PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 2015

362 NLRB No. 182 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

362 NLRB No. 182
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Paragon Systems, Inc. and Arthur J. Blake. Case 10–
CA–095371
August 26, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND JOHNSON
On February 7, 2014, Administrative Law Judge
Heather Joys issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
Charging Party filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2
The principal issue in this case is whether the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
suspending and discharging Protective Security Officers
(PSOs) Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John Holland be-
cause of their union activities. Before deciding that is-
sue, however, we must first address the Respondent’s
contention that the alleged unfair labor practices are
nonjusticiable because the suspensions and discharges
were purportedly grounded in national security concerns.
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the judge
that the Respondent failed to establish that this case is

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the Board’s standard remedial language and to require the Respondent
to inform Federal Protective Service of this Decision and Order. See
Security, Police & Fire Professionals Local 444, 360 NLRB No. 57
(2014). We agree with the judge that it is appropriate to require the
Respondent to reimburse the discriminatees for any additional Federal
and State income taxes they may owe as a consequence of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award in a calendar year other than the year in
which the income would have been earned in the absence of discrimi-
nation, and to file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating backpay for each discriminatee to the appropriate calendar
quarters. Don Chavas LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No.
10, slip op. at 2 (2014). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to
the Order as modified and in accordance with Durham School Services,
360 NLRB No. 85 (2014).
nonjusticiable. We also agree that the Respondent un-
lawfully suspended and discharged the PSOs for their
union activities.
I. FACTS
We begin by briefly reviewing the relevant facts. The
Federal Protective Service (FPS), a division of the Unit-
ed States Department of Homeland Security, provides
security services at Federal facilities across the country.
At the Federal facility in Savannah, Georgia, that houses
offices of the Army Corps of Engineers, FPS subcon-
tracts that work to the Respondent, a private-sector em-
ployer. PSOs Blake, Baker, and Holland worked for the
Respondent at the facility as security guards. Each was
also an officer of the United Security Police Officers of
America (the Union). During the course of contract ne-
gotiations in January 2012, in which both Blake and Hol-
land participated, the Union issued a strike notice.3 On
January 31, while off duty, Blake parked his car in the
Savannah facility’s loading dock and entered the build-
ing to deliver a packet of materials, including a copy of
the strike notice, to Colonel Jeffery Hall, the Corps of
Engineers’ highest ranking officer in Savannah. Baker
was the PSO on duty at the loading dock when Blake
arrived. Baker checked Blake’s Federal credential but,
consistent with the common practice at the facility, did
not subject fellow PSO Blake to the entire screening pro-
cess for visitors, which required visitors to not only pre-
sent identification but also go through a magnetometer
and put any packages through an X-ray scanner. Baker
recorded Blake’s name in the Officer’s Operations Log,
handed Blake several documents expressing the PSOs’
workplace concerns to take to Colonel Hall, and allowed
Blake to enter the building. Blake then proceeded to
Colonel Hall’s office, gave Colonel Hall the documents,
and discussed them, including the strike notice, with him.
Approximately 30 minutes after his arrival, when his
meeting with Colonel Hall ended, Blake exited the build-
ing through the loading dock, where Holland had just
arrived to relieve Baker. The three men had a conversa-
tion lasting approximately 12 minutes.
More than 2 weeks later, on February 17, the Re-
spondent’s contract manager, Vernon Fields, telephoned
Jennie Dingman, the FPS contracting officer’s technical
representative (COTR) for the Savannah contract, to in-
form her that a PSO had notified Colonel Hall about the
strike vote. The strike vote was not news to Fields, who
had learned of it several weeks earlier. Nor was it news
to Dingman, who, as the judge found, had already re-
quested and received a strike contingency plan from the
Respondent prior to February 17. Rather, Fields contact-

3 No strike actually took place.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ed Dingman not to inform her of the strike notice or any
security concerns, but, in his words, “[b]ecause now we
had the client involved,” a reference to Blake’s conversa-
tion with the colonel.4
In response to Fields’ call, Dingman telephoned a se-
curity desk at the facility on February 17 and spoke with
two PSOs, one of whom was Holland. Dingman first
asked Holland whether anyone had visited the colonel
within the last few days, to which Holland responded
“no.” Dingman then asked Holland whether a PSO had
visited the colonel at any time, and Holland told her that
he was aware that someone had delivered some paper-
work to the colonel, but he did not know who or when.5
On February 22, 2012, Dingman traveled to Savannah
to investigate whether a PSO had contacted the tenant
agency about the strike notice. She asked her supervisor,
John Hathaway, and the Respondent’s assistant contract
manager, Victoria Edmiston, to attend the interviews she
conducted with the PSOs. Dingman first interviewed
Baker. Based on the information she obtained during
that interview, she interviewed Blake and again inter-
viewed Holland. During those interviews, Dingman told
the three PSOs that they could not access the facility
when off duty by showing their credentials, that their
credentials were to be used for work purposes only, and
that they were to be treated as visitors when accessing
the building off duty. Each of the PSOs stated that he
was unaware of those requirements. During her second
interview with Holland, Dingman confronted him about
denying that he knew of Blake’s activity during their
earlier conversation, and Holland admitted that he had
not told her the truth before.
During her interview with Baker, Dingman asked him
if he had any knowledge of an incident involving a PSO
talking to the colonel about a possible strike. When
Baker gave evasive responses to her questions, Dingman
told him that his responses could be construed as “ob-
struction of and [sic] Investigation.” Dingman also ques-
tioned Blake about his delivery of the strike notice to the
colonel. During her interrogations of Blake and Baker,
Dingman told them that they were not permitted to speak
directly to tenants. When Baker and Blake each re-
sponded that the PSOs had a ruling from the National
Labor Relations Board that prohibited the Respondent
from restricting them from talking to clients, Dingman
made disparaging statements about the settlement agree-

4 Tenant agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers, are re-
ferred to as “clients.”
5 In fact, Holland knew that Blake had visited the colonel. Accord-
ing to Dingman’s report, Holland did not tell her about Blake’s visit
initially because he said he “didn’t want to get in trouble.”
ment the Respondent had reached with the Board.6
Dingman also warned Baker and Blake that if the Union
struck, the PSOs would be removed from the contract
and would never work on another Federal contract.
Edmiston, who was present during the interviews, re-
mained silent.
Approximately 3 months later, Dingman produced a
report in which she recommended that all three PSOs be
removed from the contract because they had committed
numerous infractions, including unauthorized parking,
unauthorized access, and dishonesty. Dingman conclud-
ed her report by stating that the actions of Baker, Blake,
and Holland did not meet “Government standards of this
contract,” and that:
They have their own agenda and have proven with their
actions listed above the security of the Federal Facility
for which they are assigned come [sic] second to han-
dling their own personal grievances. It is my profes-
sional opinion as the COTR of this contract that all
three PSO’s [sic] be removed. They have less than
stellar candor and have shown without a shadow of a
doubt their disregard for the safety of the government’s
facility, information or employees.
On May 31, Dingman forwarded the report to FPS
Contract Specialist Lawanna Nunnally, who in turn for-
warded it to the Respondent on July 6. On July 10,
Baker, Blake, and Holland were issued suspension notic-
es, signed by Edmiston, stating that they were being sus-
pended pending further investigation. Blake’s suspen-
sion letter stated that he “allegedly entered a restricted
area without an escort; displayed unethical or improper
use of official authority, credentials or equipment; dis-
honesty and immoral conduct that violates rules, regula-
tions or established policy of the government.” Baker’s
suspension letter asserted: “You allegedly neglected to
perform your duties (including Building Rules and Regu-
lations, Unauthorized Access and Traffic Control, Dis-
honesty and Negligence).” Holland’s suspension letter
stated: “You allegedly disregarded orders, including
your post orders, special orders or instructions and were
dishonest or lying to a government official or your su-
pervisor.”

6 In March 2011, the Respondent entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the Board to resolve allegations in a charge filed by Blake.
In this agreement, the Respondent agreed to revise its “Chain of Com-
mand” rule, which prohibited employees from directly contacting the
Respondent’s clients or clients’ customers for any reason. The new
rule contained no such prohibition. Nonetheless, during the February
22 interview, Dingman told Baker he could not directly contact a ten-
ant. When Baker referenced the settlement agreement, Dingman asked
whether Baker took orders from “the NLRB” or the Respondent.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 3
Although the July 10 notices stated that the three PSOs
were suspended pending further investigation, the Re-
spondent discharged Baker, Blake, and Holland on July
12 without any further investigation. FPS did not follow
the established procedure of convening a Review Board
when the Federal Government seeks the removal of a
PSO; nor did the Respondent consider the PSOs’ alleged
misconduct under the collective-bargaining agreement’s
progressive disciplinary policy. Instead, as found by the
judge, the “Respondent was aware [that] Dingman’s an-
imus toward the protected activity formed the basis for
her recommendation yet deliberately conducted an inad-
equate investigation into the allegations against Blake,
Baker, and Holland in order to justify its decision to dis-
charge them.”7
II. JURISDICTION
There is no statutory or case-created “national securi-
ty” exception to the Board’s jurisdiction.8 The Respond-
ent argues, however, that the PSOs’ terminations are
nonjusticiable under Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the Merit Systems Protection Board lacked the
authority to review the Navy’s denial of a security clear-
ance to a Federal civilian employee of the Navy at a nu-
clear submarine facility, which resulted in the employ-
ee’s loss of his job. The Court reasoned that such deci-
sions entail “predictive judgment[s]” that must be made
by individuals with the “necessary expertise in protecting
classified information,” and that it would not be “reason-
ably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review the
substance of such a judgment.” Id. at 529.
In the present case, the judge rejected the Respond-
ent’s argument, noting that the PSOs at the Savannah
facility were not required to, and did not, have security
clearances; rather, FPS issued them “suitability determi-
nations,” which were never revoked. Thus, the judge
found, even if Egan applied to the revocation of suitabil-
ity determinations, it would not support the Respondent’s
argument.
In its exceptions, the Respondent correctly points out
that courts have held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Egan may also apply to denials or revocations of suit-
ability determinations, at least those based on national

7 As further found by the judge, an investigation would have dis-
closed, among other things, that the rules on which Dingman relied for
improper access did not address off-duty PSOs, and Baker’s method of
access on January 31 was a widespread practice. Further, had the con-
duct of the three PSOs been so serious as to justify their discharge, the
judge found it inconceivable that Edmiston would have taken no action
against the PSOs, permitting them to continue to work for several
months after the February 22 interviews she attended.
8 See Firstline Transportation Security, 347 NLRB 447, 456 (2006).
security concerns. See, e.g., Foote v. Moniz, 751 F.3d
656 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding unreviewable under Egan
an agency determination not to certify an applicant for
Federal employment as suitable for its Human Reliability
Program, which requires the applicant to already possess
or obtain the highest level of security clearance), cert.
denied 135 S.Ct. 711 (2014); Bennett v. Chertoff, 425
F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding unreviewable
under Egan a Department of Defense determination that
an employee was unable to retain a security clearance on
the basis of a negative suitability determination); Cruz-
Packer v. Chertoff, 612 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2009)
(same, employer was Transportation Safety Administra-
tion). Moreover, it is now well established under Egan
that an adverse employment action is unreviewable if it
is based on the employee’s inability to obtain or maintain
a security clearance or to receive or retain a favorable
suitability determination because of national security
considerations. See, e.g., Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520,
524 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder Egan an adverse em-
ployment action based on denial or revocation of a secu-
rity clearance is not actionable under Title VII.”);
Ciralsky v. CIA, 689 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149 (D.D.C. 2010)
(same).
As the judge found, FPS did not revoke the PSOs’
suitability determinations, and we therefore agree with
the judge that Egan does not apply. Our conclusion
would be the same even assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, that an authoritative “recommendation” from an
Executive Branch official that private sector employees
be barred from working on Federal contracts for national
security reasons is unreviewable for reasons similar to
those expressed in the foregoing precedents. Here, we
find no evidence that national security concerns animated
Dingman’s recommendation to remove the PSOs. Where
adverse employment decisions were not based on nation-
al security considerations, courts have found no bar to
review.9 The Respondent notes that nonjusticiability has

