Park-Ohio Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 7, 1987

283 N.L.R.B. 571 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

PARK-OHIO INDUSTRIES
Tocco Division of Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. and
]International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 91, UAW
Park-Ohio Industries , Inc. and International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW) and its
Local No. 91. Cases 8-CA-12702, 8-CA-
17148, and 8-CA-17394
7 April 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
STEPHENS AND CRACRAFT
On 30 July 1981 the Board issued a Decision and
Order in Case 8-CA-12702, in which it found that
Respondent Tocco Division (Tocco) of Park-Ohio
Industries, Inc. (Park-Ohio) had violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by transferring certain
work- formerly performed by employees represent-
ed by the Union from its plant in Cleveland, Ohio,
to its plant in Boaz, Alabama, without affording
the Union an opportunity to bargain over the deci-
sion to transfer. Park-Ohio Industries, 257 NLRB
413 (1981). The Board ordered Tocco to cease and
desist from unilaterally transferring unit work, to
reinstitute the transferred , work at' its Cleveland
plant, to bargain over the 'decision to transfer, and
to reinstate with backpay the unit employees who
had lost their jobs because of the unlawful transfer.
The Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's Decision
and Order. Park-Ohio Industries v. NLRB, 702 F.2d
624 (1983). A controversy having arisen over the
amount of backpay due, the Regional Director for
Region 8 issued a backpay specification and notice
of hearing on 19 August 1985. The backpay pro-
ceeding is still pending.
On 4 November 1983 the Union filed a charge in
Case 8-CA-17148. As amended on 15 March 1984,
the charge alleges that Respondents Tocco and
Ohio Crankshaft and Camshaft Division of Park-
Ohio Industries; Inc. (Ohio Crankshaft)" violated
Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide relevant in-
formation and refusing to bargain over Park-Ohio's
decision to relocate the Tocco Division.
On 27 February 1984 the Union filed a charge in
Case 8--CA-17394 against Ohio Crankshaft. As
amended- on 15 March and 25' April 1984, the
charge alleges that Ohio Crankshaft discriminatori-
ly discharged nine named employees in violation of
Y Although Tocco and Ohio Crankshaft are separate facilities, the
Union represents a combined unit of production employees at both facili-
ties
571
Section 8(a)(3),2 and violated Section 8(a)(5) by re-
fusing to provide relevant information to the Union
concerning the discharges in question . On 30 April
1984 the Acting Regional Director issued an order
consolidating cases and a consolidated complaint in
Cases 8-CA-17148 and 8-CA-17394, alleging vio-•
lations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
The complaint was amended on 9 May .1984. No
hearing has been held on the consolidated com-
plaint in those two cases, and the matter is still
pending before the Region.
On 4 November 1983 the Union filed a charge in
Case 8-CA-17148-2, alleging that Ohio Crankshaft
had acted in concert with the Village of Newburgh
Heights, Ohio, to enforce a local ordinance against
union members in such a way as to interfere with
their Section 7 rights.3 The Union and other plain-
tiffs also filed an action in Federal district court
seeking, among other things, to have the ordinance
declared unconstitutional. The Regional Director
deferred processing of the charge pending the
court's decision. On 27 February 1986 the district
court issued a written opinion declaring the ordi-
nance unconstitutional. Davis v. Village of Newburgh
Heights, 642 F.Supp. 413 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
Following the entry of the court's decision, Ohio
Crankshaft entered into 'an informal settlement
agreement, executed by the Union and the Region-
al Director as well as Ohio Crankshaft, in which
Ohio Crankshaft agreed to post and comply with a
notice promising not to engage in the acts that
were the subject of the charge in Case 8-CA-
17148-2. The settlement agreement was on a stand-
ard Board form. The only additions, apart from the
name of Ohio Crankshaft and the case number,
were a nonadmission clause and the statement that
"It is understood and agreed by and between the
parties to this Agreement that the General Counsel
reserves the right to introduce any and all evidence
concerning the instant charge in other, matters
hereafter litigated." The Regional Director ap-
proved the settlement on 17 April 1986.
On 21 October 1986 Park-Ohio moved for sum-
mary judgment in Cases 8-CA-12702, 8-CA-
17148, and 8-CA-17394, alleging that under the
Board's settlement bar'rule, those cases may not be
litigated because they, were pending .when the Re-
gional Director approved the settlement agreement
in Case 8-CA-17148-2. On 30 October 1986 the
Board issued, an order transferring proceeding to
the Board and Notice to Show Cause in the three
2 The General Counsel asserts that the employees were discharged for
alleged picket line misconduct during a strike allegedly caused by other
unfair labor practices.
3 The ordinance contained several provisions regulating picketing in
labor disputes.
