Pacific Mills

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 30, 1950

91 N.L.R.B. 60 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter Of PACIFIC MILLS and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 34-CA-46-Decided August 30, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 29, 1950, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices in violation of the Act, and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as, set
forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. There-
after, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
a supporting brief.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.2 The rulings are
hereby affirmed .3 The Board has considered the Intermediate Re-
port, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and modi-
fications.4
' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, as amended , the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Houston, Reynolds , and Murdock].
2 During the hearing the General Counsel made a motion that all names and dates in the
bill , of particulars be changed to conform to the testimony. The Respondent objected con-
tending that because of Section 10 (b) of the Act, time was of the essence in this case.
The Trial Examiner denied the motion. No exception was filed and we find it unnecessary
to pass upon this ruling.
In determining the 6-month period specified under Section 10 (b), the Trial Examiner
appeared to construe the date of mailing of the charge as the date of service . Since it is not
material here , to decide whether the mailing of the charge or the receipt thereof by the
Respondent constitutes service , we do not pass upon the apparent resolution of this ques-
tion by the Trial Examiner. See Frederica Clausen d /b/a Luzerene Hide and Tallow
Company, 89 NLRB 989.
3 On June 26, 1950, the Board received from the Respondent a motion to reopen the
record on the basis of N. L. R. B. v. Poster Cotton Mills, Inc., 181 F. 2d 919 (C. A. 5).
For reasons stated in our order of May 19, 1950, in Bethlehem Steel Company , Shipbuilding
Division, and Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc., 89 NLRB 1476, the Respondent's
motion to reopen the record on the foregoing ground is hereby denied. See also, our order
of June 7 , 1950, in J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 90 NLRB 130.
' The Respondent 's request for oral argument is denied inasmuch as we believe the issues
and positions of the parties were adequately presented in the record and the briefs.
91 NLRB No. 3.
60
PACIFIC MILLS 61
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent spe-
cifically violated Section 8 (a.) (1) of the Act by surveillance of union
organizational meetings; by threats and promises made by Supervisor
Weaver at the union meeting of May 22, 1948; by soliciting signatures
of employees in opposition to the Union; by interrogating employee
Pruitt as to his loyality to the Respondent and withholding from
Pruitt the benefit of occupying a company house until the Respondent
was satisfied he was not a union advocate; and by attempting to with-
draw from employee Hamby the right to occupy a company house.
In its brief the Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's 8 (a)
(1) findings concerning Pruitt on the ground that they are at variance
with the allegations of the complaint and the bill of -particulars sub-
mitted in this proceeding. However, the findings are covered gen-
erally by the complaint and the Respondent suffered no surprise at
the hearing and had full opportunity to litigate the issues involving
Pruitt. We find, therefore, that it suffered no prejudice. Accord-
ingly, we find the aforesaid exception without merit.,,
2. We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent dis-
criminated against Rufus B. Hamby and Ray Cline in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
In finding that Ray Cline was discriminatorily discharged, the Trial
Examiner sets forth, inter alia, the failure of the Respondent to make
a showing as to "who replaced Storey if it was not Cline, or whether
that job was kept vacant." The -Respondent excepts to this finding as
"an attempt to shift the burden of proof from the General Counsel to
the Respondent." We disagree. We recognize that the burden of
proof never shifts," but the burden of going forward with evidence
after the prima facie case of discriminatory character of discharge has
been established necessarily falls upon the Respondent.' Here, by
credibility findings," the Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Cline was hired on a permanent basis to replace a discharged employee,
Ralph Storey. The Respondent failed to contradict or even explain
Storey's discharge and his job replacement. Employee Lunsford, who
testified as a witness for the Respondent, testified that Storey was a
3 See Fulton Bag. and Cotton Hills, 75 NLRB 883; Weaver Wintark, 87 NLRB 351. Cf.
Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 NLRB 90, footnote 10 and cases cited therein.
9 See W. C. Nabors Company, 89 NLRB 538.
7 Jasper National Mattress Company, 89 NLRB 75.
'The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner' s finding that Cline was not absent
without permission on May 7, 1948, as shown by an entry on his personnel card. The
Respondent maintains that Cline "specifically swore he was at work" on this date. It is
noted that Cline testified on cross-examination that he was not absent during this period
"as far as I know ." Clearly, Cline's statements in this connection were not as dogmatic
as the Respondent contends , nor as suggested by the finding of the Trial Examiner. We
accept, however, the Trial Examiner' s general credibility findings as to Cline's testimony.
we do not adopt his apparent finding that the burden was upon the Respondent to pro-
duce further evidence to support the entry on Cline's personnel card.
62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
loom blower on the same shift as the one he was working on and that
Storey had been discharged , supporting Cline's testimony as to this
point. In fact, Lunsford , although he testified that he "had been
told" by the "boss man" that Cline had been hired to take his job tem-
porarily while he worked a different shift, admitted that he had
worked with Cline for "a few nights" after returning to his old shift.
Upon the complete record, we are satisfied that the Respondent dis-
charged Cline because of his union activity.
3. As noted in paragraph 1, above, the Trial Examiner found, and
we agree, that the Respondent's attempt to withdraw Hamby's right to
occupy a company -owned house , under all the circumstances present
herein, constituted interference , restraint , and coercion in violation of
Section 8 ( a) (1) of the Act . Since the issuance of the Intermediate
Report, the General Counsel and the Respondent have stipulated in a
motion to reopen the record that Rufus B. Hamby was , on or about
February 15, 1950, evicted from his dwelling , a company-owned house
in the town of Rhodhiss, North Carolina, by the sheriff or his agent of
the county in which the dwelling is situated, acting pursuant to a
judgment obtained by the Respondent in eviction proceedings against
Hamby in the courts of the State of North Carolina . The motion is
hereby granted and the evidence hereby made a part of the record in
this case.
From the stipulated facts above it appears that the Respondent has
:succeeded in the actual eviction of Hamby from the company house.
