Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 3, 1961

130 N.L.R.B. 1174 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

1174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pan-O-Ramic Package Co ., Inc. and United Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO. Case No..13-CA-3685. March 3, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 23, 1960, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action,. as set forth in the copy of the Inter
mediate Report attached hereto. The Trial 'Examiner also found'
that the Respondent has not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices as alleged in the complaint, and recommended that these
particular allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection` with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Fanning, and
Kimball].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter=
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Pan-O=Ramie
Package Co., Inc., Janesville, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors;
and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Threatening to deprive employees of existing economic benefits
in their conditions of employment, or to make it "harder" upon them
if they choose to engage in collective bargaining through a union.
In the absence of exceptions thereto we adopt the Trial Examiner's findings of viola-
tions of Section 8(a) (1) pro forma . We find no merit in the General Counsel's excep-.
tions to the Trial Examiner 's failure to find a violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1). in
the discharge of employee Bouton. Although we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's
characterization of Bouton 's conduct during his meeting with the Respondent 's officers
on May 6, 1960 , as persistent provocation amounting to insolence , daring, threatening,
and taunts , we believe that his anxious and insistent interrogation of the Respondent's
officers concerning his job security sufficiently tried the latter 's patience to-cause his
discharge. As the Trial Examiner , we are persuaded that Bouton 's discharge was' not
related to his union or other protected concerted activities . We also find , contrary to
the General Counsel's allegation that the Respondent by urging its employees to attend a'
scheduled union meeting did not convey the impression of having 'surveyed the union
activities of its employees. We shall therefore dismiss the complaint insofar as' it alleges
a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) on this ground.
130 NLRB No. 111. '
PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1175
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to join or assist United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
or to form, join, or assist any other labor organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of Their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activi-
ties, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modi-
fied by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
. (a) Post at its plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall
after being signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in. conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has
taken to comply therewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Warren Bouton,
and Section 8(a) (1) by creating the impression of surveillance of its
employees' union activities.
2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of.the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision ' and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT threaten to deprive our employees of existing
economic benefits in their conditions of employment, or to make
it "harder" upon them if they choose to engage in collective
bargaining through a union.
1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, or to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activi-
ties, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of any labor organization.
PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC.,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before the duly desig-
nated Trial Examiner in Janesville, Wisconsin, on July 20, 1960, on complaint of
the General Counsel and answer by Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc., herein called
the Company or the Respondent. The issues litigated are whether the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in certain statements of its supervisors,
and whether it violated Section 8(a)(3) in the discharge of an employee. All
parties were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to
introduce evidence, to present oral argument, and thereafter to file briefs. A brief
was received from the General Counsel.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc., is a corporation existing under the laws of the
State of Wisconsin, and maintains its principal office and place of business at Janes-
ville, Wisconsin, where it is and has at all times material been engaged in the manu-
facture of plastic boxes and packages. During the calendar year 1959 the Re-
spondent purchased goods and materials for its Janesville plant valued in excess of
$50,000, which goods and materials were transported to that plant from, outside the
State of Wisconsin. During the same calendar year, in the regular course of its
operations, the Respondent manufactured and shipped from its plant products valued
in excess of $50,000 to enterprises which annually produce and ship goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly out of the State of Wisconsin. I find that the Re-
spondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this proceeding.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is, and at all times material
herein has been , a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1177
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Charging Union started an organizational campaign among the Respondent's
employees during April 1960. On May 5 it filed a petition for an election with the
National Labor Relations Board. Two major actions by the Respondent, occur-
ring about the time of these events, are said in the complaint to have been unlawful
interference with the employees' right to self-organization, and to constitute viola-
tions of the statute. On May 4, 1960, officers of the Company read a prepared
statement to assembled employees, and made comments thereon, and on May 6 the
Respondent discharged Warren Bouton, an employee. The statement read to the
employees is, assertedly, a threat of economic retaliation if they persisted in select-
ing a union , and the discharge of Bouton is alleged to have been because of his
union activities. The Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices, and affirmatively contends that Bouton was released for cause.
