Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 12, 1954107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (N.L.R.B. 1954) Copy Citation PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1547 All employees of the Employer employed at its stores in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, excluding meat department employees, managers, assistant managers, casual part-time employees working less than 15 hours per week, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication] Member Beeson took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Direction of Election. sented by the Retail Clerks or the Independent. There is no basis in this record, other than their geographical proximity to Milwaukee County, for determining whether the 2 new stores should be included in the bargaining unit. Accordingly, we make no determination as to the unit placement of employees in any stores outside Milwaukee County. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY and ORDER OF REPEATERMEN AND TOLL TESTBOARDMEN. Case No. 20-CA-612. March 12, 1954 DECISION AND ORDER On June 13, 1952, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above -entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, Respond- ent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report; and both Respondent and the General Counsel filed briefs.' The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, exceptions and briefs , and the entire record in the case,2 and finds merit in Respondent ' s except- tions to the extent set forth below. As set forth in detail in the Intermediate Report, the events giving rise to this case stemmed from a dispute between CWA and the Respondent over the traffic employees. Because CWA and Respondent could not agree on a new contract for them in the northern California division, CWA threatened to and in fact did withdraw the services of the traffic employees during the latter part of July 1951 . It chose, however, to resort to a 'Respondent's request for oral argument is denied because the record and briefs adequately set forth the positions of the parties. 2 On July 20, 1953, the Board reopened the record and remanded the case to the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region to receive certain additional evidence. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Director transmitted to the Board a stipulation of the parties, setting forth such evidence. 107 NLRB No. 301. 1548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD form of economic warfare entirely beyond the pale of proper strike activities. Its announced strategy consisted of a multi- plicity of little "hit and run" work stoppages deliberately calculated, in CWA's own words, to "harass the company into a state of confusion." The scheme was designed to compel the Respondent to "get its defenses up"--or gather substitute workers wherever a stoppage was unexpectedly pulled-- "only to have the picket line gone " when the emergency crews reached the picketed place.3 Thus, the traffic employees in a great many of the division's more than 200 offices walked off their jobs on different days instead of all at the same time; at many offices they returned to work after a short time and then walked out again after a day or two; and in some offices they again returned to work briefly and later quit anew a third time. Meanwhile, CWA pickets ranged over the entire division, appearing sporadically at a great number of offices. Before the CWA stoppages began on July 20, CWA informed high officials of ORTT, the representative of the Respondent's tollmen and the charging Union here, that the hit-and-run technique would be used.4 With this knowledge, union officials issued a bulletin, which was posted on all union bulletin boards in the area, saying that the officers felt that the best interests of the Union would be served by respecting the CWA picket lines. This formal posting of their Union's official position was notice to the tollmen of the traffic employees ' intended action. And, faithful to their Union's declared policy, most of the tollmen honored the CWA picket lines whenever they appeared. 3 We adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding that "the strategy and tactics [ of the hit-and- run strike] were openly revealed in the November 20. 1950 . issue of Coast Co-Ordinator," official CWA publication, a copy of which was offered in evidence at the hearing. As neither the General Counsel nor the Union filed any exception to this finding, we regard the publica- tion of this article by CWA as having been satisfactorily proved The article read as follows: Why is the "hit-and-run" tactic successful Let's take stock. By adopting the surprise hit-and-run picket line, the union taxes management's ability to organize its offices to the utmost. The chain of command in the telephone company is a long one. And telephone supervision is well trained to use no initiative - but wait for orders from the top. By striking quickly and unexpectedly, the Company has a problem getting its defenses set up. They can't spare supervisors from other non-struck areas , because they Have to carry on normal work. The ones they do gather together reach the picketed place, only to have the picket line gone. The Telephone Company can't function efficiently in its nation-wide operations if any part of its circulation is cut off. During a full blown strike all of its operations operate in low gear - but in a hit-and-run attack, most of the company's functions must be maintained. The company accounting records must be maintained, its workers are largely on the job, and the public expects normal service. Another advantage for the union in this tactic is that most of the workers are on the job, maintaining their financial take home while harrassing the company into a state of confusion. Having suffered no great loss, these workers can aid the men and women who are off the job all the time of the strike. The Hit and Run strike will beat the telephone industry - if properly applied. 4 We credit the testimony of Union Officials Kar_agy and Jones to this effect, and discredit the conflicting testimony of Monahan, president of the Union. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1549 As the CWA had hoped, the Respondent was hard put to main- tain the telephone services in the face of the intermittent loss of both traffic employees and tollmen. To accomplish the emergency coverage of the tollmen's jobs, it used local toll supervisors and supervisors imported from different offices. The emergency crews worked 12-hour days instead of the usual 8-hour shift. There were no man-for-man or hour-for- hour replacements, apparently because the urgency of the moment and the shortage of qualified substitutes made orderly operations impossible. Indeed, the Respondent was compelled to suspend some of its toll service activities altogether. During this period of calculated unpredictability on the part of the employees and resultant confusion in the Respondent's ranks, the tollmen returned whenever the CWA pickets dis- appeared, and offered to work. In most cases they were in- formed by local supervisors that they were "not needed" or that their jobs were "covered" that day, but that they should report the following day. In other instances they were restored to work immediately. Some of those who were put to work immediately assured the Respondent of their willingness to cross CWA picket lines should they reappear. All who gave this assurance were immediately reinstated by the Respondent. At some locations, after repeated failures by the