Parker-Hannifin Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 30, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 884 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Parker-Hannifin Corporation and Curry Loggains
District No. 8, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers and Curry Loggains. Case
13-CA- 15009 and 13-CB-6366
August 30, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On November 3, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent Union filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
only to the extent consistent herewith.
The facts are not in dispute and are fully set out in
the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. The case
involves the application of the superseniority provi-
sions of Respondents' collective-bargaining agree-
ment.' In November 1975, because of economic
reasons, Respondent Employer found it necessary to
layoff a number of employees and to require others
to step or bump down to lower paying positions. At
that time the Employer reduced the number of
welders in the group 4 classification from two to one.
Lester Hensley, one of the group 4 welders, was
union shop committee chairman with responsibilities
for the entire unit similar to those normally associ-
ated with the position of steward, including grievance
handling and contract negotiation. Charging Party
Curry Loggains, the other group 4 welder, had
greater actual seniority in both the plant and the
classification. However, because of Lester Hensley's
position as committee chairman, the Union request-
ed that the superseniority provision of the contract
be applied to him, resulting in the Employer's
I The pertinent clauses of the collective-bargaining agreement read as
follows:
Seniority. The principle of seniority is hereby established to
provide a declared policy of right of preference as to lay-off and
rehiring, measured by length of continuous service upon the payroll of
the company within a plant.
Layoff requirements. In the event of a reduction in force, the last
man to enter a job classification shall be the first man to be laid off or
step down. Employees shall be laid off or stepped down in accordance
with length of service within a classification or as designated below,
231 NLRB No. 164
requiring Curry Loggains to step down to labor grade
classification 9 at a reduction in pay from $6.58 to
$5.04 per hour.2 The record establishes that Lester
Hensley had sufficient actual seniority to remain an
active employee and avoid layoff by bumping down
to a lower labor classification.
The General Counsel contends and the Adminis-
trative Law Judge found that Respondent Union
violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act and
Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(l) and
(3) of the Act by maintaining and applying a
superseniority clause which goes beyond layoff and
recall and is contrary to the Board's decision in
Dairylea Cooperative Inc., 219 NLRB 656 (1975),
enfd. 531 F.2d 1162 (C.A. 2, 1976). The Administra-
tive Law Judge found that the superseniority clause
accorded the union agent the better of two jobs
available without legitimate justification relevant to
the agent's duties since he would, in any event,
remain an active employee in the plant. Because of
the superseniority clause, Hensley did receive a
substantial economic benefit-somewhat over $3,000
projected on a yearly basis. In fact, the gain is
identical to that which an employee would receive
using superseniority to get promoted from labor
grade 9 to labor grade 4.3 Here, however, supersen-
iority was used, not to obtain promotion, but to
prevent demotion. That makes the difference.
In Dairylea Cooperative Inc., supra, the Board held
that superseniority clauses which operate to keep a
union steward on the job are permissible because the
steward's functions benefit all unit employees. The
governing considerations were stated at 658:
[I]n view of the inherent tendency of super
seniority clauses to discriminate against employ-
ees for union-related reasons . .. we do find that
super seniority clauses which are not on their face
limited to layoff and recall are presumptively
unlawful, and that the burden of rebutting that
presumption (i.e., establishing justification) rests
on the shoulders of the party asserting their
legality. [Emphasis supplied.]
A superseniority clause which protects a steward
from downgrading is more than is strictly necessary
to protect a steward from layoff because he could
perform his steward functions as long as he remained
which shall be the controlling factor where skill and ability to perform
the available jobs are relatively equal.
Union shop committeemen. Each shop committeemen shall head
the senionty list in his classification providing he has five years
seniority.
2 Curry Loggains was a shop committeeman (i.e., steward) but with
responsibilities only for his department on his shift. Thus, Hensley benefited
from what can be called "super-superseniority."
3 No allegation was made that the clause herein would permit this.
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PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP.
on the job in some capacity. Such strict application
of Dairylea, however, ignores the realities of collec-
tive-bargaining and the working relationship between
employer and employees. The difficulties in negotiat-
ing, drafting, and administering a collective-bargain-
ing agreement must of practical necessity permit a
degree of flexibility, albeit limited, in the formulation
of superseniority clauses. What is involved here is
drawing a line between those provisions which are
presumptively impermissible and those which are
permitted under the Act. We believe that supersen-
iority which, in the event of layoffs or job elimina-
tions, permits a steward to keep his particular job or
classification and protects him from downgrading is
a reasonable means to achieve the permitted end of
keeping him on the job. Under such provisions, the
steward does economically benefit, but the gain is
incidental to the aim of protecting the steward from
layoff. The steward does not get a new gain, but
merely maintains his status; he does not initiate the
gain, but it results from the employer's economic
condition. For these reasons, we find that supersen-
iority which permits a steward to maintain his status
(or nearly equivalent status) in the event of a
slowdown falls within the Dairylea definition of
layoff and recall and is not presumptively unlawful.
