Packers Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 10, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 182 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Packer Industries, Inc. and International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO.
Cases 1-CA-10825, I-CA-11161, 1-CA-11206,
and 1-CA-11274
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
February 10, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On July 27, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Samuel Ross issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions, a brief, and his original brief to the
Administrative Law Judge in support of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision, and Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
SAMUEL Ross, Administrative Law Judge: These consoli-
dated cases were heard before me in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, on April 6, 7, and 8, and on May 4, 5, and 6, 1976, on
charges and amended charges filed by International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
herein the Union, on June 27, August 5, October 29,
November 13, and December 9, 1975, and on a complaint,
a consolidated complaint, and on amendments to the
consolidated complaint which issued respectively on Au-
gust 21, 1975, and on January 27, February 27, and March
23, 1976. The said complaints as amended allege that
Packer Industries, Inc., herein Respondent or the Compa-
ny, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, by terminating the employment of six employ-
ees because they joined and assisted the Union and
engaged in concerted activities protected by the Act, and by
engaging in numerous other acts of inference with and
restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent filed
answers which deny the substantive allegations of the
amended complaints and the commission of unfair labor
practices. Upon the entire record,' including my observa-
tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, and after due
consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the
following:
ORDER 2
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Packer Indus-
tries, Inc., Meriden, Connecticut, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
Additionally, we are satisfied that Respondent 's contention that the
Administrative Law Judge was biased is without meat . There is nothing in
the record to suggest that his conduct at the hearing, his resolutions of
credibility, or the inferences he drew were based on bias or prejudice
2 Respondent's motion to reopen the record and admit as new evidence
its June 30 , 1976, financial statement is denied . The financial statement
would contain no relevant information not previously considered regarding
Respondent's defense that the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was
motivated by financial considerations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. COMMERCE
Respondent is a Connecticut corporation whose principal
office and place of business is located in Meriden, Connect-
icut, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of aircraft parts and machines. In the operation
of the said business, Respondent annually ships aircraft
parts and machines valued in excess of $50,000 from its
plant in Meriden to points and places outside the State of
Connecticut. Respondent admits and I find that it is
engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent also admits and I find that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
i After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel moved to correct the
transcript in a number of respects. No opposition has been interposed to the
said motion and it is hereby granted The record has accordingly been
physically corrected.
228 NLRB No. 25
PACKER INDUSTRIES 183
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts Regarding Respondent
Respondent's office and plant are located at 80 Gracey
Avenue, Meriden, Connecticut, in a building owned by
Gracey Real Estate, a copartnership which is wholly owned
by Donald F. Woods and Joseph E. Hogan, Respondent's
president and vice president, respectively. Woods and
Hogan also are the principal stockholders in Respondent
corporation, each of them owning 44.7 percent of its stock.2
Respondent has two principal divisions which operate
respectively under the trade names of Packer Machine
Company and Pye and Hogan .3 Packer Machine Company
manufactures machines which are used by other companies
in their manufacturing operations. Pye and Hogan is
primarily a machine shop which makes aircraft parts in
accordance with the specifications of its customers. Em-
ployees of Respondent are generally assigned to one or the
other of these two divisions of Respondent, but they are
transferred from one to the other as needed. There is only
one payroll for the two divisions, but it is "broken down for
Pye and Hogan and one for Packer (Machine)." President
Woods is the manager of Packer Machine and the chief
salesman of Pye and Hogan. Vice President Hogan is the
manager of Pye and Hogan. Respondent subcontracts some
of its lab inspection work to Meriden Metal Labs, a
company which is located in the same building as that
occupied by Respondent and is wholly owned by Jeffery
Woods and Scott Hogan, sons of Respondent's president
and vice president. Employees of Respondent also regularly
do lab inspection work at the premises of Meriden Metal
Labs.
B. The Issues Presented for Determination
1. As previously noted, the complaints in these consoli-
dated cases as amended allege that Respondent terminated
the employment of six employees-Juan Acevedo, William
0. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred
Sprude, and Wallace Jones-and failed and refused to
reinstate them, because they joined and assisted the Union.
Respondent admits that it terminated the employment of
these employees and that it has not since reinstated them. It
contends, however, that it fired Acevedo, Ingraham and
Remillard for reasons unrelated to their union activities,
and that it laid off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones because of
financial difficulties which beset it, and not because of their
support for the Union.
2. The complaints as amended further allege that
Respondent denied employee Mario Recchioni a raise
because of his support of the Union. In respect to this
allegation, Respondent contends that it has not failed to
grant Recchioni a raise on each of his wage reviews.
3. The consolidated complaints further allege that
commencing with the date of its acquisition of knowledge
of the Union's organizational campaign, Respondent
2 The remaining stock in Respondent is owned by several small stock-
holders
3 Respondent also utilizes other trade names for the sale of its products.
One such which it uses for sales to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company is
Connecticut Machine Products, Inc.
4 All dates hereafter will refer to 1975 unless otherwise noted
embarked on a course of conduct to discourage support of
the Union and engaged in numerous acts of interference
with, restraint , and coercion of employees in the exercise of
their rights under the Act. Respondent's testimony in
respect to the said alleged violations for the most part
consists of denials of the statements attributed to its officers
and agents. In respect to the balance of the said allegations,
Respondent contends that the statements made by it are
not coercive or violative of the Act.
4. A final issue presented herein is whether Leonard
Butkiewicz is a supervisor and/or agent of Respondent
within the meaning of the Act.
The conflicting testimony adduced by the parties regard-
ing all of the foregoing issues presents for determination
primarily a question of the credibility of the witnesses and
of their testimony.
C. The Commencement of Union Organization
On Friday, May 9, 1975,' Respondent's employees
Acevedo, Ingraham, LeMay, Sprude, Recchioni, and Jesus
Medina met by prearrangement at 5:30 p.m. at the Meriden
Mall parking lot with Union Representative Joseph Bianca.
The arrangements for this meeting had been made by
Ingraham through his father who is a committeeman for the
Union at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company in North
Haven, Connecticut. At this meeting, all of the employees
who were present signed union authorization cards were
given additional blank cards, and were instructed by
Bianca on how, when, and where to solicit signatures to the
cards from other employees. Commencing with the follow-
ing Monday, May 12, the employees who had attended the
union meeting began handing out the Union's cards and to
solicit signatures to the cards at Respondent's plant and in
its parking lot adjacent to the plant during break and lunch
periods and before and after working hours.
D. The Respondent's Response to Union
Organization
Word of the union organizational campaign of the
Respondent's employees promptly reached the ears of Vice
President Hogan and President Woods. Woods testified
that on Tuesday, May 13 (the day after solicitation of
signatures to union cards began in the plant), Hogan told
him that "he had heard some scuttlebutt with reference to
the organization of a union in the shop." 5 Respondent
thereupon engaged in the following conduct which is
alleged as violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
1. Interrogation, threats, and creation of the,
impression of surveillance
On the morning of May 13, as employee Sprude, one of
the employee union organizers, was walking back to his
work station, Hogan said to Sprude, "I hear you're trying to
start a union." Sprude answered, "What makes you think
5 Hogan professed a lack of recollection about when he first became
aware of the union organizational campaign , but I do not credit his asserted
lack of recollection of the date in light of the significant events which
occurred on May 13. Moreover , as explicated infra, I regard Hogan's
testimony as frequently evasive, on occasion exaggerated and/or self-
contradictory , and in general unreliable and unworthy of much credence.
184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
so, Joe? If I was interested in a union, I would go to work
for a shop that had one ." Hogan then said, "That's good,"
or "something to that effect." 6
Hogan's statement to Sprude quite obviously was de-
signed to elicit information from Sprude regarding his views
about the Union's organizing campaign . Viewed in the light
of Respondent's manifest opposition to the representation
of its employees by the Union and Sprude's false response
to Hogan , his statement to Sprude clearly constituted
coercive interrogation of an employee regarding his union
sympathies , and I therefore find that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
On the same morning (May 13), employee LeMay,
another of the employee union organizers , was called by
Vice President Hogan to a meeting with President Woods
in the conference room where the foremen hold their
meetings . According to LeMay's testimony, which I credit,
Woods started the conversation by telling LeMay that he
had heard that LeMay and Medina were trying to organize
a union in the shop and that he was not going to have any
union .? LeMay asked Woods how he knew that he was
organizing . Woods replied that he had his sources, that he
would fire anybody who was organizing for the Union, and
that he would find out who they were. Woods further told
LeMay that he and Hogan did not need a union , and that
they could "just retire and close the shop." Woods asked
LeMay what he thought about that , and LeMay answered
that it was Woods' company and he could not tell Woods
how to run it . Woods then asked Hogan whether he thought
LeMay was organizing for the Union, and Hogan answered
no. LeMay then suggested to Woods that instead of having
employees come up individually to be told about Woods'
6 The findings above are based on Sprude's testimony which I regard as
reliable and credit . Hogan denied that he had any conversation with Sprude
on May 13 "regarding anything relating to this case " As previously noted, I
consider Hogan 's testimony as generally unreliable , and I therefore do not
credit this denial of Sprude 's testimony.
r As previously noted, Medina was another of the Respondent 's employ-
ees who had attended the Union 's first organizing meeting , signed a union
card , and received a supply of blank cards for soliciting other employees to
sign.
8 Woods admitted that he had a meeting with LeMay on May 13 in the
conference room at which Hogan was present , but his version of the subject
matter of their conversation was quite different from LeMay 's. Woods
testified that this meeting did not occur until after he made his speeches to all
the employees about the Union. According to Woods , this meeting with
LeMay was prompted by a complaint which he had received from Hogan
that LeMay could not get along with Joseph Tierney , his foreman in the
gnnding department of Pye and Hogan , and that he resolved this personnel
problem by suggesting at the meeting with LeMay that his work station be
moved from the grinding department of Pye and Hogan to the carpenter
shop of Packer Machine . Woods further testified that , following this meeting,
LeMay was so transferred but that he was retained on the Pye and Hogan
payroll to preserve his pension rights . I place no credence in Woods ' version
of this meeting with LeMay and I credit the Tatter 's version of their
conversation for the following reasons: I note initially that Woods did not
specifically deny the statements about the Union which LeMay attributed to
him. Moreover, Respondent's records in evidence of LeMay 's payroll
changes disclose quite clearly that on May 13 , 1975, the admitted date of this
conversation , LeMay was no longer working under Tierney 's supervision,
and thus belie Woods' testimony regarding the subject matter of this
conversation In this regard , G. C. Exh . 10, a payroll change notice dated
June 28, 1974, almost a year before Woods ' admitted meeting with LeMay,
states as follows : "After vacation , R. LeMay will assume responsibility for
cutter grind[ing] & mach[me] Rep[air ] in new Dept." The said document
which increased LeMay's rate of pay from $4.35 to $4.70 an hour effective on
July I, 1974, was signed by Tierney and Hogan . Thereafter, although
LeMay's wages were reviewed again on August 30, 1974, February 28, 1975,
views about union organization, why didn't Woods just
have a meeting with all the employees and tell them how he
felt. Woods thought that was a good idea and he asked
Hogan what he thought of LeMay's suggestion. Hogan
said, "okay," and Woods said that they would hold the
meeting with the employees downstairs in the inspection
rooms
Based on LeMay's credited testimony, I find that by
Woods' interrogation of LeMay about his union activities,
by his creation of the impression that he was engaging in
surveillance of his employees' union activities, by his threat
to discharge any employee who was organizing for the
Union, and by his threat to "close the shop" and "retire"
because of the union organizational activity, Respondent
engaged in further unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(axl) of the Act.
