Paramount Trends, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 12, 1976

222 N.L.R.B. 141 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

PARAMOUNT TRENDS, INC. 141
Paramount Trends, Inc. and International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union. Case 31-CA-5152
January 12, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO
On October 6, 1975, Administrative Law Judge E.
Don Wilson issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge to the
extent consistent herewith.
1. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
findings that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by discharging employees Arre-
dondo and Ramirez. We further agree with his find-
ings that Respondent, through its assistant manager,
Kratzer, violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening Ra-
mirez with discharge because she had signed an au-
thorization card on behalf of the Union, by threaten-
ing plant closure should the Union prove successful
' In his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently referred to
Respondent's Assistant Manager Kratzer as "Kratzner." Additionally, the
Administrative Law Judge found that both Peterson, Respondent's "lead-
woman," and Kratzer, respectively, terminated employee Arredondo,
whereas the record clearly reveals that it was Kratzer who informed Arre-
dondo of his discharge This apparently inadvertent error, however, does
not affect the results of our Decision herein
Respondent has filed a motion in which it requests an independent review
of the record and issuance of a decision by another Administrative Law
Judge, contending, inter aba, that the Administrative Law Judge's resolu-
tions of credibility, findings of fact, and conclusions of law are the result of
bias and that his Decision is "irregular." After a careful review of the entire
record in this case, we are satisfied that Respondent's motion is lacking in
merit. There is no basis for finding that bias and partiality exist merely
because the Administrative Law Judge resolved important factual conflicts
in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses. As the Supreme Court stated in
N.L.R.B. v Pittsburgh S.S. Company, 337 U S. 656, 659 (1949), "[T]otal
rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the integrity of compe-
tence of a trier of fact " Furthermore, it is the Board's established policy not
to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinc-
es us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enf. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3, 1951). We find no basis for
reversing the Administrative Law Judge's resolutions of credibility herein.
In addition, although we specifically do not adopt the Administrative Law
Judge's gratuitous comments and characterizations which appear in his De-
cision, including particularly his use of such terms as "virulent" and
"sledge-hammer" in describing certain violations of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act,
we are persuaded that Respondent's contentions in this regard are insuffi-
cient to warrant the granting of its motion Accordingly, Respondent's mo-
tion is hereby denied.
in organizing Respondent's employees, and by inter-
rogating employee McCoy concerning her knowl-
edge of union activities. Furthermore, we concur
with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating
and maintaining an unlawfully broad-no-solicitation
rule through the posting throughout its premises of
signs reading "No soliciting on Paramount Trends
premises." 2
Additionally, we conclude, as did the Administra-
tive Law Judge, that Respondent, through its "lead-
woman" Peterson, engaged in various acts violative
of Section 8(a)(1). Thus, based on credited and unre-
butted testimony, it is clear that Peterson: (1) on sev-
eral occasions interrogated Arredondo concerning
the latter's union activities as well as those of other
employees, including in one instance presenting Ar-
redondo with a list of names of those employees who
had allegedly signed union cards and indicating to
her that Respondent had some knowledge as to the
dates of organizational meetings held in Arredondo's
home, and thereafter, questioned her as to the accu-
racy of such information; (2) on several occasions
threatened that she would be "bitchy" to those em-
ployees who had signed cards and would make them
sorry for having done so; (3) on several occasions in
the presence of Arredondo,- threatened plant closure
in the event the Union was successful in its efforts;
and (4) stated to Arredondo that the Union "could
be bought off," and that "anyone could be bought."
Clearly, such conduct was coercive and interfered
with the exercise of the employees' Section 7 rights.
In its exceptions, Respondent does not contend
that, should, the Board find that Peterson made the
above remarks, such statements were lawful. Rather,
Respondent argues primarily that Peterson was not a
supervisor so as to make these statements attribut-
able to it and that, therefore, it has not violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(I). For the reasons set forth below, we con-
clude that Respondent's argument is without merit.