tollmen to show up at their posts, the Respondent required them to lay off an additional day before it reverted to normal operations with their services. The complaint alleges that because the Respondent did not put each tollman back to work immediately upon his every offer to return but instead made many of them wait--in most cases no more than 1 day--it unlawfully discriminated against them. In substance, we are asked to hold that while precari- ously engaged in attempting to prevent complete disruption of its telephone service, the Respondent was required--if it wished to avoid prosecution--to switch from emergency use of extra- ordinary crews to so-called normal operations whenever the planned strategy of the CWA's hit-and-run tactics so dictated. We cannot so hold. At the outset we must disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the CWA's strike actions constituted protected concerted activities within the meaning of the Act. There is no doubt that the intention of that Union was to bring about a con- dition that would be neither strike nor work. We do not think this sort of conduct, although concerted, is entitled to the protection of the Act.5 However lawful might have been the economic, objective which CWA sought to achieve by its hit- and-run technique, and regardless of the success or failure of the Respondent in its efforts to defend against the intermittent and unpredictable strike and picket attacks, the inherent 5N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 306 U, S. 240; N. L. R. B, v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199 (C. A. 4); C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B , 108 F. 2d 390 (C. A 7). 337593 0 - 5; - 99 1550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD character of the method used sets this strike apart from the concept of protected union activity envisaged by the Act.6 Had the Respondent chosen--as, apparently, it did not do--to dis- cipline any traffic employees for engaging in such strike conduct, its action could hardly be called wrong.T It is only the tollmen, however, who complain that the Re- spondent was not prompt enough, whenever they returned, in using their services again. They argue that all they did was honor a picket line, and otherwise now seek to disassociate themselves from the strike of the traffic employees and from the vice in its technique. On the record before us, we cannot view the tollmen ' s role in these events in isolation. We are satisfied that the tollmen knew not only that the CWA strike was imminent, but also the novel device for making it impossible for the Respondent to treat with it any effective manner. The hit-and-run method to be used had been widely publicized by the CWA; indeed it was the boast of its publica- tion circulated among the Respondent's employees. Union officials learned of the strike directly and, at their union halls, advised the tollmen. There is direct testimony that at least some tollmen who were union stewards individually learedthat the strike was to be an intermittent affair. Moreover , because of the nature of their duties, tollmen throughout the system were constantly in telephone communication . It would strain credulity to imagine that they did not learn from the telephone operators (traffic employees) what the latter were planning and what must then have been uppermost in their minds. And, significantly , some of The tollmen who first refused to agree to cross the picket line, later, after learing that CWA picket- ing would not be resumed for afewdays , assured the Respond- ent that they would remain at work, "pickets or no pickets." Finally, it could hardly be claimed that those tollmen who left their work 3 times in 9 days did not know that they were co- operating not only in a strike but in the planned strategy for conducting it. Because they joined in the unprotected strike of the traffic (-employees with knowledge of its planned intermittent and hit-and-run aspects , the tollmen also removed themselves from the protection of the Act. Indeed, the key importance of their duties made them a highly significant element of the traffic employees' attack. The activities of the tollmen, therefore, like those of the traffic employees, were not pro- tected by any provision of the statute.' If, as the complaint alleges, the Respondent in fact discriminated against any of them, or caused them to wait longer than was economically 6Our conclusion here finds support in the Supreme Court decision in Auto Workers v. Wisc. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 245, holding that similar intermittent work stoppages did not fall within the protection of the National Labor Relations Act and could therefore properly be enjoined by the State courts of the State of Wisconsin. 7 See Marshall Wheel and Foundry Co , 107 NLRB 314. 8Marathon Electric Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 1117. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1551 necessary before restoring them to work , its conduct would not have been unlawful. However, apart from any right the Respondent may have had to discipline the tollmen for their improper conduct , there is no proof that it in fact did so. Rather, the record shows, and we find, that in requiring a number of these employees to lay off for the day when they returned unexpectedly, the Respondent was motivated by a desire to maintain some continuity in its toll services. As stated in the Intermediate Report, the Re- spondent gathered emergency crews wherever possible, calling upon supervisory personnel from distant exchanges--the struck division being over 200 miles across. The schedules set up for this extraordinary method of operating bore no relationship to the regular hours of the tollmen. The returning tollmen might have ar.rived immediately after an emergency coverage had started functioning , or at a time when hastily gathered substitutes were converging upon the abandoned location. In either event, the Respondent had a right to know whether the operation was to continue for the day or not. With the tollmen unwilling to give this assurance , we cannot hold that the Re- spondent nevertheless was required to disperse the emergency crews summarily, perhaps only to have to regather them shortly without notice. It was precisely this frustrating situation that the CWA strike strategy was designed to accomplish. Were we to impose that burden upon the Respondent ' s legitimate right to run its business in the face of a union ' s economic pressure , we would ourselves become a tool of CWA to carry out its unprotected form of strike activity. On the entire record we conclude that the Respondent sought only to maintain its operations as best it could manage in the face of the strike activities of both the traffic employees and the tollmen .9 The resultant loss of a day or so of work by some tollmen was not a punishment visited upon them by the Respondent because of their concerted activity, but an inevi- table incident of the constant operating readjustment necessi- tated by the hit-and-run character of the strike. We deem it significant that none of the now complaining tollmen ever attempted to disassociate himself from the scheme of the traffic employees. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that some few of them- -particularly those who quit work only once--might have had no personal knowledge of the other group's intention. In any event, the Respondent, who had been amply informed of the CWA threat and the manner in which it was to be concentrated , was not required to pause during the heat of the strike to examine into the degree of knowledge of 9On this question of the reason why the Respondent did not immediately put each returning tollman back to work, our dissenting colleague erroneously views our disagreement with the Trial Examiner as a reversal of the latter's credibility resolutions. Matters of conclusion, opinion, or motivation stand apart from the direct credibility of witnesses, whether they are contradicted by other witness or not. 1552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD each tollman , all of whom were represented by the same Union. It was sufficient for the Respondent that each of the tollmen here involved was a participant in the strike strategy; whether knowingly or unwittingly is of no significance. There is a complete absence of evidence of antiunion motivation in the various instances of loss of work occasioned to the toll- men by their refusal to work. Accordingly , we find that the allegation imputing unlawful conduct to the Respondent has not been sustained , and contrary to the Trial Examiner's recommendation , we shall dismiss the complaint in its en- tirety.1° [The Board dismissed the complaint.] Member Murdock, dissenting: The majority finds, as a matter of fact, that the Respondent in laying off the tollmen "was motivatedby a desire to maintain some continuity in its toll services " and "sought only to maintain its operations as best it could manage " in the face of a strike by its traffic employees . If these findings of fact were right , the rest of its decision would be unnecessary. For this complaint alleges a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. That section forbids discrimination against employees because of their union activities . It has nothing to do with layoffs for economic reasons . Certainly, the General Counsel has not, as is suggested , asked this Board to hold that the Respondent was required to switch from em4rgency crews to normal operations merely to accommodate those employees who wished to return to work. For he has, and I think clearly, asked the Board to hold that the Respondent laid off the tollmen not to facilitate business operations during the strike but to punish them, as it has admitted punishing one employee, McCullouch, because they refused to cross the picket line. I shall discuss this factual issue below. Before doing so, however, I consider it necessary to set forth a more complete statement of the facts that appear in the record with regard to the CWA strike and the refusal of the tollmen to cross the picket line. On July 15, 1951, CWA informed the Respondent that unless a contract were agreed upon by July 20, 1951, the Union would strike at 6 a. m. on that date, which it did. CWA represented Respondent ' s traffic employees in about 70 of the 250 offices in its northern California division . The strike lasted until 10 The Trial Examiner also found that a layoff imposed on tollman McCullouch was unlawful We do not agree . McCullouch engaged in a 1-man, 1 - day, protest strike on behalf of 2 fellow tollmen, complainants here, who respected the picket line Like the other tollmen, McCullouch must have been aware of CWA's plan to engage in intermittent strike activity . He must also have known that his 2 fellow tollmen had knowingly made themselves participants . By engaging in a strike on their behalf under these circumstances , McCullouch made common cause with the CWA's unprotected union activity and, we find , must share the status of the other tollmen who participated in it. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1553 July 29, 1951, a total of 9 days. The strike was characterized by the CWA as a "hit-and - run" strike . So far as the record shows, the tactics designed for this type of strike was to picket one of Respondent ' s offices at a time rather than all of them simultaneously. There is no evidence in the record that the strike was designed by the CWA as an intermittent strike at each particular office. Indeed, the fact is that for the first 3 days of the strike, from July 20, 1951, to July 23, 1951, while the Respondent ' s offices were struck and picketed sporadically, there was no intermittent striking or picketing at any particu- lar office. Contrary to the majority s statement , there is no evidence in the record that any tollmen who were union stewards learned that the strike was to be an " intermittent affair." The pertinent evidence on this point is the testimony of an official of the ORTT, who testified that he was aware that the CWA, before the strike, had described the hit-and-run technique as follows: "We strike for a few hours, or 24 hours, then strike again in other locations , repeating the process and moving on again . . . ." ( Emphasis added.) Nevertheless , despite the absence of evidence that the tollmen knew in advance that the strike was to be inter- mittent at particular offices and in the face of the above affirmative evidence to the contrary, the majority finds that the tollmen engaged in unprotected activity because they joined the CWA strike "with knowledge of its planned intermittent and hit-and-run aspects." The basis, in part, of this finding is the inference drawn by the majority that the tollmen must have learned what was "uppermost" in the minds of the CWA traffic employees. Apart from the fact that there is no evidence that the hit -and-run strike was planned as an intermittent work stoppage , I do not believe it is within the power of this Board to make a crucial finding of fact on the basis of an assumption as to what telephone operators must have communi- cated to the tollmen or because a contrary result is difficult to "imagine." The 183 complainants in this case are tollmen , represented by the ORTT, who, except for 1, respected the CWA picket line when it was established at any of the 30 offices in which they worked . As the picketing continued for no more than 1 or 2 days at a particular office, the tollmen returned to their work, during the progress of the strike , as soon as the picket line disappeared. Before July 23, 1951, the picketing at any one office was continuous without a break. From that date until the termination of the strike on July 29, 1951, picketing at some offices occurred twice and , ina few cases, 3 times. When the complaining tollmen returned to duty they were informed, for the most part, by local supervisors that they were "not needed" or that their jobs were "covered" that day, but that they should report the following day. Some returning tollmen, however, were put to work immediately. A few of those who were immediately reinstated had assured Respondent of their 1554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD willingness to cross picket lines in the future. All who gave this assurance were immediately reinstated . Of the tollmen who were laid off for about a day because they had respected the CWA picket line, 49 were laid off for respecting the picket line from July 20 to July 23, the initial 3-day period during the 9-day strike when no intermittent picketing occurred. On July 23 when intermittent striking and picketing occurred at some offices , 87 tollmen respected the picket line. Of these 87, 7 tollmen were respecting the picket line in communities in which intermittent striking had not occurredbythat date and 56 were respecting picket lines for the first time. After July 23, 105 tollmen respected picket lines and were laid off for about a day for this reason. Of these 105 , 24 were in communi- ties in which there had still been no intermittent striking and 70 were respecting picket lines for the first time. A total of 