Accordingly , we shall order the Respondent to offer Hamby immedi-
ate occupancy of his former or substantially equivalent living quar-
ters in a company-owned house on the same terms accorded other em-
ployees. We shall further order the Respondents to make Hamby
whole for any loss he may have suffered by reason of his discriminatory
eviction by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he
has had to pay as rental for other living quarters from the date of the
eviction to the date he is offered reinstatement and occupancy in the
manner set forth above , plus such additional expenses as he may have
incurred during said period as a direct result of his eviction , but less
the amount he would normally have paid as rent for his company-
owned home during said period.'
4. As recommended by the Trial Examiner , we shall order the Re-
spondent to offer Rufus B. Hamby and Ray Cline reinstatement with
back pay from the date of their discharges. Since the issuance of the
Trial Examiner 's Intermediate Report, however, the Board has
0 Abbott Worsted Mills, Inc., 36 NLRB 545, 557 ; Industrial Cotton Mills Company, Inc.,
50 NLRB 855 ; Indianapolis Wire-Bound Company, d/b/a Cleveland Veneer Company, 89
NLRB 617.
PACIFIC MILLS 63
adopted a method of computing back pay different from that pre-
scribed by the Trial Examiner.10 Consistent with that new policy
we shall order that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each
separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the period from,
the Respondent's discriminatory action to the date of a proper offer
of reinstatement. The quarterly periods, hereinafter called "quar-
ters," shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and.
October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum,
equal to that which these employees would normally have earned for
each quarter or portion thereof, their net earnings,1' if any, in other
employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter
shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter..
We shall also order the Respondent to make available to the Board
upon request payroll and other records to facilitate the checking of the
amount of back pay due'. 12
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Pacific Mills,,.
Rhodhiss, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,.
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer
ica, CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by dis-
criminatorily discharging employees or by discriminating in ally other
manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment ;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in any
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
1° F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
11 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation , room;.
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where, which would. not have been incurred but for this unlawful discrimination, and the
consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. Crossett Lumber Company, S
NLRB 440. Monies received for work performed upon Federal, State, county, municipal-
or other work-relief projects shall be considered as earnings . Republic Steel Corporation.
v. N. L. R. R., 311 U. S. 7.
12 F. W. Woolworth Company, supra.
64 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the folowing affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Rufus B. Hamby and Ray Cline immediate and full
reinstatement to their former positions or to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges;
(b) Make whole Rufus B. Hamby and Ray Cline in the manner
set forth in paragraph 4, above, for any loss of pay they may have suf-
fered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against them;
(c) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, time cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay due and the
right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order;
(d) Offer Rufus B. Hamby immediate occupancy of his former or
substantially equivalent living quarters in a company-owned house;
(e) Make whole Rufus B. Hamby for any loss he may have suf-
fered by reason of the Respondent's discriminatory eviction of Hamby
from his living quarters in the manner set forth in paragraph 3, above ;
(f) Post at its plant in Rhodhiss, North Carolina, copies of the
notice attached hereto and marked Appendix A 13 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material; and
(g) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX A
"NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
za In the event this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words, "Decision and Order," the words,
"Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
PACIFIC MILLS 65
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA, CIO, or in any other labor organization, by
discriminatorily discharging employees or by discriminating in
any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organi-
zation, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-
named union or any other labor organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer Rufus B. Hamby and Ray Cline immediate and
full reinstatement to their former positions or to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make those employees whole for any
loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them.
WE WILL upon. request, make available to the Board or its agents,
for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security
payment records, time cards, personnel. records and reports, and
all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay
due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
WE WILL offer Rufus B. Hamby immediate occupancy of his
former or substantially equivalent living quarters in a company-
owned house, and make him whole for any loss suffered as a
result of his discriminatory eviction.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-mentioned union or any other labor organization.
PACIFIC MILLS,
Employer.
Dated -------------------- By ------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Miles J. McCormick, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frank A. Constangy and Legare Davis, Esgs., 1404 Candler Building, Atlanta,
Ga., for the Respondent.
Bruce E. Davis, Esq., 5061/ East 4th Street, Charlotte, N. C., for the Union.
66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge filed on August 30, 1949, by Textile Workers
Union of America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, called herein respectively the General Counsel
and the Board, by the Regional Director of the Fifth Region (Baltimore, Mary-
land), on November 21, 1949, issued a complaint against Pacific Mills, herein
called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, herein referred to as the Act. Copies of the com-
plaint, the charge, the first amended charge, and the second amended charge
upon which it was based together with notice of hearing thereon, were duly
served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance:
(1) That since on or about May 4, 1948, to the date of the complaint the Respond-
ent in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act by (a) urging, persuading, and warning its employees by threats of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit to refrain from assisting, becoming, or remaining
members of the Union or engaging or continuing to engage in concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (b)
questioning its employees concerning their membership in and activities on behalf
of the Union; (c) threatening its employees with loss of employment should they
join the Union or otherwise assist the Union in its efforts to organize Respondent's
employees; (d) keeping under surveillance the organizational activities of its
employees and of the Union ; and (2) that in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and
(3) of the Act, the Respondent discharged Ray Cline on or about May 28, 1948,
and Rufus B. Hamby on or about August 13, 1948, and has since refused and
failed to reinstate them, thereby discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure
of employment in order to discourage membership in the Union.
In its answer filed December 19, 1949, the Respondent admitted certain alle-
gations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Prior to the hearing in this case, the Respondent demanded, Trial Examiner
Reeves R. Hilton ordered, and the General Counsel furnished to the Respondent
a bill of particulars concerning certain allegations of the complaint.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held in Lenoir, North Carolina, from Janu-
ary 4 to 6, 1950, inclusive, before W. Gerard Ryan, the undersigned Trial Ex-
aminer, duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel,
the Union, and the Respondent participated in the hearing and were afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence bearing upon the issues.
