
the organization.' Nor is there any affirmative evidence of an agency
relationship with respect to any Respondent other than the Council.
We shall, therefore, dismiss the complaint against these Respondents.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
3 Section 8 (b) (4) (A) in pact prohibits a labor organization from inducing employees
to strike where an object is to force "any employer or other person" to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person
Section 2 (1) lists certain inclusions in the term "person," but does not provide for any
exclusions and does not mention the United States. Section 2 (2) lists both inclusions
in and exclusions from the term "employer," and provides that the United States should
not be included as an employer.
4 Member Peterson, if he thought it were necessary to a decision in this case, would
adhere to the views expressed in the Sprys case (104 NLRB 1128) that governmental
agencies, both Federal and State, are excluded from the operation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
5 Mohawk Valley District Council, 109 NLRB 522; Ebasco Services Incorporated, 107
NLRB 617. See also International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (Sunset Line
and Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487, 1509; National Union of Marine Cooks and
Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Company), 87 NLRB 54; Newspaper and Mail Delsverers'
Union of New York and Vicinity (Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc.), 93 NLRB 237,
264,
1258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Pasco-Kennewick Building
and Construction Trades Council, and its officers, representatives, and
agents, shall :
1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging the employees of
any employer (other than Cisco Construction Company) to engage
in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any serv-
ices, where an object thereof is forcing or requiring Cisco Construc-
tion Company (a) to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of or to cease doing business with
Schultz Electric Company or any other employer or person, or (b)
to recognize or bargain with any labor organization as the represent-
ative of its employees unless such labor organization has been certi-
fied as the representative of such employees under the provisions of
Section 9 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its business office copies of the notice attached hereto
marked "Appendix." s Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, after being duly signed
by an official representative of the Respondent Council, shall be posted
immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent Council to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The Re-
spondent shall also sign copies of the notice which the Regional Di-
rector shall make available for posting by Cisco Construction
Company.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent Council has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that any Respondent other than the Coun-
cil has violated the Act.
MEMBER RODGERS, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The real issue in this case is whether an agency or instrumentality
of the United States is included within the protection afforded by
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act against unlawful secondary boy-
cott action. For the reasons set forth below, I construe the protection
of that section to extend to such agencies and instrumentalities, and
6 In the event this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order " the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1259
I would decide this case accordingly. The failure of my colleagues
even to pass upon this matter has, so far as the parties are concerned,
resulted in the issuance of a Board order that has virtually no signifi-
cance whatever.
The failure of my colleagues to act, moreover, goes well beyond its
effect on the parties involved in this case. For the facts presented to
the Board in this case, as well as the Trial Examiner's ruling thereon,
squarely place in issue the Board's construction of Section 8 (b) (4)
(A) as set forth in the Sprys case.' The present reluctance of my col-
leagues, therefore, either to affirm or reject the Sprys doctrine must
necessarily bring disturbing uncertainty into a field of labor law
which, because it is concerned with undertakings by the United States
Government itself, directly affects the security and defense of the
Nation.
The facts are clear. As the result of a dispute over recognition and
work assignments between Respondent Trades Council and Cisco, a
contractor doing business with the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Council caused a strike of about 8,500 construction em-
ployees at the Commission's Hanford, Washington, Works Project.
Because of the strike, construction work at this Project, so vital to
national defense, came to a virtual standstill. It is conceded by my
colleagues in the majority that one of the objects of the Council in
causing the strike was to force the Commission to cease doing busi-
ness with Cisco. Indeed, that this was the principal object of the
strike is shown by the fact that the strike was terminated immediately
after the Commission yielded to the Council and stopped Cisco from
continuing work on its contracts. Despite this fact, and solely be-
cause it appears that the Council violated the Act as the result of
other strike aims that were incidental and subordinate to its main ob-
jective, my colleagues in the majority have chosen not to address them-
selves to the major issue of whether the Council was privileged to bring
pressure to bear in order to force the Commission to cease doing busi-
ness with one of its contractors. So far as fear of transgressing a
Board directive is concerned, this leaves the Council free to continue
to entertain such an objective, and, in furtherance thereof, to stop
construction work at the Hanford Project by the kind of strike action
it took at the time here in question, provided only that it does not at
the same time also entertain the minor objectives that the Board is
presently condemning.
I am convinced that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act extends its
protection to agencies and instrumentalities of the United States
Government, and I would reverse the Board's contrary holding in the
Sprys case. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) provides in pertinent part:
zlnternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 5, AFL ( Sprys Electric Com-
pany), 104 NLRB 1128
1260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agents-
(4) To engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike . . . where an object there-
of is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed
person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer
or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proces-
sor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person.