Following his meeting with LeMay and as suggested by
him, Woods and Hogan assembled all of Respondent's Pye
and Hogan employees and foremen in the inspection room
on the morning of May 13. Woods, who had only recently
returned to the plant after hospitalization for ulcers, told
the employees to gather around closely because he was
unable to speak loudly. He then said that he had heard that
there was union activity going on, that he did not want to
hear any more talk about a union , and that if he did he
would close the shop and they would all be out of work.
Woods further said that the last person who tried to
organize a union in the shop met with an unfortunate
accident, but that he was not strong enough at that time to
cause an accident .9
Based on the testimony of the employees credited above,
I find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(l) of
June 9, 1975, and August 29, 1975, and his hourly rate of pay was
successively increased to $5, $5 .25, and $5 .50, none ofthe said wage reviews
and payroll change notices were signed by Tierney, but two of them dated
August 30, 1974, and February 28, 1975, bear the signature of Woods, the
admitted manager of Packer Machine . (See G . C. Exh. 11, 12A, 12B, and
12C.) These documents thus clearly indicate that LeMay was transferred
from Tierney's supervision to Packer Machine in July 1974, before the wage
review on August 30 , 1974, and thus confirm LeMay's testimony that on
May 13, 1975, the date of his meeting with Woods and Hogan , Tierney was
not his foreman and there was no discussion of his differences with Tierney.
In the light of the foregoing, and from my assessment that Woods' testimony
was frequently evasive , occasionally implausible, sometimes self-contradic-
tory, and in general unreliable, I place no credence whatsoever in Woods'
version of his May 13 meeting with LeMay.
9 I base my findings above on the credited corroborative testimony of
Acevedo, Ingraham, Recchioni, LeMay, Sprude, and Robert Tierney, a
brother of Foreman Joseph Tierney . Woods' version of this talk, although
somewhat different from that of the employees credited above, conveyed
substantially the same message . According to Woods, he told the employees
that he had heard some scuttlebutt about a union ; that the Company was too
small to have a union ; that he would not work in a shop where there was a
union ; that some Englishman "wanted to organize a union in a shop and one
of the people went through the wall"; and that he was the man responsible
for the sales and would not be involved in a company that had a union
Woods' version of his May 13 talk to the employees was not corroborated by
either Hogan , any of his foremen who admittedly were present , or by any
employee , and I credit it only to the extent that it accords with the testimony
of the employees credited above . Woods also testified that he was prompted
to call this meeting, not because he had just heard from Hogan that union
organization was in progress , but to thank the employees for their notes and
gifts which he had received while he was ill. I regard this asserted reason for
this meeting as implausible and unworthy of credence . According to his own
testimony, Woods returned to the plant after his illness on May 6 or 7.
However, he did not call this meeting of the employees until immediately
after he heard that union organization was occurring in the plant . The timing
PACKER INDUSTRIES 185
the Act by Woods' statement that he would close the plant
and the employees would all be out of work if he heard any
more talk about a union. I further find that Woods' story
about the unfortunate accident which befell a former union
organizer, and his statement that he was currently too weak
to cause any accidents, constituted an implied subtle threat
of future physical violence to employees who engaged in
union organizational activity, and that Respondent thereby
further violated Section 8(a)(1).
After his May 13 meeting with Woods, LeMay received
from a union representative acquaintance a printed copy of
a leaflet entitled "Do You KNow" which listed 36 items of
"What Foremen and Supervisors Can NOT Do," and which,
if done, assertedly violated the Act.10 LeMay brought the
leaflet to the plant on the morning of May 15 and gave it to
Ingraham, one of the employee organizers for the Union.
During the lunchbreak that day, Ingraham, accompanied
by employees Medina and Recchioni, had eight copies
made of the leaflet at the library and brought them back to
the plant. After lunch, Ingraham posted one copy of the
leaflet on the wall of the men's room over the wash basin.
That same afternoon about 3:30 p.m., while Ingraham was
operating one of the milling machines in the plant, he
overheard a conversation between Hogan and employee
Edward Towler while they were standing at Towler's
machine about 2-1/2 feet away. According to Ingraham's
credited testimony, Hogan told Towler that President
Woods was "furious about the union business," and he
asked Towler if he knew who "was organizing the union."
Towler answered, "No." Hogan then said to Towler, "Well,
there's $50 to somebody who can come up with the names
of the organizers of this union." About 5 minutes later,
Towler asked Ingraham if he knew who had put up the
union leaflet in the men's room, and Ingraham replied that
he did not.11
Based on Ingraham's credited testimony, I find that
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
Hogan's interrogation of Towler as to the identity of the
union organizers and by his offer of a reward for anyone
who disclosed their identity. 12
2. The discharge of employee organizer Juan
Acevedo
Juan Acevedo was hired by Respondent on February 11,
1974, as a buffer in the burring department of Pye and
Hogan at $2.50 per hour. He admittedly was an intelligent
and satisfactory employee and was given progressive pay
raises in July 1974 to $2.70 an hour, in September 1974 to
$2.90 an hour and in December 1974 to $3 an hour.
Moreover, because of his admitted intelligence, and be-
cause he concededly "was a hard worker," Acevedo was
assigned the additional responsibility of assisting John
Pollard, Respondent's chief expediter, in moving parts from
of this meeting, as well as the content of Woods' statements thereat, belies
Woods' testimony regarding the purpose for convening it
10 G. C. Exh. 3.
i i Hogan denied that he had any discussion with any employee regarding
a $50 reward However , as previously indicated , I consider Hogan s
testimony as generally unreliable and I do not credit this denial . Moreover, I
regard Ingraham 's testimony which withstood rigorous cross -examination in
respect to this incident as more trustworthy.
2 Best Industrial Uniform Supply Company, Inc., 203 NLRB 1166, 1170
(1973)
one department to another.13 Acevedo testified that before
he was fired on May 15 he never received any warning or
complaint about his work from any supervisor or official of
Respondent. It is undisputed that no written warning notice
was ever issued to Acevedo, notwithstanding that Respon-
dent at all material times herein had warning notice forms
available for issuance . Pollard conceded that Acevedo "at
first" did the work of helping him with expediting "very
well." Pollard further testified that he received no comp-
laints from any supervisor about Acevedo's work before
May 1975.
As found above, Acevedo was one of six of Respondent's
employees who attended and participated in the Union's
first organizational meeting on Friday, May 9, after work.
Acevedo signed a union authorization card at that meeting,
and starting with Monday, May 12, he passed out union
cards to other employees in the plant and solicited them to
sign them before work, at lunchtime, and after work. On
Thursday, May 15, after lunch, Acevedo had occasion to go
to the men's room in the plant to wash his hands so that
they would be clean for his next job. According to
Acevedo's credited testimony, as he was washing, he saw on
the wall above the wash basin the union leaflet entitled "DO
You KNOW" which Ingraham had posted there. At that
moment, Foreman Edward Hamelin came into the men's
room, looked at Acevedo and at the leaflet on the wall, and
then, without saying a word, took the paper off the wall and
brought it over and showed it to Foreman John Ticino who
was nearby. Then, as Acevedo walked by them on his way
back to his job, he observed Hamelin, Ticino, and Clarence
Rider, another foreman, gazing at him as though he "was
responsible" for the presence of the poster on the men's
room wall. A short while later, as Acevedo was going to the
inspection department to get some boxes, he observed Vice
President Hogan reading the leaflet with his face "red like
tomatoes." That same afternoon at 4 p.m., Acevedo was
notified by Pollard that he was fired because he was not
doing his job. Acevedo disputed Pollard's statement and he
said that he did everything that Pollard asked him to do in
addition to tasks which were not required of him. Pollard
then said that he had told Acevedo earlier that day to go
back to work. Acevedo denied that Pollard had said that,
and he told Pollard that the real reason for his discharge
was because of the Union. Pollard, in turn, replied that that
was not true.
According to Pollard, Acevedo was fired because he was
not moving parts from one department to another when he
was requested by the department foremen to do so, but
rather when he felt like doing it. Pollard testified that he
first learned that Acevedo "wasn't doing his job" at the
beginning of May, about 2 weeks before he fired Acevedo,
and that he then promptly warned Acevedo that "if he
didn't straighten out, we'd have to discharge him." Pollard
13 The record is somewhat vague as to when Acevedo started to help
Pollard with parts expediting . Acevedo testified that he was already doing
this work when he received his second raise in September 1974. Pollard
testified that he could not remember when Acevedo began to assist hun with
expediting, and he estimated the date to be "maybe four months" before he
fired Acevedo on May 15, 1975. Hogan testified that Acevedo was assigned
to parts expediting about 5 or 6 months before his termination. I deem it
unnecessary to resolve this conflict.
186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
further testified that he again orally warned Acevedo about
a week later that "if he didn't start doing his job we'd have
to discharge him." According to Pollard, the decision to fire
Acevedo on Thursday, May 15, was precipitated by two
complaints which he received that day from Foreman
Joseph Tierney, one in the morning and another in the
afternoon, regarding Acevedo's failure to move parts from
his department when requested. As explicated hereinafter, I
consider the testimony of Pollard and all of the other
witnesses of Respondent regarding Acevedo's alleged
shortcomings and his summary termination as implausible,
contradictory, and unworthy of credence.
In the first place, I consider Pollard's testimony regarding
the oral warnings of discharge which he assertedly gave to
Acevedo as unworthy of any credence. Acevedo admittedly
was a hard worker and an intelligent employee until the
beginning of May when, according to Pollard, the first
complaint about Acevedo's failure to move parts when
requested allegedly was received by Pollard. Even assuming
arguendo that Pollard received such a complaint, and I do
not believe that he did, I regard it impossible to believe that,
upon its receipt, Pollard would then have promptly threat-
ened this previously satisfactory hard worker with dis-
charge as he testified he did . It is significant in this regard
that although Respondent concededly had written warning
notices available for use neither Pollard nor any of
Respondent's other foremen who assertedly complained
about Acevedo's lack of performance ever put any of their
alleged complaints about his work in writing. Moreover,
Pollard's testimony about Acevedo was quite implausible in
other respects. For example, Pollard first testified on direct
examination that when he received a complaint from a
foreman that Acevedo was not moving parts as requested,
he asked Acevedo, "How come?" and Acevedo replied that
he "didn't have time ," and that he would move the parts
when he had the time. On cross-examination, however,
Pollard testified that when he asked Acevedo why he had
not moved the parts he replied "on a couple of occasions"
that he would "do it when he got damn good and ready."
When Pollard was then asked why he did not fire Acevedo
when he received that response, Pollard testified, "Because
we needed the extra help." I place no credence in this
testimony of Pollard because I regard it as stretching
credulity beyond belief that Pollard or any other supervisor
would have tolerated such insubordination for an instant if
it in fact had occurred. Based on the foregoing, as well as
demeanor, I do not credit any of Pollard's testimony
regarding Acevedo's alleged shortcomings and the comp-
laints assertedly received about him.
President Woods testified that the decision to fire
Acevedo was made by Vice President Hogan, the manager
of Pye and Hogan, where Acevedo worked. According to
14 Hogan testified that he observed 20 of his employees standing in the
men's room for 10 minutes all at the same time reading the Union 's leaflet
"DO YOU KNOW" which was posted on the wall over the wash basin When
pressed for details regarding the said incident , Hogan professed an inability
to recall the name of any of the employees he allegedly had thus observed.