At the opening of the hearing, and renewed at the conclusion of the testimony,
the Respondent moved to strike from paragraph 4 of the complaint as amended
by the bill of particulars the allegations of 8 (a) (1) violations which are barred
by Section 10 (b) of the Act. Decision was reserved and the motion is now
denied for the reasons hereinafter appearing. At the close of the General
Counsel's case-in-chief, the General Counsel moved to strike from the bill of
particulars the name under paragraph 4-a of Ted Kemp, August 15, 1048;
under 4-b, Flowers Austin, August 15, 1948-1 and under 4-d, Luther Elmore,
May 15, 1948. That motion is granted. At the same time the General Counsel
moved that all names and dates in the bill of particulars be changed to conform
PACIFIC MILLS 67*
to 'the testimony. The Respondent objected on the ground that while such a
motion is usually pro forma, in the present instance, time is of the essence.
Decision was reserved. I now deny the motion. The unfair labor practices as
found hereinafter occurred on or after May 5, 1948.' Testimony to events prior
to May 5 was used for background purposes as shown infra. Decision was
reserved on the motion by Respondent to dismiss the complaint at the close of the.
General Counsel's case-in-chief and at the conclusion of the testimony. I now
deny those motions..
The parties were afforded opportunity for oral argument at the conclusion,
of the evidence and also an opportunity to file briefs, proposed findings of fact,.
and conclusions of law.
Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent?
On the entire record in the case, and from my observation of,the witnesses,.
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF PACT 3
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
.
The Respondent is a Massachusetts corporation and at all times material herein
has continuously engaged in the manufacture of rayon piece goods, including
the carding, spinning, and weaving of rayon wool and rayon acetate fabrics, at
its plant at Rhodhiss, North Carolina. The Respondent concedes and I find that
at all times material herein it has been and still is engaged in interstate com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The town of Rhodhiss is a municipality in the State of North Carolina in-
corporated by an Act of the State legislature in 1903 setting the corporate limits
and specifying jurisdiction of the municipality and its authority. The jurisdic-
tion of its police officers who have power to make arrests, preserve order, and
otherwise carry out their duties within the town extends to within a distance
of one-fourth mile beyond the corporate limits.
The Respondent operates two mill buildings at Rhodhiss, which are exactly
opposite each other on opposite banks of the Catawba River, about 300 yards.
apart, and they are connected by a bridge across the river. Mill offices, a gen-
eral administrative building, and a common warehouse for the two mills comprise
the other buildings.
Surrounding the plant is a mill village in the immediate area which consists.
of company-owned houses on both sides of the river. These houses are leased
to its employees for a nominal rental per month. All the real property in the
town belongs to the Respondent, excepting public roads, schoolhouse, and a
church. The Respondent conveyed the land to the county and the church upon
1 Since the charge was filed on November 3, 1948 , and served on November 4, 1948, the 6
month statutory cutoff begins May 5, 1948.
3 Time for the filing of briefs was duly extended to February 6, 1950.
3In making the findings herein , I have considered and weighed the entire evidence. It
would needlessly burden this Report to set up all the testimony on disputed points. Such,
testimony or other evidence as is in conflict with the findings herein is not credited.
917572-51-vol. 91-6
68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which are built the school and the church. Between five and six hundred in-
habitants live in the town whose citizens elect a town council. The mayor, town
clerk and treasurer, chief of police, and all members of the council are employed
by the Respondent. The chief of police, appointed by the council, receives a
salary from the town for his police work and also a salary from the Respondent,
who employs him as a plant guard. It was stipulated that the Respondent has
labor contracts with Textile Workers Union in its several plants in Columbia,
South Carolina, the A. F. L. union in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Machine
Printers Beneficial Association at its Lyman, South Carolina, plant.
The supervisory personnel consisted of Joseph Cobb, general superintendent
and manager ; James Culclasure, personnel manager ; Luther Elmore, night super-
intendent at Mill No. 1; Frank Webb, overseer of the carding department in
Mill No. 2; Wallace Splawn, overseer of the spinning department in Mill No. 2;
Les Weaver, yard foreman ; and all second hands. It was further stipulated that
fixers are production employees and not supervisors.
In the summer of.1947, the Union began its efforts to organize the Respondent's
employees at Rhodhiss. Little progress was made and in the spring of 1948,
the Union renewed its campaign, which continued actively through the summer
and fall of 1948.
B. The applicability of Section 10 (b)
As has been indicated previously, the Respondent asserts that Section 10 (b)
of the Act bars any reference to any incident which by the evidence is shown to
have occurred more than 6 months prior to service of the charge. The charge
was filed on November 3, 1948, and a copy served on the. Respondent on the
following day, November 4.
Section 10 (b) provides as follows:
. . . no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occur-
ring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board
and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge
is made unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such
charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month
period shall be computed from the day of his discharge.*
The General Counsel concedes that Section 10 (b) prevents the finding of
violation of the Act in any conduct of the Respondent which occurred prior to
May 4, 1948. He contends, however, that the section does not prohibit the intro-
duction of evidence of conduct antedating the 6 months' period, and the use of
such evidence for background purposes.. The Board has recently held that Sec-
tion 10 (b) does not preclude the use of evidence as to events which antedated
the 6-month period of limitation for background purposes.' I therefore find that
Section 10 (b) does not preclude the consideration of evidence relevant to the
determination as to whether the Act was violated during the 6-month period
antedating the filing and service of the charge, even though such evidence may
relate to action occurring prior to the 6-month period.
C. Interference, restraint, and coercion
1. Surveillance of union meetings
On Saturday May 22, 1948, the Union scheduled and held a meeting outdoors
on the river bank within one-quarter mile of the town limits. The date of that
4 Axelson Manufacturing Company, 88 NLRB 761.
PACIFIG MILLS 69
meeting is established by the testimony of Cline, Baxter, and Prestwood. Cline
was discharged on May 28, 1948, and he testified that the meeting was held
on the Saturday preceding his discharge. Baxter was discharged Friday night
and testified that the following day he attended the meeting on the river bank.