138 of the 183 complaints respectec the CWA picket line only once. In finding , contrary to the Trial Exar -finer, that the Respond- ent did not discipline the tollmen because of their concerted activities , the majority states that there is no "proof" that it did so. I take it, although it is not clear from the context, that the majority is not equating the word "proof" with the word "evidence ," but is merely stating that, as the majority does not find sufficient evidence to prove the unfair labor practice , there is no "proof" that it occurred . The Trial Examiner in this case found that the "preponderance of credible evidence " made it clear that the Respondent was following a punitive plan in delaying the return of the tollmen. He was unable to find "credible evidence" to support the Respondent's contention , adopted here by the majority , thatthe layoff of the tollmen was necessary as an economic or service measure. In reversing this factual finding of the Trial Examiner, which goes to the credibility of Respondent ' s witnesses who specifically testified that the layoffs were necessary as emer- gency measures , the majority must believe the very witnesses disbelieved by the Trial Examiner. To overrule a Trial Examiner ' s resolution as to the credibility of a witness is, as the Supreme Court of the United States has informed this Board and the circuit courts of appeals, 11 a most serious matter . The Board itself has established the rule that it would not do so "except where a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces [ it] that the Trial Examiner's resolution was incorrect ." >z Nowhere in its decision does the majority purport to apply this test in overruling the Trial Examiner . Applying this rule I can find no warrant for over- turning the Trial Examiner ' s credibility findings. 11 Universal Camera Corporation v. N. L R. B , 340 U. S 474 ; see, also , N L. R B. v. James Thompson & Co., 33 LRRM 2205 , where Judge Learned Hand held that the testimony of a witness as to his motive , believed by the Trial Examiner, is a credibility resolution. 12 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 ( C A. 2). PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1555 The Trial Examiner recited four undisputed statements of supervisors to tollmen who were turned away from their jobs. One was told to come back the next day, that if he "had crossed the picket line yesterday" he wouldn ' t be losing all that money; another, that the "unpleasantness of being locked out could be obviated by coming through the picket line"; a third, that other arrangements had been made because he had "observed the picket line the day before "; a fourth that he would not be per- mitted to work because he had failed to report for work on his previous shift, and that while the supervisor was "sorry," he "had orders ." These incidents were recited by the Trial Examiner as examples of the overwhelming evidence in the record supporting his finding as to credibility. In view of the majority' s reversal of the Trial Examiner's conclusions as to credibility , I deem it necessary to set forth and discuss the additional evidence in the record in support of his findings. Although the Respondent contended that tollmen who respected the picket line were not " dependable " enough to be relied upon in a strike situation , the record shows that these tollmen were not laid off for the duration of the strike . Tollmen who refused to give assurances that they would cross future picket lines were laid off for a day and permitted to work the following day, although the strike was still in progress and their de- pendability no greater than it had been the day before. Some of the tollmen who respected the picket lines twice were laid off for 1 day, permitted to work the following day, laid off a second time for a day only, and were again permitted to return to work, all during the progress of the strike. The Respondent also contended that it could not on short notice reschedule the work of its emergency crews. The record shows, however , contrary to the implications in the majority's decision , that the bulk of the emergency crews of supervisors were not recruited from distant exchanges . Of the 124 emer- gency crew members , 74 were toll supervisors or technicians who normally worked in the same city in which their emergency duty was performed . In Oakland , for example, 9 of the 10 emergency staff members normally worked in the same buildings in which the rank-and-file tollmen worked . Finally, in several offices the Respondent had no difficulty in revising its emergency schedules in order to make use of the services of tollmen who, shortly before they reported for duty, gave assurance that they would cross future picket lines. At Oakland several tollmen respected a picket line on July 24. They were laid off on July 25. These employees were engaged in " circuit order work." Their work was not per- formed on the day of their layoff. The Respondent contends that the circuit order work had to be suspended because tollmen performing such work had to be in constant telephonic contact with Respondent ' s circuit order bureau in San Francisco, the personnel of which were doing emergency duty as tollmen 1556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD during the strike. The record shows , however, that circuit order work was done in Oakland on July 23 and 24, before the picketing began there , and also on July 27, when the tollmen were permitted to return to their jobs . Yet the San Francisco emergency crews were active throughout this entire period, from July 21 through July 28. Actually , the tollmen who were engaged in the Oakland circuit order work consulted San Francisco only when they discovered errors in the circuit orders. At Coalinga 2 tollmen were engaged without supervision in a maintenance training program at 2 outlying microwave stations not yet in commercial service. On July 26, following their failure to cross the CWA picket line the previous day, they reported for duty but were not allowed to work on their on-the-job training . No explanation for this was advanced by the Respondent. At Watsonville three tollmen respected the CWA picket line on July 26 . Two of them were laid off the next day when they reported for work. The third , who had not been scheduled to work on July 27, was laid off when he reported for work the following day, July 28 , although his two fellow tollmen were both back on the job that day and although the emergency crew had already been entirely withdrawn. The danger that pickets might appear again on the 28th and render these tollmen "undependable" was obviously the same with respect to all three. One employee , McCullough, was doing outside work at the Coalinga toll office and did not see the pickets on the day they arrived. He therefore remained at work. Two of his fellow tollmen, however , saw and respected the picket line. On the following day, when the pickets had been withdrawn , all the tollmen reported for work. McCullouch had already begun his duties when he learned that the other two tollmen were being laid off because of their absence the previous day. After pro- testing to his supervisor that the layoffs were discriminatory and stating that he too would have respected the picket line, McCullouch announced that he would not work that day, and left. When McCullouch reported the next day, he was given a 1-day layoff, which Respondent freely admits was disciplinary. In view of the foregoing the Respondent cannot persuasively argue that it regarded the tollmen who respected the picket line