PACIFIC GREEN TRUCKING INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 13, 2019

21-CA-226775 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 13, 2019)

JD(SF)–03–19
Wilmington, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
PACIFIC GREEN TRUCKING INC.
and Case 21–CA–226775
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS
Cecilia Valentine, Esq., and Mathew J. Sollett, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Karen Rose, J.D. (National Labor Relations Advocates), and
Nathan E. Sweet, Esq. (Law Office of Nathan E. Sweet),
for the Respondent Company.
DECISION
JEFFREY D. WEDEKIND, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint in this case
alleges that Pacific Green Trucking Inc., an interstate freight hauling company, committed
several unfair labor practices in response to a Teamsters organizing campaign at its Wilmington,
California facility in the summer of 2018. Specifically, the General Counsel alleges that, over a
3-week period in August, the Company’s general manager interrogated the primary union
supporter, Ricardo Bonilla Colindres (Bonilla), about his union activities, created the impression
that his union activities were under surveillance, threatened him with discharge because of his
union activities, and ultimately refused to assign him work and terminated him because of his
union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and/or (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.1
A hearing on these disputed complaint allegations was held on January 14 and 15, 2019,
in Los Angeles.2 The General Counsel and the Company thereafter filed briefs on February 1.

1 The Union filed the initial and amended charges on September 4 and October 11, 2018; the
NLRB Regional Director issued the complaint on November 29; and the Company filed its
answer on December 13. The Board’s jurisdiction is uncontested and established by the
admitted facts.
2 On February 6, the General Counsel filed a motion to correct the transcript. The Company
opposes the motion on the ground that it was untimely filed after the February 1 due date for
filing briefs, citing Treasury Department regulation 31 C.F.R. 501.739(a)(2). However, the
NLRB has no such hard and fast rule. Further, the circumstances here provide no support for
rejecting the motion on this procedural ground: the parties agreed to an expedited briefing
schedule, the identified transcript errors are minor, the Company has not disputed the accuracy of
the proposed corrections or claimed that it would have to revise its brief if they were approved,
and the motion to correct was filed soon enough not to delay issuance of this decision.
Accordingly, the motion to correct is granted and added to the record as GC Exh. 3. See
Southern Florida Hotel & Motel Assn., 245 NLRB 561, 577 n. 6 (1979).
JD(SF)–03–19
2
As discussed below, with one exception (the alleged impression-of-surveillance violation), the
allegations are supported by a preponderance of the credible record evidence.3
I. THE TEAMSTERS CAMPAIGN
5
The Company employs about 80–90 drivers at the Wilmington facility. In June 2018, a
Teamsters organizer, Miguel Cubillos, spoke to two of them about the possibility of the Union
representing the drivers. Cubillos also thereafter held a series of organizing meetings at a
restaurant in Compton. Three drivers attended the first meeting in mid-June, three or four
drivers attended the second meeting on June 23, and about five drivers attended the third meeting 10
on July 7. At each of the meetings, Cubillos asked the drivers to talk to their coworkers about
the Union, to identify those who were interested in the Union, and to obtain their contact
information.
Bonilla first heard about the Union from two coworkers during a break. He asked for 15
Cubillos’s phone number and called him later the same day. He thereafter attended both the June
23 and July 7 meetings and became a leader of the organizing effort. He talked to about 15
drivers at the ports and provided at least 6 or 7 of them with Cubillos’s phone number or
arranged for them to meet with him one-on-one. He also updated Cubillos every day on his
efforts and became Cubillos’s primary employee contact regarding the campaign.420
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As indicated above, the complaint alleges that all of the subsequent unfair labor practices
against Bonilla were committed by the Company’s general manager, Vicente Zarate. Zarate 25
founded and developed the Company and has served as its general manager since 2009.5 He
hired Bonilla in February 2018, considered him a good worker, and even loaned him money to
buy new eyeglasses in July so he could continue driving for the Company.6

3 Citations to the record are included to aid review and are not necessarily exclusive or
exhaustive. In making credibility findings, all relevant factors have been considered, including
the interests and demeanor of the witnesses; whether their testimony is corroborated or consistent
with the documentary evidence and/or the established or admitted facts; inherent probabilities;
and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Language and
translation difficulties have also been taken into account (Bonilla and company witness Gerbis
Vaquiz testified through an interpreter). See, e.g., Daikichi Corp., 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001),
enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d
1460, 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 948 (1997).