The company records show that he was terminated May 22, 1948. Prestwood
fixes the date by testifying that the meeting was held on the Saturday in May
which preceded the filing of the petition for certification by the Union which
as appears infra was. filed on May 27, 1948. Approximately 50 people attended
the meeting. During the course of the meeting, Les Weaver, Respondent's fore-
man, heckled the union speakers, created a disturbance, and disrupted the
meeting to the point where he had to be quieted by Chief of Police Randall.
At the meeting, Weaver delivered himself of antiunion statements that there
had been a union at Granite and as a result the people there were thrown out of
their -houses and the young ones were starving; that if they joined the Union
the mill was going to raise the rent on their houses ; that the company was
going to put in baths in the houses but it would not cost any more if they did
not join the Union. In addition to being employed by the Respondent during
the week as outside foreman, Weaver is employed on week ends as deputy
policeman under the supervision of the chief of police, and his salary for police
work is paid by the town. Weaver was present at the meeting, not in uniform,
but in his usual garb of overalls, nor was he armed. It is clear from the record,
and nowhere is there any denial of Weaver's conduct at the meeting, that
Weaver was not there in his capacity of deputy policeman, notwithstanding
Randall's testimony that it was Weaver's duty to attend. His conduct shows
that he was not there to keep the peace but to do whatever he could to dis-
courage union membership and to disrupt the meeting to the point where Chief
of Police Randall was requested to quiet him, otherwise a warrant would be
obtained for his arrest. Not only did Weaver attend the meeting of May 22, 1948,
but he attended from 2 or 3 other meetings held on the river bank. There is no
evidence- here that the Respondent instigated police activities, whether those
activities be legitimate or not. There is sufficient evidence in this record to
hold the Respondent engaged in surveillance of the union meetings through the
presence of its foreman, Weaver, without the necessity of deciding whether or
not the Respondent is responsible for, surveillance by the police department.
Randall, the chief of police, was present in uniform, and accounts 'for his
presence by stating that it was his duty to investigate all gatherings within
the town limits. The proof is lacking that he was there in his official capacity
as a result of design on the part of the Respondent. In any event, since Randall
was not a supervisory employee of the Respondent, his presence at the meetings
would not be binding on the Respondent unless there is proof that he,was in-
structed .by some responsible official of the Respondent to engage in surveil-
lance.6 Neither is there any proof that Randall reported any facts to the
Respondent. Accordingly I find that the activities of Randall can not properly
be charged to the Respondent. In the case of Weaver, the situation is far
different. The Respondent is chargeable with the presence of its supervisor at
union meetings, and his conduct at one of them attempting to disrupt it which
required the action of the chief of police to quiet him and prevent further dis-
turbance. The fact that Weaver was a deputy policeman is no defense to the
Respondent. The acts complained of were not acts performed in the furtherance
of his police duties, rather they were in derogation of his police capacity. Even
- 5 American Thread Company, 84 NLRB 593.
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
if they were the expression of his own personal antiunion animus, since he was;
a supervisor, the Respondent could not escape its responsibility for his acts. In
a recent case,` the Board said :
When a supervisor engages in surveillance of union activities, the fact that
he does so to gratify his own anti-union feelings rather than to serve his
employer does not preclude a finding that such surveillance is unlawful.
I therefore find that the Respondent maintained illegal surveillance over the
union organizational meetings, and thereby interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Soliciting employee signatures re the Union
D. W. Childers, an employee in the card room in Mill No. 2, testified that
during the month of June 1948, Frank Webb, the overseer of the card room,
requested him to obtain employees' signatures to a book entitled in substance
"We, the people of Pacific Mills do not want a union." Childers fixes the date
as in June 1948 because he remembers that this took place in the month follow-
ing his joining the Union which was May 15, 1948. It took Childers about 10•
.minutes to take the book to the 20 employees in the card room. Only one em-
ployee signed the book. Childers did not sign it. The testimony of Childers
was corroborated by Jordan, another employee in the card room, to the extent
that Childers had brought him a book to sign if he was against the Union..
Jordan was unable to remember the date. In trying to fix the date, he remem-
bered that the weather was cool ; that he joined the Union in the fall of 1947
and the book incident was a couple of months after that ; but then he was un-
certain whether it was around the first of May 1948. Baxter, another witness,
testified that he had seen such a book as Childers described in the desk drawer
in an office used by foremen and second hands prior to May 22, 1948, but never
saw the book circulated. Though Webb denied ordering Childers to circulate
the book he does not deny knowledge of such book nor does he deny that it was
circulated. In view of Childers' testimony which I credit I find that the book
was taken around by Childers to the employees for their signatures at Webb's
orders during June 1948.
The attempt to find out who were not in favor of the Union and, by the process
of exclusion, those in favor of the Union was an invasion of the employees rights
under Section 7 of the Act. In Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company z the Board
stated :
Inherent in the very nature of the rights protected by Section 7 is the con-
comitant right of privacy in their enjoyment-"full freedom" from employer
intermeddling, intrusion, or even knowledge . . . Whenever an employer
directly or indirectly attempts to secure information concerning the manner
in which or the extent to which his employees have chosen to engage in union
organization or other concerted activity, he invades an area guaranteed to be
exclusively the business and concern of his employees.
I accordingly find that the Respondent in directing the circulation of a book
to record the signatures of those employees opposed to the Union violated the
provisions of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. ,
Beatrice Foods Company , 84 NLRB 493.
85 NLRB 1358.
PACIFIC MILLS 71
3. The Respondent's questioning of Pruitt before letting him a company house
Clarence Everett Pruitt testified that he began his employment with the Re-
spondent on November 10, 1947; about 1 month later obtained a leave of absence
and was then rehired in February 1948 when he was given a job hauling laps.