as undependable and chose the certainty of its emergency crews to the uncertainty of men who would respect the next picket line . I believe that a fair evaluation of the evidence fully supports the Trial Examiner ' s finding that the Respondent followed a punitive plan in laying off the tollmen. There then remains for consideration the legal question of whether the tollmen were engaged in unprotected concerted activity when they respected the CWA picket line. It should not need restating that the right to strike andthe right to refuse to cross a picket line are the lifelines to which employees cling PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH GOMPANY 1557 as a last resort in their efforts toward mutual aid and pro- tection. To be sure those rights are not absolute., as no rights can be where the interests of one group impinge upon the just interests of another. But it seems to me that this Board should not deprive employees of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act except for compelling reasons on a clear record. I do not believe there are such reasons in this case. In my opinion, the question of whether the CWA strike itself was unprotected because of the tactics used is a close one. Certainly, it is not as objectionable as a wildcat or a sitdown strike, or a work stoppage in which employees refuse to perform part or all of their duties while remaining on the Company's payroll or on its premises. The CWA strike is, moreover, clearly distinguishable from the conduct of the Union in the Auto Workers case.13 There the union called a series of 26 surprise work stoppages in the form of special union meetings during working hours over a period of 5 months. The company resorted to no retaliatory measures, but merely invoked the processes of a statutory procedure made available by the State of Wisconsin. The Supreme Court held that Con- gress had not legislated with regard to this particular type of work stoppage and therefore the State's action in enjoining the Union was not in conflict with the National Labor Management Relations Act. There is no case which brands a strike of the type conducted by the CWAas an unprotected concerted activity. But the issue in this case is whether the tollmen who re- spected a picket line for a lawful economic objective lose the protection of the Act because 3 days after the strike started pickets reappeared on 1 or 2 occasions at some of the offices where tollmen were employed. Are the 49 tollmen who re- spected the picket line during the first 3 days when no inter- mittent picketing occurred in the same position as all of the others? Are the 12 tollmen who respected a picket line during this period and were not called upon to respect it a second time during the entire period of the strike also deprived of their protection under the Act? Are the 138 tollmen who re- spected the picket line only once during the 9-day strike guilty of such heinous conduct that they too are unprotected in their concerted activities? Was McCullouch, who was admittedly disciplined because he protested the layoff of his fellow toll- men, engaged in unprotected concerted activity? The majority's affirmative answer to these questions means that the Company could retaliate against these employees and, if it had so desired, arbitrarily dismiss them merely because they were exercising the traditional trade union precept of refusing to cross a lawful picket line of a sister union. I think the majority's decision goes far to deprive employees of rights guaranteed them by Congress and long since cemented into the law of the land. The correct rule of law was stated in 13Auto Workers v. W. E. R. B , 336 U. S 245. 1558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the case of Cyril de Cordova & Bros. '4 There an employee, following the termination of a strike , was discharged because during the strike he had refused to cross the striking union's picket line. The Board found that the employee's discharge was violative of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. I would apply that reasoning here and affirm the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent ' s punitive layoff of its tollmen was a violation of that section of the Act. Member Beeson took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 1491 NLRB 1121. Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE A charge having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named Company, herein called the Respondent, a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat 136, herein called the Act, was held in San Francisco , Sacramento , and Fresno , all in California , on various dates between March 31 and May 16, 1952, before the undersigned Trial Examiner In substance the complaint alleges and the answer denies that in July 1951 the Respondent discriminatorily locked out 183 employees, listed in Appendix A attached hereto, because they were members of Order of Repeatermen and Toll Testboardmen, herein called the Union, or because they engaged in concerted activities, and that by this conduct the Respond- ent interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act At the hearing all parties were represented , were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross - examine witnesses , to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. Argu- ment was waived, briefs have been received from the Respondent and General Counsel. At the close of the hearing ruling was reserved upon a motion by the Respondent to dismiss the complaint Disposition of this motion is made by the findings , conclusions , and recommenda- tions below Upon the entire record in the case , and from his observation of the witnesses , the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT L THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company is a California corporation, a subsidiary of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and is engaged as a public utility in the business of receiving and transmitting by telephone and telegraph intrastate and interstate communications , with office and plants in various States IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Order of Repeatermen and Toll Testboardmen is a labor organization admitting to member- ship employees of the Respondent. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1559 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Summary of relevant events and issues In its northern California area, with which this case is concerned, the Respondent has about 30 toll offices, where highly skilled employees maintain different types of toll equipment. The principal work of the toll forces is to maintain central office equipment and connecting facili- ties which provide what is commonly called long-distance service, telephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter private line service , and network broadcasting service . For purposes of ,,ollective bargaining these employees are represented by the Union , a separate and distinct labor organization from the Communication Workers of America, CIO, herein called CWA, which in this area represents telephone workers generally. For a few days late in July 1951, apparently to bring pressue upon the Respondent during contract negotiations, CWA engaged in a strike The strike strategy, although not followed to the letter at all offices in the area, was to picket an office for about 24 hours, and then to withdraw the pickets completely or for a few days Whenever the CWA picket line appeared at an office where tollmen were employed, most of the union members respected the line