4 Tr. 33, 51, 56–64, 73, 154–159, 223, 232–233, 337.
5 Tr. 51, 337. Although Bonilla testified that he viewed Zarate as “the supervisor, the
manager, the owner, and . . . everything else” (Tr. 316), Zarate testified that his 30-year old son
is currently the sole owner of the Company (Tr. 355). The Company admits that Zarate is a
supervisor and agent within the meaning of Sections 2(11) and 2(13) of the Act.
6 Tr. 32, 170, 222–223, 343, 367. The record does not reveal precisely when in July Bonilla
requested and received the loan from Zarate for the new eyeglasses.
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A. Zarate’s alleged unlawful statements to Bonilla on August 7
The first alleged violations involve certain statements Zarate allegedly made to Bonilla
on or about August 7. Bonilla testified that around that time he went to Zarate’s office and asked
him for another loan because his mother was ill and needed medication. However, unlike in 5
July, Zarate said no. Zarate told him that he couldn’t lend money to him anymore because of his
involvement with the Teamsters. Zarate said that he should not get involved with the Union
because he, Zarate, was the one who employed him; that he should thank God he was working
for him; and that if he was unhappy he could leave. (Tr. 164–171.)
10
Bonilla’s foregoing testimony was circumstantially or indirectly corroborated by
Cubillos, who testified that Bonilla told him later the same day about the conversation with
Zarate. Cubillos testified that Bonilla told him that Zarate wouldn’t give him the loan, saying
that he knew Bonilla was with the Union and that he shouldn’t do that because he was giving
Bonilla work (Tr. 73–74.)715
As for Zarate, he testified that he did not know about the union campaign or Bonilla’s
support for it until September, when he received notice of the Union’s unfair labor practice
charge. He also generally denied that he ever threatened anyone for being a union member.8
However, he did not specifically deny that the August 7 conversation with Bonilla occurred; that 20
Bonilla asked him for another loan; or that he rejected Bonilla’s request. Nor did he specifically
deny Bonilla’s version of the conversation or offer an alternative version or explanation of why
he rejected Bonilla’s request. (Company counsel never asked him.)
Nevertheless, the Company argues that Bonilla’s testimony regarding Zarate’s statements 25
should be rejected because the General Counsel failed to call another potential witness identified
by Bonilla. Bonilla testified that the door to Zarate’s office was open during the conversation
and that the company dispatcher, who assigns the drivers their work, was in the outer office
about 12 feet away and likely would have overheard it (Tr. 170–171). The General Counsel does
not allege or argue that the dispatcher is a supervisor or was acting as a company agent during 30

7 Cubillos was called to testify by the General Counsel before Bonilla, and Bonilla was
excluded during Cubillos’s testimony pursuant to a sequestration order issued at the outset of the
hearing. The only witness who was not excluded pursuant to the order was Zarate, who was
designated essential by company counsel and was therefore present throughout the hearing.
8 Tr. 32, 338, 349–350, 358. The Company also called driver Waldemar Perez, who testified
that he had never been questioned about his union affiliation or threatened by Zarate or ever
heard of anyone else being questioned or threatened about their union affiliation (Tr. 335).
However, such testimony has little, if any, relevance. See UNF, West, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.3d
451, 464 (5th Cir. 2016) (ALJ did not err in excluding, as irrelevant, testimony by four
employees that they had never been threatened by the employer’s agents, as they were not
present when the alleged unlawful statements to two other employees were made, and their
testimony about their own experience with the employer’s labor consultants was not probative of
what happened to the other two employees), enfg. 363 NLRB No. 96 (2016). And the
Company’s posthearing brief does not rely on it.
JD(SF)–03–19
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the conversation.9 However, there is also no record or rational basis to assume that he would
have been favorably disposed toward Bonilla or the Union, i.e., that he was anything but a mere
bystander employee. See Daikichi Corp., 335 NLRB 622 n. 4 (2001), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516
(D.C. Cir. 2003); and Torbitt & Castleman, Inc., 320 NLRB 907, 910 n. 6 (1996), affd. on point
123 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir. 1997) (bystander employees are not presumed to be favorably 5
disposed toward any party and no adverse inference may be drawn against a party for failing to
call them to testify).