It further appears from the testimony of Webb, as shown infra, that Pruitt on
June 5, 1948, was given Hamby's job when Hamby was transferred to the third
shift. Pruitt's job hauling laps was discontinued and he did Hamby's work after
June 5, until his discharge in June 1949. Approximately 2 weeks before first
.going to work, Pruitt asked the Respondent for a company house in which to
live, and was told that it would be necessary for him to work there some time
to see whether it would be necessary to give him a houses Pruitt testified that
-employee Parsons spoke to him saying that Webb had sent him to find out from
Pruitt if Pruitt was going to be loyal to the company and that Parsons wanted
to know the truth so that he could inform Webb. Pruitt stated that he would
The loyal to the company. Shortly thereafter, Pruitt asked Webb to help get
him a house and Webb replied that he would help get him a house but first
he had to know whether Pruitt was going to be "loyal" to the Company and
that meant having nothing to do with the Union. The next day following the
-conversation with Webb, Pruitt saw Culclasure, the personnel manager, who
.asked him the same question. Pruitt replied that he would and Culclasure
replied that if he was going to be loyal to the Company he would give him a
house. Pruitt was then given the company house on August 14, 1948.°
Pruitt had joined the Union in the summer of 1948, prior to getting the house.
.At the time of the hearing, Pruitt and his wife were still occupying the company
house, although at that time neither was working for the Company, and they
had not been asked to vacate the house.
Upon all the evidence, I find that by interrogating Pruitt to find out if he was
.going to be loyal to the Company and by the Respondent withholding the bene-
fit of occupying the house until the Respondent was satisfied that he would have
nothing to do with the Union was interference, restraint, and coercion and con-
stituted a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The Respondent's attempt to evict Hamby
I have found infra that Hamby was discriminatorily discharged by the Re-
spondent. The General Counsel contends that the eviction proceedings insti-
tuted by the Respondent against Hamby to remove him from the company house
in which he is living was interference, restraint, and coercion violative of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) of the Act1° The Respondent contends that eviction proceedings
were instituted when Hamby was actually at work for another company" and
had ceased to pay rent to the Respondent. Since Hamby had been discrimina-
torily discharged he still was an employee of the Respondent within the mean-
ing of the Act. Whether or not he had failed to pay his rent is a matter of some
doubt. When he was discharged the Respondent refused to pay him his wages,
claiming it would hold his pay to be applied as future rent until Hamby vacated
8 At the time Pruitt applied for work, his wife was employed in the Respondent's office.
° Note the lease to Pruitt was dated August 14 and the conversations between Pruitt,
Webb , and Culclasure were at the time that Hamby was discriminatorily discharged as ap-
pears infra.
°° At the time of the hearing , the eviction proceedings were still pending in the State
court.
n The record does not show the date on which eviction proceedings were commenced.
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the premises. Sometime thereafter on a date not specified the Respondent noti-
fied Hamby to call for his pay check. Hamby decided to leave his check with
the Respondent and posted bond as security for the rent. The discharge of
Hamby and the attempt to evict him cannot be disassociated for it is evident
they were both integral parts of Respondent's plan to be rid of Hamby. That
it was is apparent because on the same day that he was discharged, the Respond-
ent demanded that he vacate. I believe the Respondent's plan to rid itself of
Hamby included not only his separation from the payroll but separation from
the right to occupy the company house. Not only was it calculated to impress
on Hamby but also to impress on all others employed by the Respondent and
living in company-owned houses the disastrous effects of engaging in union
activities. I accordingly find that the Respondent's attempt to withdraw
Hamby's right to occupy a company-owned house, under all the circumstances
present herein, constituted interference, restraint, and coercion. and violative of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
D. The discriminatory discharges
1. The discharge of Rufus B. Hamby
Hamby's employment with Respondent began on March 14, 1947, and terminated
on August 13, 1948. Prior to 1940, Hamby was a farmer, but since then has.
worked in cotton mills at various jobs including "running slubbers," " running
drawing," "running cards," "running lapping machines," grinding waste, and as
a sweeper and cleaner.12 According to the testimony of Overseer Webb and
Baxter, who was a foreman at the time of Hamby's employment, Hamby was
a utilities man or spare hand for anything that might come up. At the time he
applied for work the then superintendent Elmore asked him if he needed a com-
pany house's Upon Hamby's affirmative reply, the superintendent informed him
that he would be notified when one was available. About a week later Hamby
was so notified, moved into the house the following morning, and 2 days later
reported for work. Hamby was employed to run slubbers but did not run slubbers
very long and was assigned to sweeping strippers. He first went to work on the
third shift in Mill No. 1 where he worked for 3 or 4 months and when that shift
was shut down, Hamby was transferred to the second shift in Mill No. 2.14 There
he worked for 4 or 5 weeks and then was transferred to the third shift in the
same mill where he stayed for 2 or 3 months until he was retransferred to the
first shift in Mill No. 2. Hamby continued to work there on the first shift for 8 or
10 months until June 5, 1948, when he was assigned to the third shift still in
Mill No. 2, where he continued to work until his termination on August 13, 1948.'
His base pay throughout his employment was 87 cents per hour, plus 5 cents addi-
tional per hour for time on the third shift.
In the summer of 1947, Hamby was first visited at his home by a repre-
sentative of the Union who sought to interest him in organizing the Respondent's
employees. Hamby agreed to help the effort by taking a book to sign up
members for the Union. The campaign made little progress and Hamby pro-
13 Slubbers are machines which reduce cotton from a flat form to a thread-for every
inch of cotton fed into the machine, 8 inches of thread are obtained.
13 The Respondent let houses to its employees. Hamby's rental was 50 cents per week.
These houses in which employes live are known as the village.
14 The first shift was from 6 a. in. to 2 p. in. ;.second shift was 2 p. m.-10 p. m. ; third
shift , 10 p. m.-6 a. in.
15 During the 8 to 10 months on the first shift, Hamby spent most of his time sweeping
the floor and taking excess lint off the card cloth.