and declined to work until it was removed After disappearance of the pickets and when reporting for duty at their next previously scheduled shifts, many of the tollmen were not permitted to resume work at once but were told to come back the following day The sole issue of this proceeding arises from the Respondent ' s failure to permit tollmen, who had respected the CWA picket lines, to resume their work upon reporting for duty. In substance , it is General Counsel ' s contention that these employees were discriminatorily penalized because they observed the CWA picket lines. The Respondent, disclaiming dis- crimination in fact or for any purpose , rests its position on divergent claims: (1) The delay in letting tollmen resume their work was , in effect , an economic necessity , and (2) it may not be held accountable under the Act even if discrimination occurred , since theeconcerted activities were unprotected . The opposing contentions are discussed in more detail below. B. Summary of undisputed facts Although the record contains many pages of testimony and documents there is no dispute that certain individual tollmen , at certain offices in the area, observed the CWA picket line on certain days and on certain days thereafter were not permitted to work despite the fact that they had reported for duty and were ready and willing to resume their services. Near the conclusion of his case-in-chief , General Counsel introduced into evidence, without objection by counsel for the Respondent, his Exhibit No 17, which he well described as a "coherent and intelligent summary of exactly what the situation was at each office." The exhibit summarizes facts which had already been established either by company records, introduced by the Respondent, or by oral testimony of witnesses called by General Counsel. It was admitted into evidence subject to check for accuracy by the Respondent . No material changes were made thereafter . It consists of 40 pages and shows precisely , for each of the material dates between July 20 and 29, the days and shifts when the tollmen worked, observed the picket line, were off duty because so scheduled before the strike began, or lost time because not permitted by management to work. As to this exhibit counsel for the Respondent declined only to accept the conclusion, denoted on the exhibit by the letter "L," that certain individuals were actually "locked out" on the days indicated. That they were not permitted to work upon application, however, he did not dispute. The Trial Examiner has checked this exhibit with records introduced by the Respondent and the oral testimony of witnesses and has found no material error in it. Since there is no dispute as to the basic facts , it appears that no good purpose would be served by setting forth in this Intermediate Report all details relating to each of the 183 employees named in the complaint It is therefore found, on the basis of the entire record, that each of the individuals named in Appendix A attached to this report was deprived of his regularly scheduled employ- ment, by management , on the date and for the periods indicated on Exhibit No. 17 i 'This finding includes tollmen at Bakersfield who, as is shown on the exhibit, reported for work during the middle of their regular shift, were not allowed to work, and were deprived of work also on their next shift. See also section III, E, below, as to the case of one individual, Louis McCullouch. 1560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD C. Conclusion as to issue of discriminatorv lockout In order to determine whether or not, as General Counsel contends , the 183 individuals were deprived of work for varying periods because they had previously respected the CWA picket line it is necessary briefly to review certain facts depicting the setting in which such deprivation occurred. Although there is no evidence that management knew in advance exactly when the CWA would strike, it is established that the general plan of a "hit -and-run" strike became known to officials of the Respondent many months before it actually occurred . The strategy and tactics were openly revealed in the November 20, 1950, issue of "Coast Coordinator ," the official publication of CWA' s Pacific Coast division It must be assumed that management fully expected , in the event of such a strike , that the tollmen members of the Union would respect the CWA picket lines . In any event, according to the testimony of Charles H. Cole, division plant manager of the toll division , long beforethe strike was called management had prepared its own plan of means and methods to assure continued operation of the toll equipment and services . In short, this plant was to have management representatives cover jobs suddenly left vacant. There is no evidence that management planned to , or in fact did, hire any individual from outside its own regular staff to replace tollmen who observed the CWA picket line. Cole referred to these management representatives as "emergency forces ," All were salaried persons, all were "staff supervisors ." Some were the regularly assigned super- visors at the various toll offices . Others were regularly attached to the several technical staffs at some central point in the area. Management carried out its plan, in general . One or more of the "emergency force" took over when tollmen failed to cross the picket line . Cole admitted that such supervisors did not cover the jobs, "job for job," and credible evidence establishes that in may offices scheduled work was temporarily left undone , while the regular tollmen were either voluntarily or in- voluntarily off work. The critical question arises from the fact that when the regular tollmen reported back for work, 183 of them were not permitted to resume their duties at once . In many cases they were told they were not needed , but that they could return to work the next day . In some cases they were told their jobs were already filled for the shift but could come back the next day . In view of the claim of management , which seems based upon a reasonable appraisal of reality, that it sent out its supervisors as an "emergency force" or had local supervisors fill in for the "emergency ," it is difficult to detect merit in its more general contenton that the services of the returning tollmen were "not needed" until 24 hours later . The only periods of "emer- gency " were those created by the tollmen themselves , when they refrained voluntarily from working . Each returning tollman ended his part in the "emergency" the moment he reported ready and willing to work on his regularly scheduled shift. The work was there, the regularly scheduled worker was there No replacement , in the sense of a newly hired employee, had been made . It was simply a case of supervisors arbitrarily depriving individuals of an opportunity to work on a shift which had previously been scheduled for them by man- agement 2 The Trial Examiner is unable to find credible evidence to support the Respondent's con- tention that it was necessary , as an econorrucor service measure, to wait for varying periods before permitting the tollmen to resume their work. On the contrary, the preponderance of credible evidence makes it clear that management, in delaying the return of the tollmen to their jobs, followed a punitive plan. For example, it is undisputed that employee A. J. Harvey , at the San Francisco office , was told by Supervisor Giddens, when he reported for work but was instructed to come back the next day , that if he "had crossed the picket line yesterday" he wouldn ' t be losing all that money . Under similar circumstances at San Mateo , employee F. Satterfield was told by Chief Switchman Gunn that the "unpleasantness of being locked out could be obviated by coming through the picket line." At Visalia , when employee P. W. Wills reported back for work he was told that other arrange- ments had been made because he had "observed the picket line the day before " And at Fresno, employee V. D. Howard was told by Supervisor Hettick that he would not be permitted to work his regular shift because he had not reported for work on his previous shift, and that while he was "sorry ," he "had orders." 