The Board has recently held that superseniority
provisions similar to the one here are lawful. In
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 780,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and
Canada, AFL-CIO (McGregor-Werner, Inc.), 227
NLRB 558 (1976), the steward, whose shift had been
eliminated, used superseniority to laterally bump a
more senior employee in the same position on a
different shift. The Board found that there was no
"illegality in permitting him to retain his status." In
Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey and Medical-
Surgical Plan of New Jersey, 227 NLRB 585 (1976),
the steward, whose job was eliminated, used super-
seniority to bump a more senior employee with the
same job classification. In finding the clause lawful,
the Board specifically rejected the contention that
"superseniority may be invoked only to prevent an
actual layoff." The situations in the above cases are
legally equivalent to the situation in the instant
case-superseniority was used to protect the stew-
ard's job status, as well as his tenure on the job.4
For the above reasons, we find that the supersen-
iority provision herein and the manner in which it
was applied are lawful and shall accordingly dismiss
the complaints in their entirety.
That the events herein are essentially the same is readily apparent if
viewed as follows: Committee Chairman Hensley's job was eliminated and
he laterally bumped Charging Party Loggains.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaints
herein be, and they hereby are, dismissed in their
entirety.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
In Dairylea,5 a majority of this Board recognized
that superseniority is discriminatory by its very
nature because it benefits certain employees over
others solely on the basis of their respective status in
a labor organization. At the same time, however, we
also recognized that certain forms of union supersen-
iority may serve to benefit the interests of bargaining
unit employees generally. With this in mind, we
decided in Dairylea not to declare unlawful any
particular form of union superseniority but rather to
require that justification for the use of such a clause
be demonstrated in terms of its overriding benefit to
all unit employees. By the same token, the only union
superseniority clauses which we were willing to
accept as valid on their face were those which served
only to protect the layoff and recall right of job
stewards and this was because of our recognition of
(1) the role the job steward plays in the day-to-day
administration of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment; (2) the fact that his performance inures to the
benefit of all employees; and (3) the fact that his
presence on the job is necessary for such perfor-
mance.
My colleagues' resolution of the issue presented in
this proceeding is a complete departure from the
principles laid down in Dairylea. Here, the union
superseniority clause was used during the course of a
general layoff to prevent the union committee
chairman from being forced to take a lower paying
job. As a result, an employee with longer actual
service was forced to take the lower paying job.
How this action served to benefit the unit employ-
ees is a mystery to me. The union committee
chairman was not faced with layoff and there is no
suggestion that he would not have been able to
perform his union duties equally as well in the lower
paying job. What my colleagues are protecting here
is the economic status of the committee chairman,
thereby rewarding the individual because of his
position in the Union and nothing else. No attempt is
made by my colleagues to explain how the retention
of the committee chairman in the higher paying job
will serve the interests of the unit employees. Instead,
my colleagues attempt to analogize downgrading
5 Dairylea Cooperative Inc., 219 NLRB 656 (1975). enfd. 531 F.2d 1162
(C.A. 2. 1976).
885
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with layoff and pretend that like situations are
presented. This is simply not the case. The layoff of a
steward denies the employee the benefit of his skill
and experience in the initiation and processing of
grievances. The downgrading of a steward or
committeeman does not in and of itself impede him
in any way from performing his official duties. It is
only where the downgrading would predictably
restrict the steward in the performance of his duties
that the two situations can at all be analogized and,
even in this latter situation, the burden is with the
Respondent to show that the downgranding adverse-
ly affected the steward's performance of his function.