A. 'Unlawful coercion of the employees
By May 4, 1960, the Respondent's officers concededly were aware that self-
organizational activities were going on among the employees. On that morning,
about 10 a.m., two officers gathered groups of employees for the purpose of ad-
dressing them concerning their union activities. The plant is divided into two major
sections-the box department, with 10 or 12 employees, and the plastic department,
with 12 to 14 employees. Alvin Gehri, the company president, gathered the em-
ployees of plant No. 1 at the end of their break and spoke to them for 15 or 20
minutes. He testified his purpose was to advise them of the "facts" about union
activities, to remind them of the benefits they had been receiving from the Re-
spondent, and to tell them what he thought the situation would be by comparison
in the event a majority representative was selected. He read to them the following
prepared statement:
VACATION PAY
1/52 First year wages
1 yr to 5 yrs i Week
Over 5 yrs 2 Weeks
BIRTHDAY OFF WITH PAY
CHRISTMAS BONUS
CHRISTMAS PARTY
BREAK PERIODS A.M. & P.M. 10 minutes each
CLEAN UP PERIODS A.M. & P.M. 5 minutes each
SMOKING REGULATIONS
GROUP INSURANCE - '/2 paid by company
LIFE INSURANCE 1/2 paid by company
EMPLOYEE LOAN SYSTEM WITHOUT INTEREST
Employee will no longer be able to contact his foreman direct for any bene-
fits on his behalf. All this must be done through a middle man (the union
representative).
Employee cannot come to officers of company on any matter-this must be
done through union representative.
Employee will lose his identity and will become part of large group-all
dealing will be done on a group basis.
IF A UNION IS VOTED INTO THIS SHOP ALL BENEFITS LISTED
ABOVE WILL BE REMOVED AT ONCE AND WILL HAVE TO BE RE-
INSTATED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS.
We urge you to attend this meeting tonight and judge the facts for yourself
don't allow yourself to buy something you don't understand or want completely.
[S] ALVIN F. GEmu.
At the same time, Vice President Jack Pregont spoke to the 10 or 12 employees
of plant No. 2 when they were taking their work break. Pregont testified in the same
vein as did Gehri, explaining that he too wished to advise the employees of the
"facts." And he too read to the second group of employees the very same state-
ment which Gehri was at the time reading to his group.
In addition to reading the above statement, Gehri conceded that he explained to
the employees what he had in mind. At the hearing he admitted without equivoca-
tion that he intended them to understand that if a union were voted into the shop,
all the benefits listed on the prepared statement would be discontinued. He added
this was his opinion as to how things would develop. The Board has consistently
held that a threat by an employer to terminate existing benefits in the event the
1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees choose a bargaining agent, is a direct threat of retaliation for their union
activities and a potent form of restraint and coercion upon them in the free exercise
of the right to select a bargaining agent.' As I read the statement in evidence, I can
only hold that it contains an unequivocal and direct threat to remove benefits the
moment the employees should choose a union . It says "all benefits" will be re-
moved at once. Nor can the immediately following assurance that the Respondent
would negotiate with a bargaining representative serve to qualify the direct an-
nouncement; instead the closing phrase telling the employees that the existing bene-
fits would "be reinstated . . . over a period of years" is the clearest possible lan-
guage of finality as to the promised loss.
• There is a suggestion, not clearly articulated, in the totality of Gehri's testimony,
and in the closing oral argument of Respondent's counsel, that the company officers
.were thinking an employer could start bargaining negotiations with a union by
offering to contract for less than employees are enjoying at the moment , just as
a union may open by demanding increases in benefits. This, clearly, was not the
thought conveyed to the employees in the prepared statements. But even assuming
this to have been the Company's underlying but unexpressed position, the Board
has already held that even an equivocal statement about "starting from scratch" in
such a situation necessarily coerces employees in advance of an election. In The
Rein Co. case, '114 NLRB 694, the respondent employer claimed his statement
meant that existing benefits would be discontinued only after bargaining with the
union , and only in the event the union were unsuccessful during negotiations in
winning their continuance.