9 Thus, in Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2004), a
Title VII case, the court rejected the Government’s contention that the
FBI’s denial of employment to a job applicant because of “perceived
lack of forthrightness” was unreviewable under Egan and Ryan v. Reno,
supra. The court found “nothing in the record . . . to indicate that the
FBI’s suitability determination was made with any ‘predictive judg-
ment’ about whether hiring plaintiff would implicate national security
concerns,” or indeed that the Government had ever “considered nation-
al security as a basis for its decision not to hire the plaintiff.” Id. at 8.
The court concluded that Egan’s rationale is limited to suitability de-
terminations “made in the interest of national security, and that does
not appear to be the case here.” Id. (italics in original). Similarly, in
Corbett v. Napolitano, 897 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117–119 (E.D. N.Y. 2012),
another Title VII case, the court found subject matter jurisdiction where
the plaintiff was found unsuitable for employment by the U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP) for reasons unrelated to national security,
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been held to extend even to the decisions of private con-
tractors when they are authorized by the Executive
Branch to make national security-related decisions.
Beattie v. The Boeing Company, 43 F.3d 559, 566 (10th
Cir. 1994). But even if the Respondent made the deci-
sion to discharge the PSOs independently of Dingman’s
recommendation, there is no showing that its decision
was based on national security considerations.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the Re-
spondent has failed to establish that this case is
nonjusticiable.10
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGATIONS
We turn now to the merits of the complaint allegation,
that the Respondent suspended and discharged Blake,
Baker, and Holland because of their union activities.
The judge found that the suspensions and discharges
were unlawful. We adopt those findings for the reasons
set forth in the judge’s decision and for the additional
reasons explained below.
The judge correctly found that the appropriate analyti-
cal framework for addressing this issue is set forth in
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. on other
grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Under Wright
Line, the General Counsel has the initial burden to show
that the employees’ union activities were a motivating
factor in the employer’s actions against them. 251
NLRB at 1089. The elements commonly required to
support a finding of discriminatory motivation are union
activity by the employee, employer knowledge of the
activity, and union animus on the part of the employer.
See, e.g., Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 59, slip op.
at 2 (2011). The burden then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that it would have taken the same actions
even absent the employee’s union activity. Wright Line,
supra, 251 NLRB at 1089.
As the judge found, there is no dispute that Blake,
Baker, and Holland engaged in union activity and the

among them a security violation committed when the plaintiff was
employed by the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The court
denied the Government’s motion to dismiss, finding “no evidence in
the record that the CBP considered national security . . . as a basis for
plaintiff’s termination.” Id. at 117. See also Delgado v. Ashcroft, 2003
WL 24051558 (D.D.C. 2003).
10 Courts treat nonjusticiability as an affirmative defense, with the
proponent having the burden of proof. See Jones v. Ashcroft, supra,
321 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (“[T]here is nothing in the record . . . to indicate
that the FBI’s suitability determination was made with any ‘predictive
judgment’ about whether hiring [applicant] would implicate national
security concerns.”); Corbett v. Napolitano, supra, 897 F. Supp. 2d at
117 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record that the CBP considered
national security or [employee’s] ability to obtain a security clearance
as a basis for [employee’s] termination.”).
Respondent was aware of that fact. All three PSOs were
union officers, Blake and Holland were members of the
Union’s bargaining committee, and Blake and Baker
were involved in the protected activity of delivering the
Union’s strike notice to Colonel Hall. See Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–566 (1978) (employees en-
gage in protected activity even when “they seek to im-
prove terms and conditions of employment or otherwise
improve their lot as employees through channels outside
the immediate employee-employer relationship”).
Instead of specifically finding union animus on the
part of the Respondent, the judge inadvertently character-
ized the final element of the General Counsel’s initial
burden as proving that the three PSOs were fired because
of their protected activity on January 31. As indicated
above, it is the General Counsel’s initial burden to show
that the PSOs’ protected activity was a motivating factor
in the Respondent’s actions; demonstrating antiunion
animus is one element of that showing.
The judge’s misstatement of the test does not under-
mine her ultimate finding because the General Counsel
amply proved the Respondent’s antiunion animus. First,
as the judge found, a member of the Union’s negotiating
team testified without contradiction that during contract
negotiations, the Respondent’s president, Leslie Kaciban,
threatened to fire all members of the Union’s bargaining
team. Second, Fields’ decision to notify Dingman that a
PSO engaged in the protected activity of delivering the
strike notice to Colonel Hall reveals that Fields acted to
jeopardize the employment of the PSOs and further
evinces the Respondent’s animus.11 As both Fields and
Dingman had previous knowledge of the strike notice,
his disclosure did not serve to notify Dingman of the
strike. Third, when Fields told Dingman about the
PSOs’ protected activity, she did not contact Colonel
Hall, which would have been a straightforward approach
to finding out whether a PSO had provided details of the
strike notice, were that Dingman’s real interest. Instead,
Dingman’s investigation was aimed at uncovering
whether and which PSOs had engaged in protected activ-
ity, and her interviews of the three PSOs included inter-
rogations of the PSOs about that protected activity. In
these interviews, she also denigrated a Board settlement
agreement prohibiting the Respondent from restricting
the PSOs from directly contacting tenants, and threatened

11 Dingman essentially admitted that Fields probably contacted her
because of Blake’s union activity in delivering the strike notice—not
because a PSO had visited the colonel. When asked whether Fields
would have acted differently if a PSO had brought in a birthday present
instead of a strike notice, Dingman testified, “I can only speculate that
it would be different because I can’t imagine anybody calling me to tell
me that a PSO had taken a birthday present in.”
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 5
that a strike would result in the PSOs’ termination and
inability ever to work again on a Federal contract.
Tellingly, Edmiston witnessed Dingman’s animus
firsthand during the February 22 interviews. Edmiston
also saw it reflected in Dingman’s report recommending
the termination of the three PSOs, including references to
the PSOs “tak[ing] orders from NLRB and disregard[ing]
what Paragon says” and “hav[ing] their own agenda . . .
handling their own personal grievances.” Although
Dingman had accused the PSOs of violating certain as-
serted security rules by using their credentials to enter
the Savannah facility, Edmiston knew that Baker, Blake,
and Holland had denied being aware of any such rules.
Nonetheless, the Respondent failed to consider their as-
sertion, such as by investigating the widespread practice
by off-duty PSOs of bypassing the screening process.12
Moreover, as the judge found, the Respondent’s manag-
ers were already aware that it was a common practice for
PSOs to use their employee credentials to enter the facili-
ty while off-duty without being screened.13 Yet,
Edmiston signed the PSOs’ suspension letters, without
questioning Dingman’s conclusions, and the PSOs were
subsequently terminated without any further considera-
tion.
The judge also discredited the testimony of the Re-
spondent’s General Counsel, Laura Hagan, that the Re-
spondent had no choice but to discharge Blake, Baker,
and Holland because of Dingman’s recommendation.
The judge thus found that the Respondent’s claim that it
had no choice but to discharge the PSOs was pretextual.
See, e.g., Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304 NLRB 970, 971 (1991)
(inferring unlawful motive from employer’s false or
pretextual reasons given for its action), enfd. mem. 976
F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1992).14 We find no basis for revers-

12 In affirming the judge’s analysis of the Respondent’s failure to
adequately investigate the alleged misconduct, we additionally rely on
Management Consulting, Inc., 349 NLRB 249, 264 (2007) (failing to
obtain employee’s version of events and ignoring exculpatory facts
evidence unlawful motive), and Airport 2000 Concessions, LLC, 346
NLRB 958, 978 (2006) (failing to adequately investigate alleged mis-
conduct evidences unlawful motive) (quoting Washington Nursing
Home, 321 NLRB 366, 375 (1996)). We note that Relco Locomotives,
Inc., 358 NLRB No. 37 (2012), enfd. 734 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2013),
upon which the judge relied in part, was decided by a Board that was
improperly constituted, but was enforced by the Eighth Circuit.
13 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s supervisors
observed the PSOs’ common practice of using their credentials to enter
Federal facilities without being screened, we do not rely on the fact that
the Respondent’s sergeants were among the individuals who observed
this practice. The sergeants were not proved to be supervisors, and thus
their knowledge of the practice cannot be imputed to the Respondent.
14 Although it is not necessary to our decision, we agree with the
judge that it is appropriate to impute Dingman’s antiunion animus to
the Respondent. Dingman’s report, on which the Respondent relied,
contained several statements evincing her own animus, such as her
ing the judge’s finding. Moreover, an employer’s inter-
est in maintaining a contract is not a legitimate business
reason where, as here, a contractor requires the employer
to discriminate against employees on the basis of their
Section 7 activity. Dews Construction Corp., 231 NLRB
182, 182 (1977) (finding discharge of union employee
unlawful where contractor told employer that job was
“nonunion” and “[y]ou better remember how your con-
tract was written”), enfd. 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978),
decision supplemented on other grounds 246 NLRB 945
(1979). For the foregoing reasons, we find, in agreement
with the judge, that the General Counsel demonstrated
that the PSOs’ union activities were a motivating factor
in their suspensions and discharges.
We also agree with the judge, for the reasons stated in
her decision, that the Respondent failed to show that it
would have taken the same actions in the absence of the
employees’ union activities. We reject the Respondent’s
contention that it demonstrated it would have terminated
the PSOs, even in the absence of their union activities.
The Respondent states that Baker and Holland’s disci-
pline was justified because they lied to Dingman about
the protected activity of delivering the strike notice. We
disagree. Holland and Baker had a reasonable basis for
believing that Dingman was attempting to pry into pro-
tected union activity and that they would suffer reprisal
for that activity. Under these circumstances, Holland and
Baker were under no obligation to respond to questions
seeking to uncover protected activities. See, e.g., United
Services Automobile Assn., 340 NLRB 784, 786 (2003)
(finding no obligation to respond truthfully to employer’s
questioning that lacked a valid purpose), enfd. 387 F.3d
908 (D.C. Cir. 2004); St. Louis Car Co., 108 NLRB
1523, 1525–1526 (1954). An employer may not dis-
charge an employee for lying in response to such ques-
tions. Tradewaste Incineration, 336 NLRB 902, 907
(2001).15 Here, the Respondent knew that Dingman’s