For these reasons, I would find that the union
superseniority clause was unlawfully applied in this
instance and I would adopt the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Administrative Law
Judge.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. RIccI, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held on September 3, 1976, at
Chicago, Illinois, on separate complaints of the General
Counsel against Parker-Hannifin Corporation, herein
called the Company, or the Company Respondent (Case
13-CA-15009), and against District No. 8, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, herein
called the Union, or the Union Respondent (Case 13CB-
6366). The original complaint against the Company issued
on February 9, 1976, upon a charge filed on January 5,
1976, by Curry Loggains, an individual, herein called the
Charging Party. The original complaint against the Union
issued on January 21, 1976, upon a charge filed on
November 14, 1975, by the same Charging Party. The two
cases were consolidated for single hearing. The essential
question to be decided is whether, because of illegal
superseniority for union agents, the collective-bargaining
agreement in effect during 1975 between the two Respon-
dents proves violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
by the Company, and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by the
Union, and whether implementation of that contract with
respect to the Charging Party constituted further unfair
labor practices by both Respondents. Briefs were filed by
the General Counsel and the Union.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following: '
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Parker-Hannifin Corporation, a State of Ohio corpora-
tion, maintains an office and place of business in Des
Plaines, Illinois, where it is engaged in the manufacture of
hydraulic cylinders. During the last calendar year, a
'A posthearing motion by the General Counsel to correct certain
typographical errors in the transcript is hereby granted.
representative period, in the course of its business it had a
gross volume in excess of $1 million and during the same
period purchased materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly from out-of-state sources. I find that the Respon-
dent Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that District No. 8, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Il. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case involves a pure question of law; the facts are
not in dispute. It has long been a rule of law that employers
and unions may by contract agree that there be discrimina-
tion in employment in favor of union agents merely
because they are union agents, notwithstanding the
seemingly contrary provisions of the statute. Aeronautical
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521. The
contract in effect between the two Respondents here did
give preferred status to union agents. In its recent decision
in Dairylea Cooperative Inc., 219 NLRB 656 (1975), enfd.
sub nom. N. L R.B. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees,
Local 338, Teamsters, 531 F.2d 1162 (C.A. 2, 1976), the
Board delineated one area of limitation upon the preferen-
tial treatment that could lawfully be conferred upon union
agents. Under that ruling, preferential treatment of union
agents limited to "layoff and recall" is lawful because it
serves the Union's legitimate interest in keeping its
representatives in the plant to further effective administra-
tion of the contract. In contrast, the rule calls presumptive-
ly illegal a contract clause which goes beyond layoff and
recall because it serves no other aim than "giving union
stewards special economic and other on the job benefits
solely because of their position in the union."
The complaint here alleges the contract in question
exceeds the limits proscribed in Dairylea, and, of course,
that application of the contract terms, to the detriment of
the Charging Party employee, became an impermissible
discrimination in employment in favor of the union officer
favored in consequence.
The Facts
The pertinent clauses of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment read as follows:
Seniority. The principle of seniority is hereby
established to provide a declared policy of right of
preference as to layoff and rehiring, measured by length
of continuous service upon the payroll of the company
within a plant.
Layoff requirements. In the event of a reduction in
force, the last man to enter a job classification shall be
the first man to be laid off or step-down. Employees
shall be laid off or stepped-down in accordance with
length of service within a classification or as designated
886
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP.
below, which shall be the controlling factor where skill
and ability to perform the available jobs are relatively
equal.
Union shop committeemen. Each shop committee-
man shall head the seniority list in his classification
providing he has five years seniority.
Of significance here are the words "seniority" in the first
and third clauses set out, and the words "step-down," and
"stepped-down" in the second quoted paragraph. The
word "seniority," of itself, does not make clear what
benefits, or preferential treatment, in employment flow to
the holder of seniority. It may or may not confer on the job
benefits apart from protection only against outright
discharge and first chance at recall to employment. The
word itself is therefore ambiguous, and whether or not,
standing alone in a collective-bargaining agreement, it
proves a violation of the statute may be a question. But
that question is not reached in this case because the further
words "step-down," and "stepped-down," remove any
ambiguity and show beyond question that the holder of
such seniority in fact is assured preferred treatment apart
from discharge alone. The "layoff requirements" says the
last man who enters ajob classification shall be the first "to
be laid off or stepped-down." If "stepped-down" were
synonymous with "laid off," there would be no purpose in
referring to "stepped-down" at all. Of necessity the clause
is therefore speaking of both outright loss of employment
and lesser hurt; i.e., reduction to a lesser paying or less
desirable work assignment. On its face, therefore, this
contract must be read as exceeding the limits of what the
Board held in Dairylea to be "permissible" discrimination
in favor of union agents. Unless, as the Board also said in
Dairylea, the parties to the contract come forth with
convincing "justification" for a contrary holding, "we do
find that super seniority clauses which are not on their face
limited to layoff and recall are presumptively unlawful, and
that the burden of rebutting that presumption (i.e.,
establishingjustification) rests on the shoulders of the party
asserting their legality."