PACIFIC MILLS 73
cured only one signature. In the early spring of 1948, during March or April
the union efforts were renewed. Hamby took an active part in the organiza-
tional campaign, became a member of the union committee and secured about
50 employees for membership. He went through the village where the employees
lived in company houses, distributed union leaflets at the mill gate, talked
with employees throughout the town, and attended union meetings. The
Respondent admitted that it knew of the union organizational activities through
1947 and 1948; and in particular admitted that it knew that Hamby and 11
other employees were committeemen for the Union by reason of letters from
the Union to the Respondent so informing it 19 Frank Webb was the overseer
of the card room in Mill No. 2 for all 3 shifts from March 1946 to June 30, 1949.
On May 22, 1948, Webb discharged Howard K. Baxter who was then employed
in a supervisory capacity as second hand or foreman and informed Baxter
that he was firing him because he was fooling around with the Union. Two
or three weeks before Baxter's discharge, Webb remarked to him that Baxter
had been going to Hamby's house "a right smart" and further stated "I'm in
for Hamby, stay away from him" ; that 3 weeks before Baxter was discharged,
Webb told Baxter that he was going to fire Church and Hamby. On May 27,
1948, the union campaign had progressed to the point where, it filed a petition
with the Board requesting certification as the bargaining representative in
Mill No. 2.1i During the spring and summer of 1948, both mills were in full
operation on the first and second shifts and Mill No. 2, in addition, was working
a third shift on a skeleton operation only 19 On June 5, 1948, after Webb told
Hamby that he wanted him to help him out for a week or two on the third
shift and then he would transfer him back to the first or second shift, Hamby
was transferred by Webb from the first shift in Mill No. 2 to the third shift
in the same mill. Webb testified that at the time Hamby was transferred to
the third shift, another utility man, Everett Pruitt, with less seniority than
Hamby, was working on the second shift. Pruitt's job, hanging laps, was dis-
continued and Webb gave him Hamby's job on the first shift. Webb testified
that he needed a utilities man on the third shift to run slubbers part of the
time. Four slubbers were operated on the third shift but situated so that two
slubbers were on one part of the aisle and two further removed at another
part of the aisle, an arrangement which Baxter testified would make it impossible
for an operator to operate slubbers and "make production." Webb contra-
dicted Baxter's testimony in this respect and said that an efficient operator could
,make production. The testimony of Hamby was uncontradicted that in his
entire period of employment he was never absent and late on only one occasion.
But after his transfer to the third shift, Hamby worked only 1 full week of
40 hours.18 Hamby worked at several jobs on the third shift dividing the hours
nightly as required and as directed, viz: sweeper and overhead cleaner, drawing
hand, slubber hand, converter operator, and three other jobs coded as 200, 125,
11 In his brief the General Counsel refers to May 12, 1948, as the date of the union letter
to the Respondent. Nowhere in the record does the date thereof appear.
17 Board Number 34-RC-70. The petition was dismissed on the ground that Mill No. 1
and Mill No . 2 constituted a single unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining.
is Thirty were employed on the first shift and 30 on the second shift. The third shift
during 1948 did not have more than 5 employees.
19 His time cards disclosed that for the week ending June 12, 1948, he worked 40 hours
and earned $2.17 over his minimum: week ending June 19, 301/2 hours ; June 25, 32 hours;
July 3, 32 hours ; (July 1-14, vacation) ; July 24, 32 hours; July 31, 32 hours ; August 7,
28 hours ; August 14, 281/2 hours.
.74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and 175 which are not translated in the record 20 Work running slubbers was
Incentive work which means that an operator has an opportunity to make ad-
-ditional pay if he produces more than is required to meet the minimum pro-
,duction standard. Hamby was put on and taken off incentive jobs as he was
needed. The record shows that he was given incentive pay jobs when others
in his job category were not.
On August 13, 1948, as Hamby was finishing work, Webb informed him that
he would have to "let him off." It is undisputed that Webb had orders from
the general superintendent, Cobb, to lay off three men. While it was Cobb
who for economic reasons decided to lay off three men on the third shift, Cobb
left the decision as to which ones were to be laid off to Webb. When he in-
formed Hamby that he would be laid off, Webb also told him that the thirds
.shift was going to shut down, the second shift was going to be stopped, and
the first shift would not be running half the time within 30 clays. Hamby there-
bupon proceeded to the office of the personnel manager, Culclasure, for his check.
Culclasure told Hamby that he would put him on in Mill No. 1, but neither
mill was going to runt over a day or possibly a few hours each week. Hamby
.asked Culclasure to keep him in mind if he needed him and Culclasure agreed
so to do. Instead of giving Hamby his pay, Culclasure informed Hamby that
the would keep his check until Hamby vacated the house in which he was living.'
At no time was Hamby in arrears for rent for the house. Up to the time of the
"hearing, Hamby had not vacated the house, and litigation was still pending in the
State court on whether Hamby should be evicted by the Respondent.
Within 4 or 5 weeks following August 13, 1948, Hamby asked the Respondent
three times for work, but has never been reemployed. On August 23, Hamby
secured employment at a mill in Whitnall, 17 miles from Rhodhiss, and worked
, %there until October 15, 1948.
Sometime prior to November 1, 1948, the chief of police, Randall, left a notice to
vacate the house with Hamby's wife. Thereafter, the sheriff served Hamby
with a summons returnable on November 1, before a justice of the peace and a
hearing was held on the question of whether Hamby must vacate the house.
sFerdinand Sylvia testified that he represented Hamby in the proceedings before.
the justice of the peace and at that hearing Culclasure, on behalf of the company,
testified that Hamby had been a good worker, that no complaint had been found
with his work, and admitted that he had promised to reemploy Hamby if and
when another job became available. When asked by Sylvia at the hearing, "Are
you going to hire Mr. Hamby back when there is an opportunity for work?", Cul-
,clasure replied, "Positively, no" and gave as his reason "We just don't want Mr.