The Board's holding in the Sprys case, and in the predecessor Schnei-
der case,' stemmed principally from the fact that the Act's definition
of the term "employer" specifically excludes the United States,' and
from the additional fact that the United States is not specifically al-
luded to in the Act as a "person." 10
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, rejected a
similar restrictive construction by the Board in the Rice Milling case,"
which involved a secondary boycott against a neutral interstate rail-
road. The Board in that case had held that the protection of Section
8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) did not extend to a railroad because it was not
an "employer" within the Act's meaning. The court rejected the
Board's view, noting first that "The purpose of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
and (B) is to protect commerce from injury, impairment, and inter-
ruption, by removing [secondary] obstructions like the one we have
here. . . . Petitioners are not asking that anything be done to the rail-
road companies or their employees, or that they be compelled to do
anything. All petitioners seek is a removal of the railroads and their
employees from the scope of a labor-management conflict in which
they have no interest and want no part. We think Congress pro-
vided for the removal of such obstacles from the free flow of inter-
state commerce when it enacted Section 8 (b) (4)." 12 Adverting then
8 Al J Schneider Company, Inc., 87 NLRB 99, 89 NLRB 221.
8 Section 2 (2) of the Act defines the term "employer" as follows:
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political sub-
division thereof , or any corporation or association operating a hospital , if no part of
the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any
person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the ca-
pacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
10 Section 2 (1) of the Act states :
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, part-
nerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bank-
ruptcy, or receivers.
n International Rice Milling Co., Inc v N. L R. B , 183 F. 2d 21.
^2Ibid,183 F. 2d 21, 24-25.
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1261
to the meaning of the terms "employer" and "person" in Section 8
(b) (4), the court said :
A close reading of the language used in Section 8 (b) (4) con-
vinces us that, by the use of the words "any employer," Congress
intended to extend the section to any and all situations relative to
the one we have before us. In this particular section, the usage
of the word "any," as applied to the term employer, is confined
solely to subsection (4). Contrasting the usage of the word
"any," as found in subsection (4), with the use of the indefinite
article "an," as used elsewhere in the section, gives rise to the in-
ference, we think, that Congress intended the word "any" to em-
brace the class of employers as a whole, and not merely those with-
in the definition of "employer," as set forth in Section 2 (2) of
the Act. In construing a statute, it is necessary that every word
be given significance and effect, and every part of the statute
must be construed in connection with the whole, so as'to make
all parts harmonize. Thus, if Congress had intended the word
"employer" to mean only such employers as defined in Section 2
(2), it would have preceded the word by the indefinite article
"an." Since this was not done, we think it reasonable to conclude
that the word "employer," as used in Section 8 (b) (4), was in-
tended to have a wider and more inclusive meaning than the defi-
nition found in Section 2 (2).
A further reading of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) reveals the lan-
guage "forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other person
to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise deal-
ing. . . ." The definition of the word "person" in the Act does
not exclude railroad companies. The words "any employer," as
used in Section 8 (b) (4), appear to us to refer to the same em-
ployer as described in Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by the words "any
employer or other person." Thus we see the use of the words "any
employer or other person" being used to amplify and explain the
words "any employer." Since the word "person," as defined in
the Act, does not exclude the railroad companies, and since it is
used here in connection with the words "any employer," we think
it highly persuasive of the fact that railroad companies were not
intended to be excluded from the purview of Section 8 (b) (4)
(A) and (B) of the Act....11
The Board did not seek review of the court's construction of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) with respect to railroads,'' but applied that con-
struction in ultimately disposing of the Rice Milling case.15 That
's Ibtd., 183 F . 2d 21, 25.
'S International Rice Milling Co. Inc. v . N. L. R B , 341 U . S. 665, 669.
1595 NLRB 1420 (Supplemental Decision).
1262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
construction is, I believe , equally applicable to, and dispositive of,,
the issue presently before the Board. The Act states in its preamble
that no party has the right to jeopardize the public interest . The pur-
pose and policy of the Act is, in part , to protect the rights of the public
in connection with labor disputes . Certainly the considerations which
moved Congress to protect private persons from secondary boycotts
apply even more forcefully to protect agencies and instrumentalities
of the United States Government , particularly when the national secu-
rity is involved . Congress could not have intended to afford less pro-
tection to governmental agencies , I think, than it extended to disin-
terested private persons against the economic pressure of labor or-
ganizations seeking to conscript neutrals in their conflict with the
primary employer . To hold otherwise would be to conclude that Con-
gress intended to discriminate against Government agencies. As ex-
plained by the court in the Rice Milling case , neither the term "em-
ployer" nor the term "person" in Section 8 ( b) (4) (A) compels such
a result.