Moreover, given Zarate’s failure to specifically deny Bonilla’s testimony about the
conversation, the General Counsel could have reasonably concluded that the dispatcher’s 10
testimony was unnecessary to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See
One Stop Kosher Supermarket, 355 NLRB 1237, 1238 n. 3 (2010) (rejecting the employer’s
argument that its agent should be credited about a particular conversation with the union’s
organizer because the organizer was not called to rebut his testimony, as the agent’s testimony
was clearly inconsistent with other testimonial and documentary evidence, and thus there was no 15
real need for the General Counsel to prolong the trial by calling the organizer to testify), citing
Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center, 348 NLRB 1016, 1022 (2006) (judge abused his discretion
by drawing an adverse inference from the respondent’s failure to call a manager, as the
circumstances indicated the manager was not called because his testimony was unnecessary, not
because it would have been adverse).20
The Company also argues that Bonilla’s testimony about the early-August conversation
with Zarate should be discredited because of testimony he gave about a subsequent conversation
with another company driver, Gerbis Vaquiz. Bonilla testified that, around mid-August, he was
at a stoplight near the port when Vaquiz, who was not a union supporter, pulled up next to him in 25
another truck and yelled out, “Hey [Bonilla], tell me if it’s true that you are involved with the
Union.” He denied it, but Vaquiz told him that he should be careful because Zarate was keeping
a list and had told him to ask Bonilla if he was involved with the Union.10
The Company argues that this testimony proves Bonilla was not a truthful witness for two 30
reasons. First, because Vaquiz refuted it. When called to testify by the Company, Vaquiz
testified that he had never spoken to him at a spotlight or elsewhere; that he was not aware of any
list of union members kept by Zarate; that Zarate had never asked him to ask other drivers about

9 Cf. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 339 NLRB 650, 664 (2003) (employer’s failure to call a
dispatcher who attended meetings between manager and employees warranted adverse inference
that he would not have supported manager’s testimony about them), enfd. in part 402 F.3d 651,
661–662 (6th Cir. 2005); and Masland Industries, 311 NLRB 184, 190 (1993) (same).
10 This incident is not alleged as a violation, apparently because there is no evidence, other
than Vaquiz’s own statement to Bonilla, that Vaquiz was acting as an agent of the Company.
See FRE 801(d)(2). It has also not been considered or given any weight in support of any of the
findings and conclusions here regarding the alleged violations. Although Vaquiz’s hearsay
statements are arguably admissible and probative of the complaint allegations under the
circumstances (see, e.g., Dauman Pallet, Inc., 314 NLRB 186 (1994)), it is unnecessary to rely
on the statements given the substantial nonhearsay evidence supporting those allegations.
JD(SF)–03–19
5
their union affiliation;11 and that he had never asked any other drivers about their union
affiliation (Tr. 297, 300). Second, because Bonilla’s testimony makes no logical sense. The
Company argues that Zarate would have no reason to tell Vaquiz or anyone else to question
Bonilla if, as indicated by the alleged August 7 conversation, Zarate already knew that Bonilla
was involved with the Union. 5
However, again, Bonilla’s testimony about the conversation with Vaquiz was
corroborated in substantial part by Cubillos, who testified that Bonilla called and told him about
the conversation the same day that it occurred. Cubillos testified that Bonilla told him that
Vaquiz asked if he was the leader of the union while they were waiting at a red light; that he10
denied it; but that Vaquiz said that he knew he was involved with the Union because the boss had
a list of drivers who were with the Union (Tr. 65–69).
The Company argues that Cubillos’s corroborating testimony should be rejected because
he is a union organizer and his testimony was “self-serving” (Br. 19). However, Vaquiz was not 15
an entirely disinterested witness either. It is uncontroverted that he does not support the Union.
Further, as a current employee of the Company, he would have an interest in not antagonizing
it.12 In any event, as previously noted (fn. 3), a witness’s interest in the case is only one of many
relevant factors to consider in evaluating credibility.
20
Finally, the fact that Bonilla testified that the conversation with Vaquiz occurred around
mid-August is also insufficient to discredit his testimony. There are a number of logical
explanations other than the Company’s assertion that Bonilla made up the whole conversation.
First, Bonilla may have just been confused about the dates.13 Indeed, Cubillos testified that

11 Zarate likewise denied that he ever asked Vaquiz to question other drivers about their
union affiliation or organizing (Tr. 354).