Hamby back on the job."
a. The Respondent's defense to Ham.bp's term nation
The Respondent contends that Hamby was separated as a result of curtail-
ment of operations on the third shift of its No. 2 Mill (card room) in accordance
with its regular seniority policy and for no other reason. It is not disputed
that on August 13, 1948, 3 employees including Hamby were discontinued ; and
that later, 2 others were separated. Neither is it disputed that curtailment of
the number of employees was occasioned by economic reasons. In Mill No. 2,
20 Time cards in evidence show in detail the amount of time worked on each operation
from June 5 to August 13, 1948.
21 Hamby's son was still working in the mill and living at home with Hamby. The
despondent evicts only those employees who have been discharged or quit.
PACIFIC MILLS 75
card room, the third shift was entirely discontinued in August 1948, and the mill
operated the first and second shifts. No new employees were employed in
1948 in the card room in Mill No. 2 with the exception of Clarence Settlemeyer
who was hired in October as a "drawing hand" on the third shift. When the
third shift was shut down Settlemeyer was transferred to the first shift as
stock and box clerk which entailed keeping figures and making out reports.22
The Respondent's evidence is also uncontradicted that of the 10 men besides
Hamby, whom the Union notified the Respondent were active in the union organi-
zational campaign, 9 were still working at the date of the hearing and the tenth
had been discharged for cause. The number of employees in the card room,.
Mill No. 1, decreased for economic reasons as follows : August 1948, 53 employed;
September, 50; October, 51; November, 49; December, 48; January 1949, 46
The Respondent has a written policy on the subject of "promotions and layoffs,"
which provides : "If qualifications are equal, length of service within a department
will govern the layoffs of an employee within his or her department." In sup-
port of its defense that Hamby was laid off in accordance with its written
policy, Webb testified that he obtained the seniority list from the personnel
office and applied the rule in selecting Hamby and the others for layoff. Webb
admitted,'however, that he did keep others younger in service on other shifts than
Hamby but maintained that they were more efficient people.24 Webb admitted
also that he probably had 3 or 4 working there who had less seniority than
Hamby and who did the same work as Hamby performed. Webb further testified
that lie laid Hamby off because he was slow and inefficient. Webb testified
that he transferred Hamby from the first shift to the third shift because he
needed a utility man on the third shift and Hamby was, the only utility man on
the first shift and that Everett Pruitt, a utility man on the second shift,. had
worked there longer than Hamby. Webb admitted later in his testimony that
Pruitt was employed about the first of the year 194S ' Webb testified that
Pruitt's job was hanging laps which was a heavy job and needed a stout young
man and that Hamby was stripping and sweeping. But Webb admitted, Pruitt's
job was abolished when Hamby was transferred to the third shift and he was put
on Hamby's job,
b. Conclusions as to Hamby's discharge
The resolution of the problem whether Hamby was discriminatorily selected
for layoff or discharge by Webb depends on whether Webb took advantage of
the opportunity which presented itself, because of the necessity to lay off'
employees to rid himself of Hamby because of Hamby's union activities, under
pretense of observing the company policy regarding layoffs. Webb made no
secret of his union animosity either then or at the hearing; he admitted that he-
"laid it on them" every chance he got but claims he restricted his activities to the
year 1947 and changed his tactics after Superintendent Cobb informed the super-
visory personnel that they were not to discuss the Union with employees. Webb
promised Hamby on June 5, 1948, to return him to the first or second shift after a
couple of weeks. But it should be noted, Webb lost no time in eliminating
22 Hamby could only read "a little."
23 The number of employees in both mills gradually decreased monthly from 573 im
February 1948 to 467 in January 1949.
24 Webb testified that the policy on layoffs would apply to all three shifts in a single
room. There was no seniority policy on calling employes back to work.
25 Pruitt testified that he was employed first in November 1947 and after working a few
weeks obtained a leave of absence and returned in January or February 1948 from which,
time he worked steadily.
76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pruitt's job as lap hanger on the second shift and placing him on Hamby's job
on the first shift. Thus did Webb insure that there would be no place for Hamby
to return to on the first shift; nor on the second shift, because Webb eliminated
Pruitt's job. There is no evidence in the record to compare Hamby's qualifica-
tions with those doing similar work who were retained on the first and second
shifts. The evidence in the record comparing Hamby's earnings as contained
in the allowance reports show that the basis used for comparison is for job
number 221 (drawing hand). Of the several job classifications in which Hamby
worked the Respondent sets forth in the allowance report Hamby's work as a
drawing hand and compares his record with others working not only as drawing
hands but in other classifications as well. Examination of Hamby's time cards
from the week ending June 5 to August 13, 1948, diclose that he worked at sev-
eral other jobs besides being a drawing hand. I do not believe Webb's testi-
mony that he included Hamby for layoff after deciding that his qualifications
were not equal to those younger in service than Hamby was. I believe and
find that in view of Webb's proven hostility to the Union he selected Hamby
for eventual discharge, pursuant to Webb's own voiced purpose to be "shed" of
him ; paved the way for that accomplishment by transferring him to the third
shift on June 5; and then discharging him on August 13, under the pretext that
the application of the seniority policy required his dismissal. Accordingly I
find that, upon all the evidence, the Respondent by discharging Hamby and
refusing him reinstatement discriminated with respect to his hire and tenure of
employment, thereby discouraging membership in the Union and interfering with,
restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
2. The discharge of Ray Cline
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act by discriminatorily discharging Cline because of his union membership and
activities. The Respondent defends on the ground that Cline was hired as a
temporary employee to do another employee's job and when that employee
was returned to his own job, Cline's services were discontinued as no longer
needed.
Cline testified that upon hearing from his brother-in-law who also worked for
the Respondent, that an employee Ralph Storey had been discharged at the mill,
Cline applied to Leonard Sanders, who was in charge of the weaving room, for
the job. Cline testified that Sanders told him he wanted a man who would work
regularly and Cline promised that he would ; and that nothing was said that the
job would be temporary. Sanders then sent Cline to Culclasure, the personnel
manager, to fill out the necessary application forms. Cline testified that Cul-
clasure at that time asked. Cline if he needed a company house to which Cline
replied that he did not, because he lived with his father-in-law, Rufus Hamby.