disparaging statements to Blake and Baker about the settlement agree-
ment with the Board and her mischaracterization of the PSOs’ conduct
as “their own agenda” and “personal grievances.” It is well settled that
an employer violates the Act when it follows the direction of another
employer with whom it has business dealings to discharge its employ-
ees because of their union activities. See, e.g., Black Magic Resources,
Inc., 312 NLRB 667, 668 (1993), decision supplemented 317 NLRB
721 (1995). The fact that the direction comes from a Government actor
does not alter our analysis.
15 This case is materially distinguishable from Fresenius USA Mfg.
Inc., 362 NLRB No. 130 (2015). There, the Board found unprotected
an employee’s dishonesty during the employer’s legitimate investiga-
tion of facially valid and serious complaints of employee misconduct,
even though the misconduct took place during the employee’s union
activity. Id., slip op. at 1–2. Here, by contrast, the Respondent already
knew the Union had issued a strike notice and had no legitimate reason
for investigating the PSOs’ protected actions in informing Colonel Hall
about the strike notice.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recommended discipline of Baker and Holland was based
on their lack of candor about their protected activity, yet
it followed her recommendation and unlawfully dis-
charged them.
Finally, we find no merit in the Respondent’s assertion
that the Respondent lawfully disciplined Blake for im-
permissibly parking his vehicle in the loading dock and
speaking to on-duty PSOs for 12 minutes. Neither the
suspension form nor the discharge notice lists these in-
fractions as grounds for his discipline. Thus, regardless
of whether Dingman recommended removal based on
these infractions, the Respondent’s argument fails be-
cause it did not cite these alleged infractions in its disci-
plinary notices. With respect to Baker’s responsibility
for enforcing the loading dock area rules, the Respondent
has failed to show that this would provide a basis for
discharge. Moreover, we are skeptical of the Respond-
ent’s contention that these infractions posed a grave
threat to the safety of those in the facility, given that
Dingman took more than 3 months to recommend the
PSOs’ removal (during which time Edmiston took no
action against these PSOs and permitted them to continue
to work). Accordingly, we find no merit in the argument
that the Respondent was compelled to discharge the
PSOs because they purportedly posed a safety risk.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we adopt the
judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by suspending and then discharging
Blake, Baker, and Holland.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Paragon Systems, Inc., Savannah, Georgia,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Suspending, discharging, or otherwise discriminat-
ing against employees for supporting United Security
and Police Officers of America or any other labor organ-
ization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John Holland full rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prej-
udice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John Holland
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
as a result of the discrimination against them, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s
decision.
(c) Compensate Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John
Holland for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of re-
ceiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards, and file
a report with the Social Security Administration allocat-
ing the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quar-
ters for each employee.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful suspen-
sions and discharges of Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and
John Holland, and within 3 days thereafter, notify each
of them in writing that this has been done and that the
suspensions and discharges will not be used against them
in any way.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify
the Federal Protective Service of this Decision and Or-
der.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Savannah, Georgia facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 7
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since July 10, 2012.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 10 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 26, 2015
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER JOHNSON, concurring.
The threat posed by terrorism is one of the most press-
ing issues facing the United States today. In light of this
threat, national security concerns occupy a position of
paramount importance, even in regard to Federal labor
policy. And here in the circumstances of this case, the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) plays a central role in
maintaining national security by protecting Federal
buildings and monitoring access to those buildings. FPS
“protect[s] the homeland by managing risk and ensuring
continuity for one of the most crucial elements of our
national critical infrastructure—the people and our na-
tion’s Federal Facilities.”1 The Respondent’s Protective
Security Officers (PSOs) are essential to the mission of
FPS because they are the persons responsible on a daily
basis for enforcing the security rules at the buildings that
they guard. Thus, FPS insists that the PSOs adhere
closely to those security rules, and rightly so. Indeed, if
we do not have a solid security force protecting federal
property, then we are vulnerable to terror attacks, as the
2015 Tennessee terrorist attack, and the 2013 Washing-
ton Navy Yard and 2009 Fort Hood mass killings made
tragically clear. Many Federal agencies have recently
undertaken changes in security procedures to further
strengthen our defenses against the ever-increasing threat
of terrorism, both domestic and foreign.2 Against this

1 Department of Homeland Security’s website, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/topic/federal-protective-service.
2 For example, the Transportation Security Agency has continued to
make changes to security procedures to address the continual threat to
commercial aviation. TSA Unveils Enhanced Security Screening Pro-
cedures and Changes to the Prohibited Items List, available at
http://www.tsa.gov/es/node/537. Recently, the Department of Home-
background, I believe the Board risks doing a great dis-
service to the nation by sanctioning an employer that
acted in conformance with the FPS’ high standard of
conduct for PSOs charged with such grave duties. Ac-
cordingly, I believe the Board should take great care in
determining whether an employer met its Wright Line3
rebuttal burden in these circumstances. Specifically,
substantial weight should be given to national security
concerns when raised by a contractor in defense of disci-
plinary action recommended by a Government agency.
However, my colleagues are right, and I agree with the
judge that credited evidence here shows that the Re-
spondent’s reliance on the FPS report here was
pretextual. There is evidence that the Respondent con-
tacted FPS Representative Jennie Dingman in the first
place in response to PSO Blake’s union activity. The
Respondent’s representative Edmiston witnessed
Dingman interrogating the PSOs regarding their union
activity during Dingman’s interviews with them, and
then the Respondent relied on Dingman’s recommenda-
tion knowing it was based on her animus. Thus, the Re-
spondent was aware that Dingman’s report was based on
her antiunion animus. Further, there is credited evidence
that direct threats were made to fire strikers during each
officer’s investigatory interview in the presence of
Edmiston.4
In sum, the credited evidence indicates that the Re-
spondent’s officials knew about and shared Dingman’s
pronounced animus against the 3 PSOs—officers of their
local union—because of a threatened strike, and that was
the reason both for the investigation and the Respond-
ent’s unquestioning acceptance of the removal recom-

land Security ordered the TSA to revise its security procedures after
screeners at airport checkpoints failed to detect weapons and other
prohibited items 95 percent of the time in a covert test. ABC News
website, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-undercover-
dhs-tests-find-widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881. Due to
concern over the rise in cyber-attacks, the Department of Homeland
Security and U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement have blocked
personal webmail accounts on Government computers. Exclusive:
Cash for Slackers, Part III, available at
http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy-policy/2015/06/03/fox-business-
exclusive-cash-for-slackers-part-iii/. In response to national security
concerns, the Department of Energy created the National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration to oversee the department’s national security-
related programs, including nuclear weapons labs. AllGov, available at
http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-
energy?detailsDepartmentID=565.
3 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
4 In its brief, the Respondent argues that Edmiston was not involved
in the decision to discharge the PSOs. However, that argument lacks
merit because Edmiston signed the PSOs’ suspension notices.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mendation as grounds for discharging them.5 They also
knew that it was common practice for PSOs to use their
employee credentials to enter the facility while off-duty
without being screened, one of the alleged grounds for
removal and discharge of the PSOs. All of this strongly
supports the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s reli-
ance on the FPS report was pretextual. Necessarily, then,
the report was not a legitimate factor for consideration of
whether the Respondent met its Wright Line rebuttal bur-
den, so this is not a scenario where the Board would be
incorrectly substituting its judgment regarding the Re-
spondent’s decision to follow the Federal Government’s
recommendation on a matter of national security. Cf.
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528–529
(1988) (decisions by Executive Branch personnel about
security involve an act of “predictive judgment” that
“must be made by those with the necessary expertise in
protecting” the security interests at issue in any particular
security-related decision).
Accordingly, I concur with my colleagues in affirming
the judge’s finding that the Respondent committed the
alleged violations.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 26, 2015
______________________________________
Harry I. Johnson, III, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

5 I find no need to go beyond the particular facts of this case in ad-
dressing whether the failure to conduct an investigation of alleged
misconduct warrants the inference of unlawful motivation.
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge, or otherwise dis-
criminate against you for supporting United Security
Police Officers of America or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John Holland
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or priv-
ileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John
Holland whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them,
plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL compensate Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and
John Holland for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards, and
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Admin-
istration allocating the backpay awards to the appropriate
calendar quarters for each employee.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful suspensions and discharges of Arthur Blake, Joel
Baker, and John Holland, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this has
been done and that the suspensions and discharges will
not be used against them in any way.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, notify Federal Protective Service of the Board’s
Decision and Order.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/10-CA-095371 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 9
Elaine Robinson-Fraction, Esq. for the General Counsel.
Thomas P. Dowd, Esq., for the Respondent.
Jacqueline K. Taylor, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HEATHER JOYS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Atlanta, Georgia, from December 4–6, 2013. Arthur J.
Blake filed the charge on December 19, 2012, and the General
Counsel issued the complaint on September 18, 2013. Re-
spondent filed a timely answer denying the essential allegations
of the complaint.
The complaint alleges Respondent, Paragon Systems, Inc.,
discharged three employees—Charging Party Arthur Blake,
Joel Baker, and John Holland—because of their union activi-
ties. Respondent denies the allegation, asserting that all three
employees were fired for breaches of their security duties and
lack of candor in an investigation of those breaches.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after thoroughly considering the
parties’ briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION1
Respondent, Paragon Systems, Inc., is an Alabama corpora-
tion in the business of providing armed guard and security ser-
vices. It contracts with the Government, primarily the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, Federal Protective Services (FPS).
(Tr. 296.)2 During the past 12 months, a representative period,
Respondent has performed services for the Government in the
State of Georgia valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent
admits, and I find, it is an employer engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
It is admitted, and I find, at all times material here, Director
of Human Resources Nicole Ferritto; Contract Manager Vernon
Fields; and Assistant Contract Manager Veronica Edmiston
were supervisors and agents of Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.