I would, therefore , find that the Council violated the Act by strik-
ing to force the Commission to cease doing business with Cisco, and
I would issue a cease -and-desist order predicated on that finding.
MEMBER MURDOCK , dissenting :
In the unusual circumstances of this case I cannot agree that there
has been a violation of either Section 8 (b) (4) (A) or ( B) of this
Act. I am, of course , gravely concerned that work by the Atomic
Energy Commission at the Hanford Project, of such vital necessity to.
this Nation, proceed without interruption and with maximum effi-
ciency. I do not believe , however, that settled principles of law should
be lightly brushed aside or the intrinsic nature of this labor dispute
disregarded in determining whether or not an actual secondary boy-
cott and a strike to force Cisco to recognize the Respondent Council
in violation of this Act occurred at the Hanford Project.
I shall first discuss the alleged violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (B).
To the majority the conclusion is "obvious" that an object of the strike
was to force Cisco to bargain with uncertified labor organizations.
This conclusion rests upon a single sentence in which the majority
finds, as a matter of fact, that "the Council called the strike of em-
ployees at the Project" together with a positive inference that the
Council would not have called the strike "if Cisco had yielded to the
Council's bargaining demands." As to the majority 's factual state-
ment, the record is perfectly clear that the May 5 strike began as a
spontaneous , unplanned , and unauthorized walkout of employees as
soon as Schultz' nonunion employees appeared on the Project. Al-
though the walkout was later ratified by the Council , it is factually in-
correct to hold that the Council "called" the strike or, indeed , planned
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1263
the strike as a means of "getting" Cisco. Certainly, if the Council
had lost all patience with Cisco and had determined to force that
Company to yield to its long standing demand for recognition, it
might well have planned and called a strike for that purpose. The
fact of the matter is that the Council neither called nor initiated this
strike. As the Trial Examiner found, members of the Operating
Engineers Union, Local 370, began to walk out on May 5, 1954, when
Schultz' nonunion employees appeared on the Project. Other union
members joined in the walkout. Later in the day the Council ratified
and adopted this action. There is no question in my mind that there
would have been no strike at all but for the presence of Schultz' non-
union employees, posing as Cisco employees. The majority, however,
reasons that the existence of a dispute between Cisco and the Council
over recognition plus a strike admittedly due to the presence of
Schultz' (Cisco's) nonunion employees necessarily means that the
strike was also intended to force recognition by Cisco. This, in my
opinion, is circular reasoning. Of course, if Cisco had recognized the
Council in the first place Schultz might never have appeared on the
Project and there would have been no strike. But Schultz did appear
and there was a strike to eliminate this grievance. It does not follow
that this interruption in work precipitated by the members themselves
was intended to cure all differences with Cisco. The dispute over
recognition had existed for more than a year without, so far as the
record shows, a single strike or threat of a strike. The Council per-
mitted Cisco to carry out all of its contractual commitments until the
advent of Schultz. Indeed, the record shows that the Council used
means other than those prohibited under this Act to achieve recogni-
tion. In December 1953 Cisco agreed to sign the regular Pasco-
Kennewick Building Trades agreement in effect in the area provided
the Council was successful in withdrawing charges that Cisco had
violated the Davis-Bacon Act. Although the Union attempted to
withdraw these charges, it was unsuccessful in doing so. As the Trial
Examiner found, following a denial of a temporary injunction by a
Federal district judge, Schultz was replaced by another company
and Cisco resumed work on the silica waste storage plant. As in the
past, no action in the form of a work stoppage was taken by the Coun-
cil to force recognition by Cisco.
Under these circumstances, I am unable to find that an object of
the strike was to force Cisco to bargain with uncertified labor organi-
zations. It would seem more reasonable to conclude the object of the
strike was simply to protest against the presence of Schultz' employees.
The issue of the alleged violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) presents
another and, in my opinion, more complicated problem the existence
of which is ignored in the majority's disposition of the case. Nor-
mally, the Board has held that where employees on a construction
1264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
project strike neutral employers to force a cessation of business be-
tween those employers and an employer with which they have a labor
dispute that strike is in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). The
instant case, however, is factually unlike any presented to the Board
in an alleged secondary boycott on a construction project. As the
Trial Examiner found, the Atomic Energy Commission itself initiated
and conducted a meeting in 1952 between the several trade unions in-
volved and the contractors at the Hanford Project for the purpose of
encouraging collective bargaining and the execution of a working
agreement between these two groups. At that meeting David Shaw,
the general manager of the AEC Hanford Works Project, stated
that he would guarantee that all contractors performing work on
the Project would be required to become parties to such a contract.