12 See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 240, (1978) (“The danger of
witness intimidation is particularly acute with respect to current employees—whether rank and
file, supervisory, or managerial—over whom the employer, by virtue of the employment
relationship, may exercise intense leverage. Not only can the employer fire the employee, but job
assignments can be switched, hours can be adjusted, wage and salary increases held up, and other
more subtle forms of influence exerted.”). See also NLRB v. Maxwell, 637 F.2d 698, 702–703
(9th Cir. 1981).
13 Uncertain, incorrect, or inconsistent testimony regarding dates is common and frequently
discounted in evaluating witness credibility, particularly where the date would not have had any
particular importance to the witness at the time. See, e.g., Traction Wholesale Center Co., 328
NLRB 1058, 1068 n. 13 (1999), enfd. 216 F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hartz Mountain Corp., 228
NLRB 492, 496 n. 13 (1977), enfd. 593 F.2d 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Longshoremen
Local 10, 123 NLRB 559, 568–569 (1959), enfd. 283 F.2d 558, 562–563 (9th Cir. 1960); and
L.L. Majure Transport Co., 95 NLRB 311 (1951), enfd. 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952). See also
Cojocari v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 622–623 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[D]ates and times [are] the sorts
of minor details that are most vulnerable to the vagaries of human memory.”). Here, Bonilla was
questioned (through an interpreter) about several conversations he had with Zarate and others in
August, and the temporal difference between early August and mid-August is relatively narrow
and imprecise. Further, as noted above, Vaquiz’s statements to Bonilla are not alleged as a
JD(SF)–03–19
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Bonilla told him about the conversation with Vaquiz “at the beginning” of August (Tr. 66).
Second, Zarate may have told Vaquiz before August 7 to question Bonilla, but Vaquiz did not
have an opportunity to do so until a week or two later, when his truck happened to be stopped
next to him at the port. Third, Zarate may have wanted to find out whether Bonilla was still
involved with the Union and/or the extent of his involvement.145
In sum, a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that Zarate made the August
7 statements described by Bonilla. As for whether those statements were unlawful, the General
Counsel contends that they violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in two respects: first, they
effectively interrogated Bonilla about his union activities, and second, they impliedly threatened 10
him with job loss because of his union activities. The Company’s posthearing brief does not
directly dispute this, i.e., it does not argue that the statements were lawful even if Bonilla’s
description of them is accurate. In any event, the General Counsel’s position is supported by
Board precedent. See, e.g., Cayuga Medical Center at Ithaca, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 170, slip op.
at 16 (2017) (interim director’s statement that he knew employee was the ring leader and was the 15
one promoting all the union stuff constituted an unlawful interrogation under all the
circumstances because it implicitly called for the employee to confirm or deny the statement),
enfd. per curiam --- Fed. Appx. ---, 2018 WL 7080305 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2018); and Pacific
Coast Sightseeing Tours & Charters, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 131, slip op. at 9 (2017) (manager’s
statements that employees who did not like their working conditions or wages could quit and go 20
work for other employers constituted an unlawful implied threat of job loss).15
The complaint also alleges that Zarate unlawfully created the impression of surveillance
during the same conversation by telling Bonilla that he knew everything that happened in the
office because there were cameras all around it. In support of this allegation, the General 25
Counsel’s posthearing brief cites Bonilla’s testimony that he recalled “the subject of security
cameras coming up” during the conversation; that Zarate told him “he had surveillance cameras
throughout the office”; and that Zarate said that he had the cameras “to see what was happening
within the office” (Tr. 168). Again, Bonilla’s testimony was corroborated by Cubillos and not
denied by Zarate. However, neither Bonilla nor Cubillos testified that Zarate mentioned the 30
office cameras in the context of the union campaign. The General Counsel never asked Bonilla
about when during the conversation Zarate made the statement or its context. And Cubillos

violation, and there is no apparent reason to doubt that Bonilla could have misremembered the
date.
14 The latter two are also possible explanations for a similar conversation Bonilla testified he
had with another driver named Osbaldo after the August 7 conversation with Zarate (Tr. 171).
The conversation with Osbaldo was likewise corroborated in substantial part by Cubillos, who
testified that Bonilla told him about it on August 9 or 10 (Tr. 67, 70–71), and was not denied by
Osbaldo, who did not testify. Like Vaquiz’s statements, however, Osbaldo’s statements are not
alleged as a violation and have not been relied on here as support for the alleged violations.