Moreover, Hogan further professed a lack of memory as to whether he spoke
to any of the employees about standing around and reading the leaflet I
regard Hogan 's testimony in these respects to be patently implausible and
incredible
is See fn 13,supra
16 For example , Ticino testified on direct examination that when he
Woods, he was not consulted regarding the decision to fire
Acevedo, and he had no prior knowledge of any problems
with Acevedo before he was fired. However, Hogan
testified contrary to Woods that he spoke to Woods about
"all the dischargees" before they were terminated. I regard
Woods' testimony in this respect as more reliable than
Hogan's which I consider to be patently implausible in
some respects. For example, Hogan testified that he
personally on "numerous times" observed Acevedo stand-
ing around doing nothing when he should have been
working. Yet, Hogan nevertheless testified that he never
spoke to Acevedo, either about his indolence, or about the
complaints which he allegedly had received from Pollard. I
find it impossible to believe that a plant manager like
Hogan, who admittedly is in the shop all day long, would
permit any employee to stand around doing nothing on
numerous occasions when he should be working without
even asking him why he was idle. Based on this and other
implausible testimony by Hogan,14 his evasive responses to
questions, and his demeanor, I place no credence in his
testimony regarding either Acevedo's alleged timewasting,
or about the complaints about Acevedo which he assertedly
received from Pollard.
The testimony of Respondent's foreman, John Ticino,
about his complaints about Acevedo is similarly unworthy
of any credence. Ticino testified that he complained to
Pollard about Acevedo "about three weeks after he
[Acevedo] took over the job" of assisting Pollard with
expediting. Inasmuch as Acevedo, at the latest, took over
the expediting work 4 months before he was fired,15
Ticino's testimony would thus place his first complaint
about Acevedo's work in about January or February.
However, Pollard testified, contrary to Ticino, that the first
complaint about Acevedo's performance was not received
by him until the beginning of May. Ticino further testified
that prior to Acevedo's termination he also complained
about his refusal to move parts when requested to President
Woods and to Foremen Clarence Rider and Joseph Tierney
at the weekly meetings of the supervisors. Ticino's testimo-
ny in this respect conflicts with that of Woods who, as
previously noted, testified that he had no prior knowledge
of any problems with Acevedo before he was fired.
Furthermore, although Foreman Rider testified for Re-
spondent regarding the discharge on the same day of
Ingraham, another of the employee union organizers, he
gave no testimony about any complaints which he either
made or received about Acevedo's work performance.
Based on the foregoing, other contradictions and implausi-
bilities, and on demeanor, I consider Ticino's testimony to
be worthy of little, if any, reliance.16 I therefore place no
credence in his testimony regarding his alleged complaints
observed the union leaflet "DO YOU KNOW" in the men's room, Acevedo, to
his knowledge, was not there . However, on cross-examination, Ticino first
denied that he so testified, and later eventually testified that he did not know
whether Acevedo was in the men's room at that time I place no credence in
either of these responses and credit Acevedo 's testimony that Ticino
observed him in the men's room reading the union leaflet Ticino also
testified that after he reported the presence of the union leaflet on the men's
room wall to Woods and Hogan, nobody, to his knowledge, inquired as to
who posted it. Ticino further testified that he did not discuss the instant case
with anyone at the Company, not even the other foremen. I regard Ticino's
testimony in all these respects as patently implausible and incredible
PACKER INDUSTRIES 187
to Woods, Rider, Tierney, and Pollard about Acevedo's
alleged failure to move parts when requested by him.
As previously noted, the complaints about Acevedo
which assertedly triggered his discharge in midweek on
Thursday, May 15, allegedly were made to Pollard by
Foreman Joseph Tierney. Respondent failed to call Tierney
to testify, and it offered no explanation for the failure to do
so. I infer from the failure to call Tierney that if he had been
called he would not have corroborated the testimony of
Pollard and Hogan regarding the complaints which he
allegedly made to them on May 15 about Acevedo's failure
to move parts when requested.17
In responding to the first charge filed by the Union in
Case l-CA-10825, Respondent, in a letter to Regional
Board Attorney Smith dated June 30 and signed by Woods,
contended that Acevedo (and Ingraham, another employee
union organizer) were terminated inter alia, because of "a
general turn down in business."18 However, at the hearing
in this case, Respondent raised no contention and adduced
no testimony that Acevedo's termination was in any way
motivated by business conditions. I conclude from all the
incredible, conflicting, and implausible testimony offered
by Respondent for Acevedo's peremptory termination,
from Respondent's apparent abandonment of the business
reason therefor stated in Woods' letter to the Regional
Office, and from Acevedo's credited testimony that he
never received any complaints about his work from any
official or supervisor of Respondent, that the reasons
asserted by Respondent for his precipitate dismissal are
pretexts designed to conceal the real reason for his
termination.
In the light of the pretextual reasons advanced for
Acevedo's termination, the real motivation therefor is quite
apparent. In Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation (Iron King
Branch) v. N. L. R. B ., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966), the
court of appeals aptly stated the following in respect to the
assignment of pretextual reasons for the discharge of
employees:
Nor is the trier of fact - here the trial examiner -
required to be more naif than is ajudge. If he finds that
the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly
can infer that there is another motive. More than that,
he can infer that the motive is one that the employer
desires to conceal - an unlawful motive - at least where,
as in this case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce
that inference.
The principle thus enunciated in Shattuck Denn, supra, is
clearly applicable to Acevedo' s termination.
Before Acevedo became one of the initial organizers of
the Union, he was regarded by Respondent as an "intelli-
gent" employee and a "hard" worker, and he was given
17 International Union (UAW) v. N. L.R B, 459 F.2d 1329 (C.A.D C.,
1972), 2 J. Wigmore , Evidence, Sec. 285 (3rd Ed . 1940).
is See G . C. Exh. 18.
19 Like Ticino, whose testimony I do not credit (see fn . 16, supra),
Hamelin testified that no one was in the men 's room when he discovered the
union leaflet on the wall , and that as far as he "can remember ," Acevedo was
not there . I place no credence in Hamelin 's testimony in this regard, and I
credit Acevedo's converse testimony for the following reason On cross-
examination , Hamelin was asked , inter aha, if he knew that Respondent was
opposed to the Union . Hamelin twice evaded a direct response to this
question and then testified obviously falsely, "I don 't know whether they're
successive raises in pay. Respondent, however, was utterly
opposed to the Union and, as found above on LeMay's
credited testimony, President Woods had threatened to fire
anybody who was organizing for the Union, and he had
stated that he had his sources and would find out who the
organizers were. In light of Vice President Hogan's interro-
gation of Towler as to who "was organizing the union," and
his offer of a $50 reward for anybody who came up with the
names of the organizers, it is fairly evident that Respondent
learned that Acevedo was one of those whose names it was
seeking. That conclusion is also supported by the timing of
Acevedo's peremptory discharge in midweek on the very
same day that he was observed by Foremen Hamelin and
Ticino in the men's room when they discovered the union
leaflet on the wall over the sink where Acevedo was
washing his hands, and by the looks Acevedo received from
Hamelin, Ticino, and Foreman Rider as he left the men's
room on that day.19
I conclude from all the foregoing, including the absence
of any prior reprimands or warnings about Acevedo's work,
the vacillating and pretextual reasons asserted for his
termination, Respondent's manifest hostility to the repre-
sentation of its employees by the Union, and its knowledge
or suspicion that Acevedo was one of the union organizers,
that Respondent terminated Acevedo's employment to
discourage membership in or support by its employees of
the Union, and that it thereby discriminated against
Acevedo in respect to tenure of employment and engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. The discharge of employee organizer William
0. Ingraham, Jr.
Ingraham was hired by Respondent on January 8 to work
for Pye and Hogan as a Bridgeport milling machine
operator at $3.75 an hour under the supervision of Foreman
Clarence Rider. Prior to being hired by Respondent,
Ingraham had worked 1-1/2 years for Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Company, one of Respondent's principal custom-
ers, as an experimental machine operator, and he had
studied the machine trade for 1 year at a technical school.
As previously noted, Ingraham, through his father, made
the arrangements for the first union organizational meeting
which took place after work on Friday, May 9. He signed a
union authorization card at that meeting, and starting
Monday, May 12, he began to solicit Respondent's employ-
ees to sign union cards before and after work in the
Company's parking lot outside the plant and wherever he
encountered them elsewhere. In addition, as noted above,
on May 15, Ingraham made copies of the union leaflet "DO
opposed to it or not. They haven't confided in me." Subsequently, on further
cross-examination , Hamelin admitted that he had attended Woods' May 13
meeting with the employees in which Woods stated "that they didn' t want a
union." In the light of the foregoing , as well as demeanor, I believe the
converse of Hamelin's denial of Acevedo's presence in the men's room to be
true . See, e.g, N LR.B v. United Mineral & Chemical Corporation, 391 F 2d
829, 833 (C.A. 2,1968), where the court said:
[T ]he . . evidence was of the very sort warranting a trier of the facts in
believing the truth to be the opposite of what was asserted
188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
You Lwow," brought them to the plant, and posted one
copy on the wall of the men's room over the wash basin.
At quitting time on May 15, Ingraham notified his
immediate Supervisor Richard LaDeaux that he would be
coming to work late the following morning because he had
to go to the hospital . The following morning (May 16)
between 7 and 7:30 a .m., Ingraham called Respondent's
office and left a similar message with one of the girls in the
office. Later that morning between 9:30 and 10 a.m.,
Ingraham again called the office to inform them that he was
through at the hospital and would be returning to work,
only to be advised over the telephone that he had been laid
off. That afternoon about 3 : 30 p.m ., Ingraham went to
Respondent 's plant and was given an envelope by Hogan
which contained two checks and a blue slip to the
Connecticut Unemployment Office according to which the
reason for his termination was that he "was not capable of
doing our type of work." 20 Ingraham's wage rate was
reviewed on March 21 by Foreman Clarence Rider and
Vice President Hogan. According to Ingraham 's credited
testimony , he was told then that he would not get a raise in
pay because he talked too much, and that he would be
reviewed again on June 1 .21 Ingraham further credibly
testified that, except for the said admonition about his
verbosity , he never received any warning that his work was
unsatisfactory nor any threat of discharge before he was
peremptorily terminated as described above . It is undis-
puted that no written warning notice was ever issued by
Respondent to Ingraham.
Vice President Hogan testified that he made the final
decision to fire Ingraham because "he couldn't do his
working. . . work was not up to our standards," and for
"no other reason ." However, as previously noted, in
Respondent's letter to the Regional Office dated June 30, it
contended that Ingraham (and Acevedo) also had been
"terminated as a result of . . . a general turn down of
business ." At the hearing in this case , Respondent offered
no testimony that his firing was motivated by financial
considerations . As indicated below, I regard the testimony
of Respondent's witnesses in respect to Ingraham's alleged
shortcomings as contradictory , implausible, and unworthy
of any credence , and I consider the asserted reasons for his
sudden termination in mid-morning on May 16 as a
transparent pretext to conceal the real motivation therefor.
Hogan testified that on one job that Ingraham worked
"almost 50 percent of the parts that he did weren't
acceptable ." He further testified that, at the time of
Ingraham's wage review on March 21, he told Ingraham
that he "would give him one more chance ," and that "if his
work didn't improve , we could not keep him ." Hogan also
testified that the final reason for Ingraham 's termination
involved a job on which he had sawed some parts "in the
wrong places," and then had thrown the improperly cut
parts into a barrel near the handsaw where they were later
discovered . Hogan estimated that these parts which Ingra-
ham allegedly had scrapped were discovered in the barrel
about "a week before" he fired Ingraham . When Hogan
was asked, "What did you do about it at that time," he
answered, "I just laid him off as soon as possible, or the
next, you know, when we laid off." Previously, when Hogan
had been asked by the General Counsel's representative
when he made the decision to fire Ingraham , he first had
evasively responded, "I don't keep a record of these dates,
ma'am, I work in the shop," then he testified that he did not
know when he made the decision, and finally he testified
that it was on the day Ingraham was fired.