On September 29, 1952, the Hanford Contractors Negotiating Com-
mittee, which had been formed for that purpose, and a committee
representing the Pasco-Kennewick Building and Construction Trades
Council executed a contract covering the hours, wages, and conditions
of employment of categories of employees represented by the Council.
Other contracts have been executed by the Contractors Committee
with trade unions not affiliated with the Council. The executive secre-
tary of the Contractors Committee is carried on the payroll of one of
the member contractors. His salary, however, is charged to the AEC
as a reimbursable cost.
It does not appear from the record that the AEC has, in fact, re-
quired that all contractors at the Project become signatories to exist-
ing contracts with the several trade unions. Some have signed the
contracts and some have not. The evidence reveals, however, that all
contractors at the Project, whether or not participants in overall col-
lective bargaining through the Contractors Committee, are required
by contract with the AEC to pay the wages and allowances set by
the AEC, which, in turn, derives these figures from those arrived at in
collective bargaining between the Contractors Committee and the sev-
eral-unions. As to wages and allowances, therefore, negotiations have
been conducted on the basis of a single projectwide unit of all em-
ployees performing the same function. In practice, the Contractors
Committee and the several unions bargain out the terms and condi-
tions of employment. The secretary of the Contractors Committee
then petitions the AEC to determine that the wages and allowances
agreed upon are those prevailing at the Hanford Project. According
to his testimony, the Commission has never finally refused to accept
one of his petitions, although it has on occasion required additional
justification to support the request. These wages and allowances are
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1265
then incorporated in the contracts between the AEC and individual
contractors.
Thus, Cisco's contract with the AEC contains the following pro-
vision :
33. PREVAILING WAGE RATES AND ALLOWANCES
The Contractor agrees to pay laborers and mechanics engaged
in the work hereunder at Hanford Works the scale of wages and
allowances prevailing at Hanford Works (including all terms of
any modifications thereof) as determined by the Commission;
provided, however, that in no case shall the Contractor be required
to pay less than the applicable schedule of rates predetermined
by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Davis Bacon Act and
attached as Section 3 of Part IV, Wage Rates and Allowances of
the Specifications. Sections I and II of Part IV set forth the
scale of prevailing wages and allowances determined by the Com-
mission as of the date indicated therein. There shall be no ad-
justment in the contract price, nor shall the Contractor be entitled
to any additional compensation, in event of an increase or de-
crease in prevailing wages or allowances. "Allowances" as used
herein shall be construed to mean all payments made to or for the
account of laborers or mechanics, other than wages. The Con-
tractor shall cause appropriate provisions to be inserted in all
subcontracts whereby the subcontractors will be required to con-
form to the foregoing clause.
Under "Specifications" all contractors, including Cisco, are in-
formed of the existence of these collective-bargaining agreements and
the fact that by signing these agreements the contractor can benefit
by becoming "a direct participant in negotiations" for the wages which
they are bound to pay.
PART II
GENERAL CONDITIONS
GC-1.
b. Construction collective bargaining agreements applicable to
all fixed price and cost-plus fixed fee construction at Hanford
Works have been negotiated between Hanford Works construc-
tion contractors and the various building and construction trades
unions. Copies of these agreements are available from the Ex-
ecutive Secretary , Hanford Contractors Negotiating Committee,
902 Stevens ( P. O. Box 1002), Richland , Washington.
1266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
These agreements provide that a contractor may become signa-
tory thereto and in such event will become a direct participant in
negotiations conducted by the Hanford Works construction con-
tractors and the building trades unions.
These facts, it seems to me, add up to multiemployer bargaining as
to wages and allowances for all employees at the Hanford Project,
established and maintained by the AEC itself. The Federal district
judge, who denied a temporary injunction substantially on these facts,
recognized the paramount authority of the AEC as it affected the
terms and conditions of employment of all employees on the Project.
In denying the General Counsel's request for an injunction he stated:
". . . if there is to be a change, if Schultz, a notorious non-union con-
tractor, is to be put into the middle of that job, I think that the
Atomic Energy Commission should do it, and not this Court." Cisco's
contract with the AEC specifically provided that no subcontract was to
be effective without the prior approval of the AEC. Schultz has never
been approved as a subcontractor by the AEC and his presence on
the Hanford Project was therefore at all times unauthorized if, indeed,
it was not unlawful.