In reaching this conclusion, we- specifically agree
2 In its exceptions , Respondent contends that no violation of Sec. 8(a)(1)
should be found in this regard because it subsequently changed the lan-
guage of these signs in a manner which it asserts conformed to applicable
Board precedent. The complaint alleges, and at the hearing Respondent's
counsel stated, that some 5 weeks after the initial posting of the signs the
language thereon was changed to read "No soliciting on Paramount Trends
premises during working hours." Although there is record testimony that
these signs were subsequently altered by Respondent, there is no evidence
as to the specific changes made in the language used thereon. However, if in
fact Respondent altered the signs as alleged, such modification, without
more, would not constitute a valid rule under current Board standards See
Essex International Inc., 211 NLRB 749 (1974). Furthermore , even assuming
arguendo that Respondent had subsequently promulgated la rule which con-
formed to Board policy, we would find such a belated effort insufficient to
negate the coercive impact of the unlawfully broad language which origi-
nally appeared on the signs. We therefore conclude that Respondent has
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) We note, however, that the Administrative Law Judge,
apparently by inadvertence, omitted to provide a specific remedy for this
violation and, accordingly, we shall make a new Order to conform herewith.
222 NLRB No. 27
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with the' Administrative Law Judge's finding that Pe-
terson- in fact was Respondent's supervisor. Thus,, in
addition to the other factors cited.by the Administra-
tive Law Judge in support of his conclusion, we par-
ticularly rely on the uhrebutted testimony of Arre-
dondo that Altman, in a meeting held with the pants
department employees at which he introduced Pe-
terson, stated that the employees were to bring com-
plaints to Peterson "because she was suppose to be in
charge" of, the department;3 Peterson had final ap-
proval with respect to the hiring of applicants within
the pants department, and- that she, on at least one
occasion, informed Arredondo that she had hired an
additional employee to help out in the department;
and she checked the quality ,of the employees' work
and ensured that sufficient-supplies were available to
them. We further note that, unlike the others in the
pants department, Peterson spent the vast majority
of her time in duties other than running machines,
was paid a salary rather than an hourly wage, and
did not punch.a timeclock. Additionally, it is signifi-
cant that it was Peterson herself who refused to ac-
cept Ramirez' apology for her allegedly poor work
and who instructed the latter to pick up her pay-
checks at the office upon her termination . Further-
more, even ,assuming that Respondent's complement
was 125 employees, the lowest figure suggested in the
record, and that Spence, Respondent' s 'management
trainee, was in fact a supervisor, the ratio of supervi-
sors to nonsupervisory employees would be approxi-
mately I to 40, a ratio which, in our opinion, is dis-
proportionately high.
It is clear , moreover, that Peterson, if not in fact
vested with actual supervisory authority, was placed
in a position by Respondent whereby employees
would reasonably believe that she was acting as an
agent on its behalf. Thus, in addition to the afore-
mentioned factors, we particularly note that Peterson
called Arredondo into Plant Manager Altman's of-
fice and interrogated her with no admitted manage-
ment official present , and it was she who threatened
to make those who had signed union cards sorry.
Consequently, we conclude that, inasmuch as Pe-
terson was invested by Respondent with at least ap-
parent authority to act on its behalf, her above-cited
statements made to Arredondo are attributable to
3 The Administrative Law Judge, in crediting Arredondo's testimony con-
cerning Altman's statements to the employees at this meeting , additionally
attributes to Arredondo the testimony that Altman asked the employees "to
be patient with [Peterson ], she was just starting out and that we would have
to bear with her and help her out and she was there to help us ." The record
discloses that it was Ramirez who so testified . Inasmuch as the Administra-
tive Law Judge has specifically credited the testimony of both these employ-
ees and in view of our previous finding that his credibility resolutions are
correct, we find that this apparently inadvertent error does not affect the
results of our decision herein
Respondent4 and Respondent has thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
2. We specifically do not adopt the Administrative
Law Judge's finding at section 111,E of his Decision
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) based on
Assistant Manager Kratzer's purported failure to re-
pudiate certain statements allegedly made in his pres-
ence by Plant Manager Altman to employee McCoy.
The record clearly discloses that at the hearing that
portion of McCoy's testimony concerning statements
made to her by Altman was stricken from the record
by the Administrative Law Judge. No party has filed
exceptions thereto. Accordingly, there is no record
evidence concerning Altman's alleged statements to
McCoy and, therefore, the Administrative Law
Judge's finding of a -violation based thereon- is un-
warranted.'
In view of the foregoing, and the entire record in
this proceeding, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging or otherwise discriminating
against employees Gloria Arredondo and Carmen
Ramirez because of their union activities, Respon-
dent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By directly-and impliedly threatening employ-
ees-with discharge because of their activities on be-
half of the Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. By threatening the above-named employees
with plant closure in the event the Union successfully
organized the plant, Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the - meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By stating to employee Arredondo that the
Union "could be bought off" and that "anyone could
be bought," Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
° Broyhill Company, 210 NLRB 288, 294 (1974); The Bama Company,145
NLRB 1141, 1143 (1964)
5 Although the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent
violated Sec 8(a)(I) through Peterson 's remarks that the Union "could he
bought off," and that "anyone could be bought," he apparently by inadver-
tence omitted to provide a specific remedial provision therefor We shall
therefore make a new Order accordingly
6 In view of our conclusion herein , we find it unnecessary to reach the
issue of whether , had Altman in fact made coercive statements to McCoy,
Kratzer's failure to repudiate the remarks made by his admitted superior
would in itself constitute a violation of Sec 8(a)(1) -
PARAMOUNT TRENDS, INC. 143
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
7. By interrogating employees Arredondo, Rami-
rez, and McCoy concerning their union activities
and/or those of other employees, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By posting signs_reading "No soliciting on Para-
mount Trends premises," Respondent has,engaged in
unfair labor practices within- the meaning of Section
8(a)(l)-of the Act.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Paramount Trends, Inc., San Bernadino, California,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating
against any of our employees because of their mem-
bership; support, or other activities on behalf-of In-
ternational -Ladies Garment°Workers Union, or any
other labor organization.
(b) Directly or indirectly threatening its employ-
ees with discharge because of their membership, sup-
port, or other activities on behalf of the above-named
or any other labor organization.
(c) Threatening its employees with plant closure
or stating to them that the above-named or any other
labor organization "could be bought off," and that
"anyone could be bought," in order to discourage its
employees from joining, supporting, or engaging in
other activities on behalf of the above-named or any
other labor organization.
(d) Interrogating its employees concerning their
activities and/or those of its other employees on be-
half of the above-named or any other labor organiza-
tion, in order to discourage its employees, from join-
ing, supporting, or engaging in other activities on
behalf of the above-named or any other labor organi-
zation.
(e) Promulgating, maintaining, or enforcing any
rule, or posting any notice reading "No soliciting on
Paramount Trends premises."
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights -to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the
above-named or any other labor organization, to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purposes 'of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the purposes of -the-Act:
(a) Offer employees Arredondo and Ramirez im-
mediate reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if no
such jobs exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, with-
out prejudice to- their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make the above-named employees
whole for any losses in earnings they may have suf-
fered by reason of- Respondent's - discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth in the section of
the Administrative Law„Judge's Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its San Bernadino, California, facility,
copies of the attached notice -marked "Appendix." I
Copies of .said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional =Director for Region - 31, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcingan Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD -
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage or otherwise discrim-
inate against any of our employees because of
their membership, support, or other activities on
behalf of International Ladies Garment Work-
ers Union, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT directly or indirectly threaten
our employees with discharge because of their
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
membership, support, or other activities on be-
half of the above-named or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
plant closure or state to them that, the above-
named or any other labor organization "could
be bought off," and that "anyone could be
bought," in order to discourage our employees
from joining, supporting, or engaging in any
other activities on behalf of the above-named or
any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT interogate our employees con-
cerning their activities and/or those of our other
employees on behalf of the above-named or any
other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce
any rule, or post any notices reading "No solicit-
ing on Paramount Trend premises."
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist the above-named or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities.
WE WILL offer employees Gloria Arredondo
and Carmen Ramirez immediate reinstatement
to their former jobs or, if no such jobs exist, to
substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges
and WE WILL make the above-named employees
whole for any losses in earnings they may have
suffered by reason of our discrimination against
them.
PARAMOUNT TRENDS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
E. DON WILSON, Administrative Law Judge: Based upon
an original charge filed by International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, herein the Union, on March 14, 1975, and
an amended charge filed by the Union on April 4, 1975,
the Regional Director for Region 31, of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein the Board, issued a complaint and
notice of hearing on April 28, 1975, alleging that Para-
mount Trends, Inc., herein Respondent, committed various
violations of the Act. Respondent has timely denied the
same.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing in this matter was held
before me on June 17, 1975, at San Bernardino, California.