And the agreed-upon facts of how the disputed clauses
were implemented in the case of Loggains only illustrate
more clearly the true intendment of the contract. In
November 1975 two men, Loggains and Lester Hensley,
were welders in employee classification group four; both
were union agents, Loggains a committeeman and Hensley
shop chairman. Loggains was hired in 1957 and therefore
held plant seniority of 18 years. Hensley was hired in 1959
and held 16 years' plant seniority. Loggains moved into the
group four welder classification in 1959 and Hensley did
the same in 1962. Loggains therefore held 16 years'
seniority in his group four classification, and Hensley only
13 years. They were the only group four welders at the
time. That month there was They economic reduction in
force, the Company thereafter needing only one such
welder. One had to go. But because of their overall
seniority, whoever was to go had a right to bump down, or,
in the contract language, "step-down" into a lower and
lesser paid classification.
On November 5 the Company made a preliminary
decision to drop Loggains instead of Hensley, and so
advised the Union. Loggains objected: the company
representative told him "it was a union request, that he
wanted to go by contract, but the union had requested it
this way, and that is the way he done it. He was only do
[sic] it with their request." With this, Loggains spoke to
Bob Stoops, business representative of the Union, who said
it was all because his supervisor, George Janis, had so told
him and, when Loggains said he would go to the NLRB,
Stoops said he could do that.
Loggains then filed a grievance pursuant to the contract.
At the second step the Union took the position it had no
merit and the Company let the matter die there. No further
steps were taken by the Union; the contract contains no
provisions for arbitration.
Loggains was then "stepped-down" to classification nine,
at an hourly rate reduction from $6.58 to $5.04. Hensley
remained in the welder classification group four.
Defense
1. Before the hearing in this case took place all parties
signed an agreed-upon stipulation of facts, decided to
bypass the hearing, and moved that the Board itself decide
the merits of the complaints in the first instance. The Board
refused to process the case in that manner. The Respon-
dents now ask dismissal of the complaints for such reason.
There is no merit in the position. The complaints, as later
amplified and amended, are clear and sufficient. The
Union filed an answer to the amended complaint; the
Company chose not to respond to the amendment. The
evidence in support of the complaints was put into
evidence in regular course, and both Respondents had full
opportunity to deny or supplement. They chose to call no
witnesses in defense.
There is no basis for the Respondents' contention that
the Board's failure to explicate its reasons for sending the
case to regular hearing misled or deceived either the
Company or the Union.
2. At the start of the hearing the Respondents proposed
to the Administrative Law Judge that the issue raised by
the complaints be disposed of by binding arbitration. What
they meant by this is that the Employer and the Union
would select a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator and have
him pass upon the merits of the grievance Loggains filed in
November. Counsel for the Union said he would "offer the
Charging Party every participation that he . . . deems
necessary to protect his own interest." What the parties
intend, in effect, by this "proposal," is a motion that this
proceeding be deferred along the lines of the Collyer
principle (Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971)).
An arbitrator decides the merits of a grievance by reliance
upon the contract as written - without regard to whether
the contract is legal or illegal under this statute. The
collective-bargaining agreement in this instance contains
no provision for binding arbitration anyway. Moreover, the
interest of the Union could not more clearly be aligned
against that of the Charging Party. See Kansas Meat
Packers, a Division of Aristo Foods, Inc., 198 NLRB 543
(1972).
3. The Union's attempt to avoid the limiting strictures
upon contractual superseniority for union agents rests
upon the assertion supported by the evidence - that for
some years it has been a rule, or a policy, of the Union to
887
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
select its shop chairmen from among the holders of jobs in
the top four classification groups. The Union distinguishes
between committeemen - such as Loggains - and
chairmen, such as Hensley. There were two chairmen at the
time - Hensley and Simms being cochairmen. Both
remained at work as Loggains, with greater seniority, was
"stepped-down." In support of the contention that this
union rule has "a legitimate statutory purpose," the Union
says only more experienced workmen, the higher paid, the
more knowledgeable about the contract, union affairs, and
the merits of grievances - past and present - are
qualified. From this statement of fact - with which I
cannot quarrel, the Union then reasons it had a right to
insist the chairman remain in group classification four in
order to discharge his duties.