Whether or not Cisco actually signed the Hanford Works contract,
in my opinion, when that Company signed a contract with the AEC,
delegating, in effect, its power to determine the wages and allowances
Gf its own employees, the latter for all practical purposes were repre-
sented in the multiemployer collective-bargaining negotiations at the
Hanford Project. The same is true of all other contractors on this
Project, including Schultz'16 whose employees were injected into the
established bargaining unit by representing themselves as the em-
ployees of Cisco. In view of the practice by the AEC at the Han-
ford Project of assuring the same uniform wages and allowances de-
rived through multiemployer collective bargaining for all employees
on the Project, I cannot consider any contractor participating in this
practice as an employer separate and distinct from all other employers
on the Project. In my opinion, a controversy over the terms and
conditions of employment of any group of employees on this Project
is one involving every contractor in the projectwide bargaining unit.
For these reasons I can find no "neutral" or secondary employers at
the Hanford Project. If there are none there can be no violation of
Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act. I would, therefore, dismiss the complaint
in its entirety."
19 Cisco 's contract with Schultz provided that the latter "agrees to be bound by and
comply with all applicable provisions of prime contract."
14 while it is unnecessary to my decision in this case, I, like Member Peterson, would
adhere to the views expressed in the Sprys case, 104 NLRB 1128, that governmental
agencies , both Federal and State , are excluded from the operation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1267
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CON-
STRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF CISCO CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby give notice that :
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer (other than Cisco Construction Company) to engage in a
strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods or to perform any services, where an object thereof
is to require Cisco Construction Company to cease doing business
with Schultz Electric Company or any other employer or person,
or to recognize or bargain with any labor organization unless cer-
tified by the Board.
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND
CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge duly filed on May 10 and 18, 1954,
respectively, by Cisco Construction Company, herein called Cisco, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the Gen-
eral Counsel' and the Board , issued a complaint on May 26, 1954 , against the labor
organizations named in the caption above , herein collectively called Respondents,
alleging that Respondents have violated Section 8 ( b) (4) (A) and ( B) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint and charges , together with notice of hearing thereon, were
duly served upon each Respondent and upon Cisco. Respondents duly filed answers
denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice , a hearing was held in Richland, Washington, from June 8
through 11, 1954, before a duly designated Trial Examiner . All parties were repre-
sented at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. The
parties were granted leave to file briefs or proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, or both , on or before July 1, 1954 .2 Briefs have been received from the
General Counsel and from counsel for several of the Respondents and have been
duly considered Motions by Respondents to dismiss the complaint are disposed of
I This term specifically includes counsel for the General Counsel appearing at the
hearing
2 At the request of counsel for some of the Respondents the time to file briefs was ex-
tended to July 9.
344056-55-vol. 111-81
1268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in accordance with the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations .3
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his obervations of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. CISCO'S BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Cisco Construction Company's, a partnership composed of Andrew H. Cronkrite
and Clifford T. Schiel, has its principal place of business and offices in Portland,
Oregon, where it is engaged in the construction of commercial, industrial, and
governmental projects. During 1953, Cisco employed construction labor on projects
in the State of Washington. At the time of the issuance of the complaint herein,
Cisco was performing two construction jobs amounting to $637,000 at the Hanford
Works Project of the Atomic Energy Commission located in, and in the vicinity of,
Richland, Washington.
Upon the above undisputed facts the Trial Examiner finds that Cisco is, and
during all times material herein was, engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Pasco-Kennewick Building and Construction Trades Council, each of its affiliates,
and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 77, are labor
organizations admitting to membership employees of Cisco.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The pertinent facts
At the hearing the parties stipulated, and the Trial Examiner finds, that, during
all times material herein, the Atomic Energy Commission, herein called AEC, owned
and operated, and now owns and operates, the Hanford Works Project, herein called
the Project.
During World War II, the State of Washington deeded to the United States Govern-
ment about 640 square miles of land. This land became known as the Project and
the Government then placed it under the control of the Manhattan District Corps
of Engineers, United States Army, herein called Manhattan District, for atomic
research and development.
By the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Congress set up the AEC and
delegated to it, among other things, the operation of the Project. The working areas
of the Project are located outside Richland and North Richland, Washington. There,
plutonium is produced for the exclusive use of AEC. Access to the working areas
is only through gates manned by AEC security police and guards.
When the Project was under the Manhattan District control, E. I. DuPont de
Nemours Corporation, Wilmington, Delaware, herein called DuPont, was the Project's
prime construction and operation contractor. In 1943, DuPont's representatives
and United States Army officials approached certain union officials in and around
Richland and enlisted their aid in recruiting construction workers.