The pertinent language of the notice in that case read: "We deem it only fair to
tell you that we have this right and that we do not propose to do anything but start-
from scratch if the Union becomes your bargaining agent, . but [we] will not,
feel bound to voluntarily offer in any contract which the Union may negotiate any
benefits which may have heretofore been given." The Board deemed this language
as necessarily imparting the thought that the company, before starting to bargain
with the union, would withdraw benefits previously enjoyed. More so is such a con-
clusion required from a fair reading of the prepared statement read. by Gehri and
Pregont here.
Accordingly, as alleged in the complaint, I find that in their respective speeches
to employees. on May 4, 1960, both President Alvin Gehri and Vice President Jack
Pregont violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
B. The alleged unlawful discharge of Warren Bouton
Bouton was hired by the Company in the fall of 1959 by Leonard Wyss, an officer
of the Respondent, as a favor for a friend. Bouton suffers from epilepsy and, ap-
parently, it was somewhat difficult for him td' obtain employment. He was taken
on as a maintenance and general handyman; with time, he was given additional
duties, including the setting of very elementary and simple molds in some of the
machinery. His employment seems to have been satisfactory, he was given a 5-cent
raise on one occasion, and, so far as appears definitively, what criticism the employers
had of him was not different than the usual urgings upon employees to do a better
job. Bouton signed a card in favor of the Union on April 20; it does not appear that
he did anything else to help the organizational drive._ During the afternoon of May 4, after the company officers had read their pre-
pared statement to all employees in the morning, Bouton went to the office of Vice
President Pregont and asked about details of the Company's loan plan, which the
vice president had mentioned as one of the benefits in the morning. Pregont ex-
plained it to him. Bouton also asked for the "White Book," purportedly listing em-
ployee benefits, and Pregont said he would obtain it for him. As the discussion con-
tinued, Pregont asked Bouton why the employees desired to have a union, and Bouton
said they thought they could obtain higher wages and more seniority. According
to Bouton's uncontradicted-testimony Pregont became bitter, slammed the table, and
said "damn." Bouton also testified, without contradiction, that during this conversa-
tion Pregont said to him "it would be harder on me than it was now, if the Union
did come in."
About 9 p.m. on May 5, Bouton telephoned Wyss at home to complain of a rumor
he had heard that the Company was going to dismiss him because of union activities.
He asked Wyss if this was true, and Wyss assured him it was not so. Bouton was
persistent on the subject, and when Wyss tried to discontinue the conversation, asked
could he speak to Wyss again later that evening "about these rumors." Wyss said
he was busy, and asked Bouton to come to his office the next morning if he wished.
1 Bell Bakeries , Inc., 126 NLRB 522.
PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1179
Bouton reported to work 40 minutes late the next morning . One of his first duties
was to turn on the production machines so that they would warm up and be ready
.for operation at 7 o 'clock when the operators arrived . In consequence of Bouton's
lateness, production that morning ran about three-quarters of an hour behind
schedule.
. Shortly after 9 o'clock that morning Bouton was in the office of Vice President
Wyss, where he found Vice President Pregont and Foreman Stoker. There is dis-
agreement in the testimony as to what was said during this conversation. Bouton's
version is as follows: He went to the office without being asked. Wyss started by
referring to the rumors which Bouton had mentioned the night before, and said he
wanted them straightened out; he then listed the things the Company had done for
Bouton, such as giving him a job, being at his bedside when he was ill, trying to
obtain. a driver's license for him, and ended by saying Bouton apparently did not
like his job, and even accused him of standing around talking to the employees and
'wasting their time. Bouton protested this was not so, and that he liked his job.
.Bouton went on to testify that Vice President Pregont then told him he had been
late that day and gave him a warning slip for such tardiness, with the warning he
would be discharged if the offense were repeated.
Still according to Bouton, at this point he raised his voice to Pregont and said the
Company itself had advised the employees to go to the union meeting. Bouton ex-
plained at the hearing that he made this statement because in his mind during that
morning's conversation the thought came to him that by "talking and wasting time"
the company officials were referring to his union activity . Bouton also said Pregont
refused to discuss the Union, tried to terminate the conversation, and urged every-
one to return to work.
Bouton nevertheless continued to persist to Wyss and Pregont that they tell him,
before he left the room,, whether the Company was going to discharge him or not,
and they replied by saying it depended on the way he acted. Bouton, still insisting
on a final answer to his question, then said: "Well, I suppose if you were going to
fire me I could call my union representative in Kenosha, and we could sue you for
it." At this point, according to Bouton, Pregont leaped to his feet with a flushed
face and said: "That's it, that is insubordination, the threat of a union within our
office, get out of here, take everything you own, you are fired." Bouton left the
room, tore up the tardy slip as he was departing, and hurled a dirty phrase back to
Wyss.
The testimony of Wyss and Pregont as to this conversation is significantly different.
According to them, they were discussing certain business matters in the office when
Stoker, the foreman, entered to say that production was 45 minutes behind because
.Bouton had arrived late.' Wyss decided a tardy slip should be given to Bouton
formally as a warning' against future errors of this kind, and Bouton was therefore
called in. Both of them testified that as soon as Bouton entered the room, he began
to insist that the Company's concern over him was because of his union activities.
As Wyss recalled, Bouton quickly said the reason for the conference was not to give
him a tardy slip. According to Pregont, before they could tell Bouton why he had
been called, he said to them they could not' fire him because of union activities. The
two vice presidents testified that their attempts to change the, subject to the question
of tardiness were rejected by Bouton, who continued to persist that the Company
could not discharge him for union activities.
Gehri entered the room after a while and Bouton again asked all of them whether
he was fired or not. As Wyss recalled, he assured Bouton he had not been called
in to be discharged, but Bouton refused to let the matter rest there: With Bouton
'not relenting, Wyss told him his continued employment was' "strictly up to you,"
and Bouton became increasingly excited. Wyss conceded that in the conversation
he accused Bouton of idling and wasting the time of other employees; he explained
he did it because he had heard that during the morning Bouton had been discussing
the "rumors" with other employees. Finally, as both Wyss and Pregont recalled,
Bouton announced that if he were fired, 'he would 'call Kenosha. Both company
officials 'conceded they understood Bouton to mean he would call the Union to his
help. And Pregont also admitted'that upon being told this: "I told him he couldn't
threaten us with a union ... that does it, you're fired." Finally, Pregont admitted
on-the stand that he had no intention of discharging Bouton that day, and had the
employee not said he would "call Kenosha," he would not have been fired.
'I think a fair appraisal of the entire record must lead to a conclusion that, for real
or fancied reasons, it was Bouton who chose to ' discuss with his employers-even to
the point of irritation-his union activities, and not that the Company wished to raise
-that'subject with him. There is nothing in the record to indicate that any' of the
cbmpany officers had any particular concern with Bouton' s union 'activities before
1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
these two conversations , or were even aware that he had signed a union card . . Bouton
first raised the question of union activities to Wyss on the telephone , and, despite
Wyss' assurance he would not be- fired , and advice not to believe everything he heard,
persisted that he wished to call later again the same evening to continue to discuss
the "rumor." And again , the next day , it was Bouton , on his own admission, who
injected and refused to discontinue the subject of the Union in the conversation. He
conceded that he had been late, that the question of his lateness was thrown up to
him that day, that he was served with a formal notice of tardiness , and that he became
excited , raised his voice , and again and again refused to be responsive to the subject
his superiors wanted to speak about . Indeed , the entire subject of discharge was
never mentioned by a company officer, either the night before or the next morning,
but instead was injected into the conversation repeatedly by the employee. On
these facts , and from observing the witnesses themselves , I find that the conversation
of May 6 occurred substantially as related by Wyss and Pregont.
Essentially, the General Counsel's contention that the discharge was motivated
by a desire to discourage union activities , centers upon the fact that Bouton said
he would turn to the Union if he were discharged, and that Pregont conceded that
had Bouton not threatened the Company with resort to the Union, there would have
been no discharge . In substance , this argument is an attempt to limit consideration
of the main issue to a-single word of all that happened and was said , and to exclude
from the record the total context of Bouton 's behavior and all of his remarks to his
superiors . There was no threat or talk of discharge by the managers , yet Bouton
threatened them with suit, through the Union, if they should release him. And this,
in the very teeth of a warning that he must not again delay production by his late
arrival in the morning . I am asked to consider only the fact that the threat was to
go to the Union , and to ignore the language of threat . In the total context of the
conversation , considering particularly Bouton 's persistent provocation, bordering
very closely upon if not virtually amounting to insolence , I cannot say Wyss and
Pregont were concerned with Bouton 's union penchant , and were unaffected by the
fact that he was threatening all the company officials. For reasons sufficient to him,
Bouton saw fit to dare the officers of the Company to take action against him, and
without provocation or threat of any kind having been , voiced to him, to promise
them litigation if they should rise to his defiance. It is one thing to say an employer
is obligated to tolerate union activity , to refrain from punishing employees because
they chose to join unions, or because they turn to a union for help in improving their
conditions of employment . It is quite another to require him to hold still in the
face of unwarranted and unprovoked taunts merely because they are couched in
terms of union activity.
In any event , here, as in every case presenting the question of motivation in a dis-
charge, the ultimate question is whether or not the preponderance of the evidence
as a whole suffices to prove that the true reason in the discharge was antiunion
purpose. On the entire record I am unable to reach that conclusion here. In support
of the inference of illegal motivation sought by the General Counsel , there is the
fact that 2 days before the discharge company officials had threatened to withdraw
economic benefits from the employees if they chose a union . And, on Bouton's
uncontradicted testimony-which in this respect I must credit-Pregont also told
him continued union activities would make it "harder" upon the employees. Both
of these incidents reflect antiunion animus by the Respondent and amounted to
independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. They were both , however,
directed to the employees as a whole, and , in the case of Bouton's conversation of
May 4 , it was he who inquired of Vice President Wyss, the officer had no knowledge
of Bouton 's individual membership or activity for the Union , and at no point did
the conversation between the two show personal animus toward the employee.
Indeed , Wyss' statement that it would be "harder"- with a union was but a repetition
of what Gehri and Pregont had announced that same morning.
Apart from the foregoing, I see no positive affirmative evidence in the record. even
were I to accept Bouton 's version of the May 6 conversation to be correct, of illegal
motive for the discharge . Bouton said that Wyss started the conversation by listing
the various favors the company officers had done for him, including the initial hiring..
He said the vice president complained of Bouton's talking about among employees
and causing them to lose time . The officers had occasion to say to him that whether
or not he remained with the Company would depend upon how he behaved. It is
suggested that I should infer that by the phrase "talking around," the officers im-
pliedly meant "discussing union activities." I am asked to presume that past favors
were thrown up to Bouton as reason for him not to join the Union, out of a sense
of reciprocal obligation. When Pregont and Wyss told Bouton his continued em-
ployment would depend upon "how he behaved ," were they necessarily saying to him
LOCAL 5881 , UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1181
it all depended upon how he behaved with respect to adhering or staying away from
the Union? I find all these but tenuous arguments, based more upon suspicion and
unsupported implication than on positive probative proof. Like all records in cases
of this type, the ultimate finding must be based upon the totality of the record. Upon
consideration of all .the evidence , I find it insufficient to support , as required by law,2
the allegation that Bouton was discharged because of union or other protected con-
certed activities , and I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed
in this respect.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III , above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall recom-
mend that it cease and desist therefrom , and take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc ., is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. United Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Statutes.
3. By threatening to deprive employees of existing economic benefits in their
conditions of employment , and to make it "harder" upon them if they choose to
engage in collective bargaining through a union , the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
2 Glen Raven Silk Milla, -Inc., 101 NLRB 239, enfd. as mod . 203 F. 2d 946 (C.A. 4).
Local 5881 , United Mine Workers of America and Grundy Min-
ing Company. Case No. 10-CB-1225. March 3, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 21, 1960, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the. Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members
Rodgers and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The
130 NLRB No. 112.