283 NLRB No. 82
572 DECISIONS OF TIKE `NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pending cases, directing the General Counsel and
the Union to show cause why the motion should
not be granted. Both the General Counsel and the
Union filed memoranda opposing the motion. Park-
Ohio filed a- reply, and the General Counsel filed a
response.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
Ruling on the °Motion for -Summary Judgment
Under the "settlement bar rule" enunciated in
Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel Co.,4 and followed con-
sistently thereafter, 5 a settlement agreement dis-
poses of all issues involving presettlement conduct
unless earlier violations of the Act ' were unknown
to the General Counsel and not readily discover-
able by investigation, or specifically reserved ,from
the settlement by the mutual understanding of the
parties.6 Park-Ohio contends that neither of the ex-
ceptions set forth above is applicable in this pro-
ceeding, and therefore that Cases 8-CA-12702, 8-
CA-17148, and 8-CA-17394 should be dismissed
because they were pending before Region 8 when
the Regional Director approved the settlement
agreement in Case 8-CA-17148-2.
The General Counsel and the Union oppose the
Motion for Summary Judgment in Case 8-CA-
12702- (the backpay proceeding), contending that
Park-Ohio's proposed extension of the settlement
bar rule to compliance cases is unprecedented.?
They argue that the rule never was intended to
cover 'situations in which unfair labor practices
have been found, and where the only questions re-
maining concern compliance with a Board order.
The General Counsel and the Union also oppose
granting` summary judgment, in the two pending
unfair labor practice cases. They contend that the
clause in the settlement agreement reserving the
right to introduce evidence concerning the charge
in Case 8-CA-17148 2 in future litigation is a clear
reservation of the right to litigate the pending
cases. They also argue that it is plain from the cir-
cumstances 'of the 'settlement that ' the agreement
was intended to encompass only Case 8-CA-
17148-2, and not the other - pending cases. In sup-
port of their position they point out -that only Case
8-CA-17148-2, and only Ohio Crankshaft, are
mentioned anywhere in the agreement,-and that the
notice posted pursuant to the settlement agreement
refers only to matters contained in the charge in
4 235 NLRB 1397 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Universal Blanchers, 275 NLRB 1544 ( 1985); B.SL Meats,
270 NLRB 1430 ( 1984), Ventura Coastal Corp., 264 NLRB 291, 298-301
(1982), Cambridge Taxi Co., 260 NLRB 931 (1982).
6-Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel Co., 235 NLRB 1397, supra.
7 Park-Ohio does not contest this point
Case 8-CA-1-7148-2. - They also urge that it, is
simply unbelievable that the Regional Director or
the Union would have agreed to dismiss- pending
cases involving potential restoration of transferred
work and significant amounts of backpay, in which
the- Regional Director had found merit and- issued a
consolidated complaint, in return for Ohio - Crank-
shaft's posting a notice in settlement of a complete-
ly unrelated charge. Accordingly, the General
Counsel and the Union contend that the foregoing
circumstances, combined with the clause in the set-
tlement agreement reserving litigation rights, estab-
lish that the parties mutually understood that they
were specifically reserving the other pending cases
from the settlement.
We shall deny the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment.
Concerning the backpay proceeding in Case 8-
CA-12702, we agree with the General Counsel and
the Union that the settlement bar rule was not in-
tended to encompass' such actions. Indeed, as set
forth in Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel, the rule "bars
subsequent litigation of presettlement conduct al-
leged to constitute unfair labor practices."8 It was
not meant to preclude compliance litigation where
unfair labor practices already have been found by
the Board, and we so hold. Accordingly, the por-
tion of the motion addressed to the backpay pro-
ceeding is dismissed with prejudice.
We also deny, but without prejudice, the portion
of the motion addressed to the pending unfair labor
practice- cases . We reach this result because, on the
limited record before us, we are unable to deter-
mine whether the parties to the settlement agree-
ment in Case 8-CA-17148-2 mutually intended to
reserve from that agreement the issues in the other
pending cases. If such was their intent, the litiga-
tion of those cases would not be precluded.9 At
this point, however, the intent of the parties is un-
clear. For example, we disagree with the conten-
tion of the General Counsel and the Union that the
language in the settlement agreement reserving liti-
gation rights is, unambiguous evidence that the, par-
ties intended to reserve the right to litigate those
cases . The language refers instead to "other matters
hereafter litigated." We find the quoted language-
which could be interpreted either as referring only
to the litigation of charges that may be, filed in the
future, or, also to, the litigation of pending
charges-inherently ambiguous.
Additional ambiguity as to the parties' intentions
arises from the fact that the charges in the various
cases involve two separate divisions and facilities
e 235 NLRB 1397 (emphasis added).
9 Id.
PARK-OHIO INDUSTRIES
of Park-Ohio . Thus, whereas Cases 8-CA-17148-2
and 8-CA-17394 involve only Ohio Crankshaft,
Case 8-CA-17148 apparently is concerned chiefly
with events at the Tocco Division . Moreover, as
the General Counsel and the Union point out, only
Ohio Crankshaft (and not Tocca) is named as a
charged party in the settlement agreement . It is un-
clear, then, whether the settlement agreement was
intended to cover only Ohio Crankshaft , or to in-
clude Tocca as well.
Ambiguities such as those discussed above raise
substantial and material questions of fact concern-
5 73
ing the intended scope of the settlement agreement
that should be `determined at a hearing . We there-
fore deny the portion of the motion addressed to
Cases 8-CA-17148 and 8-CA-17394, without prej-
udice to the introduction at the hearing of evidence
tending to establish the intent of the parties in ar-
riving at the settlement agreement.
ORDER
The Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as
set forth above.