After the AEC came into existence and had taken over the Project, General Elec-
tric Company, Schenectady, New York, replaced DuPont as the prime construction,
operation, and maintenance operator. Under the General Electric Company's regime
the basic subcontractor was a joint venture composed of Guy F. Atkinson Company,
J. A. Jones Construction Company, and others, which venture was known as Atkin-
son-Jones. A collective-bargaining agreement, dated August 17, 1947, was entered
into by and between the Atkinson-Jones group and certain unions composing the
Building Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor. This agreement,
the first written one covering certain groups of construction employees on the Project,
was modified in 1948 to eliminate the closed-shop provision contained therein.
In the spring of 1952, AEC invited about 200 contractors, who had expressed in-
tentions to bid on work to be done on the Project, to meet with representatives of
the Building Trades Department. The meeting was held on the Project in a building
which housed the main offices of AEC and General Electric. There, David Shaw,
an official of AEC and the Project's general manager, opened the meeting with the
statement that Congress had appropriated a considerable amount of funds to AEC
3 At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, counsel for International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No 77, moved to dismiss,the complaint as to his
client The motion was granted without objection.
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1269
for construction purposes and if the contractors and the unions were able to arrive
at a mutually acceptable agreement he was most certain that a portion of the allotted
funds would be made available for further construction on the Project. Shaw
then suggested that the contractors and the unions each select a negotiating com-
mittee and if these committees were able to write a workable contract he would
guarantee that all contractors performing work on the Project would be required to
become parties to the contract. Shaw then left the meeting and the contractors and
the union officials discussed Shaw's remarks and suggestion.
The negotiating committee representing the Pasco-Kennewick Building and Con-
struction Trades Council, herein called the Council, and the Hanford Contractors
Negotiating Committee, herein called the Employers Committee, held a series of
meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1952. Each of these meetings was
attended by Francis H. Bacon, chief of the industrial relations branch of the Project,
and Frederick Rutt, Jr., a labor relations specialist attached to the Project also at-
tended some of the meetings. Although Bacon and Rutt did not participate in the
negotiations, Bacon often was consulted by representatives of the Employers Com-
mittee respecting money items. As a result of these meetings, a collective-bargain-
ing contract, dated September 29, 1952, was executed by the Council and the Em-
ployers Committee. This agreement was in full force at the time of the hearing
herein.
Section 5 of article XI (headed "Subcontractors") of said contract reads:
The employer states that the Atomic Energy Commission has agreed to require
that compliance with VIII, IX, X, and XVIII Sec I (Articles) of this agreement,
will be a contractual requirement in all construction contracts?
As far as this record reveals, all the contractors and subcontractors performing
construction work on the Project abided by the terms of the aforesaid agreement
except Cisco. Only a few of the aforesaid contractors and subcontractors, however,
were signatories to the contract but the Employers Committee apparently acted for,
and on behalf of, all the contractors and subcontractors employed by AEC on the
Project.
In connection with its construction program at the Project, AEC let 2 contracts to
Cisco,5 1, dated November 20, 1953, for the construction and installation of power
transmission lines and substations at an agreed price of $567,000, and the other for
the construction of a silica waste storage plant at a cost approximating $72,000.
Cronkrite and Schiel first worked on Project about October 15, 1952, under a
water-main contract 6 This original job proceeded without incident until about
January 19, 1953, when the Council and one of the Unions here involved, the latter
having had a "conditional contract" with Tri-State, refused to dispatch to Tri-State
any further workmen until it agreed to abide by the aforesaid 1952 collective-bargain-
ing agreement. Nevertheless the water-main job was finally finished even though the
job site had been picketed in an effort to force Tri-State to capitulate to the unions'
demands.
For quite a period of time prior to about April 1954, the Council and its affiliated
Unions had been demanding that Cisco recognize and bargain collectively with the
Council or with the appropriate individual members thereof as the representative of
Cisco's construction employees. On or about April 7, 1954, the Council demanded
that Cisco execute a "Memorandum of Understanding" agreeing to abide by the
terms and conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement then in force between
the Council and the Employers Committee and to assign all work Cisco was per-
forming under its AEC contracts to members of the Unions affiliated with the Council.
Cisco refused to bow to the aforesaid demands or to sign the "Memorandum of
Understanding" unless and until the Council was, or the appropriate Unions were,
certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of Cisco construc-
tion employees.