15 With respect to the interrogation violation, see also Space Needle, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 11,
slip op. at 4 (2015) (supervisor’s statement that he knew employee was a “smart guy” and would
“make the right decision” about resigning from the union was unlawfully coercive in context
regardless of whether it constituted an interrogation as alleged in the complaint), enfd. 692 Fed.
Appx. 462 (9th Cir. 2017).
JD(SF)–03–19
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testified that Bonilla told him that Zarate mentioned the cameras later in the conversation, when
they were discussing a disputed incident that occurred in the office between Zarate and another
driver a few days earlier, stating that the cameras would show what actually happened (Tr. 75).
Further, there is no evidence that Bonilla or other drivers ever engaged in union activity inside
the company office. Finally, although Zarate admitted that the Company also has security 5
cameras in the yard (Tr. 358), there is no contention or evidence that he mentioned those cameras
during the conversation. Accordingly, the evidence fails to support this additional alleged
violation.
B. Zarate’s alleged unlawful statements to Bonilla on August 2110
The next alleged violation involves statements Zarate allegedly made to Bonilla on or
about August 21. Bonilla testified that around that time, while he and Zarate were outside,
Zarate told him that if he came to know that there was a next time that Bonilla was fighting with
the drivers, he would fire him. Bonilla responded that he didn’t fight with anyone, and asked 15
Zarate what fights he was talking about. Zarate replied that he knew Bonilla was involved in
something. (Tr. 173–177.) The General Counsel alleges that these statements by Zarate again
threatened Bonilla with job loss because of his union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
20
As with the previous alleged violations, the Company asserts that Bonilla’s testimony
regarding this alleged violation should be rejected. In support, it again cites Zarate’s testimony
that he never threatened anyone because of their union activity and Bonilla’s lack of credibility
generally. It also argues that Bonilla’s testimony about the August 21 conversation is
insufficient on its face to establish a violation because Bonilla testified that Zarate only 25
mentioned “fighting with” coworkers, which is not protected activity, and did not specifically
mention the Union or union activity.
However, as discussed above, the Company’s arguments for discrediting Bonilla are
without merit or unpersuasive under the circumstances. Further, as with the August 7 30
conversation, Zarate did not deny that the August 21 conversation occurred or offer any
alternative version of it. Nor did he deny that he told Bonilla that he would be fired if he
continued fighting with coworkers.
As for the meaning of “fighting,” there is no contention or evidence that Bonilla ever 35
actually fought with or verbally abused or harassed coworkers or was reported to have done so.
See Zarate’s testimony, Tr. 343 (“Q: Did you ever have any problems with Mr. Bonilla? A: No.
Q: Did you ever have any problems with him fighting with other employees? A: No. No. Q
[again]: Did you ever have any problems with Mr. Bonilla? A: No.”); and Bonilla’s testimony,
Tr. 188–189 (“Q: Did you fight with drivers? Like physically fight? A: No. Q: Did you argue 40
with drivers? A: We would talk about the Teamsters. Q: What kind of fighting did you have
with your co-workers? A: To be all united.”).
Thus, given Zarate’s previous explicit antiunion statements on August 7, it is sufficiently
clear that Zarate referred to “fighting” with drivers as a euphemism for discussing or debating 45
the union with drivers and that it would have reasonably been interpreted as such. Cf. Mardi
JD(SF)–03–19
8
Gras Casino, 359 NLRB 895 (2013) (supervisor’s statement that he had heard employee was
“getting herself into trouble” was a veiled reference to her union activity), reaffd. 361 NLRB 679
(2014); Smithfield Foods, Inc., 347 NLRB 1266, 1274 (2006) (supervisor’s statement that
employee was a “problem person” was a euphemism for the employee’s union activity); Boddy
Construction Co., 338 NLRB 1083 (2003) (president’s reference to employee as an “instigator” 5
was a euphemism for employee’s prounion sentiments); Diversified Bank Installations, Inc., 324
NLRB 457, 471–472 (1997) (president’s statement that employee caused “problems” or
“trouble” was a euphemism for union activity); McClain of Georgia, Inc., 322 NLRB 367, 382
(1996) (president’s statement that employee was responsible for the “shit” in the shop was a
thinly veiled reference to the union campaign), enfd. 138 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1998); 10
Schaumburg Hyundai, Inc., 318 NLRB 449, 458 (1995) (owner’s statement that employee did
“not work well with his team and had a bad attitude” was a euphemism for union animus);
Rainbow Garment Contracting, Inc., 314 NLRB 929, 937 (1994) (employer’s reference to
employees’ “excessive talking” was a euphemism for their union activity); K & E Bus Lines, 255
NLRB 1022, 1033 n. 27 (1981) (president used various euphemisms for union activity, including 15
“upset,” nervousness,” and “agitation”); Boyer Ford Trucks, Inc., 254 NLRB 1389, 1395 (1981)
(statements by owner and manager that employee was discharged for a “bad attitude” and being
a “disruptive influence” were euphemisms or code words for union activity); M.J. Pirolli &
Sons, 194 NLRB 241, 245 (1972) (president’s reference to “trouble” in the plant was a
euphemism for union activity), enfd. per curiam 1972 WL 3041 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 20
U.S. 1008 (1972); Hertz Corp., 184 NLRB 445, 446 (1970) (manager’s characterization of
employee as “troublemaker” could only have referred to her suspected union activities given that
she was considered one of the best employees), enfd. 449 F.2d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 1971); and
Chemical Construction Co., 125 NLRB 593, 599 (1959) (employer’s statement that employee/
union steward was discharged because he caused “dissension” among the employees was a 25
euphemism for his union activity).