2See Roure-Dupont Mfg., Inc., 93 NLRB 1240 at 1243, where the Board comments on "tem- porary replacements." PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1561 The foregoing incidents establish a pattern supporting General Counsel ' s conteintion- -that the returning tollmen were, in fact, penalized for observing the CWA picket line . It is so concluded and found . The individuals named in Appendix A were discriminatorily deprived of their regular employment , as indicated on General Counsel's Exhibit No . 17. for the reason that they had declined to cross the picket lines. D. Conclusions as to the issue of protected activity Since it has been found that the Respondent ' s failure to permit its employees to return to their scheduled shifts was retaliatory , it remains only to be determined whether or not the conduct of such employees was protected activity. Neither at the hearing nor in its brief is the contention advanced by the Respondent that the objective of the CWA strike was illegal It is therefore unnecessary to consider here whether observance of a picket line of a union engaged in a strike for an illegal purpose is , by that fact , branded as unprotected activity. The Respondent claims only that the "tactics" of the CWA strike were of a nature depriving them of the "protection of the Act," and that the tollmen who "chose to act in sympathetic support of such tactics stand in no better position than the strikers themselves " The substance of the Respondent 's argument is that CWA did not conduct " the traditional type of strike" and that the technique adopted was the "type of recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work" which the Supreme Court found did not'have the protection of the Act in International Union, U.A.W., A. F. of L., Local 232, et al , more commonly re- ferred to as the Auto Workers case. 3 If the Supreme Court found to be unprotected such strike technique as was engaged in here the Trial Examiner would, of course , be bound by the cited decision. The following quotation form the Court' s decision described the nub of the case before it: The strategem consisted of calling repeated special meetings of the Union during working hours at any time the Union saw fit, which the employees would leave work to attend . It was an essential part of the plan that this should be without warning to the employer or notice as to when or whether the employees would return . The device was adopted and the surprise cessation of work was called on November 6, 1945; thereafter, and until March 22, 1946 , such action was repeated on twenty-six occasions . The em- ployer was not informed during this period of any specific demands which these tactics were designed to enforce nor what concessions it could make to avoid them This procedure was publicly described by the union leaders as a new technique for bringing pressure upon the employer . It was, and is, candidly admitted that these tactics were intended to and did interfere with production and put strong economic pressure on the employer, who was disabled thereby from making any dependable production plans or delivery commitments . And it was said that " this can't be said for the strike After the initial surprise or walk-out , the company knows what to do and plans accordingly." It was commended as a procedure which would avoid hardships that a strike imposes on employees and was considered "a better weapon than a strike." The majority of the Court concluded that "We think that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work to win unstated ends was neither forbidden by Federal Statute nor was it legalized and approved thereby." The effect of the decision was, however , to find that the stoppage described was unprotected , since it concluded that the State of Wisconsin had the power to enjoin it. It does not appear to the Trial Examiner that the cases are identical , but that they are in fact distinguishable . The company there involved was a large manufacturing concern, the employees were production employees . Here the Company is a public utility, the employees involved were and are maintaining service. There , the Court was apparently concerned because production was interrupted by the tactics , which, if found protected , " manage- ment ... would be disabled from any kind of self-help to copy with ... except to submit to its undeclared demands " Here management was not only , not "disabled from any kind of self-help ," but testimony of management representatives establishes that it was both able and prepared in advance to cope with the previously announced CWA tactics, insofar as they affected the working of union members. 3 336 U. S 245. 1562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In summary, it is clear that here management, within its own organization, was amply prepared to take care of precisely the situation which arose in July 1951. Cole admitted that "16 percent of all telephone workers are management employees," the highest ratio in American industry. He also testified that the "emergency crews" made up of management representatives who took the places of tollmen observing the picket lines "were fully qualified to do the necessary work." These members of the emergency crews were salaried, they were not replacements hired from outside. Accepting the testimony of Cole and other management witnesses on this point at face value, it is plain that the Respondent was hardly even em- barrassed by a situation which it knew of in advance, was prepared to meet, and successfully met. Factors with which the majority of the Supreme Court were concerned in the Auto Workers case are not present here. The Trial Examiner is convinced that that case does not govern. The Respondent also contends, "An employee may work or he may strike. He has no right to attempt to do both on an off-again -on-again basis." The Trial Examiner is aware of no Board policy or Court holding which lays down so broad and strict a rule. Application of it would make illegal and unprotected anything less than a full-blown strike. It would tend to lead to the increase, and not the diminishment, of industrial strife, since it would encourage all workers to withhold all services and tie up all production until each of their demands were met or until they were willing to capitulate completely. Under the circumstances of this case the Trial Examiner is convinced and finds that the concerted activity of the tollmen was protected. E. The case of Louis McCullouch The Respondent claims that his employee was properly disciplined for failing to work. In summary, the facts relating to him are as follows: McCullough was the local union steward at Coalinga. On July 25, he went to work early, with management permission, and proceeded to microwave station some distance from the toll office to perform his regular duties. In the meantime, and without his knowledge, CWA pickets appeared and other tollmen on his shift observed them. He reported for work the next morning, July 