Briefs of General Counsel and Respondent have been re-
ceived and have been fully considered. Upon the entire
record in this case, and from my observation of the wit-
nesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Respondent, a California corporation, is engaged in the
production of women's sportswear, at San Bernardino,
California. It annually sells and ships goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly to customers located within the
State of California, who sell and ship goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly to customers outside the State of
California. At all times material, it has been an employer
engaged in commerce and in a business affecting com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
At all times material, the Union has been a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
Was Barbara Peterson a supervisor within the meaning
of the Act; on or about March 11, 1975, was employee,
Carmen Ramirez, discharged because of her union and
other protected activities and on or about March 17, 1975,1
was Gloria Arredondo discharged and refused reinstate-
ment because of her union and otherwise protected activi-
ties? Also, did Respondent interfere with, restrain, and
coerce its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act; were there other violations of Section 8(a)(1), includ-
ing an unlawful "No Soliciting" rule?
B. Barbara Peterson Was a Supervisor Within the Meaning
of the Act
Respondent vigorously denies any supervisory authority
within the meaning of the Act so far as Peterson is con-
cerned. He insists that any simple direction by Peterson is
not enough to establish her supervisorial authority within
the meaning of the Act. Of course, I agree. He insists there
must be responsible judgment, including independent judg-
ment, before Peterson can be found to be a supervisor,
within the meaning of the Act. I agree. Of course, I should
expect operations to be preplanned and not a mere helter-
skelter. I find Respondent's operations were preplanned. In
no way does this diminish the supervisorial status of Pe-
terson, within the meaning of the Act? What competent
operation in this country does not have some preplanning?
i Hereinafter, unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 1975
2 She did not testify. Chris Kratzner did not testify. Jim Spence did not
testify The latter two, allegedly, according to Respondent, were part of
Respondent's managerial staff, along with the admitted manager, Leo Alt-
man. I do not credit the testimony of Leo Altman where contradicted by
otherwise credited testimony. His demeanor impressed me most unfavor-
ably
PARAMOUNT TRENDS , INC 145
Respondent, unsuccessfully, would have me believe that
every action at work, of Peterson, was preplanned by man-
agement. Such is not credited by me and is absurd.
Respondent's counsel, in his so well written brief, con-
cedes that Peterson "directed" the work of the employees 3
in the pants department. But, again, he brings in and insists
upon preplanning and thus lack of responsibility. There
were about 200 employees in this plant. Respondent would
have me believe that two or three managers directed and
controlled all of their work .4 I may not be so naive. Re-
spondent insists, essentially, that Altman and Kratzner
alone directed and controlled all the work of 200 employ-
ees with the assistance of an unidentified Jim Spence. Alt-
man told the girls, "Barbara 6 was in charge." Barbara
placed various orders. Barbara was employed before Alt-
man? I cannot believe that whether Respondent had 125-
130 employees or 150 employees, Altman and Kratzner
made all assignments of work for three departments. Barb-
ara assigned overtime work, she assigned work.' Peterson
assigned the work in the morning. Altman testified she
spent only 15 percent of her time at the machines. Such
work included testing, repair, and training. It is clear to me,
and I find, she spent the balance of her time in supervising,
as the word is understood in the Act, the work of the em-
ployees in the pants department. She handled employees'
work problems. Spot checks as to quality, etc., were within
her province. As Altman testified, she would call employee
grievances to management's attention after they were
brought to her. Upon giving a test, she had permission to
state her opinions as to an employee's qualifications or lack
thereof. If she said the applicant was qualified, they did not
give another test to such employee. They hired applicants,
if Peterson said they were qualified. They might find the
applicant qualified in another department, despite her
opinion. If Peterson said an applicant were a good opera-
tor, they'd hire her. She "lined up the work-for the next
day." "It was her responsibility to check " "She had to
make sure she had enough supplies on hand for the em-
ployees to get the work out." She had to call it to the atten-
tion of a girl who fell a little short, and instruct her. Unlike
other employees, Peterson was paid a salary and did not
punch a timeclock. Without question, Barbara Peterson was
a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. "In hiring she
had the permission, upon giving a test, to state whether she
felt that the person was qualified or not, as an operator." If
she said the person was not qualified, the person was not
hired. If she said they were qualified, they were hired. If she
found them not suitable for pants, etc., they might be
found suitable for blouses, or jackets. If Peterson said an
applicant was a "good operator," they'd hire her.