Accordingly, like his unlawful August 7 statements, Zarate’s August 21 statements to
Bonilla were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged. See Armstrong
Machine Co., 343 NLRB 1149, 1151 (2004) (president’s statements that certain employees had30
“bad attitudes,” that he was “tired of this bullshit,” and that the employees should take a couple
weeks off or leave if they didn’t want to work there would reasonably have been interpreted
under the circumstances as referring at least in part to their union activity and threatened them
with suspension and discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act); and Smithfield Packing
Co., 344 NLRB 1, 6, 23–25 (2004) (supervisor’s threat to fire employee if he heard her talking 35
about the union with other employees again violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act), enfd. 447 F.3d
821 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
C. Zarate’s alleged unlawful refusal to assign Bonilla work on August 24
40
The next alleged violation involves the circumstances of Bonilla’s early departure from
work on August 24. Bonilla worked at least 40 hours each week, Monday–Friday, from 7 am
until whatever time he finished the assignments he was given by the company dispatcher—
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9
typically between 4 and 6:30 pm—and was paid by the hour, with time and a half for overtime.16
Bonilla testified that on Friday, August 24 he received his first assignment from the dispatcher,
which was to deliver a load to Hanjin at the port. After he made the delivery, he called the
dispatcher as usual to get his next assignment, and the dispatcher told him to come back to the
yard to get another load. However, when he returned and asked the dispatcher for the 5
assignment, the dispatcher told him to go see Zarate in his office. He did so, and Zarate told him
there was no more work for him. As it was Friday, the usual payday, Zarate also gave him his
paycheck for the previous week (August 13–17).17 He therefore gathered his belongings, walked
to his car, and called Cubillos to tell him what happened. (Tr. 178–181.)
10
Bonilla’s testimony is consistent with the driver manifest he turned in that day, which
confirms that he was assigned only the initial Hanjin delivery and worked only until 9:50 am
(GC Exh. 2, p. 1). His testimony is also again corroborated in substantial part by Cubillos, who
testified that Bonilla called him immediately thereafter and told him he had been sent home early
(Tr. 76– 77).18 15
As for Zarate, he testified that Bonilla came to see him around 10 am and asked for his
paycheck. However, Zarate acknowledged that this is not unusual; that all the drivers ask him
for their paycheck throughout the day. (Tr. 344). Further, he did not specifically deny that he
told Bonilla there was no more work for him that day. 20
The Company nevertheless argues that Bonilla and Cubillos should be discredited, both
because of their lack of credibility and because the General Counsel failed to call the dispatcher
or two other drivers that Bonilla testified were in Zarate’s office at the time. However, for the
reasons discussed above, the Company’s arguments are without merit.1925

16 See Tr. 140–142, 178, 208–209, 350; GC Exh. 2; and R. Exh. 3. The Company apparently
deducted a period of time from Bonilla’s total hours for unpaid lunch breaks. Compare GC Exh.
2 with R. Exh. 3. See also Tr. 62, 72.
17 The Company pays the drivers for each week’s work on Friday of the following week (Tr.
369).