That same night, May 3, 1948, Cline reported for work on the third shift in the
weaving room, blowing off looms and sweeping. His work was never criticized
and he worked regularly until his termination on May 28, 1948.6 On the night
of May 28, when Cline reported for work at his usual hour 10 p. in., Eppley, the
second hand under whom Cline worked, notified him that he would not need
him any longer and to report to Culclasure to get his pay. Cline inquired if his
11 Cline denied that he was absent without permission on May 7, as shown by an entry
on his personnel card. The Respondent having failed to produce further evidence to
support the notation on his personnel card, Cline 's testimony is accepted.
PACIFIC MILLS 77
work was satisfactory and Eppley informed him that it was "OK." The Re-
spondent did not offer any evidence to contradict Cline's testimony that he was
hired after promising Sanders that he would work regularly ; or that Culclasure
asked Cline if he needed a company house 27 Such uncontradicted testimony
is practically conclusive that Cline was hired on a permanent basis to replace
Storey, otherwise why would Culclasure be interested in providing Cline with a
company house if his job was to be temporary for a matter of 3 or 4 weeks?
The Respondent failed to show who replaced Storey if it was not Cline or whether
that job was kept vacant. If Cline actually did replace Storey then the
evidence relating to transfers and retransfers of Lunsford and Page are
irrelevant.
As noted above, at the time he. was hired, Cline informed Culclasure that
he was Rufus Hamby's son-in-law and lived with Hamby. Cline joined the
Union during the first week of his employment in May and took an active part
in union activities. He attended union meetings and was discharged within
a week from the time he spoke at the meeting of, May 22, 1948. At that meeting,
the Respondent's supervisor, Weaver, heckled the speakers and attempted to
disrupt the meeting, on the basis of his antiunion statements. Cline testified
that within Weaver's hearing he stated if there were any more such interrup-
tions he would throw them in the river 29 Cline accompanied his father-in-law,
Hamby, throughout the houses in the company village in the campaign to secure
union members; Cline and his wife made posters advertising union meetings and
hung them on the mill gate and fence ; Cline passed put leaflets to employees
at the mill gate and used his automobile to transport employees to the union
meetings. Baxter testified that during the same conversation had with Webb
before Baxter's discharge in which Webb had remarked that he was going to
"get shed of Hamby," Webb had also said that he knew that Hamby's son-in-law
was also going around signing up employees in the Union. Cline also testified
that following his discharge, others with no experience were hired to do the
same kind of job he had been doing. Following the death of Curtis 20 in a week
following Cline's discharge, the Respondent hired a new employee to replace
Curtis, although Culclasure according to Cline's uncontradicted testimony had
told Cline when he was paid off that he would put him back to work if there
was anything open. Cline applied to the Respondent for work in September
1949 at which time Culclasure told him that he had nothing for him. Upon
consideration of all the evidence, I find that Cline was hired to replace Storey
and was not temporarily hired to do Lunsford's work.
Upon all the evidence, I conclude that because of Cline's known union mem-
bership and activities the reasons assigned by the Respondent were a pretext.
for discharging him on May 28, 1948, and therefore find that in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, the Respondent by discharging Cline and refusing
him reinstatement to a loom blower and sweeper's job on May 28, 1948, dis-
criminated with respect to his hire and tenure of employment, thereby dis-
couraging membership in the Union and interfering with, restraining, and
coercing, its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
27 Neither Sanders nor Culelasure testified at the hearing.
' Cline's testimony on this point is uncontradicted. Weaver did not testify at the
hearing.
° Curtis did the same work as Cline, blowing looms and sweeping.
78 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE . UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring
in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I,
above, have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3)
of the Act, I shall recommend that it, cease and desist therefrom, and that it
take affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminated against Rufus B. Hamby in
regard to his hire and tenure of employment , thereby discouraging membership
in the Union , by discharging him on or about August 13, 1948, -I shall recommend
that the Respondent offer to Rufus B. Hamby immediate and full reinstatement
to his former job as a utility man in the card room or a substantially equivalent
position , 80 without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges ; and
that the Respondent also make the said Rufus B. Hamby whole for any loss of
earnings suffered by him by reason of the Respondent 's discrimination against
him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would
have earned as wages as a utility man from the date of the discrimination against
him, August 13, 1948, to the date of the offer of reinstatement , less his net earn-
ings during that period si,
Having found that the Respondent discriminated against Ray Cline in regard
to his hire and tenure of employment , thereby discouraging membership in the
Union, by discharging him on or about May 28, 1948 , I shall recommend that the
Respondent offer to Ray Cline immediate and full reinstatement to his former
job as loom blower and sweeper or a substantially equivalent position ,n without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges ; and that the Respondent
also make the said Ray Cline whole for any loss of earnings suffered by him by
reason of the Respondent ' s discrimination against him , by payment to him of a
sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages as a
loom blower and sweeper from the date of the discrimination against him, May
28, 1948, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during that
period sa
I believe that the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent po-
tentially relate to other unfair labor practices proscribed and that danger of their
commission in the future is to be anticipated from the Respondent 's past conduct.
The preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless my recommendations
are coextensive with the threat. Accordingly, in order to make effective the
interdependent guarantees of Section 7 and thus effectuate the policies of the
Act I shall recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner
interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I
make the following :
ao See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico Branch,
65 NLRB 837 . Also, Macon Textiles , Inc., 80 NLRB 1525.
Crossett Lumber Co ., 8 NLRB 440 , 497-498.
as See footnote 30.
as See footnote 31.
PACIFIC MILLS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
79
1. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section. 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Rufus
B. Hamby and Ray Cline, and thereby discouraging membership in Textile
Workers Union of America, CIO, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]