I find and conclude Barbara Peterson was a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act. I do not credit Altman's 9
About 45
4 Altman, Kratzner, and Spence
5 What was his authority? Management tramee9
6 Peterson
r Why she did not testify, I do not know
8 I credit the testimony of Arredondo, Ramirez , and McCoy, unless con-
tradicted by otherwise credited testimony Their testimony was frank and
forthright, and the demeanor of each impressed me most favorably
9 The manager
testimony that he spent 95 percent of his time on the floor,
supervising. Jim Spence "is being trained as an assistant
manager." 10
The "assistant superintendent," Jim, spent 100 percent of
his time on the floor, while being trained as assistant man-
ager.il Peterson, swore Altman, had permission to state
whether an applicant was qualified as an operator and such
operator was hired or not hired on her say-so. She trained
the operators management sent to her. Management hired
or did not, upon Peterson's say-so.
A couple of weeks after Altman and Kratzner were in-
troduced to the employees as new management, Altman
conducted a meeting with the employees in the pants de-
partment. Gloria Arredondo impressed me as an honest
and forthright witness. I credit her testimony completely.
She testified that at this meeting, Altman spoke to the girls,
and told them that if they had any complaints about in-
coming work, etc., the girls should let Peterson know "be-
cause she was supposed to be in charge of all of us." Altman
said Peterson, "was in charge." Peterson was in the pants
department, "at all times." On cross-examination, she testi-
fied that Altman told the pants department employees that
if they had any "complaints" they should tell Peterson about
them. Arredondo credibly testified that, Mr. Altman asked
those in the pants department, "to be patient with Barbara,
she was just starting out and that we would have to bear
with her and help her out and she was there to help us."
She further testified that Altman said Peterson " was as-
signed to thatjob because she could do it and that nobody
was going to run her out." Altman did not dispute this
testimony, which I credit. It was Peterson who assigned
overtime work to the employees. She would ask an employ-
ee if she wished to work overtime in the afternoon or Fri-
day and would ask an employee if she wished to come in
on Saturdays. Upon their assent, Peterson okayed overtime
work.
Altman testified that Peterson was extremely experi-
enced, and knew all the operations in the pants depart-
ment. Between the repairs on buttonholes, including but-
tons, sewing or interlocking or whatever the case may be,
Peterson, according to Altman, actually worked on ma-
chines about 15 percent of the time. Altman testified that
in hiring, Peterson had permission, upon giving a test, to
state whether she felt that the person was qualified or not
qualified as an operator. If she made such a statement, the
decision to hire was generally made by Kratzner or Altman
based upon Peterson's statement. If Peterson said an appli-
cant for employment was qualified, she was hired. In hir-
ing, Peterson had authority effectively to recommend that
an applicant be hired.
Operators were paid on a piece rate basis, or at least
were paid a minimum wage, as set by the government. Pe-
terson was paid a "salary," and did not have to punch a
timeclock as did the other employees. She was a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act.
10 Try and imagine the manager , assistant manager and manager " train-
ee" spending 95 percent of their time on the floor being supervisors Who is
running the store" Three foreladies, one manager trainee, and two managers
spending all their time directing employees?
tt He was not assistant manager
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. The Discharge of Gloria Arredondo
As previously found by me, Arredondo was an honest
witness and her testimony , as did that of Carmen Ramirez,
impressed me very much . As I have previously noted with
respect to Arredondo , Ramirez' testimony was straightfor-
ward and reliable . Their demeanors showed forth the hon-
esty of their testimony
Arredondo was first employed by Respondent about Oc-
tober 1974. For most of the time that she worked for Re-
spondent , she worked on a zipper machine.
Altman testified in connection with Arredondo's dis-
charge that she happened to be "a very good worker and a
very good producer." Gloria was a crackerjack worker. She
averaged up to $32 per day, well above the normal hourly
wage.
It was she, who earned so much, who contacted the
Union , because she did not like the way the other employ-
ees were being treated . It was she who contacted Carmen
Leone, an agent of the Union. She signed the first union
authorization card , and for a couple of weeks spoke in
favor of the Union . She had a couple of union meetings in
her home . Peterson and Arredondo had been on a friendly
business basis at the plant. About February 21, Peterson
asked Arredondo whether she was aware of union organi-
zational efforts in the plant . Arredondo replied negatively.
Peterson told her the plant would shut down before the
Union came in. On the very next day, Peterson, at
Arredondo 's machine , again, asked her if she knew of any-
one signing cards Arredondo said no, but added that if she
found out , she would tell Peterson . Peterson stated "she
[Peterson ] was a bitch and she would prove she was bitchy
if she found out who the card signers had been " 12
Arredondo had a third conversation with Peterson about
March 11 , in Altman 's office, Peterson having told her to
join her there. 13 Peterson , again, asked her if she knew any-
thing about the Union ; Arredondo replied in the negative
Peterson then read to her a list of all who had signed cards
for the Union , including Arredondo . 14 Peterson said they
had information that Arredondo had started the Union
and meetings were held at Arredondo 's house.15 Peterson
checked off the information , including the list of names,
and asked her if it, including the times she fixed, were
true.16 This was an obvious violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Arredondo pleaded ignorance . Peterson said the Union
would not "go in there." She stated her father had been in
union business , "and she had seen huge checks with high
amounts of money paid to union representatives, to buy
them off ." 17 She added that anyone could be bought.
Again , Peterson said she was a bitch and would prove she
was a bitch because she would make anyone who signed a
card sorry for it 18
Arredondo held two union meetings at her home, about
February 25 and March 4 . Peterson added, in effect, that
12 A virulent violation of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act
13 Unusual freedom for Peterson)
t4 8(a)(1)
1s 8(a)(1)
68(a)(l) of the Act
7 Violative of Sec 8(a)(I) of the Act
18 Obviously, violative of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act
life would be miserable for card signers and the plant
would shut down before the Union got in. She again added
she'd prove she was a bitch.19 Arredondo returned to the
zipper machine at which she had been working for months,
and was almost immediately transferred to a "pocket" ma-
chine. No one told her how to use the machine for pock-
ets 20
While at the "pocket machine" Arredondo heard Pe-
terson and Respondent's quality control inspector 21 in a
conversation. Arredondo had not been instructed in this
line of work. Amy told her she could give her no instruc-
tions. Early in the morning, Arredondo heard Peterson
state to Amy that Arredondo was the last one she would
expect to sign a card for the Union, but she had found out
she had done so and Arredondo would have to pay for it.
Arredondo was soon thereafter switched to working on
"zippers," on some "very difficult material." Altman, Amy,
Peterson, and a Joan from Los Angeles, together, checked
her work. They checked and rechecked her work as she
went along. They said nothing. Such type of supervision
had never happened before. Previously, there had just been
a "glance."
Not surprisingly, I find, Arredondo became nervous and
upset by this unnerving observation of her work by her
superiors. She had been repeatedly coerced by Peterson in
their conversations about the Union. On March 13, ner-
vous and upset, Arredondo left for home at lunchtime.
About the end of the lunch break, Arredondo called the
office manager,22 and told her she would not be in for the
rest of the day because she was sick. She explained she had
taken some "nerve" pills and was very nervous and upset
and "might be going to the doctor." She was not permitted
to speak to Peterson. A doctor's note was not mentioned.23
She had never before been required to bring in a doctor's
certificate.
On the following day, Arredondo's daughter called in to
report her mother's absence from work. Arredondo, realiz-
ing that her production records for the week had not been
submitted and that such were necessary were she to be
paid, went early to the plant and submitted such records.
She spoke to no one and simply performed the task for
which she went to the plant Such is why she went to the
plant. Misconduct? But Altman saw her perform this prop-
er and normal function An hour after Altman received the
call from Arredondo's daughter, when he saw her in the
plant, "I decided at that point, when she went out without
stating anything to myself or to Chris or to anyone the reason,
I decided she should be terminated, because basically, she is
not ill,24 she is using something or trying to. We needed the
production flow and she happened to be a very good worker
and a very good producer." Thus, this was the time Altman
decided upon discharge.25
Arredondo reported for work on time, March 17. Her
timecard was not in its slot. She inquired of Seals, who
19 8(a)(1)
20 She had been a high producer at the zipper machine
21 Amy o
22 Frances Seals
23 Seals never testified Altman 's hearsay testimony is not credited
24 Altman's S.P
25 Note the pretext for her discharge-no doctor's certificate on Mon-
day-decision to fire on Friday
PARAMOUNT TRENDS, INC.
asked for a-doctor's excuse. Arredondo explained she had
been mentally rather than physically ill and that she had
gone to the Labor Board on Friday. Kratzner appeared,
made the same request as had Seals and upon being told
there was no doctor's excuse and all the facts, including the
visit to the Labor Board, told her she was being fired for
lying concerning her absences.26 Another, employee, Maria
Sanchez appeared in the office about _ this time. She had
been absent for a week. She was asked for a doctor's ex-
cuse . She said she had none and never had been asked for
one before. Kratzner simply told her to go back to work.