1 The Respondent raised in its answer and in a footnote in its brief
that any actions taken by this Board, including its agents and delegates
lacks authority because the court in Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d
490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted 81 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. June 24,
2013) (No. 12–1281), found the recess appointments of Members Sha-
ron Block and Richard Griffin were unconstitutional and invalid. Thus,
according to Respondent, the Board lacks a quorum. The Board does
not accept the decision in Noel Canning, in part, because there is a
conflict in other circuits regarding this issue. See Belgrove Post Acute
Care Centers, 359 NLRB No. 77, slip op. at fn. 1–2 (2013). Further-
more, the Board has determined that while the question regarding the
validity of the recess appointments remains in litigation and pending a
definitive resolution it will continue to fulfill its obligations under the
Act. See Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 113 (2013); Puna Geo-
thermal Venture, 359 NLRB No. 87 (2013).
2 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s exhibits; “Jt. Exh.” for Joint
exhibits; “R. Exh.” For Respondent’s exhibits; and “CP Exh.” for
Charging Party exhibits.
The parties admit, and I find, the United Security and Police
Officers of America (the Union) is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent’s primary business is providing security guards
to various agencies of the Federal Government under contracts
with FPS. (Tr. 296.) FPS is Respondent’s largest client. Re-
spondent, in turn, is a party to approximately 40 percent of
FPS’s contracts for security services. (Tr. 305–306.) Under
these contracts, security guards hold the title of protective secu-
rity officer or PSO. Nationwide, Respondent employs approx-
imately 5400 PSO’s. (Tr. 297.) In Georgia, Respondent em-
ploys 340 PSO’s to provide services to 66 facilities. (Tr. 484.)
B. Respondent’s Contract with the Federal Government
Contracts between Respondent and FPS have a 5-year term.
(Tr. 299.) However, every 6 months, Respondent is evaluated
on compliance and a contractor performance assessment report
is prepared by the Government every year. (Tr. 307; R. Exh. 4,
p. 68.) In addition, the contractor and FPS representatives are
required to meet at least once per year to discuss contract per-
formance issues. (R. Exh. 4, p. 6.) Laura Hagan, Respondent’s
general counsel, testified that the most important factor as-
sessed in these evaluations is the responsiveness of the contrac-
tor to FPS requests. (Tr. 308.) Responsiveness is also a con-
sideration when a contractor is bidding to renew a contract.
Every contract between Respondent and FPS contains a
“Statement of Work.” (Tr. 305.) This “Statement of Work”
governs, among other things, the qualifications and expected
conduct of PSO’s. (R. Exh. 4.) PSO’s must meet certain min-
imum qualifications, undergo a formal “adjudication” by FPS,
meet certain medical requirements, undergo training, and pass a
series of examinations in order to perform work on the contract.
(R. Exh. 4, pp. 9–10.) In addition, the “Statement of Work”
mandates PSO’s follow FPS’s security guard information man-
ual (SGIM) and the rules of conduct set out therein. (Tr. 305;
Jt. Exh. 2; R. Exh. 4.)
As required under the “Statement of Work,” section 7 (R.
Exh. 4, p. 21), Respondent has individuals within Georgia re-
sponsible for oversight of its contracts within the State. At all
relevant times, the program manager for Georgia was Vernon
Fields. (Tr. 483.) Fields had been an employee of Respondent
for the previous 5 years. His responsibilities included oversight
of PSO’s employed by Respondent within Georgia ensuring
that personnel assigned to work on the contract followed the
rules and codes of conduct. (Tr. 483–484.)
Fields’ assistant was Veronica Edmiston. Edmiston had
been employed by Respondent for 7 years. (Tr. 531.) Prior to
becoming Fields’ assistant, she had been a contract manager in
Alabama and South Carolina. She became assistant contract
manager for Georgia in 2008. Her primary responsibility was
oversight of the 25 facilities for which Respondent had con-
tracts in the southern part of Georgia. (Tr. 532.)
FPS also employs individuals to oversee the performance of
the PSO’s onsite. The FPS official with daily oversight of the
contract between Respondent and FPS in Georgia during the
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relevant time period was Jennie Dingman. Dingman’s title was
contract officer’s technical representative (COTR). Dingman
in turn reported to Lawanna Nunnally whose title was contract
specialist. (Tr. 434.) Ultimately, Nunnally reported to the
contracting officer (CO), who was Michael DeCrescio. (Tr.
434.)
Dingman had been an employee of FPS since May of 2003.
(Tr. 378.) She held several positions before being promoted to
the COTR position for Georgia in October 2011. (Tr. 378.)
Her duties as COTR included monitoring work on the contract
and being the technical representative for FPS in Georgia. She
physically inspected the various buildings over which she had
oversight upon request. (Tr. 379.)
During the relevant time, Respondent’s contract with FPS for
Georgia included providing security to a Federal facility in
Savannah that housed the Army Corps of Engineers (the ACE
facility). This was a limited access facility with three secured
entrances and five security guard stations or “posts.” (Tr. 135.)
There are three posts at the main entrance and one each at the
loading dock and garage. (Tr. 136.) Guards serve 30-minute
shifts at each post, rotating from post to post throughout the
day. (Tr. 135.)
C. The Alleged Discriminatees
The complaint alleges three individuals were discharged in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act for assisting the
Union and engaging in concerted activity. These three individ-
uals were Arthur Blake, the Charging Party, Joel Baker, and
John Holland. Each served as PSO’s at the ACE facility in
2012.
Arthur Blake had been an employee of Respondent from
April 1, 2008 until his discharge on July 12, 2012. (Tr. 29.) He
had worked in various capacities and at various locations
throughout his tenure. Prior to his assignment to the ACE facil-
ity, he had served in managerial positions, including as a lieu-
tenant and sergeant. (Tr. 30.) He stepped down from his lieu-
tenant position in 2009, and from his sergeant position in 2011.
(Tr. 65–67.) At his final post, he served as a PSO. Blake also
served as interim union president during the relevant time peri-
od and as a member of the bargaining committee. (Tr. 31.)
There is no evidence that, prior to his suspension and termina-
tion in July of 2012, Blake had been disciplined by Respondent.
Joel Baker was also employed with Respondent from April
2008 through July 2012. (Tr. 133.) During his tenure, he
served as a PSO at the ACE facility in Savannah. (Tr. 133.)
Baker also served as secretary of the Union from December
2011 through July 2012. (Tr. 134.) There was no evidence
presented that, prior to his suspension and discharge, Baker had
been subject to disciplinary action by Respondent.
John Holland was similarly employed by Respondent from
April 2008 through July 2012. (Tr. 191.) His most recent as-
signment had been as a PSO at the ACE facility. He also
served as interim vice president of the Union and was a mem-
ber of the bargaining committee. (Tr. 192.) As with Blake and
Baker, no evidence of any prior discipline of Holland was pre-
sented.
D. Prior Board Charges
In March 2011, Respondent entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the Board to resolve allegations in a charge filed by
Blake. (GC Exh. 6.) In this agreement, Respondent agreed to
revise its “Chain of Command” rule. The prior rule prohibited
employees from directly contacting Respondent’s clients or
clients’ customers for any reason. (GC Exh. 4.) The new chain
of command rule contained no such prohibition. (GC Exh. 5, p.
17.)
E. The 2012 Contract Negotiations
The United Security Police Officers of America (the Union)
is the exclusive bargaining representative of PSO’s employed
by Respondent in Georgia. (Tr. 30.) Under the collective-
bargaining agreement in effect from April 1, 2012, through
March 31, 2015, Respondent recognized the Union as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the following unit:
All armed and unarmed security officers employed by Para-
gon Systems performing guard duties as defined by Section
9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, assigned to fed-
eral facilities throughout the State of Georgia under the com-
pany’s contract HSCEE4-08-A-0001 with the Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Protective Service . . . excluding
office clericals, managerial personnel, confidential personnel,
supervisors (Lieutenants and Captains) . . . and all other per-
sonnel. It is expressly agreed and understood between the
parties that persons enrolled or participating in pre-hire train-
ing programs offered by the company shall not be considered
employees. . . . (Jt. Exh. 1.)
This collective-bargaining agreement was entered into by the
parties in February of 2012. (Tr. 39.)
The Union had been the exclusive bargaining representative
for unit employees since December 2011. Previously, the In-
ternational Union Security Police Fire Professionals of America
had been the bargaining representative for the PSO’s. The prior
collective-bargaining agreement included sergeants in the unit.
Sergeants were excluded from the unit under the new agree-
ment. The prior contract with that union expired on July 1,
2011. (R. Exh. 17.)
In January 2012, Respondent and the Union entered into
contract negotiations for the current agreement. (Tr. 31.) The
Union had an 11-member negotiating team. Among the mem-
bers of that team were Blake and Holland. Respondent’s nego-
tiating team consisted of Respondent’s president, Leslie
Kaciban, Respondent’s director of employee relations, Roman
Gumul, Fields, and Edmiston. Although details of the negotia-
tion were not made part of the record, testimony established
these negotiations were heated at times. John Kabakova, a
member of the Union’s negotiating team, testified without con-
tradiction that Kaciban threatened to fire all of the Union’s
team during these negotiations. (Tr. 277.)
In the midst of negotiations, on January 22, 2012, the Union
issued a strike notice which it forwarded to all the bargaining
committee members. (Tr. 33, 72; GC Exh. 3.) Fields testified
that once the strike had “been made public” the COTR request-
ed Respondent provide FPS with a contingency plan, which it
did. (Tr. 510.)
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 11
Blake testified after the Union issued the strike notice, he
had a conversation and exchanged emails with Gumul and
Kaciban. (Tr. 73.) In these exchanges, the parties agreed to
return to bargaining. The parties met first via telephone and
then in person on February 16, 2012. (Tr. 73.) Ultimately, the
parties reached agreement and entered into a new collective-
bargaining agreement on March 19, 2012. (Jt. Exh. 1.)
F. The Events of January 31, 2012
Although Blake, Baker, and Holland were not discharged un-
til July 2012, Respondent set forth in its termination notices
they were discharged because of events that occurred in Janu-
ary and February of 2012. These events are largely undisputed.
On January 31, 2012, Blake, who was off duty that day, ar-
rived at the loading dock area of the ACE facility around 12:30
p.m. (Jt. Exh. 4; Tr. 39.) The loading dock consists of two
bays with an overhead door. A personnel ramp leads to the
dock at which a single guard post is located. (Tr. 135.) At this
guard post is an x-ray machine and a magnetometer.3 (Tr. 135.)
Blake parked his car in the loading dock and proceeded to the
guard’s desk. (Tr. 40.) He was neither in uniform nor carrying
a weapon. (Tr. 40.) On duty at that time was Baker. (Tr. 40.)
Baker handed Blake some documents, checked his credentials,4
noted Blake’s presence on the officer’s operations log or 1103
form, and allowed Blake entry into the building without going
through the magnatrometer or having him place his packages
on the x-ray machine. (Tr. 40; 138; 165; Jt. Exh. 4.)
The loading dock walls display multiple signs. Posted at the
double doors leading into the building is a sign that indicates
the entrance is not an authorized pedestrian entrance and directs
pedestrians to the main or York Street entrance. (R. Exhs. 13
and 14.) There is also a sign at the back wall, behind the
guard’s desk. It reads “15 minute parking only” and “for vehi-
cles loading/unloading.” (R. Exh. 15; Tr. 399.) It further di-
rects that once loaded or unloaded, a vehicle must be moved.
There is no dispute each of these signs was in place on January
31, 2012.
Once in the building, Blake proceeded unescorted to the of-
fice of Colonel Jeffery Hall, the highest ranking official for the
Army Corps of Engineers in Savannah. (Tr. 39.) After a short
wait, Blake was able to see the Colonel. (Tr. 43.) Blake testi-
fied he discussed the contents of the packet with the Colonel,
including the strike notice. (Tr. 44.) Blake further testified the
Colonel told him he would be taking steps to obtain a contin-
gency plan in the event of a strike by the PSO’s. (Tr. 44.)
At approximately 1 p.m., or 30 minutes after his arrival,
Blake returned to the loading dock. (Tr. 45; 139; 168.) At that
point, Holland had arrived to relieve Baker. (Tr. 139.) The
three men had a conversation lasting approximately 12 minutes.
(Jt. Exh. 3, p. 9; Tr. 45; 169; 216.) Blake then left the facility
in his car.5