* Article VIII is headed, "Worked Schedule-Premium Time-Holidays"; article IX is
headed, "Processing Time" ; article X is headed, "Isolation Pay" ; and sec. 1 of-article
XVIII deals with the wage scales and working rules which are attached to the contract.
i At the time of entering into the contracts Cisco was a partnership composed of Andrew
H. Cronkrite and Clifford T. Schiel Thereafter, Cisco Construction Company, an Oregon
corpora ation, was formed Cronkrite owns 49 shares of the capital stock of the corpora-
tion, Schiel owns a like number of shares, and McDaniel Brown, an attorney,--owns-the-
remaining 2 shares The corporation, however, did not assume the AEC contracts and
they are being, and always have been, performed by the partnership.
6 This contract apparently was entered into by Tii-State Plumbing & Heating Company,
a corporation, herein called Tri-State, the stockholders of which are-,Cronkrite, Schiel,
and another party.
1270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cisco commenced work with its own nonunion employees on the silica waste
storage plant job in or about January 1954. Early in 1954, after Don L. Cooney,
Inc., F. C. Woods Company, Lewis Hopkins Company, and Cyclone Fence Com-
pany, to whom Cisco had subcontracted most of the work called for under the power
transmission lines and substations contract, and whose construction employees are
unionized, had been working on this subcontract for quite some time, Cisco discovered
that it had not subcontracted that part of the contract calling for the assembling
and testing of transformers and oil circuit breakers. Thereupon Cisco sublet this
work to the aforementioned F. C. Woods Company and the latter firm commenced
work on this in April 1954.
After Woods had been on the assembly and testing job for about 10 days, this
subcontract was terminated by Cisco because Woods' costs were too great. Shortly
after the aforesaid termination, AEC called upon Woods to submit a bid for the
completion of this assembly and testing job and Woods quoted $28,500 as a reason-
able figure.
Between the date when Cisco canceled the assembly and testing subcontract with
Woods and May 4, 1954, Cisco unsuccessfully attempted to get AEC to relieve it of
the assembly and testing portion of the basic contract. Cisco offered $15,000 for a
release and AEC requested $32,500?
Because of Cisco's inability to be relieved of the portion of the contract which it
had canceled with Woods for $15,000 it, on May 4, 1954, entered into an agreement
to perform the work for $10,000 with Milton F. Schultz, an electrical contractor who
did business under the name and style of Schultz Electric Company.8
On May 5, despite the fact that the subcontract between Cisco and Schultz had
not been approved by AEC, nor had Schultz Electric Company been found by AEC
to be a qualified subcontractor, as required by the terms of Cisco's basic contract,
Schultz and four of his nonunion workmen, identifying themselves as Cisco employ-
ees, passed through the gates barring access to the Project except to security-cleared
workmen, and proceeded to the job site located behind the barricaded area.
About midafternoon of May 5, the Council's executive board, which was then
meeting with respect to another contractor, was informed that the members of Re-
spondent Operating Engineers Union, Local 370, were leaving the Project because
Schultz' nonunion men were working there. After a rather lengthy discussion, the
executive board suggested to William Wiseman, the Council's executive secretary,
that he telephone Henry Thurston, chief of organization and personnel division of
the Project, and discuss with Thurston the seriousness of the situation. This Wise-
man did.
Wiseman testified without contradiction, and the Trial Examiner finds, that while
the executive board was discussing the problem occasioned by Local 370 members
walking off the job, the board received 2 or 3 additional telephone calls informing
it that members of other craft unions were also leaving their jobs; that when he told
Thurston, with whom he transacted all official Council-AEC matters, that members
of the Council's affiliates were leaving the Project in protest against Schultz' nonunion
men working thereon, Thurston stated that he knew nothing about Schultz' men being
on the Project but would immediately ascertain how serious the walkout was; that later
in the day a series of phone calls came to the Council's headquarters from shop
stewards working on the Project requesting instructions because, they said, they
were unable to keep the men on the job; and that at a regular scheduled executive
board meeting held that night the board discussed at great length the pending walkout.
At the executive board evening meeting, the following resolution, among others,
was adopted:
that the Building Trades notify all crafts men employed on the Hanford
Works, that they are to remain off of the project until further notice, or until
Cisco is off the job; and radio stations be notified to put on the air at 6.30 at
30 minutes intervals until midnight and then continue from 6 a. in. to 10 a. m.
Regular maintenance or standby personnel as well as the work listed as critical
by minor construction to continue to work.
The minutes of said meeting also contain the following statement.
The Executive Board is of the opinion, that the men are leaving the job because
of the policy of the A. E. C. and in all fairness to the members, they should be
7 The offers were, in reality, to reduce the total contract price by the above respective
figures.