I place no credence in any of the foregoing testimony of
Hogan . Although Respondent concededly possesses rec-
ords of the work performed by its employees, it produced
none to corroborate Hogan's testimony that the work
Ingraham did was not acceptable. The forms used by
Respondent on its wage reviews contain provision for
rating employees for ability, conduct, attendance, and
production as either excellent, good, fair, or poor. On
Ingraham's wage review form signed by Hogan and Rider
on March 21 (G. C. Exh. 6), there appears no rating for
Ingraham in respect to any aspect of his employment. I find
it impossible to believe that if, as Hogan testified, Ingraham
had been threatened with dismissal unless his work im-
proved, a notation to that effect would not have been made
on his wage review form, or at the very least, a rating of his
alleged lack of ability. I conclude from the absence of any
such notation on the form, and from my assessment of
Hogan's testimony as generally unreliable that, as Ingra-
ham testified, no such warning was given to him. Finally, I
place no credence in Hogan 's testimony that he based his
final decision to fire Ingraham on the discovery of the bad
parts which Ingraham had allegedly produced and
scrapped, for even assuming arguendo that Ingraham was
responsible for the improperly cut parts, if this were the real
reason for his termination he obviously would have been
fired upon the discovery of this alleged dereliction, and not
"as soon as possible," on the "next" layoff, or about "one
week later," as Hogan testified . In the light of the foregoing,
I regard the assignment of these reasons for Ingraham's
termination as pretexts designed by the Respondent to
conceal its true motivation for his dismissal on the morning
of May 16 when Ingraham was not even in the plant.
We come then to the testimony about the reason for
Ingraham's discharge given by Clarence Rider, Ingraham's
foreman. Rider testified that he and Hogan "had a couple
of talks" with Ingraham in which they assertedly told him
that "his quality had to improve or we would have to
terminate him." According to Rider, the occasion for this
talk was Ingraham 's wage review which assertedly occurred
in December 1974, a date Rider "was sure of." However,
when apprised by Respondent's counsel that Ingraham did
not start to work for Respondent until after December
1974, and he was shown the wage review form of Ingraham
which he had signed on March 21, 1975, Rider testified that
that was the date that Ingraham was warned of possible
discharge unless his work quality improved. But, when
Rider was asked on redirect examination by Respondent's
counsel to relate the conversation which had occurred on
that date, his response significantly omitted any reference
to any threat of discharge. Moreover , when Rider was
asked when , after Ingraham was hired , he first learned that
his work was unsatisfactory, Rider replied that Ingraham
20 See G . C. Exh. 8. 21 See G C. Exh. 6.
PACKER INDUSTRIES 189
worked for him 3 months before he made that discovery,
then Rider modified that response and said that Ingraham's
work was satisfactory during that initial period "in some
areas," and finally Rider contradicted his initial reply and
testified that Ingraham's work was unsatisfactory in some
areas during his first 3 months of employment. I conclude
from all the foregoing vacillations and self-contradictions,
as well as from the absence of any notation or warning on
Ingraham's wage review form dated March 21 that his work
was other than satisfactory, that I can place no credence in
Rider's testimony regarding either the unsatisfactory nature
of Ingraham's work or the alleged threat of termination if
his work quality did not improve, and I credit Ingraham's
contrary testimony that no such warning was given to him.
According to Rider, the incident which assertedly trig-
gered Ingraham's termination before the June 1 date
previously set for his next wage review was the discovery by
Leonard Butkiewicz (who admittedly was in charge of the
department when the finding was made) of some parts
which Ingraham allegedly had thrown into a scrap barrel.22
Rider testified that about 8 parts out of a lot of 210 on
which Ingraham had worked were brought to him by
Butkiewicz , and that the latter had told Rider that he had
found them in the scrap barrel. Rider further testified that
he then checked the dimensions of the parts with a pin
micrometer and found that they were one 100,000th of an
inch too short, and that he then asked Ingraham whether
"he was the one who destroyed the parts and threw them in
the garbage." Rider testified that Ingraham denied doing
so, that he then told Ingraham "that he was the only one
that had worked on the job in that area, so it could be no
one else," but that Ingraham still denied that he had done
it. According to Rider, that concluded his conversation
with Ingraham, but on cross-examination Rider added for
the first time that he also notified Ingraham at that time
that "we were going to terminate him from the company,"
and that as far as he, Rider, was concerned, "as of that
moment, I had fired him, yes." I place no credence
whatsoever in Rider's testimony regarding the incident
which assertedly triggered Ingraham's summary termina-
tion on the morning of May 16 while he was not in the
plant. I base this conclusion on the following considera-
tions.
I note initially that in Respondent's letter to the Regional
Office in response to the Union's charge in this case, there is
absolutely no reference to this incident which assertedly
motivated Ingraham's termination. I find it impossible to
believe that if such an incident had in fact occurred and had
precipitated Ingraham's discharge, Respondent would not
have given this reason for his termination in the letter in
which it was explaining why it fired him, especially since in
that same letter, it relied on a general downturn in business
as one of the reasons for his termination, a ground which it
apparently has since abandoned. I note further that
Respondent failed to call Butkiewicz, who assertedly found
the parts which Ingraham allegedly "destroyed" and threw
"in the garbage," and it offered no explanation for not
calling him to testify. I infer, from this failure to call
Butkiewicz and to thus subject him to cross-examination
regarding his alleged discovery of the scrapped parts, that if
called, he would not have supported Rider's testimony
regarding this incident 23 Moreover, even assuming arguen-
do that scrapped parts had been found by Butkiewicz,
Respondent produced no records, clearly available to it, to
show that Ingraham was responsible for the defective parts.
I note in this regard that when employee David A. Gerace
caused 19 pieces of a part to be "junked" because of
defective work he was given a written warning that a
repetition would be cause for discharge.24 Admittedly, no
such written warning was ever given to Ingraham. As
previously noted, Ingraham credibly testified that, prior to
his notification over the telephone on May 16 by the girl in
the office that he had been laid off, he had not been spoken
to by anyone in the Company about rejected parts, or
warned about possible termination. On the other hand,
Rider's testimony that he notified Ingraham on May 15 that
he was being fired "as of that moment" is inconsistent with
undisputed facts. Thus, if Ingraham had been so advised by
Rider, he obviously would not have notified Supervisor
LaDeaux that he was coming in late the next day because
he had to go to the hospital, nor would he have called
Respondent's office the next morning and left a similar
message . Moreover, if Ingraham had been fired on May 15
as Rider testified, the office girl who received Ingraham's
message on May 16 would not have relayed it to Butkiewicz
who apparently was in charge of Ingraham's department on
that day.25 I conclude from all the foregoing that Rider's
testimony regarding this alleged conversation with Ingra-
ham on the day before Ingraham actually was fired, about
scrapped parts which, according to Hogan, had been found
in a trash barrel about a week earlier, is worthy of no
credence whatever, and moreover is inconsistent with
Hogan's version of this alleged incident.
In the light of the incredible testimony adduced by
Respondent regarding this alleged reason for Ingraham's
termination, the absence of this reason in Respondent's
letter to the Region which purported to state the grounds
for Ingraham's discharge, and the abandonment of the poor
business reason asserted in the said letter, I conclude that
all of the reasons asserted by Respondent for Ingraham's
peremptory termination on the morning of May 16 while he
was not working are incredible pretexts fabricated by
Respondent to cloak its true motivation for this action.
The real reason for Ingraham's sudden discharge is fairly
apparent from the record. Ingraham, like Acevedo who was
fired the day before, was one of the Union's employee
organizers at Respondent's plant. Respondent was unalter-
ably opposed to the representation of its employees by the
Union. It was Ingraham who posted the union leaflet "Do
You icxow" on the men's room wall. Respondent apparent-
ly did not learn about Ingraham's connection with the
union leaflet until the morning of May 16 while Ingraham
was away from the plant. Months later, Hogan admitted to
employee Robert Muir that Ingraham was putting the
union leaflets on the men's room wall as fast as Respondent
was ripping them off, and this Respondent "couldn't
22 As previously noted, one of the issues in this case which will be 23 See fn . 17, supra.
considered , Infra is whether Butkiewicz is a supervisor and/or agent of 24 G.C. Exh. 20.
Respondent within the meaning of the Act. 25 G.C Exh. 19.
190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
allow." Moreover, a copy of the union leaflet admittedly
was maintained by Respondent in its personnel file on
Ingraham , and Respondent' s witnesses were unable to
explain, although asked, who put the leaflet in the said file
or why. I conclude from the foregoing that it is evident that
Ingraham's termination was motivated by his union activity
of posting a union poster on the men's room wall at
Respondent's plant and by Respondent's opposition to the
Union. The record does not disclose that Respondent had
any rule which prohibited employees from posting materi-
als there. I therefore conclude that by terminating Ingra-
ham's employment because he engaged in a union activity
protected by the Act, Respondent thereby discouraged
membership in or assistance to the Union by its employees,
and thereby further engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. Additional interference with, and restraint and
coercion of, employees' rights
At 8 a.m. on the morning of May 16, Jesus Medina,
another of the Union's employee organizers was notified by
Edward Towler, a fellow employee that he had been fired
and that he should go down and talk with Hogan. Medina
accordingly went down to Respondent's office and met
Hogan there. No one else was present. Hogan told Medina
that he had been fired because he was a union leader.
Medina protested that he did not want the Union in the
shop, and Hogan then asked him why, if that was so, he was
always talking to Ingraham. Medina answered that he
talked to Ingraham because he knew him from before. In
response to questions from Medina as to why Acevedo and
Ingraham had been fired, Hogan said that it was because
they were union leaders, but that he had put another reason
on their blue slips to avoid getting into trouble. Hogan then
cautioned Medina to forget what had happened and
Medina returned to work. Medina continued thereafter in
Respondent's employ until shortly before the hearing in this
case.26
Based on the foregoing credited testimony, I find that by
Hogan's May 16 statement to Medina that he, Acevedo,
and Ingraham were fired because they were union leaders,
Respondent further interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act,
and thus violated Section 8(aXI) of the Act.
That same evening of May 16, employee Richard
Remillard met Hogan at a stag party at the VFW Club in
Meriden, Connecticut. In the course of the conversation
which followed, Hogan told Remillard that he wished the
union situation at the plant cleared up, and that Woods
would close the shop rather than allow the Union in the
door. Remillard replied that perhaps a union was the best
thing for the Company.27
26 The findings above are based on Medina 's testimony which was
subjected to no cross -examination regarding this incident and which I credit
in these respects . Hogan 's only testimony regarding the said incident
consisted of a single blanket denial that he at any time discussed the
termination of Ingraham and Acevedo with any employee . As previously
noted , I regard Hogan 's testimony to be generally unreliable , and I do not
credit this denial
27 The findings above are based on Remillard 's testimony which I credit
in these respects Hogan admitted that he attended the stag party and that he
Based on Remillard's credited testimony, I find that by
Hogan's statement that Woods would close the shop rather
than let the Union in the door, Respondent further violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The discharge of Richard Remillard
Remillard was hired by President Woods on October 14,
1974, to work as an inspector in Respondent's quality
control department under the supervision of George
Shields, quality control manager, and Robert Moulison,
chief inspector. Remillard's initial rate of pay was set after
bargaining with Woods at $4.60 an hour, a rate higher than
all the other inspectors in the department, and equal to that
paid to Chief Inspector Moulison. Prior to his employment
by Respondent, Remillard had worked for a year and a half
at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Respondent's principal
customer, as an inspector of aircraft parts, and he also had
worked for 2 years for United Nuclear Company doing
machining, welding, and inspecting. Remillard was given
his first wage review by Hogan and Shields on December 2,
1974. He was rated at that time as good in ability and
conduct, and fair in attendance and production. Remillard
was given no raise at that time because, as he was told, his
rate of pay already was higher "than most of the inspectors
in the department." 28 Remillard also was told at this wage
review that there was no problem with his work perfor-
mance, but that his attendance should improve. Remillard
was given a second wage review on March 14, 1975, by
Shields and Woods, and he was told that he would get no
raise at that time "because money was tight," but that he
would be reviewed again in June.29
About a week before Remillard was fired by Respondent
on May 30, he became active in the union campaign at the
plant. At that time, Remillard signed a union authorization
card and he thereafter, before his termination, passed out
union cards to three employees and spoke to several others
to encourage them to join the Union. In addition, as found
above, on the night of May 16, after Vice President Hogan
told Remillard that Woods "would close the shop rather
than allow the union in the door," Remillard told Hogan
that "maybe [a] union was the best thing for the company."
Later in that same conversation, after Remillard said that
he hoped "eventually" to become an engineer, Hogan told
Remillard that he was going to let him go from the
Company, perhaps even the next day, and that he would be
doing Remillard a favor by firing him.
On Monday, May 19, following their discharge by
Respondent, Acevedo and Ingraham returned to the plant
during the employees' lunchbreak and engaged several of
the employees in conversation in the Company's parking
lot. While Remillard was standing next to Ingraham's truck
and talking to him, Hogan drove by on his way back from
lunch, and Acevedo and Ingraham waved union cards out
may have met Remillard there. He testified, however, that he drank heavily
that night from about 8:30 p.m . until he went home about 2.30 a.m. the
following morning, and that he could not remember what, if any, statements
he may have made to Remillard about the plant Remillard's testimony
credited above thus stands uncontroverted.
28 Remillard's first wage review is in evidence as Resp. Exh. 11
29 The findings above are based on Remillard's testimony which I credit
in these respects. There is no indication on Remillard's second wage review
that his work performance was other than satisfactory. (Resp. Exh. 18 )
PACKER INDUSTRIES 191
of their car windows at him. Remillard continued working
for Respondent the rest of that day and all of the following
day. On the mght of May 20, after work, Shields telephoned
Remillard at his home and told him that he had been fired
and, when Remillard asked him why, Shields said that he
did not know, but that maybe it was because Remillard
could not do the job. The following day, Remillard went to
the plant and picked up his inspection equipment and
received a blue slip from Respondent which stated only,
"Not capable of doing our type of work." 30
Respondent contends that it fired Remillard because he
was an incompetent inspector who approved parts for
shipment which should have been rejected, as a result of
which parts which he had approved were later rejected and
returned to Respondent by its customers. Respondent
further contends that it fired Remillard when it did
because, as a consequence of his faulty inspection of shroud
segment parts which it had manufactured for Pratt &
Whitney Aircraft Company, its principal customer, Pratt &
Whitney rejected many of the parts it received from
Respondent and ultimately canceled its contract for the
said parts. In support of these contentions, Respondent
introduced into evidence numerous documents which
indicate that many shroud segment parts which had been
shipped by Respondent to Pratt & Whitney were later
rejected by the latter. I nevertheless regard the testimony of
Respondent's witnesses in support of the contention that it
fired Remillard either because of these rejections, or
because of the alleged contract cancellation by Pratt &
Whitney, to be completely false, and I regard the assertion
of these reasons for his termination as pretexts by which
Respondent seeks to conceal its real reason for Remillard's
sudden termination after work on May 20. I base these
conclusions on the following considerations.
According to Shields, Remillard's supervisor and Re-
spondent's principal witness in respect to the reasons for
Remillard's discharge, Remillard was hired as a layout
inspector, a type of inspection which requires more skill
than mechanical inspection . Shields testified that Remillard
was not qualified to do layout inspection, and that, after 3
or 4 months, he accordingly reassigned Remillard to
mechanical inspection work. Shields further testified that
Remillard's work as a mechanical inspector also was not
acceptable because of the number of rejections and returns
which Respondent was getting of parts which Remillard
allegedly had approved. Shields testified that in November
1975 he notified Remillard that he wanted better inspec-
tion31 According to Shields, in December 1974 he assigned
Remillard to inspect some of the Pratt & Whitney shroud
segment job which consisted of about 3,000 parts; in
January or February, he put Remillard on this job "100
percent"; and, in the middle or the end of March, Shields
began to receive rejections of parts from Pratt & Whitney
30 The copy of this slip which was obtained by the General Counsel from
Respondent 's records contains the additional notation "on our copy only,
reference P&Whitney segements [sic ]." (G. C. Exh 4.) According to Hogan,
it was he who instructed the office girl what to put on the blue slip, his
instructions did not include any reference to the Pratt & Whitney segments,
and he had no knowledge of how the additional verbiage was put on
Respondent's copy of the blue slip. However, Woods testified, contrary to
Hogan , that the blue slip was typed by the office secretary pursuant to his
instructions , and that he ordered the additional notation thereon on the same
which Remillard assertedly had approved for shipment. At
that time, Shields allegedly told Remillard that "he had
better do a better job of inspection." Shields further
testified that Remillard's work thereafter improved some-
what but that the improvement did not last,land that about a
month before Remillard's termination, he told Hogan,
"Remillard was not doing the job," and Hogan said, "if I
felt he wasn't qualified to do the job to leave [sic] him go."
However, Shields did not then fire Remillard, and when he
was asked why, in the light of Hogan's alleged authoriza-
tion, he did not do so, Shields replied, "Because I put him
on mechanical inspection. I figured he could probably do
the job there. I don't want to lose anybody unless I have
to." Shields also testified that prior to his conversation with
Hogan in which he assertedly was authorized to fire
Remillard but didn't, he also had called Remillard up to the
office, and he and President Woods talked to him about his
faulty inspection work. Shields finally testified that the
ultimate decision to fire Remillard was recommended by
him and approved by Hogan when Shields allegedly
received a telephone call from Pratt & Whitney canceling
the shroud segment contract because of the numerous
rejections of faulty parts which Remillard assertedly had
approved for shipment to Pratt & Whitney.
Shields' testimony above is rife with inconsistencies,
contradictions, and implausibility, and I place no credence
in any of it. His testimony that Remillard was not qualified
to do layout inspections and that in November 1974 he told
Remillard that he wanted better inspections is patently
unworthy of any credence in the light of the wage review
form which Shields signed on December 2, 1974, in which
he rated Remillard's ability as "Good." Shields' further
testimony that about a month and a half before Remillard
was fired he and President Woods had a conference with
Remillard in Woods' office in which they discussed
Remillard's allegedly faulty inspection work is contrary to
Woods' testimony that before Remillard's termination he
had no prior knowledge that Remillard was "unknowledge-
able or incapable." Shields' attempted explanation on
cross-examination for not firing Remillard 1 month before
his actual discharge, when he assertedly was specifically
authorized by Hogan to do so, is patently implausible and
self-contradictory. Thus, Shields' testimony that he did not
fire Remillard at that time because he then assigned him to
mechanical inspection work which he thought Remillard
"could probably do" contradicts Shields' prior testimony
on direct examination according to which Remillard
already had been then doing only mechanical inspection
work for several months. Likewise, Shields' further explana-
tion that he did not want to lose anybody unless he had to is
manifestly inconsistent with his testimony about Remil-
lard's alleged lack of ability and his alleged responsibility
for the Pratt & Whitney rejections. Another example of
day that the rest of the slip was typed I place no credence in Woods'
testimony and find , contrary thereto, that the additional notation was quite
obviously an afterthought designed by Respondent for use in this case, for
otherwise the notation would also have been included on the original blue
slip which was given to Remillard
31 Since Remillard was fired on the night of May 20, 1975, and was no
longer working for Respondent in November 1975, it is obvious that Shields'
reference to 1975 was erroneous and that he undoubtedly meant November
1974, the only November that Remillard worked for Respondent.
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shields' self-contradictory testimony is disclosed by his
attempt to explain why he notified Remillard of his
discharge by telephone after work . On direct examination,
Shields first testified , "I got a call from Pratt and Whitney
that they were cancelling the contract on this [shroud
segments ] job . . . because of the rejection rate on it."
Then, inconsistent with that explanation of Remillard's
after work hours discharge , Shields testified that "one to
two days" after he "received oral notification of the
cancellation [of the contract ]," he suggested to Hogan that
,.we let him [Remillard ] go because he is unable to do our
type of work ," and Hogan authorized Shields to fire him.
Still later , on cross-examination , Shields admitted, contrary
to his testimony on direct , that he did not receive the
telephone call which allegedly canceled the Pratt &
Whitney shroud segments contract, that he did not know
who did, and that he notified Remillard of his discharge at
home at night because he was ordered to do so by Hogan
during an evening production meeting of supervisors at
which Hogan had told him about the alleged contract
cancellation . All of the foregoing persuade me that Shields'
testimony is completely unreliable.
The records introduced by Respondent into evidence
clearly indicate that there were many rejections by Pratt &
Whitney of shroud segment parts received by it from
Respondent . I find, however, that these rejections resulted,
not from any lack of ability or fault of Remillard, but from
the manner in which he was instructed by Shields to inspect
the said parts . I base that fmding on the following. The
Pratt & Whitney shroud segments job admittedly was a
rush order and Remillard worked considerable overtime
hours and on weekends on it . Remillard credibly testified
that he had been instructed by Shields to inspect these parts
on a random sample basis and not on a 100-percent basis as
Pratt & Whitney required.32 Remillard also credibly
testified that he had been instructed by Shields to skip the
inspection of certain dimensions of the parts.33 Moreover,
Remillard was not the only inspector who had worked on
the inspection of these parts , and Shields admitted that he
had no way of telling whether the particular parts referred
to in the rejection slips in evidence had been inspected by
Remillard or another inspector . Under these circumstances,
I place no credence in the testimony of Shields and Hogan
that they attributed the Pratt & Whitney rejections either to
faulty inspection or lack of competence on the part of
Remillard, for they clearly had no rational basis for doing
so.
Moreover, I place no credence in the testimony of Shields
and Hogan that the shroud segments contract was can-
celed, either as a result of Remillard 's allegedly faulty
inspection, or for any other reason . I base this conclusion
on the following considerations . According to Shields, after
he assertedly was notified orally of the cancellation of the
shroud segments contract "because of the rejection rate on
it," Pratt & Whitney also allegedly canceled the contract in
writing . After expressions of concern by me on the absence
from the record of the written contract cancellation, and of
32 Shields admitted that he sometimes instructs his inspectors to inspect
on a sample basis and to report that 100-percent inspection had been
performed , but he denied that he issued such instructions on the Pratt &
Whitney shroud segments job. I do not credit his denial.
33 Robert Muir and Alfred Sprude similarly credibly testified that they
my desire that it be "put in evidence," Respondent finally
on the last day of the hearing offered what it asserted to be
the said cancellation of the contract . It was a typewritten
statement on a Western Union telegram form which bore
no date or time , and which merely stated that Respondent
was to "stop shipments [of the shroud segments] until
further notice." 34 I rejected the said exhibit because
President Woods, through whom it was offered , admitted
that he had no recollection of ever having seen it before,
and because it appears not to be a genuine telegram which,
as a matter of common knowledge, always bears a date and
time when it is transmitted . Moreover , Shields admitted on
cross-examination that shroud segment parts which former-
ly had been shipped to Pratt & Whitney in East Hartford,
Connecticut, and then reshipped by Pratt & Whitney to its
plant in Canada, were not just shipped directly by Respon-
dent to Pratt & Whitney in Canada. I conclude from all the
foregoing that Pratt & Whitney never canceled its shroud
segments contract with Respondent , either because of the
rejection rate, or for any other reason , and I regard the
assertion of this reason for Remillard 's termination as
another fabrication of Respondent to becloud its true
reason for his dismissal.
Viewed in the light of the pretextual reasons asserted for
Remillard's termination , the real reason therefor is fairly
apparent from the record . Respondent is utterly opposed to
the representation of its employees by the Union. On the
night of May 16 at the VFW Club, Remillard disclosed to
Hogan that he was prounion when he told Hogan that the
Union might be a good thing for the Company. On the
following Monday, May 19 , Respondent also learned that
Remillard was "consorting with the enemy" when Hogan
observed Remillard in the company of Ingraham who, as
found above, had been fired just the previous Friday
because he was a union activist. Respondent thus knew or
suspected that Remillard was also a union organizer. In the
light of the pretextual reasons asserted for his termination,
it is thus fairly apparent that the real motive for Remillard's
termination was to discourage its employees from joining or
supporting the Union. I therefore find that by its summary
termination of Remillard for this reason, Respondent
thereby further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
6. The denial of a wage increase to Mario
Recchioni
Mario Recchioni was hired by Hogan to work for
Respondent on January 16, 1975, as a burrer in the burr
room of Pye and Hogan at $2.50 an hour. At the time he
was hired, Recchioni had applied for a job as a machinist
and he was told by Hogan that they had no need for one at
that time, but that if a vacancy occurred he would be
moved up to the milling department or the lathe depart-
ment . On March 21, while still working as a burrer,
Recchioni was given a 20-cent raise to $2.70 an hour. On
May 9 , Recchioni attended the first organizing meeting of
the Union and signed a union authorization card, and he
also were frequently instructed by Shields to skip the inspection of certain
dimensions of parts , and Muir also testified that he often was told by Shields
to approve parts which he considered defective.
34 Resp . Exh. 28 (rejected).
PACKER INDUSTRIES 193
also was given a supply of union cards with which to solicit
signatures from other employees. In the latter part of May
or early June, Recchioni was transferred to the milling
department where he was told that he would be working
under the supervision of Leonard Butkiewicz and Richard
LaDeaux. After working in the milling department for
about a month, Recchioni asked Butkiewicz for a raise and
Butkiewicz said he would talk to Hogan about it. About 10
minutes later, Butkiewicz came back and asked Recchioni
if he was involved in the Union. Recchioni told Butkiewicz
to go ask Jesus Medina who knew everybody who was so
involved. Butkiewicz then told Recchioni that Hogan had
denied him a raise because he was involved in the Union.
Butkiewicz continued to ask Recchioni whether he was so
involved, and Recchioni eventually admitted that he was.
On July 25, Recchioni quit his employment with Respon-
dent.35
The parties stipulated at the hearing that in July 1975, the
wage rate of employees in Respondent's burring depart-
ment ranged from $2.95 to $4.25 an hour, and that those in
the milling department varied from $3.95 to $5.35 an hour.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by its denial of a wage
increase to Recchioni because of his involvement with the
Union, and that it further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by Butkiewicz' interrogation of Recchioni regarding his
union activity. In respect to these alleged violations, Hogan
testified that at the March 21 wage review of Recchioni, at
which he was given a 20-cent raise to $2.70 an hour, the
next wage review for Recchioni was scheduled for Septem-
ber, and Recchioni quit before them. Hogan gave no
testimony as to whether or not Butkiewicz had asked him in
July for a raise for Recchioni and, if so, what his response
was. Respondent did not call Butkiewicz to testify and it
offered no explanation for not doing so. It contends,
however, that Butkiewicz is not a supervisor or agent of
Respondent within the meaning of the Act, and that it
therefore is not responsible for what Butkiewicz said or
asked. I reject Respondent's contention that Butkiewicz is
not its supervisor and/or agent for the following reasons:
Ingraham credibly testified that when President Woods
went to the hospital, he was informed by Foreman Clarence
Rider that Hogan was taking over Woods' office duties
upstairs, that he, Rider, would be general foreman, and that
Butkiewicz would be foreman. Ingraham further credibly
testified that Rider then also told him that he was to report
directly to either Butkiewicz or Richard LaDeaux for his
assignments. Thereafter, Ingraham received his job assign-
ments from Butkiewicz. Robert Tierney, another employee,
similarly credibly testified that he was notified by Rider
that Butkiewicz was the foreman. Hogan and Rider both
denied that they ever told any employee that Butkiewicz
was a foreman, but, as previously noted, I regard their
testimony as unreliable and I do not credit their denials.
Moreover, I note in this respect that Rider admitted that
Butkiewicz was in charge of the milling department when
he allegedly found the faulty parts which Ingraham
assertedly had discarded in a trash barrel. I note further
as The findings above are based on the testimony of Recchioni which was
uncontroverted and which I credit in all these respects
36 G. C Exhs. 19 and 20.
that when Ingraham called Respondent's office on May 16
to report that he would be coming in late, a note to that
effect was sent by the office to Butkiewicz, and that when
Respondent issued a warning notice to employee Gerace,
Butkiewicz and Mrs. Roy, Woods' secretary, signed the
notice as witnesses.36 I conclude from the foregoing that
even assuming that Butkiewicz is not a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act, Respondent held him out to its
employees as such, and that, therefore, it is responsible for
his conduct as its agent within the meaning of Section 2(13)
of the Act.
I accordingly infer from Respondent's unexplained
failure to call Butkiewicz to testify, and from the significant
difference between Recchioni's wage rate of $2.70 an hour
and the lowest rate of $3.95 an hour which Respondent
paid to its other milling department employees, that, as
Recchioni was told by Butkiewicz, he was dented a wage
increase by Hogan because of his involvement with the
Union. I therefore find that by denying Recchioni an
increase in wages for that reason Respondent discouraged
membership in and support of the Union and thereby
further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I further
find that by Butkiewicz' interrogation of Recchioni about
his union involvement Respondent also further violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. Additional interrogation and the creation of
the impression of surveillance
According to the uncontroverted and credited testimony
of Roger LeMay, about 2 months before his employment
was terminated by Respondent and thus about September
1975, while he was working in the welding shop, President
Woods came over and asked him what he thought about
unions in general and about a union in Respondent's shop.
LeMay responded that he had worked in three or four
shops that had unions which "were okay," but that "a
union would not work here because too many people are
scared." Woods then told LeMay that he had heard that
LeMay was organizing, and he asked LeMay if he was in
the Union. LeMay replied that he was not. Woods then said
that he had a list of the people who were in the Union, who
were not, and who were "maybe's," and that LeMay was on
the union list 37
Based on the foregoing credited testimony of LeMay, I
find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by Woods' interrogation of LeMay regarding his union
status, and by creating the impression that Respondent was
engaging in surveillance of its employees' union activities
by accusing LeMay of being a union organizer and by
telling him that he had a list of employees which indicated
their predilections in respect to the Union.
8. Woods' November 17 meetings with employees
On Monday, November 17, President Woods conducted
a series of eight meetings with all of Respondent's employ-
ees in small groups of from 4 to 10 employees. The meetings
were held in the Pye and Hogan office. At the commence-
37 Although Woods testified for Respondent regarding LeMay's subse-
quent termination in November 1975, he gave no testimony regarding this
conversation
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meat of each meeting the employees who attended were
handed two pieces of paper, one of which listed the asserted
value of all the fringe benefits which Respondent provided
the employees, and the other was a typewritten copy of a
speech which Woods read to the employees about Respon-
dent's allegedly "bad financial bind," and about the
Union's continuing organizational activities . In the speech,
Woods told the employees, "You don't have to belong to a
union," and that if they were "pressured to join the union
movement" against their wishes , they could file a charge
with the Board.38 After Woods read the speech to each
group , a discussion and question and answer period
followed . According to the uncontroverted and credited
testimony of Alfred Sprude who attended the fifth group
meeting on November 17, during the course of the
discussion period , an unidentified employee asked Woods
how long the union activity would continue , and Woods
replied that "it would go on and on and the only way to
stop it would be to get these people to leave ." Sprude
further testified that Woods also said that "he suspected or
knew who was against him and he had a particular spot in
his back for these people." 39
In the context of Woods' antiunion speech, his statement
that he knew or suspected who was against him clearly was
a reference to prounion employees, and Woods' further
statement that he had a spot on his back for those people,
although somewhat ambiguous , nevertheless subtly implied
a threat of some form of reprisal against them . I according-
ly find that by Woods' said statement Respondent further
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Similarly, in view of its
context , Woods' answer to an employee's question that the
only way to terminate union activity from "going on and on
would be to get these people to leave," appears to be
another subtle threat that union activists would be forced to
leave their employment by Respondent. I therefore find
that by this statement Respondent further trenched on
employee rights guaranteed by the Act and violated Section
8(ax 1).
9. The termination by the Respondent of three
additional union activists
Starting with the inception of the union organizing
campaign in May 1975, the Union held meetings of
Respondent's employees about once every 3 weeks. At one
such meeting held on November 13, the employees who
attended discussed rumors which they had heard of an
impending layoff at the Company. A day or two after the
union meeting, Respondent posted a notice over its
timeclock signed by President Woods which stated as
follows: "There will be no-none-layoffs now or in the
near future and you know where these rumors come from."
At the union meeting on November 13, the union represen-
tative also urged the employees to be more open in their
support of the Union, and Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude,
and Wallace Jones, all active union organizers, agreed to
put IAM union stickers on the cars which they drove to
38 Resp . Exhs. 8-a and 8-b.
39 Woods did not deny making the statements attributed to him by
Sprude , and his secretary 's (Mrs. Roy's) transcribed notes of what transpired
at these meetings admittedly did not purport to be a verbatim transcript of
what was said.
work. On Monday, November 17, LeMay, Sprude, and
Jones drove to work with union stickers posted in promi-
nent places on their cars , and parked their cars in
Respondent's parking lot near the door where everyone
goes in to work. That same day, Woods conducted his series
of group meetings with Respondent 's employees to discour-
age their support of the Union during which he said that he
knew or suspected who was against him and that he had a
spot on his back for those people. Two days later, about
11:40 a.m., and in midweek on Wednesday, November 19,
Respondent terminated the employment of LeMay,
Sprude, and Jones allegedly for lack of work, and it has not
since reinstated any of them.
The complaint in this case alleges that LeMay, Sprude,
and Jones were terminated because of their membership in
and activities on behalf of the Union. Respondent, on the
other hand, contends that these three employees were laid
off because of its dire financial straits and because of the
necessity to reduce overhead by eliminating the nonproduc-
tive jobs on which these three employees worked. As
hereinafter explicated, I place no credence whatever in the
pretextual reasons asserted for the termination of these
three union activists, and I conclude moreover that, even
assuming that a layoff was necessary, the selection of
LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was motivated by their support
of the Union.
(a) Roger LeMay
LeMay was hired by Respondent on May 20, 1972, as a
thread and surface grinder. He also did surface grinding
contract work for Respondent.41 In 1974, after his vacation,
LeMay was given responsibility by Respondent for cutter
grinding and machine repairing. During the last "couple of
months" before his termination , LeMay, in addition to his
other duties , also was assigned to assist in doing piping and
sheet metal work on a machine which Packer Machine was
manufacturing for the Xerox Corporation. Prior to his
employment by Respondent, LeMay had worked 4-1/2
years for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft as a machinist and
operator of grinders, thread cutters, drill presses, and other
machines. Respondent quite obviously regarded LeMay as
a competent and satisfactory employee, for, in the 3-1/2
years he worked for it, he was given eight successive pay
raises, the last of which, given to him on September 12,
1975, just 2 months before his termination, brought his rate
of pay up to $5.50 an hour.
As previously noted, LeMay was one of Respondent's
employees who attended the Union's first organizational
meeting . Thereafter, LeMay signed up four or five other
employees to union authorization cards at Respondent's
shop and, until his termination, he continued to solicit
employees to sign union cards but without success. As
found above, in September 1975, Woods told LeMay that
he had heard that he was organizing for the Union, and that
he had a list of the employees who were in the Union and
that LeMay was on that list. In addition, on and after
4° The findings above are based on the credited testimony of LeMay and
Sprude.
41 Contract work was work performed by Respondent 's employees as
independent contractors either in Respondent's shop or in their homes.
PACKER INDUSTRIES
November 17, LeMay had IAM stickers in conspicuous
places on his camper which he parked daily in Respon-
dent's parking lot. I conclude from the foregoing, contrary
to Woods' testimony, that he had knowledge of LeMay's
active support of the Union before he decided to terminate
LeMay's employment 42
On Wednesday, November 19, shortly before noon, while
LeMay was in the process of repairing a milling machine,
he was instructed to go to the foreman's office and he there
met Woods and John H. Gade, the assembly room foreman
of Packer Machine. Woods told LeMay that he was laid off
and he gave him a blue slip which stated that it was for
"lack of work." LeMay asked Woods how his layoff could
be for lack of work since machines were always breaking
down and needed repairing. Woods replied that the
machine which Respondent had made for Xerox was now
completed and that there was no more work. LeMay
responded that he had not been hired to work on that
machine and that he had just been helping out on it. Woods
merely repeated that the machine was finished and that
LeMay was laid off. LeMay then accused Woods of laying
him off because he was organizing for the Union. Woods
conceded that that was why he "was getting rid" of LeMay.
LeMay retorted that Woods would "have to get rid of a lot
of guys to get rid of the Union." Woods responded that he
did not care and that he would get rid of everybody if he
had to. LeMay asked Woods to repeat what he had just said
before a witness other than Woods' witness, Foreman
Gade. Woods replied that LeMay did not need a witness, he
was "being laid off for lack of work," and he instructed
LeMay to pick up his tools and leave the plant. Woods then
accompanied LeMay to Respondent's carpenter shop and,
while LeMay was segregating his tools from those of
Respondent, Woods told LeMay that he could not under-
stand why he would be organizing a union when he was
making $5.50 an hour and was his "own boss." LeMay
replied that "the benefits weren't any good," and that there
were employees in the burr room who were lucky to be
making $3 an hour. Woods then assisted LeMay in loading
his tools on LeMay's truck and LeMay left the plant.43
(b) Alfred Sprude
Sprude was hired by Respondent on February 28, 1972,
as a first piece and layout inspector. Before that, Sprude
had worked for 2 years for Pratt & Whitney Aircraft as a
layout inspector of precision aircraft parts and , for 3 years
before that, he had worked for the Respondent in final
inspection. About 6 or 7 months after Sprude returned to
work for Respondent , Woods told Sprude that "he needed
42 Woods testified that he first became aware that LeMay was interested
in the Union when he notified LeMay of his termination. I place no credence
in Woods' testimony to this effect.
43 The findings above are based on the testimony of LeMay whom I
regard as a credible and reliable witness and credit in these respects. Woods
admitted that, when he told LeMay that he was being laid off for lack of
work, LeMay accused him of terminating his employment because of his
union activity According to Woods, however, he then told LeMay that he
did not care whether LeMay was involved with the Union, and that he did
not want to know anything about it. Although Respondent called Foreman
Gade to corroborate Woods' version of this conversation, all Gade could
recall was that Woods told LeMay that he was being laid off for lack of work,
and that LeMay then said "that he was not being laid off for that reason but
for his union activities." Gade also testified that his presence at this meeting
195
a young bright intelligent individual to take over the lab,"
and he asked Sprude if he would be interested in taking on
the job. Sprude agreed, and he thereafter spent 80 to 85
percent of his time testing parts for imperfections by the
zyglo and magnoflux processes in the Meriden Metal
Lab 44 When Sprude had no work to perform in the lab, he
spent the balance of his time in material handling, treating
parts by other processes, and working in the inspection
room. Respondent quite obviously regarded Sprude as a
competent and satisfactory employee, for in the 3 years and
9 months he worked for it after he was rehired in 1972 he
was given eight successive raises in pay. The last such pay
raise which was given to Sprude in July 1975, just 4 months
before his termination, brought his rate of pay up to $4.95
an hour, and Sprude was then rated by Respondent as
"Excellent" in ability, and "Good" in conduct, attendance,
and production.45
As previously noted, Sprude was one of the employees
who participated in the Union's initial organizational
meeting where he signed a union authorization card and
received a supply of additional cards to solicit other
employees to sign. Following that first union meeting,
Sprude passed out union cards to other employees in the
street outside Respondent's plant. As found above, on May
13, the day after solicitation of signatures to union cards
began at the plant, Hogan told Sprude, "I hear you're trying
to start a union." Sprude thereafter attended all the Union's
meetings which were held about every 3 weeks. On
Monday, November 17, just 2 days before Sprude's
employment was terminated in mid-morning, Sprude put
an IAM union sticker on the windshield of his car which he
backed into his parking space close to the entrance door to
the plant so that the sticker would be visible. As found
above, Woods told LeMay that he had a list of the
employees who were in the Union. Moreover, Foreman
Gade, a witness for Respondent, admitted that Respon-
dent's was "a small shop [and] you're bound to hear about
it [union activity]." I conclude from all the foregoing that
Respondent knew before it terminated Sprude that he was
an active supporter of the Union.
On Wednesday, November 17, about 11:40 a.m., al-
though Sprude was performing black oxiding of some parts,
a process which would not be completed until about 2 p.m.,
and he had been told by Foreman Shields that more parts
were coming in that day for magnaflux or zyglo testing,
Hogan came into the lab with Foreman Rider and told
Sprude that he was being laid off. Sprude asked Hogan why
he was being laid off, and Hogan replied, "There is no work
for you." Sprude remonstrated that there was plenty of
with LeMay had been requested by Woods, and he admitted that he had
never before been called on to participate in an employee's layoff. As
previously noted, I consider Woods' testimony as generally unreliable, and I
therefore credit his version of this termination meeting only to the extent that
it accords with that of LeMay credited above.
44 See sec.. III , A, of this Decision entitled "Background Facts Regarding
Respondent."
Sprude admittedly was certified by the Magnaflux Corporation to test by
its process for the period from March 2, 1973, to March 2, 1976, and he also
was certified periodically by Hamilton Standard Corporation and by Avco-
Lycommg, customers of Respondent, to test and inspect parts destined for
them.
45 See G. C Exh. 13.
1% DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work to do from the orders he had seen . Hogan merely
reiterated , "There is no work for you, we'll have to lay you
off."
(c) Wallace Jones96
Jones was hired by Respondent on May 2, 1975, to work
as a cutter grinder , sharpening tools , drills , and reamers at
$3.50 an hour. Jones admittedly was a very skillful cutter
grinder.
Jones signed a union authorization card , and he attended
the union meeting on November 13 at which the business
representative urged the employees to be more open in their
support of the Union. As noted above, Jones thereafter on
November 17, placed an IAM union sticker on his car
which he drove to work daily and parked in Respondent's
parking lot 47 On Wednesday, November 19, just before
noon, Hogan notified Jones that he was laying him off, and
he gave Jones a blue slip which stated that it was for "lack
of work." 48
(d) The pretextual reasons asserted by Respondent
for the layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones
According to President Woods, the decision to lay off
employees was triggered by his receipt of a financial report
from Respondent 's comptroller for the 4-month period
from July 1 to October 31, 1975, which allegedly showed
that Respondent was "getting seriously into debt," and a
decline in the "backlog of orders , in sales, and in profit."
Upon the receipt of this report , Woods and Hogan
allegedly decided that they "had to reduce as much of the
overhead as possible ," that the jobs of cutter grinding,
machine repair and of magnaflux and zyglo inspection were
"non-productive ," and so they decided "to eliminate"
LeMay, Sprude , and Jones , the incumbents in those jobs.
Similarly , George Slater, Respondent's comptroller, testi-
fied that in November 1975 he made recommendations in
writing to Woods to the effect that , unless the cost of sales
and selling expense was reduced or sales increased, Woods
would have "to shrink the size of the company so that the
cash flow would be equated in and out." Slater further
testified that he also recommended a layoff as a means of
48 Jones did not testify at the hearing According to the General Counsel,
he was not available to testify because of his absence out-of-state in Florida,
initially because of the illness of his mother , and subsequently because of his
own eye surgery
47 I base the findings above on the credited testimony of LeMay and
Sprude
48 According to Hogan , when he notified Jones that he was being laid off
"because we had to cut overhead," he at the same time told Jones that if he
came back in a few days , he would discuss giving him a production job.
Hogan further testified that Jones never thereafter came back to discuss a job
with him . When Hogan was asked on cross-examination why he did not
discuss another job with Jones when he laid him off , Hogan answered,
"Because I didn't feel like it." Hogan further testified that after the layoff he
saw Jones handing out union leaflets to employees as they came in to work.
Although uncontroverted , I place no credence in Hogan 's testimony that he
offered to consider Jones for other so-called productive employment , for the
following reasons in addition to my previously indicated lack of regard for
the reliability of his testimony. In the first place, in the light of Jones'
admitted skill as a cutter grinder and Respondent 's conceded need for some
cutter grinding work at all times, I find it difficult, if not impossible to believe
that if Hogan really intended to offer other production work to Jones, he
would not have done it before, rather than after , he laid Jones off. Moreover,
I am persuaded by Jones' admitted failure to follow up on Hogan's alleged
achieving that objective, but he later modified that testimo-
ny and stated that he only suggested to Woods that he
reduce his labor costs, but did not tell Woods how that
should be done. As indicated hereinafter, I place no
credence in the testimony adduced by Respondent that the
layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was required or
motivated by financial considerations , and I regard the
assignment of this reason for their precipitous discharge in
midday and midweek as another pretext to conceal the real
reason for their termination.
Respondent failed to produce Slater's report upon which
it allegedly based its decision to lay off LeMay, Sprude, and
Jones, and it asserted as the reason for its failure to do so
that the said report was no longer in existence . I regard this
explanation as incredible . Respondent admittedly knew
when it laid off LeMay that he was contending that his
termination was motivated by antiunion considerations and
that he intended to file charges with the Board to effectuate
his reinstatement . Moreover, at the time of the layoff, there
were already pending against Respondent charges filed by
the Union with the Board which alleged that it had fired
Acevedo , Ingraham , and Remillard because of their mem-
bership in and activities on behalf of the Union. Under the
circumstances , it is quite obvious that if a report existed
such as that upon which Respondent allegedly based its
decision to lay off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, it would have
been preserved by Respondent for defense against the
charges which LeMay admittedly threatened to bring. I
infer that no such report ever existed.49 Moreover, the
relevant records which Respondent did produce belie its
testimony regarding the financial necessity for a layoff of
employees. Thus, Respondent's annual report for its fiscal
year ending June 30, 1975, discloses that in that fiscal
period, stockholders' equity in Respondent increased over
that in the previous fiscal year by almost $100,000, and
retained earnings increased by a like amount.50 Further-
more, contrary to Woods' testimony regarding a decline in
the backlog of orders on hand, Respondent's records in
evidence disclose that the backlog increased from $880,938
on July 15, 1975, to $1,022,418 on November 15, 1975.51 It
is further significant that, even assuming arguendo that
Respondent had a financial need in November 1975 to
offer , that no such offer was made . I consider Hogan 's response on cross-
examination that he did not offer to discuss other employment with Jones
when he laid him off "because he didn't feel like it ," as another indication
that no offer was made I note in this regard that Hogan's other testimony
about Jones (whom he knew would not appear to testify) is patently false
Thus, according to Hogan, he hired Jones as a surface grinder and not as a
cutter grinder, and after about 10 days of working as a surface grinder Jones
allegedly had told Hogan that "he would rather not work if he had to do that
kind of work ." Hogan assertedly then transferred Jones to cutter grinding
with the admonition that when there was no more such work , he would have
to let Jones go. However , contrary to Hogan 's testimony that he hired Jones
as a surface grinder and that Jones did surface grinding for about 10 days
before he was assigned to cutter grinding, Jones' application for employment
by Respondent (G. C. Exh. 15) clearly discloses that all of Jones' prior
employment experience had been as a cutter grinder , and Jones ' application
for Respondent's group life insurance dated May 8, 1975 , 6 days after Jones
was hired, clearly discloses that Jones was hired as a cutter grinder (G C
Exh. 14.) 1 conclude from all the foregoing that no credence can be accorded
Hogan 's testimony regarding his alleged offer to consider Jones for another
position.
49 See fn . 17, supra.
50 Resp. Exh. 20, Exhs. A and C.
51 Resp . Exh. 25
PACKER INDUSTRIES 197
reduce its labor costs, the layoff of 3 employees out of
Respondent's then labor force of about 82 quite obviously
could not make any material impact on such costs, and a
much better method of reducing such costs existed but was
not utilized by Respondent. In this respect, the record
discloses that Respondent's employees at all times material
herein regularly worked 9 hours a day and usually every
Saturday, and thus a substantially greater savings in labor
costs could have been effected by Respondent, if indeed it
had been necessary, by the simple expedient of eliminating
overtime hours for which time and a half pay is required by
law. I conclude from all the foregoing that no credence can
be accorded to Respondent's testimony that the layoff of
LeMay, Sprude, and Jones was motivated by financial
considerations. Furthermore, Respondent did not "elimi-
nate" the jobs previously performed by LeMay, Sprude,
and Jones, for it still required machine repair, magnaflux,
and zyglo inspection, and cutter grinding to be performed
after it laid off these three employees, and it merely
assigned these functions to other employees for perfor-
mance . Moreover, at the time Respondent decided to lay
off LeMay, Sprude, and Jones, it admittedly did not
consider or discuss the possible layoff of other employees
who had lesser seniority, and it retained such employees in
jobs which LeMay, Sprude, and Jones were capable of
performing.52 In this respect, the record shows that al-
though Respondent laid off LeMay who was hired on April
20, 1972, it retained MacNabola who was hired on January
14, 1974, and McDonald who was hired on September 15,
1975, just 2 months before the layoff of LeMay. Similarly,
Respondent retained inspectors Miniter who was hired on
August 11, 1975, 3 months before Sprude was laid off, and
Muir who was hired on January 7, 1974, while laying off
Sprude, an inspector who had worked for it since February
28, 1972. And, when Respondent laid off Jones, it assigned
his cutter grinding work to Korab who had 2 months less
seniority than Jones, an admittedly skillful cutter grinder.
All of the foregoing persuade me that no credence can be
given to the reasons asserted by Respondent for the sudden
layoff of LeMay, Sprude, and Jones and that the assign-
ment of these reasons for their termination is another
pretext devised by Respondent to mask its true motivation
for this action.
The real reason for the midday and midweek termination
of these three active union supporters is fairly apparent
from the record. According to the credited testimony of
employee Robert Tierney, and that of Hogan which is
credited to this extent only, the following incident occurred
on November 19, shortly after Jones, LeMay, and Sprude
were laid off. Tierney accused Butkiewicz, who as found
above is an agent of Respondent, of acting as "a stool
pigeon" and of telling Hogan that Jones had given
Butkiewicz "a union card this morning at 11 a.m."
Butkiewicz admitted that Jones had given him a union card,
but he denied that he had told anyone other than employee
Dick Demanche. Tierney then went over to Demanche and
asked him, "Did you rat on Wally Jones?" Demanche got
52 Hogan admitted that the layoff of no other employees other than the
three who were laid off was discussed by him with Woods.
53 Woods admitted that he and Hogan had a pnvate conversation with
Tierney on November 19 after Rider , Demanche, and Butkiewicz left, but,
angry and went over to Butkiewicz and grabbed him and
said, "How many times do I have to tell you to keep your
big mouth shut," and he then punched Butkiewicz. The
latter then told Hogan that he was going to quit because he
was tired of being pushed around. Hogan then immediately
convened a meeting in Woods' office of all the participants
in this incident , where, in the presence of Woods, Hogan,
and Foreman Rider, the foregoing events which had
transpired were repeated. Woods then told the employees
that no one had ratted on Jones, that he had fired LeMay,
Sprude, and Jones for lack of work, and he instructed
Rider, Demanche, and Butkiewicz to go back to work. This
left only Woods, Hogan, and Tierney in Woods' office.
According to Tierney, whom I credit in these respects,
Woods then told him that now there were no witnesses, and
he accused Tierney of being a signed member of the Union,
he asked Tierney, "why you," he said that he had a good
mind to go down and clear out the rest of the union
supporters right now, and that he would fire anybody he
caught signing cards. Woods then further told Tierney that
Al Sprude "was a good man until he got mixed up in these
union activities," that "LeMay was a good man, [had] a
good job, and look where he ended up," and that he felt
sorry for Jones, he liked him, and "you see, these people
don't profit by these things [and] they only ended up on
their ass." Woods finally told Tierney that if a union got in
he would get in his car and leave, and that if Tierney
wanted to be on Respondent's side, "Good, we're glad to
have you," but "if you want to be on their side, go ahead,
but get the `F' out." Tierney at that point told Woods that
all he wanted was to be left alone and permitted to do his
job, and Hogan said that if Tierney had any problems to
come and see him.53
The foregoing incident clearly discloses the reason that
LeMay, Sprude, and Jones were suddenly terminated
before noon on November 19. Although Woods was asked,
he was unable to furnish a plausible or credible explanation
for why these three employees were fired in midday while
they were busily at work on assignments for Respondent. I
conclude from all the foregoing, and especially in the light
of the pretextual reasons asserted for their termination, that
they were fired because of their support of the Union and to
discourage membership therein, and that Respondent
thereby further violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I
further conclude that by interrogating Tierney about his
union membership, by threatening to fire union supporters
and card signers, and by in effect telling Tierney that
LeMay, Sprude, and Jones had been fired because of their
support of the Union, Respondent further engaged in
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
according to Woods, he only told Tierney that if he instigated another such
incident , Respondent would have to fire hun . As previously indicated, I
consider Woods' testimony to be generally unreliable, and I do not credit his
version of his pnvate meeting with Tierney.
198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent terminated the employ-
ment of Juan Acevedo, William O. Ingraham, Jr., Richard
Remillard, Roger LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace
Jones and that it thereafter failed and refused to reemploy
them because of their membership in and activities on
behalf of the Union, I will recommend that Respondent be
ordered to offer them immediate reinstatement to their
former positions, or, if they no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them by the payment to each of
them of a sum of money equal to the amount he normally
would have earned from the date of his termination to the
date of his reinstatement , less his net earnings during the
said period, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis in
the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Backpay shall include the
payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in
the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962).
Having further found that Respondent denied a wage
increase to Mario Recchioni because of his membership in
and activities on behalf of the Union, I will also recom-
mend that Respondent be ordered to make him whole for
his loss of earnings suffered as a result of that discrimina-
tion from the date of such denial until Recchioni voluntari-
ly left Respondent's employ on July 25, 1975, together with
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum.
I will also recommend that Respondent preserve and,
upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records , social securi-
ty payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary to analyze and
determine the amounts of backpay due under the terms of
this recommended remedy.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent , Packer Industries , Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By terminating the employment of Juan Acevedo,
William O . Ingraham , Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger
LeMay, Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones because of their
membership in and activities on behalf of the above-named
Union, and by denying a wage increase to Mario Recchioni
for a like reason, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct, by coercively interrogating
employees regarding their union membership or sympa-
thies; by creating the impression of surveillance of its
employees' union activities; by offering a reward to
employees who disclose the names of the employee union
organizers ; by threatening to fire employees who sign union
cards, to inflict physical punishment on employee union
organizers , and to close the plant if union organization
succeeds; and by telling employees that it had fired other
employees because of their union organizational activities,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 54
Respondent, Packer Industries , Inc., Meriden , Connecti-
cut, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employee in respect to hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, for engaging in any
union or other concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees regarding their
union membership , activities, or desires.
(c) Conveying to employees the impression that their
union activities are being subjected to surveillance.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge , plant closing,
or any other reprisal to discourage union membership or
su(e)oIn any other manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through a representative of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , or to refrain from engaging in such activities,
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment , as authorized by Section
8(aX3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Juan Acevedo, William O. Ingraham, Jr.,
Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay , Alfred Sprude, and
54 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings , findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 waived for all purposes.
PACKER INDUSTRIES 199
Wallace Jones immediate and full reinstatement to their
former positions, or, if those positions no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, and make them and Mario Recchioni whole for
any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them in the manner provided in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze and determine the amounts of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Meriden, Connecticut, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 55 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be
posted by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that the said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
55 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act, and has ordered us to post this notice, and we intend to
carry out the Order of the Board.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representa-
tive of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any and all these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these
rights.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against you in regard to hire or tenure of employment,
or any term or condition of employment, for engaging
in any of the activities listed above which are protected
by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you regarding
your union membership, activities, or desires.
WE WILL NOT convey to you by any acts or
statements the impression that we are engaging in
surveillance of your union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, plant
closing or with any other reprisal to discharge union
membership, activities, or support.
Since it was decided that we violated the Act by
terminating the employment of Juan Acevedo, William
0. Ingraham, Jr., Richard Remillard, Roger LeMay,
Alfred Sprude, and Wallace Jones because they en-
gaged in union and other concerted activities guaran-
teed by the Act, WE WILL offer them full reinstatement
to their former jobs, and wE WILL reimburse them for
any losses they suffered because we fired them.
Since it was also decided that we violated the Act by
denying a wage increase to Mario Recchioni because he
engaged in union and other concerted activities guaran-
teed by the Act, WE WILL make him whole for the losses
he suffered because we denied him a wage increase.
WE WILL respect your rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to
bargain collectively through International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or
any other representative of your choice, or to refrain
from any such activity, and WE WILL NOT in any other
manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of these rights.
PACKER INDUSTRIES, INC.