3 The X-ray machine scans packages and the magnetrometer scans
people.
4 Blake testified that he had on him his common access card, his
GSA badge, and his 24-hour access card. (Tr. 42.) However, he did
not state which of these he presented to Baker.
5 A video surveillance tape of the loading dock security area was re-
viewed by Dingman, among others. Dingman did not provide testimo-
Prior to departing, but while still at the loading dock, Blake
also had a conversation with FPS Inspector Beuning. (Tr. 46.)
Blake testified that Beuning was in uniform, from which he
deduced he was on duty. Blake testified Beuning asked him
whether he was on or off duty and Blake responded that he was
off duty. (Tr. 46.) Beuning asked Blake whether he was con-
ducting union business to which Blake responded, “no,” that he
had just dropped off a packet to the Colonel. (Tr. 46.) Other-
wise, Beuning asked no other questions of Blake regarding his
business at the facility and made no comment about his having
used the loading dock to enter the building. (Tr. 47.) Although
Holland confirmed he witnessed this conversation, he testified
he could not hear it. (Tr. 192.) Beuning did not testify.
G. The Investigation
On February 17, 2012, Fields called Dingman to inform her
PSO had contacted the Colonel at the ACE facility to inform
him of a potential strike. (Tr. 382; Jt. Exh. 3.) Fields testified
he called Dingman because he had heard rumors someone had
notified the tenant agency at the ACE facility of a potential
strike. (Tr. 490.) Upon receiving the call, Dingman testified
she felt it necessary to investigate whether a strike was about to
take place in order to determine whether FPS would need to
develop a contingency plan to provide security to the ACE
facility. (Tr. 384.) Further, she testified she felt the most effi-
cient manner to do so would be to contact the security guards at
the ACE facility directly.
Dingman first called the security desk at the front entrance to
the ACE facility. PSO Lynn Michael answered the call. (Tr.
385.) Dingman asked Michael whether he knew of a PSO de-
livering a strike notice to the Colonel. He responded he did
not. She then asked who else was working and, when informed
Holland was working, she asked to speak with him. Dingman
asked Holland whether anyone had been to see the Colonel
within the last few days, to which Holland responded “no.”
When she changed her question to ask whether a PSO had been
to see the Colonel at any time to discuss a possible strike, Hol-
land told her he was aware someone had dropped some paper-
work off with the Colonel, but he did not know who or when.
Dingman testified she found Holland’s responses to be evasive.
(Tr. 385.) Following this conversation, Dingman decided to go
to the ACE facility to conduct interviews. Dingman did not
contact the Colonel to ask him who had brought him the notice.
(Tr. 453.)
Dingman went to the ACE facility on February 22, 2012, to
begin to conduct an investigation. Prior to going to the facility,
Dingman called both her supervisor, John Hathaway, and
Edmiston. (Tr. 385.) Her intention was to have both present
for interviews.
Dingman conducted her interviews in the PSO breakroom at
the ACE facility. Upon first arriving at the breakroom,
Dingman found Baker already there. (Tr. 387.) Dingman in-
formed him he would be interviewed at that time. According to
Baker, he first asked to speak with a union representative, but
Dingman denied the request saying this was not a union matter.

ny that disputed the version of events presented by Blake, Baker, or
Holland with regard to Blake’s entry into the facility or the length of
any of the conversations.
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Tr. 176.) Baker next asked to talk with a company representa-
tive to obtain permission to speak with Dingman. (Tr. 176–
177; 388; Jt. Exh. 3.) Dingman allowed him to call Edmiston.
(Tr. 388.) Edmiston was scheduled to be there, but had not yet
arrived. When reached on her cell phone, Edmiston told Baker
to go ahead with the interview. (Tr. 177; 388.)
Dingman testified she found Baker to be evasive initially.
(Tr. 389–390.) Specifically, she testified Baker responded to
her questions with questions, rather than answers. However,
after Edmiston arrived and after Dingman told Baker his ac-
tions “could be construed as obstructing an investigation,” he
became, in her assessment, more forthcoming. (Tr. 389–390.)
Ultimately, Baker told Dingman Blake had come to the build-
ing “much earlier” than her question had implied. (Tr. 142.)
Baker also informed Dingman he had made a notation of
Blake’s visit on the 1103 form at the time of his arrival. (Jt.
Exh. 3.) At that point, Edmiston reviewed these forms and
found the exact date Blake had come to the building. Hatha-
way also obtained the video surveillance tape of the loading
dock for January 31, 2012, and he, Dingman and Edmiston
reviewed it. (Jt. Exh. 3.)
During this interview, Dingman asked Baker several ques-
tions about his understanding of the rules of conduct for PSO’s.
Dingman asked Baker why he had allowed Blake to use the
loading dock entrance. (Tr. 142; 392.) Baker responded it was
his understanding the loading dock could be used for building
access as long as the individual employee did not intend to be
there more than 15 minutes and had his Government issued
credentials. (Tr. 392.) It was during this part of the interview
that Dingman informed Baker such credentials were to be used
for work purposes only; reminding him he had been previously
so trained. (Tr. 183; 405; Jt. Exh. 3.) Baker testified Dingman
also informed him that off-duty PSO’s were to be treated as
visitors for purposes of entry into the building. (Tr. 184.)
Baker told Dingman he was unaware of that rule, but would
follow it in the future. (Tr. 184; Jt. Exh. 3.) Dingman also
asked Baker whether he was aware he was not to speak directly
with tenants of the building in which he worked. (Tr. 142; Jt.
Exh. 3.) Baker responded PSO’s had a “ruling” from the
“NLRB” stating restricting PSO’s from speaking with the client
was “unlawful.” (Jt. Exh. 3; Tr. 143.) Dingman then asked
Baker whether he took his orders from Respondent or the
“NLRB.” (Tr. 143; Jt. Exh. 3.) Baker responded he took or-
ders from Respondent “with in [sic] the parameters of the law.”
(Jt. Exh. 3.)
At some point in the interview of Baker, the issue of the
strike was also discussed. Baker testified Dingman stated to
him if the Union were to strike, the PSO’s could be removed
from the contract and would never work another Federal con-
tract again. (Tr. 141; 185.) Dingman testified she made a
statement to Baker to the effect he “ran the risk” of not being
able to work another Federal contract if he participated in a
strike. (Tr. 408.)
The same day, Dingman interviewed Blake. (Tr. 409.) Ac-
cording to Dingman’s report, Blake told her he was the PSO
who had delivered the strike notice to the Colonel. (Jt. Exh. 3,
p. 5.) Blake told Dingman he had come to see the Colonel
because the Colonel was mentioned in a letter Blake had writ-
ten to the President of the United States about the PSO’s work-
ing conditions, and Blake felt the Colonel should be informed
of past events leading to the writing of that letter and the strike
vote. (Jt. Exh. 3, p. 5.) The packet of materials Blake delivered
to the Colonel did contain correspondence dating back to early
2011 as well as a letter to President Obama. (GC Exh. 2.)
During her interview of Blake, Dingman also asked him
about his understanding of certain rules of conduct for PSO’s.
Dingman wrote in her report that she asked Blake about “the
NLRB saying it is illegal for PSO’s to be told they cannot con-
verse company or personal business to tenant Agencies” to
which he responded, “yes.” (Jt. Exh. 3, p. 5.) Blake testified
he told Dingman he had sent a copy of the settlement to
Edmiston and Edmiston offered to forward a copy to Dingman.
(Tr. 48–49.) Dingman also asked Blake whether he understood
he could not use his Government issued credentials for personal
business to which Blake responded, “no.” (Jt. Exh. 3.) She
asked Blake whether he understood he could not fraternize or
converse about personal business while on post, to which Blake
responded he understood he was to keep such conversation to a
minimum. Finally, she asked whether he understood using his
credentials to enter the building through the loading dock was a
misuse of his credentials, to which he responded, “no.”
Dingman’s report also indicates she and Blake discussed
Blake having previously entered Federal buildings off duty,
both in and out of uniform. According to the report, Blake told
Dingman he did not believe doing so constituted any type of
rule violation. (Jt. Exh. 3, p. 6.) Dingman wrote in her report
Blake “showed no remorse” for his actions and “continued to
believe everything he had done was acceptable.” (Jt. Exh. 3, p.
6.) Dingman similarly testified she perceived Blake as uncon-
cerned with her investigation because, in his mind, he had done
nothing wrong. (Tr. 409.)
Blake testified, in discussing the strike, Dingman told him if
the union did strike, the PSO’s would lose their jobs and never
be able to work on another Federal contract. (Tr. 49.) Blake
testified, although present, Edmiston made no comments when
Dingman made this statement. Dingman did not deny making
this statement.
Dingman returned to the ACE facility on the following day
to interview Holland. (Tr. 414; Jt. Exh. 3, p. 7.) Dingman
testified she initially confronted Holland about the telephone
conversation in which he had claimed only to know that a PSO
had dropped some information off to the Colonel. (Tr. 416.)
According to Dingman’s report, Holland admitted he had not
told her he knew Blake had been to see the Colonel because he
“didn’t want to get in trouble.” (Jt. Exh. 3, p. 8.) As with the
other two interviews, Dingman asked Holland about his under-
standing of the use of his Government issued credentials for
personal use, socializing on post, and allowing Blake to enter
the building through the loading dock and without screening
him. (Jt. Exh. 3, p. 8.) As with Baker and Blake, Holland re-
sponded he did not understand using his Government issued
credentials to enter a Federal building while off duty was im-
proper. (Tr. 201.)
H. Dingman’s Conclusions and Report
Dingman ultimately reduced her findings to a written report.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 13
(Jt. Exh. 3.) In it, she summarized her interviews and stated her
conclusions about the rule infractions committed by the three
PSO’s. She found Baker had allowed Blake to park in the load-
ing dock, did not process Blake as a visitor, but allowed him
access without screening, allowed Blake to enter a restricted
area without an escort, and was not “forthcoming” in his re-
sponses during the investigation. (Jt. Exh. 3, pp. 3–5.) She
found Blake had parked in unauthorized area, entered the build-
ing while off duty but did not do so as a visitor, entered a re-
stricted area without an escort, and improperly used his Gov-
ernment issued credentials to enter the facility. (Jt. Exh. 4, pp.
6–7.) Finally, Dingman found that Holland had “blatantly lied”
to her and socialized while on duty. (Jt. Exh. 4, p. 9.)
Dingman’s report details the interviews she conducted and
contains each individual’s written statement. The report does
not make note of Dingman’s comments regarding the strike.
Dingman’s report specified Baker and Blake had violated
certain provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations and the
SGIM. With regard specifically to the SGIM, Dingman wrote
that Baker, in not treating Blake as a visitor while off duty,
violated section 2.2 of the SGIM which requires PSO’s to “ob-
serve and monitor building occupants and visitors for compli-
ance with the facility’s posted rules and regulations.” He also
violated two other portions of section 2.2 by allowing Blake to
park in the loading dock area. Specifically he violated a provi-
sion titled, “Traffic control” that states, “Depending upon your
location and based on your post order, you may be required to
direct traffic, control parking, issue courtesy traffic violation
notices on federal property” and a provision titled “Unauthor-
ized Access” which requires the PSO to “prevent, discover,
delay and/or detain persons attempting to gain unauthorized
access to the property. . . .” Dingman also found Baker had
engaged in conduct listed as unacceptable in the SGIM. Specif-
ically, Baker had violated rule 6 which lists as unacceptable
conduct dishonesty which includes lying to one’s supervisor;
rule 9 which lists as disregarding orders; rule 10 which lists
“immoral conduct or any other criminal act;” rule 13 which
lists negligence of duty; rule 19 which prohibits the “unethical
or improper” use of official authority, credentials or equipment;
and rule 22 which requires PSO’s to cooperate with Govern-
ment officials or the employer during an official investigation.
(Jt. Exh. 4, pp. 4–5.) Blake was similarly found to have violat-
ed rules 6, 9, 10, and 19. Holland was found to have violated
rules 6 and 9 only.
Dingman’s report ends with her conclusion that the actions
of Blake, Baker, and Holland did not meet the “Government
standards of this contract.” (Jt. Exh. 4, p. 10.) She further
wrote:
They have their own agenda and have proven with their ac-
tions listed above the security of the Federal Facility for
which they are assigned come second to handling their own
personal grievances. It is my professional opinion as the
COTR of this contract that all three PSO’s be removed. They
have less than stellar candor and have shown without a shad-
ow of a doubt their disregard for the safety of the govern-
ment’s facility, information or employees.” (Jt. Exh. 4, p. 10.)
Dingman testified that, immediately following the inter-
views, she spoke on the phone with Nunnally6 about her con-
cerns. However, Nunnally informed her she would take no
action until she had seen a written report. On May 31, 2012,
Dingman completed her report and forwarded it to Nunnally.
Nunnally did not testify and there was no evidence presented to
establish Nunnally brought the matter to the attention of the
CO. Rather, Nunnally forwarded the report directly to officials
for Respondent on July 6. (R. Exh. 5.) Dingman testified that
approximately 3 months passed before she completed her report
because she had attended a 2-week training session in the inter-
im and because she had other duties. (Tr. 473.) The record is
silent as to whether Nunnally forwarded the report to the CO or
why a month passed before she forwarded it to Respondent.
I. The Decision to Discharge Blake, Baker and Holland
Hagan testified she was involved in the decision to terminate
Blake, Baker, and Holland. She testified she received
Dingman’s report via email from Respondent’s director of em-
ployee relations Nicole Ferritto on July 6, 2012. (Tr. 312.) She
stated this was the first she had been made aware of these is-
sues. (Tr. 313.) Hagan received the report on a Friday and
discussed it the following week with Ferritto and Respondent’s
director of labor relations, Roman Gumul. (Tr. 313–314.)
Neither Ferritto nor Gumul testified.
Hagan testified in reviewing Dingman’s report, she consid-
ered its detail and conclusions. Specifically, she noted the alle-
gations that the individuals had violated security, had not been
candid in the investigation, and that Blake had shown no re-
morse were, in her assessment, all supported with factual detail.
(Tr. 314–317.) Moreover, she testified she “completely agreed
with” the conclusions reached by Dingman in her report. (Tr.
318.)
Hagan testified she concluded, based on the findings in
Dingman’s report, the conduct of the PSO’s had a negative
impact on their ability to do their jobs. (Tr. 318.) She specified
because PSO’s may be called upon to testify in court proceed-
ings regarding events occurring on the job, a finding that they
are untruthful “completely destroys their ability to do a funda-
mental part of their job.” (Tr. 319.) Hagan testified she be-
lieved Dingman was “genuinely disturbed” by the PSO’s con-
duct and she was as well. (Tr. 319.)
In addition to her concerns about what Dingman had found
with regard to the PSO’s dishonesty, Hagan testified it was also
wrong for an off-duty PSO to use his credentials for access to
the ACE facility. (Tr. 319–320.) She testified that doing so
violated the SGIM at section 5.5. (Tr. 320; Jt. Exh. 2, p. 37.)
She also stated the conduct violated Respondent’s rules for
personal conduct in the employee manual, but did not specify
which rule. (Tr. 321.) She stated she interpreted the rule in the
SGIM to limit the use of a PSO’s credentials to allow access to
the building only when on duty. (Tr. 323.) Hagan testified she
interpreted Dingman’s report to conclude the named PSO’s no
longer met the “contract criteria and constituted a security risk
if they were to be retained under the contract.” (Tr. 323.) She
further testified she agreed with that conclusion.

6 Dingman’s report incorrectly identifies Nunnaly as the contracting
officer. She, in fact, is a contracting specialist with less authority than a
contracting officer.
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hagan also testified Respondent had no choice but to follow
Dingman’s recommendation. (Tr. 323.) She clarified, howev-
er, that under certain circumstances, Respondent would not
have to follow such recommendations, such as if the recom-
mendation was not supported by relevant facts. (Tr. 323.) She
explained Respondent’s recourse in such a situation would be
to appeal to the CO who could overrule the COTR. Hagan
testified Respondent chose not to do so here because the rec-
ommendation was supported by specific facts. (Tr. 324.) No
one employed by Respondent conducted any further investiga-
tion. (Tr. 351–352.) Rather, Hagan testified she reviewed
several documents, including the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, noting that because FPS had requested the PSO’s be re-
moved from the contract, the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions of the collective-bargaining agreement did not apply. (Tr.
324.) Although she was present for the three interviews,
Edmiston did not speak to anyone about the investigation. (Tr.
368.)
Respondent first suspended Blake, Baker, and Holland on
July 10, 2012. (GC Exhs. 8; 10; and 12.) Prior to their suspen-
sions, the three PSO’s continued to work their usual assign-
ments. The suspension notices indicate the three were being
suspended pending further investigation and were each signed
by Edmiston. On July 12, 2012, Respondent discharged the
three PSO’s. (GC Exhs. 9 11; and 13. The discharge letters
were signed by Ferritto and state the PSO’s were being dis-
charged at FPS’s request.
J. Discipline of PSO’s
The “Statement of Work” provides circumstances under
which a PSO may be removed from work on the contract. The
“Statement of Work” holds the contractor responsible for disci-
plinary action “as may be necessary” to maintain “standards of
employee competency, conduct, appearance, and integrity.”
(R. Exh. 4, p. 43.) The COTR and the CO have the authority to
direct the contractor to retrain, suspend, or remove an employee
from work on the contract. (R. Exh. 4, p. 43.) Under this pro-
vision FPS may request the removal of a PSO from work on the
contract and the contractor “must comply” in a timely manner
(R. Exh. 4, p. 43). PSO’s discharged on request of FPS may
not invoke the grievance and arbitration provisions of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. (Jt. Exh. 1, p. 15.)
FPS in turn has a directive that addresses PSO removal from
a contract. (GC Exh. 14.) This directive indicates it was de-
veloped to provide “a formal and standardized process to en-
sure the prompt and proper removal of PSO’s who fail to con-
form to the requirements as outlined in the contract. . . .” (GC
Exh. 14, p. 1.) Under this directive, all recommendations to
permanently remove a PSO from a contract “shall go before a
Review Board for final approval.” (GC Exh. 14, p. 3.) The
review board is a standing committee that meets weekly and
consists of representatives from FPS’s office of the principal
legal advisor and the acquisition’s division consolidated con-
tracting group. (GC Exh. 14, p. 2.) The directive further states,
“[n]o PSO shall be removed at the direction of the Government
prior to obtaining approval of the Board.” (GC Exh. 14, p. 5.)
A PSO may be temporarily suspended, pending investigation
and Board presentation, however, if the CO and the COTR
determine the conduct requires such immediate suspension.
(GC Exh. 14, p. 5.) Finally, the directive contains a form upon
which formal requests for PSO removals are made. (GC Exh.
14, p. 7.)
Dingman testified she was familiar with this directive. (Tr.
440.) It was not followed in this case, according to Dingman,
because Respondent chose to discharge Blake, Baker, and Hol-
land without going through the formal process. (Tr. 441.)
Respondent also has a security officer handbook that con-
tains rules of conduct and Respondent’s progressive discipli-
nary policy. (GC Exh. 5.) With regard to rules of conduct, the
handbook delineates major offenses, for which a violation may
result in discharge “after unpaid suspension and management
investigation” and minor offenses for which a violation may
result in counseling or a written warning “in accordance with”
Respondent’s progressive discipline policy. (GC Exh. 5 at 48–
50.) These rules of conduct are similar to and, in some re-
spects, mirror the rules of conduct in the Statement of Work
and the SGIM. (R. Exh. 4; Jt. Exh. 2.)
The handbook also contains Respondent’s progressive disci-
plinary policy and procedures. (GC Exh. 5 at 52–54.) The
procedure has four steps. These are, in order of severity, an
oral reprimand; written reprimand; unpaid suspension; and
termination. It contains a caveat that where a major offense has
been committed, steps one and two may be combined. It also
gives management the authority to immediately suspend a PSO
pending an investigation for conduct such as physical attacks,
threats of violence, theft, or harassment. Additionally, PSO’s
who commit acts of violence or “other egregious misconduct or
serious safety violations” may be terminated, depending on the
outcome of an investigation. The handbook also lists types of
conduct for which discharge may be appropriate in the case of a
first offense. These include, but are not limited to, refusal to
submit to or failure to pass a random drug test; acts of or threats
of violence; physical attacks; theft; or harassment. (GC Exh. 5,
p. 52.)
The discharge notices Respondent issued to Blake, Baker,
and Holland do not reference any prior discipline or the ap-
plicability of progressive disciplinary policy.
K. Rules Governing Off-Duty PSO’s
Respondent contends Blake and Baker were discharged for
violating rules governing entrance to a secure Federal facility
by PSO’s while off duty. The rules governing the manner in
which PSO’s allow any individual to enter a Federal facility are
covered in the SGIM and in “post orders.” The SGIM contains
rules applicable to all PSO’s and all facilities protected by FPS.
Post orders are specific to the facility and, Dingman testified,
are developed by the “facility security committee.” (Tr. 467–
468; R Exh. 1.)
Dingman testified that under the post orders for the ACE fa-
cility, an off-duty Government employee is allowed access
without screening, but a PSO is not. (Tr. 202; 402.) However,
the written post orders in the record for the ACE facility only
detail the procedure for processing a visitor. (R. Exh. 1.) They
do not define a visitor or specifically address how to treat off-
duty employees or PSO’s. Dingman and Hagan testified this
distinction is based on an interpretation of the rules governing
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 15
use of Government issued credentials found in the SGIM. (Tr.
320.) Additionally, Fields and Edmiston testified that off-duty
PSO’s were to be treated as visitors, PSO’s were aware of this
rule, neither had ever witnessed a violation of the rule, and not
following the rule was a significant security breach.
Respondent called Donald Holcomb, its corporate training
officer, to testify about training of PSO’s on this subject. He
testified he trains PSO’s that they can use their credential “only
when they are on duty.” (Tr. 566.) He went on to specify that
PSO’s are taught they cannot use their credentials to “get out of
a ticket.” (Tr. 569.) He went on to testify that when PSO’s
come to work, “whenever they come into the building . . . they
are still required to go through the screening process because
they’re not on duty.” (Tr. 571.) This suggests that PSO’s are
never allowed entry into the building without being screened as
a visitor, as they are only on duty when they are on post. When
asked specifically whether PSO’s were trained that an individu-
al with “any form of Federal credential can enter a Paragon
protected building and use that Federal credential to circumvent
the magnetometer and x-ray screening procedures,” he re-
sponded, “No, because what I tell these guys is that you do not
allow this person past you unless you’re satisfied.” (Tr. 574.)
Holcomb had previously testified that when making this deter-
mination, the PSO is trained to check the identification and if
“it grants them in the building and it’s them and it’s valid and
all that kind of stuff, bypass the system.” (Tr. 571.) I find this
not only confusing, but inconsistent with other testimony that
PSO’s must be treated as visitors when off duty.
In contrast, several current and former PSO’s testified that
PSO’s have used their credentials to by-pass screening to enter
secure Federal facilities, including the ACE facility while off
duty. (Tr. 57–72; 99–102; 201–207; 249; 268–280; 586–592.)
In addition to testifying this was a wide spread practice, several
individuals testified this was done in the presence of officials
from FPS and management with Respondent. It is also undis-
puted that an FPS inspector spoke with Blake on January 31 as
he was leaving the loading dock, and did nothing. Kabakova
testified Fields was among Respondent’s managers who wit-
nessed such conduct and took no action. (Tr. 280; 596–592.)7
On this issue, I credit the testimony of Arrick Todman, a
PSO working currently on the Georgia contract in Atlanta. (Tr.
588.)8 Todman had been trained on the SGIM as recently as
2011. (Tr. 587.) He testified specific rules regarding entry into
Federal facilities by off-duty PSO’s was not a subject of that
training. (Tr. 587.) He also testified it was common practice
for off-duty PSO’s to use their credentials to enter these facili-
ties without being screened. (Tr. 587–588.) Moreover, he was
able to provide examples of specific instances in which Re-

7 I found Kabakova’s testimony on this credible. Although
Kabakova was often vague, failing to recall dates, he did not appear
deliberately evasive. Moreover, his testimony was consistent with
other PSO’s testimony on this point.
8 I found Lynn Michael, Kabakova, Blake, Baker, and Holland all
credible on this issue as well. All were consistent with regard to the
lack of a specific rule or training and that bypassing screening when off
duty was common practice. I make note of Todman’s testimony be-
cause he had been most recently trained, so would be the most familiar
with the training, and his demeanor evinced no bias.
spondent’s supervisors had either engaged in such practice or
witnessed it. Todman was straightforward in his responses and
no evidence of bias was elicited. Therefore, I find the rule at
issue was neither interpreted nor followed by the PSO’s in the
manner Respondent purports.
L. Discharges for Security Rule Violations
Respondent presented evidence that both before and after
this incident, it discharged employees for security breaches and
lack of candor. Hagan testified that in February 2013, PSO
Dozier was discharged for improper use of his access card. (Tr.
326.) Specifically, Hagan testified Dozier had used his “after
hours” access card to enter a closed secure Federal facility to
allow a friend to use the restroom. (Tr. 327.) Because it was
after hours, there was only one, roving, PSO on site. That PSO
reported the incident and Dozier was discharged. (Tr. 327.)
There were no further details in the record and no documenta-
tion to corroborate this testimony.9
The second discharge also involved allowing access to an in-
dividual who was required to be screened. In this instance,
Darnell Williams, a PSO in Chicago, allowed a contractor’s
employee into a secure building without screening. (Tr. 327–
328; R. Exhs. 6, 7, and 8.) He first disavowed any recollection
of the incident, but later admitted to it. According to the in-
spection form, Williams had been repeatedly informed about
specific rules addressing contractor employee identification.
(R. Exh. 6.) Respondent issued Williams a suspension notice 6
days after the incident. (R. Exh. 7.) Hagan testified Williams
was discharged, but the record does not contain a termination
notice, only an email indicating a decision had been made to
terminate him. (R. Exh. 8.)
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Respondent’s Affirmative Defenses
Respondent contends as a threshold matter, that the Board
lacks authority to review the termination decisions of Blake,
Baker, and Holland because they were based on considerations
of national security. Respondent bases this contention on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988). In Egan, the respondent was a civilian em-
ployee of the Navy who was promoted, conditional on a finding
of eligibility, to a position classified as “sensitive.” Id. at 521.
Eligibility for the job included successfully obtaining a security
clearance from the Department of the Navy. Following an
investigation, the Navy denied Egan his security clearance,
rendering him ineligible for the job. He appealed that decision
to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The Court
held the MSPB did not have the authority to review the deci-
sion to deny the security clearance because that decision was
“committed by law” to the discretionary judgment of the agen-
cy responsible for the protection of the classified information.
Id. at 527–529. The Court’s decision in Egan has been extend-
ed to preclude judicial review of security clearance determina-
tions as well as the decision to conduct a security clearance
review.
Upon careful consideration of the Court’s holding in Egan, I

9 Hagan was unable to remember the date of the incident or individ-
ual’s full name.
16 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find the facts in the instant matter are inapposite and reject
Respondent’s argument.10 In the instant case, FPS did not re-
quire the PSO’s at issue to have a security clearance. As Hagan
clarified in her testimony, PSO’s have a “suitability,” determi-
nation, not a security clearance. (Tr. 330.) Indeed, under the
Statement of Work, all PSO positions require a suitability de-
termination, while only certain positions require a security
clearance. (R. Exh. 4, p. 59.) A required security clearance is
provided by the agency requiring the clearance, in other words,
the agency responsible for the protection of the classified in-
formation. The suitability determination is made by FPS. (Tr.
331; R. Exh. 4.) A suitability determination is valid for 5 years,
absent an intervening event that would render the individual
unsuitable for work on a contract. Hagan admitted there was
no change in FPS’s suitability determination for Blake, Baker,
or Holland. (Tr. 332.) Unlike the employer in Egan, Respond-
ent made the decision to discharge its employees prior to any
revocation of FPS’s suitability determination. Even if the
Court’s holding in Egan were to apply to FPS’ revocation of
suitability determinations, it would not apply in the instant case
because FPS did not revoke any of the PSOs’ suitability deter-
minations, nor does Respondent contend that the investigation
by Dingman was initiated in order to review the suitability
determination. Thus, Respondent’s reliance on Egan to shield
its decision from Board review is misplaced.
Respondent also contends that the “federal enclave doctrine”
precludes the Board from regulating “conduct occurring on” the
ACE facility. (R. Br. at 50.) I find Respondent’s contention
without merit. Respondent relies on the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988),
in which the Court found activities on Federal facilities are
shielded from direct regulation by a state under the Supremacy
Clause. Because this matter does not involve any type of state
regulation, I find the “federal enclave doctrine” does not apply.
B. Unfair Labor Practices
1. Legal framework
An employer violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act if it
discharges an employee for engaging in union activity. The
Board applies the framework for deciding allegations of such
discriminatory discharge set out in its Wright Line decision.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under this
framework, the burden is on the General Counsel to make out
an initial showing that the employee’s protected or union activi-
ty was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.
In order to establish this initial showing, the General Counsel
must prove: (1) the employee engaged in union or concerted
activity protected by the Act; (2) the employer knew of the
concerted nature of the activity; and (3) the adverse action tak-
en against the employee was motivated by the activity. Cir-
cumstantial evidence, such as suspicious timing, false reasons,
failure to adequately investigate misconduct, departures from
past practices, tolerance of behavior for which the employee
was allegedly fired, and disparate treatment, may be used to

10 The General Counsel did not brief this issue.
show discriminatory motive. Medic One, Inc., 331 NLRB 464
(2000).
Once the General Counsel has met its initial showing that the
protected activity was a motivating or substantial reason for the
employer’s decision to take adverse action, the burden of per-
suasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have
taken the same action even in the absence of the protected ac-
tivity. Consolidated Bus Transit, Inc., 350 NLRB 1064, 1065–
1066 (2007), enfd. 577 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2009); Palace Sports
& Entertainment, Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.3d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir.
2005), rehearing en banc denied (2005).
2. Contentions of the parties
The General Counsel contends Respondent discharged
Blake, Baker, and Holland because they engaged in union and
concerted protected activities. Blake, Baker, and Holland were
each officers in the new union and participants in the negotia-
tions for a new collective-bargaining agreement, and brought
workplace concerns and the potential for a strike to the atten-
tion of the facility tenant. The General Counsel contends be-
cause of this protected activity Respondent initiated and partic-
ipated in an investigation undertaken by FPS which was moti-
vated by antiunion animus, and ultimately acquiesced in FPS’s
unlawfully motivated request to discharge Blake, Baker, and
Holland.
Respondent contends that the General Counsel cannot meet
her initial burden under Wright Line to establish that antiunion
animus played any part in the decision to discharge Blake,
Baker, and Holland. Respondent contends the record contains
no direct evidence of animus on the part of its decisionmakers.
Further, Respondent contends, even if the General Counsel
could prove discriminatory animus, it would have taken the
same action in the absence of the discriminatory motive. Re-
spondent contends it was obligated under its contract with FPS
to take whatever action FPS requested. Moreover, Respondent
contends, none of its decisionmakers could have been aware of
any discriminatory motivation on the part of Dingman, if one
existed, and that Dingman’s report provides legitimate grounds
upon which to discharge Blake, Baker, and Holland.11
3. Applicability of Capital CMI Music
The General Counsel contends that the antiunion animus of
Dingman should be imputed to Respondent pursuant to the
Board’s holding in Capital EMI Music, 311 NLRB 997 (1993),
enfd. 23 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994). In Capital EMI Music, the
Board held an employer may be held liable for the discrimina-
tory employment actions of its joint employer where the record
permits an inference that the nonacting employer “knew or

11 Respondent also contends in its brief that application of the ana-
lytical framework set out by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Burnup &
Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), would not lead to a different result. The
General Counsel has not asserted liability under this analytical frame-
work and, in fact, argued against application of Akal Security, Inc., 355
NLRB 584 (2010) (reaffirming and incorporating by reference 354
NLRB 1 (2009)) (applying the Burnup & Sims analysis to the discharge
of security officers at a Federal courthouse). Because the General
Counsel does not contend this analytical framework is applicable, I
have not addressed it herein. Further, I find this matter is properly
analyzed under Wright Line because it turns on motive.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 17
should have known” the other employer acted with an unlawful
motive and acquiesced in the unlawful action by either failing
to protest or “exercise any contractual right it might possess to
resist it.” Capital EMI Music, supra at 1000. A necessary pre-
requisite for applicability of this theory of liability is a showing
that the two employers are joint employers. The General Coun-
sel has to the burden to make that showing. Here, the General
Counsel did not plead joint employer status nor did either party
address the issue in its briefs. Thus, I find joint employer lia-
bility was not a matter fully litigated by the parties and decline
to apply the Board’s holding in Capital EMI Music to the in-
stant case.
4. Prima facie case
I find that the General Counsel has made a prima facie show-
ing under the Wright Line analysis. Neither protected activity
nor knowledge were significantly in dispute as Blake, Baker,
and Holland all held officer positions with the Union and were
involved in internal management of the Union, filing of griev-
ances, communicating with Respondent’s management about
working conditions, and, in the case of Blake and Holland,
negotiating an initial collective-bargaining agreement. (Tr. 31;
134; 192.) Moreover, I find that bringing a potential strike to
the attention of the Colonel was activity protected under the
Act. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–566 (1978).
Respondent concedes it was aware each of these individuals
was an office holder with the Union, members of the negotiat-
ing team, and, in the case of Blake and Baker, had been in-
volved in raising the issue of a strike with the Colonel.
The final element the General Counsel must establish as part
of its initial burden is that Blake, Baker, and Holland were dis-
charged because of their protected activity. I find the General
Counsel has met that burden. Specifically, I find the circum-
stances, when viewed as a whole, establish Respondent’s dis-
charge of Blake, Baker, and Holland was discriminatorily mo-
tivated. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding
Respondent was aware Dingman’s animus toward the protected
activity formed the basis for her recommendation yet deliber-
ately conducted an inadequate investigation into the allegations
against Blake, Baker, and Holland in order to justify its deci-
sion to discharge them.
The investigation that led to the discharge of Blake, Baker,
and Holland began with a phone call from Fields to Dingman
on February 17 in which Fields told Dingman a PSO had con-
tacted the Army Corps of Engineers about a potential strike by
the PSO’s. Neither Field’s explanation for making the call to
Dingman, nor Dingman’s explanation for conducting her inves-
tigation is credible. The Union issued its strike notice to the
bargaining committee members on January 22. (GC Exh. 3.)
Thus, by the time he contacted Dingman on February 17, Fields
had been aware for several weeks that the Union had issued a
strike notice. Moreover, at some time during contract negotia-
tions, Dingman requested and Respondent provided a contin-
gency plan in case of a strike. (Tr. 510.) Thus, there was no
need for Dingman to investigate whether a strike was imminent
for contingency planning purposes.
I find it telling that Fields acted only after Blake contacted
the Army Corps of Engineers and, contrary to her repeated
assertions, Dingman’s focus was on whom, and in what man-
ner, the strike notice was delivered, not on the likelihood of a
strike. According to her own report, Dingman never asked
anyone about the likelihood of a strike and when testifying, was
unable to explain why. (Tr. 450–460.) Moreover, Dingman’s
antipathy toward the Union and its intent to strike, as well as
toward Blake directly contacting the client is uncontroverted on
the record. I found Fields lacked credibility based on both his
inconsistent testimony and demeanor when testifying.12 His
testimony that he lacked any knowledge of why Dingman in-
tended to conduct interviews strained credulity. (Tr. 516.) It
seems unlikely Fields would have no understanding of why
Dingman would be interviewing employees whom he super-
vised after having contacted her only days before. In this con-
text, I find the evidence establishes Dingman's purpose and
focus was Blake’s discussing PSO grievances and the strike
notice with the Colonel.
Moreover, the record contains direct evidence of Dingman’s
antiunion animus and Respondent’s knowledge of that animus.
Dingman told each of the PSO’s a strike would result in their
termination and inability to ever work another Government
contract. She further admonished them about going directly to
the building tenant with workplace concerns. I find these
statements establish Dingman’s negative attitude toward the
PSO’s protected activity.13 Moreover, each of these statements
was made in the presence of Edmiston. Thus, I find Respond-
ent was aware of Dingman’s antiunion motivation.
I also find sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish Re-
spondent itself acted with discriminatory motive. Upon review-
ing the report submitted by Dingman, Respondent made the
decision to discharge Blake, Baker, and Holland without con-
ducting any investigation. The Board has held evidence that an
employer fails to adequately investigate alleged misconduct or
allow an employee the opportunity to explain his or her actions
supports an inference of animus and discriminatory motivation.
Midnight Rose Hotel & Casino, Inc., 343 NLRB 1003, 1005
(2004), affd. 198 Fed. Appx. 752 (10th Cir. 2006); W. W.
Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 1978);
Relco Locomotives, Inc., 358 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at 14
(2012), enfd. 734 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2013); American Crane
Corp., 326 NLRB 1401, 1410 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 1819 (4th
Cir. 2000). Dingman’s report, which specifically reference an
understanding by the PSO’s that they had not engaged in any
direct rule violation, would have lead a reasonable employer to
question and investigate whether Blake and Baker had engaged
in the misconduct alleged. Moreover, such an investigation
would have revealed that bypassing screening by off-duty

12 Fields was evasive when testifying, often stating he did not un-
derstand or needed to have repeated, simple, straightforward questions.
He had lengthy pauses between questions and answers and contradicted
prior sworn testimony. (Tr. 499; 501.)
13 I have not found that any of these statements constitute an 8(a)(1)
violation, nor is such a finding necessary. The Board has long held
such statements, although not rising to the level of an 8(a)(1) violation,
may still be evidence of animus. NACCO Materials Handling Group,
Inc., 331 NLRB 1245 (2000); General Battery Corp., 241 NLRB 1166,
1169 (1979).
18 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
PSO’s was a widespread practice, not a clear and well-enforced
rule violation.
Several current and former PSO’s testified it was common
practice for PSO’s to use their credentials to enter these facili-
ties without being screened. (Tr. 587–588.) Moreover, this
was done in the presence of Respondent’s managers. I find
both Field’s and Edmiston’s denials of having seen such con-
duct lack credibility.14 I also find, based on this evidence, Re-
spondent did not treat similar conduct in the same manner. I
am not persuaded by Respondent’s argument that because only
sergeants witnessed this conduct and failed to act supports a
finding that management was unaware of these infractions.
The record establishes sergeants had the authority to impose
discipline for rule infractions. I find that this practice was wit-
nessed by those with the authority to impose discipline who
tolerated the conduct.
Nor could any of Respondent’s witnesses explain why, in
light of the purported severity of the misconduct, were no ac-
tions taken for over 3 months. Edmiston was present for all of
the interviews and was aware of the alleged misconduct in Feb-
ruary. However, she did nothing. Edmiston had the authority
to take disciplinary action. She testified she did nothing be-
cause she did not want to interfere and wanted to remain neu-
tral. (Tr. 557–558.) I do not find this a reasonable explanation
for her failure to act, if the purported misconduct was as serious
as Respondent alleged. Temp-Rite Air Conditioning Corp., 322
NLRB 767 (1996) (a delay in taking action after the miscon-
duct may rebut an employer’s contention that it would have
taken the disciplinary action in the absence of protected activi-
ty).
Respondent had a progressive disciplinary policy under
which it could have taken disciplinary action against Blake,
Baker, and Holland. Just as it chose not to investigate the al-
leged misconduct, Respondent chose not to follow this policy,
either at the time Edmiston became aware of the alleged mis-
conduct or at the time it received Dingman’s report. This fail-
ure to follow its own progressive disciplinary policy also raises
an inference of discriminatory motive. The three PSO’s had no
prior disciplinary history and had not committed any of the
offenses enumerated in Respondent’s progressive disciplinary
policy that might result in discharge for a first offense. Thus, I
find that applying Respondent’s own policy would likely not
have led to a decision to discharge, but for a discriminatory
motive.
Finally, I find Respondent’s contention it was required to
discharge Blake, Baker, and Holland under the terms of its
contract with FPS to be false and Respondent’s statements in its
termination notices to that effect to be misrepresentations. The
Statement of Work does provide the COTR and CO authority to
request the removal of a PSO from work on a contract. FPS

14 I have previously found Fields lacked credibility. I similarly find
Edmiston was not a credible witness. Edmiston, like Fields, was eva-
sive and her testimony was marked by pregnant pauses. Indeed, she
failed to answer several questions, simply staring blankly at the ques-
tioner. (Tr. 542, 547, 544; 560; 562.) Edmiston appeared confused and
unable to answer simple questions and went as far as to deny knowing
that she had signed the suspension notices for Blake, Baker, and Hol-
land. (Tr. 559.)
has a directive specifying the procedure under which PSO’s are
to be removed, if done so at the direction of FPS. That proce-
dure was not followed here because, as Dingman testified, FPS
did not request the removal of the PSO’s. (Tr. 446.) Hagan
admitted Respondent could have appealed Dingman’s recom-
mendation to the CO. Hagan’s testimony that Respondent was
without any option but to discharge Blake, Baker, and Holland
is not credible. Rather, I find Respondent made a decision
absent such directive or request.
Based on the foregoing analysis, I find the General Counsel
has met his burden to establish Respondent discharged Blake,
Baker, and Holland because each actively engaged in protected
and union activity.
5. Respondent’s burden
Respondent contends, even if discriminatory animus played
a part in the discharge decisions, it would have taken the action
that it did absent the discriminatory motive. As previously
discussed, Respondent contends it was obligated to follow the
recommendation of the COTR. In addition, Respondent con-
tends Dingman’s report provided an adequate basis upon which
to base its discharge decision. In support of that contention,
Respondent presented evidence it discharged PSO’s for similar
security breaches and lack of candor. I do not find these in-
stances to be sufficiently similar to meet Respondent’s burden.
Hagan testified that in February 2013, PSO Dozier was dis-
charged for improper use of his access card. (Tr. 326.) The
record contains no details and no documentation to corroborate
Hagan’s testimony. In order to establish similarly situated
employees were treated the same, Respondent would need to
present more than uncorroborated, vague recollections. More-
over, this discharge took place after the discharges in the instant
matter. Such post-hoc actions are insufficient to meet Re-
spondent’s burden.
The second purportedly similar discharge involving PSO
Williams in Chicago is also not sufficient to meet Respondent’s
burden. A significant distinction between this and the instant
case is that, according to the inspection form, Williams had
been informed on repeated occasions about specific rules ad-
dressing contractor employee identification. (R. Exh. 6.) Re-
spondent did not include the referenced attachment containing
this directive to the inspection report. Such failure to produce
documents within its control leads to the conclusion that this
evidence would be unfavorable to Respondent. See Interna-
tional Automated Machines, Inc., 285 NLRB 1122, 1123
(1987), enfd. 861 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988). I have previously
found the rule at issue in this case was not clearly communicat-
ed or consistently enforced. Thus, I find Respondent’s example
too distinct from the instant case to meet its burden to show it
treated similar conduct the same.
I further find insufficient evidence to conclude the purported
security breach at issue in the instant case to be the clear rule
violation warranting discharge Respondent purports it to be.
Neither the SGIM nor the post orders for the ACE facility con-
tain a rule specifically prohibiting an off-duty PSO from enter-
ing a building in which he works using his credentials to bypass
screening. The conduct rule in the SGIM addressing use of
credentials is a broad admonition against “unethical or improp-
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC. 19
er use of official authority, credentials or equipment.” (Jt. Exh.
2, p. 13.) I do not find it the clear admonition against the spe-
cific conduct at issue. Moreover, it is not further clarified by
reference to section 5.5 as Respondent contends. I find Re-
spondent’s reading of section 5.5 to apply to this situation to be
tortured. Moreover, Respondent’s evidence of how PSO’s are
trained was confusing. I did not find Respondent’s witnesses
with knowledge of how PSO’s are trained to be credible on this
issue. Thus, I find Respondent has failed to meet its burden to
establish it would have made the discharge decision based on
the alleged rule violation, absent a discriminatory motive.
Finally, Respondent presented no evidence it has taken any
disciplinary action against a PSO for lack of candor alone.
I have previously found Respondent was neither obligated
nor without option but to follow FPS’s request. Based on the
analysis above, I further find Respondent has not met its burden
to establish it has treated similar misconduct in the same man-
ner. Thus, I find Respondent failed to establish it would have
taken the actions that it did absent a discriminatory motive.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act when it discharged Blake, Baker, and Holland for
engaging in concerted protected and union activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it discharged Arthur Blake.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it discharged Joel Baker.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it discharged John Holland.
REMEDY
Having found Respondent has engaged in certain unfair la-
bor practices, I find it must be ordered to cease and desist and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
polices of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Arthur
Blake, Joel Baker, and John Holland must offer each reinstate-
ment and make each whole for any losses, earnings, or other
benefits incurred as a result of Respondent’s discharge of them.
These amounts are to be computed in accordance with F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate
prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), com-
pounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
In accordance with Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44
(2012), Respondent shall compensate Arthur Blake, Joel Baker,
and John Holland for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving lump-sum backpay awards, and file a report with the
Social Security Administration allocating backpay to the ap-
propriate calendar quarters for each.
On these findings and conclusions of law and on the entire
record, I issue with following recommended15
ORDER
Respondent, Paragon Systems, Inc., Savannah, Georgia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise disciplining employees because
they engage in union activity or other activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
Arthur Blake reinstatement to his former position or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed; and remove from its files any and all
references to the unlawful suspension and termination and
within 3 days thereafter notify Arthur Blake in writing that this
has been done and that the discipline will not be used against
him in any way.
(b) Make Arthur Blake whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of his unlawful discharge, in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the board’s Order, offer
Joel Baker reinstatement to his former position or, if that posi-
tion no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed; and remove from its files any and all
references to the unlawful suspension and termination and
within 3 days thereafter notify Joel Baker in writing that this
has been done and that the discipline will not be used against
him in any way.
(d) Make Joel Baker whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of his unlawful discharge, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
John Holland reinstatement to his former position or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed; and remove from its files any and all
references to the unlawful suspension and termination and
within 3 days thereafter notify John Holland in writing that this
has been done and that the discipline will not be used against
him in any way.
(f) Make John Holland whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of his unlawful discharge, in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(g) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause

15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
20 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Savannah, Georgia, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since July 12, 2012.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, DC February 7, 2014
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
any of you for supporting United Security Police Officers of
America or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Arthur Blake full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Arthur Blake whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Joel Baker full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Joel Baker whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
John Holland full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make John Holland whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating backpay to the appropriate quarters.
WE WILL compensate Arthur Blake, Joel Baker, and John
Holland for the adverse tax consequences, if any of receiving
on or more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer
than 1 year.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.