But the method whereby a union, or the employees
themselves, choose to select a representative in the plant
has nothing to do with where he works after he is chosen,
or what preferential treatment at the hands of the employer
may thereafter be permissible or impermissible. The
collective-bargaining agreement in no way circumscribes
the Union's freedom as to which employee to designate,
upon which of its members, in effect, to confer greater job
retention rights. Loggains, while admitting he heard of a
union practice of selecting chairmen only from among the
top four grades, said - without contradiction - that in his
19 years with the Company he had never heard of a
chairman losing his union agent status merely because he
"stepped-down" to a lower grade. Maybe the situation
never developed, but there is no reason to believe a
chairman chosen while in group four could not just as
effectively function while doing the lesser skilled and lesser
paid work; certainly no evidence so indicating was
adduced. Even Hensley said no one ever told him that if he
dropped from group four to group nine, as did Loggains,
he would have to cease being the shop chairman. Surely,
whatever personal qualifications he had as steward on the
job would have remained with him.
The shop chairman functions over the plant as a whole;
he is the "the number one man in the shop," as counsel for
the Union said at the hearing. As the Board said in
Dairylea, the important thing, the determinative element in
this superseniority situation, is that the union agent remain
"in the plant." And the court agreed that the contractual
preference is lawful because of the continued presence of
the steward on the job. So long as the steward - or
chairman, as in this case - is not discharged, but remains
"on the job," "in the plant," all that case law permits has
been accomplished. No one ever suggested Hensley was in
danger of dismissal. Had he not been given the preferential
treatment he would still have remained at work, albeit in
group nine. If, as the Union says, it would in that case not
have permitted him to continue serving as union agent, his
removal from the position would have been its doing, not
that of the Employer.
From the Board's Decision in Dairylea (219 NLRB at 659):
"[]t . . . remains the union's task to build and maintain its own
organization, and where the immediate problem is simply a matter of
encouraging employees to be stewards a union can alone handle the
situation simply by paying employees ....
I think this case is the perfect parallel to Dairylea. There
the steward was given the better choice of work assign-
ments - the better paying runs in the trucks to be driven.
It was a discrimination in his favor based clearly upon his
union activity and therefore violative of Section 8(a)(3) by
the employer and violative of Section 8(b)(2) by the Union.
Here, the contract provides - and the Union caused the
Employer to accord to the union agent - the better of two
jobs available - group four assignment instead of the
lesser paying grade nine job. And no legitimate justifica-
tion - relevant to Hensley's function as chairman - has
been suggested at all. In short, there is a difference between
"on the job" benefits, and retention or loss of any job and
the right to remain in the plant.
The fact Hensley is superior to Loggains in the union
hierarchy, and higher in authority as union spokesman in
grievances, is irrelevant to the question whether he should
be paid more by the Employer. He is in the plant, and
whatever his duties, or his reward from the Union, his
services "to the benefit of all employees" remain the same.
If, while occupying a lower paying job pursuant to the
collective-bargaining agreement which treats all employees
alike, he does not care to be a union agent, that is a matter
for the organization to face and itself resolve.2 To say the
employer must pay him more than others with greater
seniority because the Union so desires is literally what both
Section 8(b)(2) and Section 8(a)(3) of the Act hold may not
be. And again, the Respondent Union here finds itself back
at the beginning. Permission to grant superseniority to
union agents by contract is limited to "layoff and recall."
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth above, and
occurring in connection with Respondent Company's
operations and those of the Respondent Union, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that they
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Inasmuch as it has been found that the union agent
superseniority clauses here in dispute are unlawful, the
Respondents must cease and desist from maintaining and
enforcing those clauses in their current bargaining agree-
ment or any future collective-bargaining agreement. Fol-
lowing the unlawful demotion of the Charging Party to the
lower paying job in implementation of the illegal union
agent security clause, he was reinstated to his former
position. Accordingly, there is no occasion here to order
From the court's decision in the same case (531 F.2d at 1166):
If a union finds that it must offer incentives to attract qualified
stewards, it may pay a salary to the stewards ....
888
889PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP.
reinstatement to his old position as part of the remedy. But
the Respondents must jointly make Curry Loggains whole
for any loss of earnings he suffered in consequence of the
demotion from grade four to group nine from November
1975 to the date when he was restored to his former higher
paying position. And finally the Respondents must be
ordered to cease and desist from in any like or related
manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By maintaining and enforcing a seniority clause in
their collective-bargaining agreements according union
agents superseniority for terms and conditions of employ-
ment not limited to layoff and recall, and by unlawfully
applying such contract to the Charging Party, the Respon-
dent Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)( IX)(A) and (2)
of the Act, and the Respondent Employer has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(aX 1) and (3) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce with the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]