26. His fellow employees were not allowed to work because they had not crossed the picket line the day before. He was told he could work. He protested, told the supervisor "if there had been pickets here when I came, I would not have crossed the picket line," and declined to work that shift. The next day, July 27, he was told "You could have worked yesterday, and you didn't, so we are giving you a day off today as a disciplinary action to think it over." Hd was not permitted to work on July 27. It appears to the Trial Examiner that the "discipline" applied to McCullouch was of the same pattern as that accorded to those who had in fact observed the picket line. Distinguish- able in time, it was the same in essence . Since it has been found that the Respondent's re- taliation against the other tollmen was violative of the Act, it is concluded and found that its treatment of McCullouch was likewise proscribed by the same statute. F. Conclusion in summary It has been found that the individuals listed its Appendix A engaged in concerted and protected activity . It has been found that each of these employees was discriminatorily locked out, in retaliation , for at least one work-shift following his observance of the CWA picket line. It is therefore concluded and found that by such conduct the Respondent discriminated in regard to the tenure and conditions of employment of its employees , because of their concerted activi- ties and to discourage membership in the Union , 4 and thereby interfered with , restrained, and coerced them in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 4To penalize union members for carrying out a union policy is clearly to discourage union member ship PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 1563 V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices , the Trial Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Respondent discriminatorily failed and refused to reinstate the employees named on Appendix A. attached hereto , for periods shown on General Counsel's Exhibit No . 17. It will be recommended that the Respondent make whole each of the said employees for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent 's discrimi- nation against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would nor- mally have earned as wages during the shift or shifts that he was locked out, less his net earnings , if any, during said period.5 The unfair labor practices found reveal on the part of the Respondent such a fundamental antipathy to the objectives of the Act as to justify an inference that the commission of other unfair labor practices may be anticipated . The preventive purposes of the Act may be frus- trated unless the Respondent is required to take some affirmative action to dispel the threat. It will be recommended , therefore , that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record, the Trial Ex- aminer makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Order of Repeatermen and Toll Testboardmen is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment and terms and conditions of employment of the 183 individuals listed on Appendix A , attached hereto , thereby discouraging membership in the above -named labor organization , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 ( a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 5 Since the lockout here was of so limited duration, it appears unnecessary to cite the Board's Woolworth doctrine as to computing back pay. APPENDIX A Stratton, K. R. Cathey, A. W. Hammes, E. F. Kingsbury, K. Kirk, W. N. Mann, M. M. McClurkin, L. H. McElroy, R. E. Nelson, O. B. McIntire, J. R. Sanders, D. M. Shadinger, G. H. Whitlock, R. W. Lindsey, D. E. Walton, W. A. Ralston, R. L. Kelbaugh, W. Poeschel, P. J. Maples, F. H. Bakerfield Friend, J. A. McCullouch, L. J. Phelps, R. R. Coalinga Chico 11 Coleman , H. A. Crockett Hollinger, T. J. Nettleton, J. S. Valiton, T. M. McCune, W. F. Anderson, E. J. Snyder, M. E. Howland, R. S. Sannazzari, J. J. Stover, F. L. Davis, C. L. Greer, J. B. Eureka Howard, V. D. Fresno Burke, E. E. De Pew, W. R. Harlan, J. M. 1564 Liljenfelt, R. Fraslm, C. J. Heacox, R. R. Perkins, L. W. Price, H. M. McElroy, W. Delaney, E. L. Dysart, W. W. Falls, E. C. Bryan, M. G. Karnatz, E. E. McCluskey, V. J. Fiedler, F. Gum, N. Hottel. B. Bell, E. Day, R. Bullard, F. W. Bowley, G. Conley, A. Fitzpatrick, J. Murphy, W. Nedelka, W. Oliver, S. O'Neil, J. Peterson, H. Reed, F. Scaroni, J. Somerville, G. Stickney, G. Tripp, W. Costedoat. M. La Fantasie, F. P. Tucker, P. Riley, D. Agnew, R. D. Ainsworth, J. K. Williams, H. P. Nibecker, R. E. Reese, J. W. Bristow, J. Newcomer, D. Sass, C. Alpers, R. R. Anderson, A. Bramlett, C. Cline, H. A. Coomes, C. C. Deering, P. E. Dixon, H. G. Dunn, H. A. Fischer, R. B. Greene, W. A. Harlow, J. E. Keehn, W. J. McCallum, E. A. Moore, J. E. Murray, J. R. Paolmi Sabourin, F. Shipman, W. R. DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A--Continued Fresno Smail, C. L. Walker, G. F. Brumley, A. Hanford Laurin, J. R. Marysville Miller, F. L. Merced Neeley, M. G. Napa 11 Oakland 11 11 Albert, M. Kelling, F. J. Lamkins, W. C. Tazeau, T. Turney, J. C. Banks, E. G. Billo, H. P. Birns, H. C. Brown, A. S. Eickenberg, J. E. Friburg, R. M. Gamba, L. F. Gorton, J. E. Graves, H. Horn, C. Larson, W. R. Leydecker, R. Meachum, D. W. Melbin, R. E. Pozzo, A. J. Salva, M. J. Schneider, C. Smith, R. R. Spatofore, A. J. Spindler, G. Thomson, W. H. Tweedy, N. E. Woolf, A. Halligan, A. Palo Alto Harvey, A. " Palmer, G. E. Paso Robles Patterson, J. C. Redding Sanford, A. W. Trafton, H. F. Sacramento Vosti, W. E. Whitney, B. H. Williams, H. Hardin, J. D. Hensley, D. L. Jensen, C. H. Reynolds, R. S. Walker, F. N. Wesselmg, E. W. Wesseling, E. C. Dye, L. L. Johnson, E. J. Fink, R. L. Satterfield, F. S. Jones, D. E. Moffit, W. C. Hutchinson, E. J. Ormond, C. F. McFarland, P. L. Marin, B. J. Hardy, L. R. Sacramento 11 11 San Francisco 11 San Luis Obispo San Mateo 11 San Rafael Santa Rosa 11 BOSTON CONSOLIDATED GAS COMPANY 1565 APPENDIX A--Continued Badger, R. T. Santa Rosa Sellman, W. Visalia Fuchs, S. L. Stockton Taylor, D. L. Watsonville Gannon, D. P. Brown, C. G. 11 Pugmire, L. L. Doran, E. W. Todd, F. T. Laurent, R. P. Warner, M. R. Raburn, D. O. Whitson, L. J. Porterfield, K. B. Evans, D. D. Thomas, N. F., Sr. Lasher, D. R. Ukiah Reid, R. D. Weed Sherman, G. P. 11 Touchon, P. E. 11 Pridgen, O. B. Visalia O. A.Strider Wills, R. W. 11 , APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in order of Repeatermen and Toll Testboard- men or any other labor organization of our employees by discriminating in any manner with regard to their hire and tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employ- ment. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named labor organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL make whole each of the 183 individuals named on the attached list for any loss of pay suffered by him as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above-named union or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Employer. Dated ................ By.................. . .................... .. .................. ............................. (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. BOSTON CONSOLIDATED GAS COMPANY and CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, Petitioner. Case No. 1-RC- 3470. March 12, 1954 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Sidney A. Coven, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at 107 NLRB No. 322. z}^so3 0 10, 0 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation