Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 20, 1982

262 N.L.R.B. 1034 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and
Communications Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, Local 9404. Cases 20-CA-15348 and 20-
CA-I5349
July 20, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND HUNTER
On February 13, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Jay R. Pollack issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, the General Coun-
sel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief,
and Respondent filed an answering brief in support
thereof.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Pacific Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company, Greenbrae, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recom-
mended Order.
I Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain credi-
bility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolu-
tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of
the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing his findings.
2 In the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent met its burden of proving that the decision to discipline the em-
ployees in question was not based upon information obtained at the un-
lawful interview and therefore declined to order a "make whole"
remedy. The General Counsel excepted to this finding, contending that
the Employer's decision to discharge the employees in question was
based on information learned during the course of the unlawful inter-
views, specifically, the employees inability to satisfactorily explain the
improper use of company equipment. We agree with the Administrative
Law Judge.
In so doing, we note that on a prior occasion, in a narrow factual set-
ting, the Board found that a make-whole remedy was appropriate because
discipline was based not on the subject under investigation, but on the
employee's failure at the interview to furnish a "satisfactory explanation."
Ohio Masonic Home, 251 NLRB 606 (1980). However, that decision does
not suggest that anytime an employee fails to offer a satisfactory explana-
tion during an unlawful interview reinstatement is required under our de-
cision in Kraft Foods Inc., 251 NLRB 598 (1980). In this case, we are
satisfied that the discharges were based on information other than that
obtained during the unlawful interviews.
262 NLRB No. 125
MEMBER JENKINS, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part:
I concur in the Administrative Law Judge's find-
ing that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act when it denied employees Martinez and
Revada the right to prior consultation with their
union representative before participating in the in-
vestigatory interview with Respondent.
In light of my dissent in Kraft Foods, Inc.,3 and
the facts existing in the instant case, I cannot agree
with my colleagues' failure to find that a "make-
whole remedy" for these employees is appropriate.
The record shows that Respondent's supervisor,
Susan King, had two purposes in mind when she
conducted the unlawful interviews: to suspend the
two employees pending further investigation and to
discover whether the employees could explain the
misuse of the Company's equipment. Moreover,
King admitted that her recommendation that the
two employees be discharged was made after she
conducted the unlawful interviews and was based
on several factors, and it appears she relied on as
the most significant factor the employees' failure to
produce a satisfactory explanation of what hap-
pened. Further, I am in agreement with the Gener-
al Counsel that this factor was reflected in the se-
verity of Respondent's discipline of Martinez and
Revada. Respondent's past practice shows that it
only suspended, rather than discharged, employees
for this kind of misuse of equipment when Re-
spondent believed that the accused employees were
being cooperative and candid. In this instant
matter, Respondent believed that Martinez and
Revada were being less than candid, a belief which
may well have resulted from Respondent's unlaw-
ful denial to them of consultation with their union
representative.
Because I do not subscribe to the decision in
Kraft Foods, I reject my colleagues' view that this
case substantially differs from Ohio Masonic Home,4
since in both cases Respondent affirmatively relied
on the employees' inability to offer a satisfactory
explanation. Accordingly, I would find that the de-
cision to discharge these two employees, flowing
from an unlawful interview, was tainted, and in ac-
cordance with Ohio Masonic Home, a make-whole
remedy is appropriate.
MEMBER HUNTER, dissenting:
For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company,5 I would find
merit in Respondent's exceptions to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's finding that it unlawfully re-
3 251 NLRB 598 (1980).
4 251 NLRB 606 (1980).
5 262 NLRB 1048 (1982).
1034
PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
fused to allow employees Martinez and Revada to
consult with their union representatives prior to
their investigatory interviews. Thus, since I believe
there is no statutory right to prior consultation, and
since it is clear that the employees were assisted
during their interviews by knowledgeable union
representatives, I would find that Respondent con-
ducted lawful interviews in accordance with the
employees' Weingarten rights. Accordingly, I
would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 6
s In view of my dissent herein, I find it unnecessary to address the
issue of the appropriateness of a make-whole remedy in the instant case.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me in San Francisco, California,
on November 20, 1980.' On June 27, the Regional Di-
rector for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations
Board issued a consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing, based on unfair labor practice charges filed by
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local
9404, herein called the Union, on May 13. The complaint
alleges that Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company,
herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called
the Act.
The parties have been offered full opportunity to
appear, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, and to file briefs. Post-trial briefs were
filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent.
Based on the entire record, on the briefs filed by counsel,
and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JUIRISDICTION
At all times material herein, Respondent has been a
California corporation with an office and place of busi-
ness in Greenbrae, California, engaged in the operation
of a telephone and telegraph system. During calendar
year 1979, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess
of $100,000 from the operation of its telephone system.
During the same time period, Respondent purchased and
received at its Greenbrae, California, facility goods and
materials valued in excess of $5,000 directly from suppli-
ers located outside the State of California.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent has been at all times material herein, an
employer engaged in commerce and in a business affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
t Unless otherwise stated, all dates hereinafter refer to calendar year
1980.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that the Union has been, at all times material herein, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
As discussed above, Respondent is engaged in the op-
eration of a telephone system. The Union represents Re-
spondent's employees at its facility located at Greenbrae,
California, referred to in the record as the Larkspur
TSPS.2 This case arises out of investigatory interviews
involving two employees at the Larkspur TSPS: Helena
Martinez and Betty Revada.
On May 5, Respondent experienced a problem with
certain equipment involved in its Traffic Service Position
System, covering four offices, including the Larkspur
TSPS. Pat Shoemaker, a facilities manager for Respond-
ent, began an investigation to determine the reason for
the problems in the system. In the course of Shoemaker's
investigation, she discovered, inter alia, that two calls in-
volving operator positions at the Larkspur TSPS were
tying up needed equipment. Shoemaker called the Lark-
spur TSPS and had the equipment released back into the
system. Shoemaker also called Rae Morgan, the supervi-
sor on duty at the Larkspur TSPS that evening, and
asked Morgan to prepare a list of the operators on duty
at the time of the two calls in question.
On May 6, Susan King, then manager of operator
services at the Larkspur TSPS, called Shoemaker to as-
certain the details concerning the problem of the previ-
ous evening. Shoemaker advised King that two question-
able calls involving the Larkspur TSPS had tied up
equipment in the system. Shoemaker told King that the
calls appeared to represent billable calls for which no
biling charge was indicated. Shoemaker referred to each
call as "traffic busy," from which King incorrectly in-
ferred that Shoemaker had confirmed that conversation
had taken place. Shoemaker provided King with the in-
formation that one call was placed at 8:15 p.m., involv-
ing a local number and a number in central California
and the other call involved was placed at 8:42 p.m., in-
volving a local number and a number in Hawaii.
At her discussion with Shoemaker, King compared the
local numbers with a list of numbers of employees at the
Larkspur TSPS. Thus, King learned that the number in-
volved in the call to central California was Martinez'
home phone number and that the number involved in the
call to Hawaii was Revada's home phone number. King
then checked the list of operators on duty prepared by
Morgan and found that both Martinez and Revada were
on duty when the subject calls were placed.
Based on the above information, King determined to
interview both Martinez and Revada to ascertain what
information they could provide to explain what appeared
to be unauthorized use of Respondent's equipment.
Before conducting such interviews, King called Bernard
2 TSPS stands for Traffic Service Position System.
1035
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Chiaravalle, president of the Union, and advised him of
the two questionable phone calls. King at first refused to
identify the employees involved but was persuaded by
Chiaravalle to do so. King told Chiaravalle that the
phone numbers involved were that of Martinez and
Revada and that both were on duty at the time the calls
were placed. King mistakingly believed that conversation
was confirmed and so she also relayed that information
to Chiaravalle. Further, King told Chiaravalle that she
would be suspending both employees pending further in-
vestigation. The further investigation included interview-
ing Martinez that same day, and interviewing Revada
when Revada returned from her day off. King requested
Chiaravalle's assistance in ensuring that union stewards
would be present for the interviews. Chiaravalle agreed
to contact the stewards.
It is the conduct of the investigatory interviews which
gives rise to the instant case. The complaint alleges that
Respondent violated the Act by refusing to allow Mar-
tinez and Revada consultation with a union steward
prior to conducting the investigatory interviews. Further
litigated was the issue of whether Respondent's subse-
quent decision to discharge Martinez and Revada was
based on information obtained at the allegedly unlawful
interviews.
B. The Investigatory Interviews
As discussed above, King, based on information that
improper calls had been placed from the Larspur TSPS
involving Martinez' and Revada's home phones, decided
to suspend these employees pending further investiga-
tion. King advised the Union of the forthcoming investi-
gatory interviews and sought assistance in obtaining the
presence of a union steward. At 5 p.m. on May 6, shortly
after King called Chiaravalle,3 she met with Christina
Opaso, union steward. King asked Opaso whether Chiar-
avalle had advised her about Martinez' interview. Opaso
stated that he had not. King then told Opaso that she
would be suspending Martinez because of the improper
call involving Martinez' home phone. Opaso asked to
speak with Martinez prior to the meeting so that she
could advise the employee. King answered that Opaso
could not do so prior to the interview but could do so
afterwards.
King, Opaso, and Martinez then met in a conference
room. Martinez asked, "[W]hat's going on?" Before King
could answer, Opaso said, "I just want you to know that
I feel that I cannot adequately represent this employee
without first having time to discuss their rights with
them and go over things with them before we go into
the discussion." Martinez indicated her agreement with
that request.4 King answered that Opaso was there as a
witness and that was all that was required. King then
told Martinez that during the previous evening, in inves-
tigating equipment trouble, Respondent had discovered a
a Although there is conflicting testimony regarding the time of the
conversation between King and Chiaravalle, it is undisputed that Chiara-
valle was unable to contact Opaso prior to 5 p.m.
4 There is conflicting testimony as to whether Martinez expressed her
desire to speak with Opaso. However, as there is no dispute that Mar-
tinez nodded her approval, there is no reason to resolve the conflict in
testimony.
questionable phone call involving her home number.
King asked Martinez if she had any explanation and
Martinez answered that she did not know anything about
it. King asked if anyone had access to Martinez' home
telephone and Martinez asnwered yes. King asked for
the name of persons with access to Martinez' telephone.
Opaso told Martinez that she did not have to answer any
questions "that made her feel uncomfortable." Martinez
then stated that she would rather not answer King's
question. King ended the meeting by telling Martinez
that she was suspended pending investigation. King per-
mitted Opaso and Martinez to meet privately and then
escorted Martinez out of the building.
After the conclusion of the Martinez interview, King
met briefly with Opaso and told the steward of her in-
tention to interview Revada the next morning. Roxanna
Ferris, another union steward, was subsequently assigned
to represent Revada at her interview. Ferris was told of
this assignment by Opaso either on the evening of May 6
or the morning of May 7. When Ferris arrived at King's
office, King asked whether Opaso had briefed Ferris re-
garding the interview. When Ferris answered that Opaso
had not, King explained that she would be suspending
Revada because of a questionable call involving Revada's
home phone on the evening of May 5. Ferris asked to
meet privately with Revada prior to the interview. At
the outset of the meeting with Revada, Ferris again
asked King if she could speak privately with Revada and
King answered that she could not. 5 Ferris then said that
she felt that she could not properly represent Revada
without first speaking with her. Ferris told Revada that
the employees did not have to say anything or answer
any questions that she was uncomfortable with. King ex-
plained to Revada that a questionable call had tied up
equipment during the evening of May 5. King told
Revada that the call involved the employee's home
phone number and a number in Hawaii. Revada was
asked what she knew about the incident and she said she
did not know anything about it. King asked if anyone
else had access to her telephone and Revada laughed and
said, "a lot of people do." Revada was asked if she had
any further information that could help and she an-
swered that she did not. King then suspended Revada
pending investigation and agreed to call Revada and
inform her of the outcome of the investigation. At the
conclusion of the meeting, King permitted Revada and
Ferris to meet privately before she escorted Revada out
of the building.
C. The Discharge
On the afternoon of May 8 or on the morning of May
9, King recommended to her supervisor, Sandy Breaum,
that Martinez and Revada be dismissed. King testified
that she based her decision on the fact that the question-
able calls had been placed from the Larkspur TSPS to
Martinez' and Revada's home numbers, at times when
Martinez and Revada were on duty as operators. She
concluded that Martinez and Revada had each placed a
6 Revada testified that she did not say anything in regard to Ferris'
request but that she nodded her head in approval.
1036
PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
call which misused company equipment and her own
time. King testified that she decided on discharge as the
penalty, rather than suspension, based on the fact that
the calls involved were to numbers outside the area
code. On May 12, Martinez was informed that she was
dismissed for misuse of company time and equipment.
King called Revada and told her of her discharge on
May 10.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that, had the employees been granted consultation with
their union stewards prior to the interviews, they would
not have denied knowledge of the subject calls. Further,
the General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that had the employees not denied knowledge of the sub-
ject calls they would have been suspended but not dis-
charged. To this end, Chiaravalle testified that three em-
ployees, not operators, were suspended but not terminat-
ed for having made free telephone calls. Each of these
three employees had told the truth upon being ques-
tioned about the subject calls. Further, Chiaravlle and
Revada both testified that in May, an operator, who was
initially terminated for making free calls, was reinstated 3
weeks later. Finally, Chiaravalle testified that two opera-
tors who were terminated for committing similar viola-
tions had both lied about the events to Respondent's offi-
cials.
There is no evidence, however, that any of the inci-
dents recited by Chiaravalle involved employees super-
vised by King. King denied that either Martinez' or Re-
vada's conduct as the subject interviews played any part
in the decision to discharge them. She further testified
that even if Martinez or Revada had admitted wrongdo-
ing it would not have changed her recommendation to
discharge them.
D. Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
denying Martinez and Revada the right to consult with
their union representatives prior to the commencement
of the subject disciplinary interviews. Respondent con-
tends that Martinez and Revada were each assisted by a
knowledgeable steward and, therefore, that the employ-
ees' rights under Weingarten6 were not violated.
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's
determination that, under Section 7 of the Act, an em-
ployee has the right to insist on the presence of a union
representative at an interview which the employee rea-
sonably believes might result in disciplinary action. The
critical issue herein is whether the right to the presence
of a union representative at a Weingarten interview in-
cludes the right to prior consultation with the union rep-
resentative.
In Climax Molybdenum Company, a Division of Amax,
Inc., 227 NLRB 1189 (1977), the Board held that the
right to union representation clearly embraced the right
to prior consultation. The Board stated at 1190:
Surely, if a union representative is to represent
effectively an employee "too fearful or inarticulate
6 N LR.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
to relate accurately the incident being investigated"
and is to be "knowledgeable" so that he can "assist
the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and . . .
getting to the bottom of the incident," these objec-
tives can more readily be achieved when the union
representative has had an opportunity to consult be-
forehand with the employee to learn his version of
the events and to gain a familiarity with the facts.
Additionally, a fearful or inarticulate employee
would be more prone to discuss the incident fully
and accurately with his union representative with-
out the presence of an interviewer contemplating
the possibility of disciplinary action. These consid-
erations indicate that the representative's aid in elic-
iting the facts can be performed better, and perhaps
only, if he can consult with the employee before-
hand. To preclude such advance discussion, as our
colleagues would, seems to us to thwart one of the
purposes approved in Weingarten. Nothing in the ra-
tionale of Weingarten suggests that, in its endorse-
ment of the role of a "knowledgeable union repre-
sentative," the Supreme Court meant to put blinders
on the union representative by denying him the op-
portunity of learning the facts by consultation with
the employee prior to the investigatory-disciplinary
interview. Knowledgeability implies the very oppo-
site. The right to representation clearly embraces
the right to prior consultation [at 1190].
Further, in Climax, the Board held that the union's re-
quest for prior consultation was sufficient to invoke the
right. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit denied enforcement of the Board's Order.8 First, the
court found that Weingarten required that the employee
must request representation and at no time did the two
employees in Climax request that a union representative
be present. Further, neither employee ever manifested an
interest in consulting with his union representative prior
to the investigatory interview."
Secondly, the court found that the Board's holding
would run contrary to the admonition in Weingarten that
the right of union representation may not interfere with
legitimate employer prerogatives. Accordingly, the court
held that an employer is under no obligation to accord
the employee subject to an investigatory interview with
consultation with his union representative on company
time if the interview date otherwise provides the em-
ployee adequate opportunity to consult with union repre-
sentatives on his own time prior to the interview. The
court added, however, that Weingarten requires that the
7 The Board has apparently reversed this aspect of Climax. In Appala-
chian Power Company, 253 NLRB 931 (1980). the Board affirmed, without
comment, an administrative law judge's holding that a union could not
invoke an employee's Weingarten right to representation This issue need
not be reached in the instant case as Martinez and Rexada each clearly
indicated, to King, her agreement with the request made by her union
representative.
a 584 F.2d 360 (1978).
a It must be noted that the two employees in Climax had 17-1/2 hours
between the time they were advised of the pending investigation and the
time it took place but did not consult with their union representative
during such time
1037
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employer set investigatory interviews at such a future
time and place that the employees will be provided the
opportunity to consult with his representatives in ad-
vance thereof on his own time.
The Board has not addressed this issue since the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Climax. Thus, I am constrained to
apply the Board's decision in Climax to the instant
case.' o
Here there is no question that Martinez and Revada
had reasonable cause to believe that the subject inter-
views might result in disciplinary action. Respondent
made provision for the presence of a union representa-
tive. The critical question is whether the employees had
a right to consult with their representatives prior to the
interview. The Board has decided in Climax that the
right of representation includes the right to prior consul-
tation. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to permit Martinez
and Revada to consult with their union representatives
prior to the subject investigatory interviews which they
reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action.
THE REMEDY
In Kraft Foods. Inc., 251 NLRB 598 (1980), the Board
announced the following test for determining the appro-
priate remedy for an employer's violation of an employ-
ee's Weingarten rights. First, the General Counsel must
make prima facie showing that a make-whole remedy lI
is warranted. The General Counsel satisfies this burden
by proving that the employer conducted an investigatory
interview in violation of Weingarten and that the employ-
ee whose Weingarten rights were violated was subse-
quently disciplined for conduct which was the subject
matter of the unlawful interview.
Second, the burden shifts to the employer to demon-
strate that its decision to discipline the employee in ques-
tion was not based on information obtained at the unlaw-
ful interview. Third, the Board stated that the burden on
the employer in cases of this type is in the nature of an
affirmative defense. Thus, the ultimate burden of proof is
on the employer to establish this affirmative defense.
Applying the principles of Kraft Foods to the instant
case, it is clear that the General Counsel has established
a prima facie case for a make-whole remedy. The Gener-
al Counsel has shown that Respondent conducted unlaw-
ful interviews with Martinez and Revada and that the
employees were later discharged for conduct which was
the subject of the unlawful investigatory interviews. I
also find that Respondent has met its burden in rebutting
the prima facie case by showing that the decision to dis-
charge Martinez and Revada was not based on any infor-
mation obtained at the unlawful interviews. Martinez and
Revada were discharged because they misused company
equipment and company time. The information on which
this decision was based had been known to Respondent
prior to the interviews. No further information was ob-
i0 It is well settled that it is the duty of an administrative law judge
"to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not
reversed." Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 at fn. 4 (1979),
citing Iowa Beef Packers Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1965).
1 Eg., reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of all disciplinary
records.
tained by Respondent at the unlawful interviews and
there is no evidence on which to find that the employees
were discharged because they did not provide informa-
tion at the interview.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that the employees were discharged, rather than suspend-
ed, based on their failure to admit wrongdoing at the
subject interviews. Such a contention requires that I
make two suppositions: (1) that the employees would
have conducted themselves differently had they been
permitted consultation with their stewards, and (2) that
Respondent would have dispensed lesser discipline based
on such conduct. I cannot engage in such speculation.
Rather, I find in accordance with King's testimony that
the determining factor with regard to the degree of disci-
pline was the nature of the telephone calls involved.
King decided on discharge because long-distance, rather
than local, calls were involved. There is a business justi-
fication for such a decision and it would be inappropriate
for me to second guess Respondent. Therefore, I find
that Respondent has sustained its burden of proving that
its decision to discharge Martinez and Revada resulted
from their suspected wrongdoing on the evening of May
5 and not from their conduct at the unlawful interviews.
Accordingly, I will recommend a cease-and-desist
remedy for Respondent's violation of Section 8(a)(1) but
will not recommend a make-whole remedy.
CONCLUSIONS Of: LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by re-
fusing to permit employees Helena Martinez and Betty
Revada to consult with their union representatives prior
to investigatory interviews which they reasonably be-
lieved might result in disciplinary action.
4. The unfair labor practices specifically found above
are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record herein and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER' 2
The Respondent, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company, Greenbrae, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
" All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order
hereby are denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by
Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations
Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purtposes.
1038
PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
(a) Refusing to permit employees to consult with their
union representatives prior to investigatory interviews
which they reasonably believe might result in disciplin-
ary action.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act:
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the purposes of the Act:
(a) Post at its facility in Greenbrae, California, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."13 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
1" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to permit employees to con-
sult with their union representatives prior to investi-
gatory interviews which they reasonably believe
might result in disciplinary action.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section
7 of the Act.
PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY
1039