8In addition to the $10,000 to be paid to Schultz, Cisco agreed to furnish certain opera-
tors and all equipment, including a cram
PASCO-KENNEWICK BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION, ETC. 1271
notified as soon as possible what this action means. . . The men are not tak-
ing this action because of any jurisdictional dispute, they are leaving the jobs
because of the use of non-union men by the Cisco Construction Company.
The announcement Wiseman gave the two local radio stations after the meeting,
and which was read over the air at stated periods on May 5 and 6, reads, in part,
as follows:
This is to notify all union members on the Hanford Project, that they are not
to work on the Hanford Project as long as non-union men are employed by
Cisco Construction Company on the Hanford Works Project.
Most of the men working on the May 5 day shift finished the shift. Those work-
ing on May 5 second and third shifts and the May 6 day shift, with few exceptions,9
did not work in the construction areas behind the barricades. Schultz and his four
men, however, worked the entire May 6 day shift on the same job on which they had
worked the day before.
Shortly before noon on May 6, AEC Officials Shaw and Thurston, using two tele-
phone extensions, called Wiseman and inquired whether the men would return to
work if AEC would issue a "stop work" order on the job on which Schultz and his
men were working. Wiseman requested, and obtained, time to confer with the
Council's executive board. Wiseman convened the executive board. There, accord-
ing to Wiseman's credible and undenied testimony, "after a general discussion [had]
ensued and after it [had been] reported by the representatives of the various unions
that the reports from the men was that the whole action that they had taken upon
themselves was because of the nonunion men [appeared] on the job, and that as
long as there was nonunion men out there, that they did not intend to return," he
was instructed to inform Shaw that if AEC "would issue a stop order immediately"
on the two jobs Cisco had contracted to perform, then the Council would order the
men to return to work. Pursuant to the above-mentioned proposal, AEC immedi-
ately placed a "stop work" on the two Cisco contracts and the Council immediately
notified the men to report for work. Commencing with the May 6 swing shift, the
men returned to work and there has been no further labor trouble, so far as this
record reveals, since that date.10
B. Concluding findings
Upon the credited evidence in this case, as summarized above, the Trial Examiner
is convinced, and finds, that Respondents have not violated Section 8 (b) (4) of
the Act. The record does not support the allegations of the complaint that the
May 5 walkout had as an object, or other design, the forcing and requiring Cisco
to cease doing business with Schultz; the forcing and requiring of Cisco's union sub-
contractors to cease doing business with Cisco; and the forcing and requiring Cisco
to recognize and bargain with the Council or with the appropriate affiliates of the
Council although neither the Council nor any of its affiliates has been certified as
the collective-bargaining representative of any of Cisco's employees working at the
Project. The record, on the other hand, is clear that the Council's sole purpose in
ordering the men not to work on the Project was to force AEC to remove Cisco's
nonunion help from the jobs Cisco had contracted to perform.
The Trial Examiner further finds, contrary to the General Counsel's contention,
that AEC is not an employer or person within the meaning of the Act and hence
no finding of unfair labor practices can be made with respect to the incidents involved
in this proceeding.ii
Upon the record as a whole, the Trial Examiner finds that the allegations of the
complaint that Respondents violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) have not been
sustained by the evidence. Accordingly, the Trial Examiner recommends that the
complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following.
9The exceptions were those engaged in standby and maintenance personnel and those
employed in minor construction
10 On June 5, AEC refused to approve Schultz as a subcontractor under Cisco' s substa-
tion contract and that job was given to the Foothills Electric Company, a Kaiser Engi-
neers, Inc , subsidiary. Cisco, however, is performing the silica waste storage plant
contract.
11 Sprys Electric Company, 104 NLRB 1128; Al J. Schneider Company, Inc, 87 NLRB
99, 89 NLRB 221.
1272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Cisco Construction Company, a partnership , is engaged in, and during all
times material herein was engaged in, commerce within the meaning of Section 2
( 6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondents named in the complaint herein are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Respondents have engaged in, and are
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
and (B ) of the Act have not been sustained.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
WHITE MOTOR COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AuTo-
MOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 10-CA-194. March 31, 1955
Decision and Order
On October 20, 1954, Trial Examiner James A. Corcoran issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding
that the Respondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of
the Act and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Re-
sponded had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor prac-
tices, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in respect
to these allegations. Thereafter, exceptions were duly filed by the
Charging Union and the General Counsel, but not by the Respondent.
Briefs were filed by the Union and the General Counsel; and a reply
brief was filed by the Respondent, pursuant to special leave.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, White Motor
Company, Atlanta, Georgia, and its officers, agents, representatives,
successors, and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in International Union, United Au-
tomobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
111 NLRB No. 204.