Arredondo had taken sick leave about three times before
and never had been required to produce a doctor's certifi-
cate. Of course, Altman had already -decided to fire Arre-
dondo early on the preceding Friday 27 Altman testified
Respondent's sick leave policy had never been strictly en-
forced. He never announced future enforcement. Arredon-
do was fired then and there, and got her_ check.
It is obvious that Peterson learned of Arredondo's union
activities and stated she would be a bitch about such activi-
ties. Certainly, ,as of the time of her discharge, Respondent
knew she had already- visited the Board 's office. On -the
preceding Friday, Altman had already decided to dis-
charge her with no knowledge as to whether she did or did
not have a doctor's certificate. It would be a good- employ-
ee who appeared early on Friday to have her work records
in order. I do not ignore Peterson's threats, some more
severe than others, with respect to Arredondo's and other's
union activities, nor Peterson's interrogation, etc. I find Pe-
terson -meant it when she said she would be a "bitch" with
respect to union activities. I would not suggest Peterson
was a bitch but her discharge of Arredondo, because Pe-
terson considered herself to be a bitch at least with regard
to Arredondo's union activities, makes clear that the assis-
tant manager and Respondent discharged Arredondo in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. -
I have-not ignored Peterson's threat that the plant would
be "shut down" should the Union enter. I do not ignore
that when Arredondo was transferred to the pocket line,
she received no instructions. Peterson told Amy Arredondo
would have to "pay" for her union activities. Thereafter,
Arredondo was subjected to intense supervision of her
work. Who, among us, is, to wonder that she went home on
her lunch break? Mentally but not physically ill-enough
to take valium. Never before, after an illness of any kind,
had she been required to present a doctor's certificate.
She was not fired because she failed to present a doctor's
certificate on Monday. Think-of Altman's contradictory
statement that he decided to fire Arredondo on Friday.28
Respondent violated Section 8(4)(3) and {1) by its dis-
charge of Arredondo. Compare with Sanchez.29 I find no
substantial evidence that even though she visited the Re-
gional Office of the NLRB, she was not mentally ill and/or
upset. Altman testified that Respondent's sick leave policy
26
What he9
27 Respondent's exhibit in connection with Sanchez' dealings with a doc-
tor, does not appear to me to be a doctor's excuse, nor do I find it was
presented to Respondent when she returned to work. I cannot find any
connection between Sanchez' absence and the doctor's certificate
28 No doctor's certificate, then in order
29 Her doctor's certificate (?) is meaningless.
147
was never strictly enforced. It was so enforced here only as a
pretext to cover her discharge for union activities. Never was
an announcement made that Respondent's sick leave poli-
cy would be enforced. General Counsel has proved by a
preponderance of the probative and-substantial evidence
that Arredondo-was discharged because of her union activ-
ities. The demand for a doctor's certificate upon her return
to work was a farce. Altman-had decided to discharge her
at least by early on Friday morning. Respondent-knew that
she had been mentally (emotionally) -ill rather than physi-
cally ill30 For some time, Respondent made her working
life most unpleasant because of her union activities-, which
were the cause of her discharge. -
D. The Unlawful Discharge of Carmen Ramirez
Ramirez began work for Respondent about July 1974.
She regularly operated a buttonhole machine. She attended
the, second union meeting at Arredondo's house. She
signed a card for the Union, A couple of days later, Kratz-
ner asked her to come to his office at lunch time . Kratiner
said he had heard about the ' Union and'inquired ` whether
she had anything to do with ,it. Ramirez admitted she was
involved, adding she wouldprobably lose her job. In effect,
Kratzner said she was right. - She -returned to her machine
and very shortly was switched to a job on band overlock-
ing, a job where she had had no prior experience. No one
showed her how to operate it. She continued such employ-
ment until the end of the week. Ramirez phoned Kratzner
on' Saturday, March 8, telling him she was uncertain
whether she would return to work on .Monday 31 Kratzner
told her to return," but he could not understand her union in-
volvement. He told her that if the Union'came in, the workers
would lose because the plant would shut down and the supervi-
sors would move with the rest of the plant.32
Ramirez returned to work on Monday. After again
working on the interlock machine, she was switched back
to the buttonhole machine. Kratzner asked her to work an
hour overtime on Monday, she did so. Kratzner had also
asked her to come in an hour early on Tuesday, she did
SO. 13 About -9 a.m., Altman, Kratzner, and Peterson ob-
served her work most closely. SucY scrutiny had never, be-
fore occurred. After about 10 minutes, Altman and Pe--
terson told her she was doing thejob wrong.' Ramirez told
them she was doing the job as-she always had,34 but was
sorry if one or two mistakes had occurred. Peterson said,
"sorry wasn't enou and she was being-fired and go'and
pick up her check.3 Ramirez; as directed by Peterson went
to -the office and got her check. Peterson and Kratzner,
there, took, great. pains to explain that her union activities
had nothing to do with her discharge. Ramirez left with her
check. I find'that as Kratzner had already told her, she was
fired for her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
30 Vigorous and massive supervision for the first time.
31 Kratzner was never called as a witness
32 Sledgehammer 8(a)(1).
33 She was obviously, to me, considered a most valuable employee.
34 I especially credit this.
35 Peterson not a supervisor'?
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. McCoy's Testimony as to Violations
There is no allegation of a violation of the Act by Alt-
man. At the end of General Counsel's case , with no notice
of any kind to Respondent, General Counsel blandly put
on McCoy to prove that Altman had violated the Act, even
though he had not been charged in the complaint by Gen-
eral Counsel with such violation . Respondent hadn't been
given a week's or even one minute's notice that a motion
would be made so to amend the complaint . Forget due
process if you will, but what-about common decency, good
faith, lawyer-like conduct, fairness? Add on to them. Are
they all to be ignored? While General Counsel attempts to
make a mountain from a molehill , it is inconsequential. I
find McCoy to have been a completely honest witness and
in early April was in a conversation with Altman and
Kratzner . I find Kratzner , in the presence of Altman, asked
if she knew something about the Union, and Altman in the
presence of Kratzner asked her to investigate and find out
who started it, adding the Union was not good for them
and he didn't want the Union in there. He said the plant
would close down if the Union came in. She told them
she'd tell them what she could find out. Chris violated Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) in many ways. This was done in the presence of
Altman. What difference whether two did it or one did? Chris
violated the Act by not repudiating Altman 's statements. I
insist and insist I properly exercised my discretion as to
Altman in these circumstances . I insist such should be ob-
vious. If the violations are found , what matters it whether
they were committed by one or two? She was unlawfully
asked to indulge in surveillance and otherwise Kratzner
and Altman violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Section
8(d) of the complaint refers to violations by Kratzner from
March 8 , 1975, to date. Nowhere does the complaint refer
to any statements and Altman's unrepudiated statements
in Kratzner 's presence by Altman . Section 8 (a)(1) was here
violated by Kratzner's presence.
E. The Unlawful No-Solicitation Rule
I have noted the credit I attach to the testimony of Arre-
dondo. She credibly testified that after the second union
meeting was held at her home, Respondent posted notices
around the plant reading, "No soliciting on Paramount
Trends premises." I regard and find as baseless that the
signs were posted because outside salesmen for meat, etc.,
went through the plant and talked to employees. I find
such claim was without foundation. Such rule was posted
in places a salesman would not visit. Indeed, I find there
were no salesmen in the plant. It was meant for the em-
ployees. The posting of the rule obviously violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, since "solicitation in behalf of the"
Union, was clearly and literally included in Respondent's
"No Soliciting" rule. If salesmen were included in the sign,
so be it. "Union solicitation" was also included.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Union set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of Employer
described in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic , and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to-labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that on or about March 17, Respondent
discharged its employee Gloria Arredondo and since that
date has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse
to reinstate Arredondo to her former position of -employ-
ment, and having found that on or about March 11, Re-
spondent discharged its employee Carmen Ramirez and
since that date has failed and refused and continues to fail
and refuse to reinstate Ramirez to her former position of
employment , because each joined or assisted the Union or
otherwise engaged in protected concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, I shall recommend that Respondent offer Arre-
dondo and Ramirez, each, full and complete reinstatement
to their former positions , or, if such positions no longer
exist , then to substantially equivalent positions , without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges.
I shall also recommend that Respondent make Arredon-
do and Ramirez whole for any loss of pay either or both
may have suffered by reason of the discharges of either or
both, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, in
the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest on backpay computed in
the manner described in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962), and reinstate them to their former or
substantially equivalent positions.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3. By interrogations and threats to close the plant, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices and the others
found, herein , affect commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]