18 There are some differences or inconsistencies. For example, while Cubillos testified that
Bonilla called and told him that he “was sent home early,” Bonilla testified that he called and
told Cubillos he was “fired” (Tr. 230). However, the record as a whole indicates that Bonilla
may have simply been confused when he gave this testimony and/or that the question or answer
may have been mistranslated due to difficulties or nuances in interpretation (as indicated above,
Bonilla testified through an interpreter). Indeed, when asked to explain why he took his personal
belongings with him on August 24, Bonilla testified that he did so only because it was his
understanding that the evening drivers sometimes used his assigned truck and that Zarate
therefore did not want him to leave his stuff in it (Tr. 146–147, 181, 201–211), not because he
thought Zarate had fired him. Further, as discussed infra, Bonilla testified that Zarate did not tell
him he was terminated until the following evening.
19 It is also noteworthy that Bonilla did not testify that he knew or recalled the names of the
two drivers who were in the office. See Tr. 180.
JD(SF)–03–19
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Thus, a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that Zarate did, in fact, send
Bonilla home early on August 24. Regarding Zarate’s reason(s) for doing so, the parties agree
that the proper analytical framework is set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under that framework, the
General Counsel must prove by a preponderance of the direct or circumstantial evidence that an 5
employee's union activity was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment
action. The General Counsel can make a sufficient initial showing in this regard by
demonstrating that the employee engaged in union activity and the employer knew or suspected
it, and that the employer had animus against such activity. If the General Counsel makes the
required initial showing, the burden shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the 10
evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action against the employee even absent
his/her union activity. See Shamrock Foods Co., 366 NLRB No. 117, slip op. at 26–27 (2018);
and East End Bus Lines, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 180, slip op. at 1 n. 7 (2018), and cases cited there.
As discussed above, the General Counsel established that Bonilla engaged in union 15
activity and that Zarate knew or suspected it and had animus against that activity as reflected by
his unlawful statements to Bonilla on or about August 7 and 21. Further, the Company failed to
establish that Zarate would have sent Bonilla home early anyway on August 24 regardless of his
union activities. The Company’s posthearing brief (p. 13) suggests that Bonilla would have been
sent home early anyway because he had already worked 40.10 hours that week. However, there 20
is no testimonial or documentary evidence that Bonilla was not allowed to work more than 40
hours a week, or that Zarate sent him home early on August 24 for this reason. On the contrary,
Zarate testified that the drivers all averaged 30–50 hours per week; and that Bonilla averaged “at
least” 40 hours per week (Tr. 350). Moreover, the Company stipulated that there was additional
work that could have been assigned to and performed by Bonilla at 9:50 am and thereafter on 25
August 24 (Tr. 151–153, 193).
Accordingly, Zarate’s refusal to assign Bonilla further work on August 24 violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, as alleged.
30
D. Zarate’s alleged unlawful termination of Bonilla on August 25
The final alleged violation involves the circumstances of Bonilla’s separation from
employment the following day, Saturday August 25. As with the prior alleged violations, both
Bonilla and Cubillos testified with respect to this allegation, as did two other Teamsters 35
organizers, Jamie Welsh and Adrian Macias, to the extent of their participation and personal
knowledge. Their testimony, which was substantially corroborative and consistent with
Bonilla’s phone records, was as follows.20

20 There are differences in their testimony with respect to certain details. However, this is
common. See Owino v. Holder, 771 F.3d 527, 538 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[S]light differences in the
recollection or perception of different witnesses are a common occurrence.”). See also U.S. v.
Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 894 (1991). Further, the differences
are not major or critical and have been resolved based on the usual credibility factors (see fn. 3,
above).
JD(SF)–03–19
11
At about 6:30 pm that evening, while Bonilla was bowling with his family, he received a
call from Zarate on his cell phone. Zarate asked him why his truck was empty; why he had taken
his personal belongings out of it. Bonilla was surprised by the call and thought he was supposed
to clean out the truck because the evening drivers sometimes used it and Zarate had recently
reminded him that the Company owned the truck and told him not to leave things in it. When he 5
did not immediately respond to Zarate’s question, Zarate told him that he didn’t want him to
come back to the Company, and that he would send him a paycheck for the past week (August
20–24) on Monday. Bonilla asked Zarate why, but Zarate replied that he did not want to argue
about it and hung up.21
10
As usual, Bonilla immediately called Cubillos and told him about the conversation. The
following Monday, August 27, he also went to the union office in person to fill out an online
application for unemployment benefits. Welsh, another Teamsters organizer in the office who
was proficient with computers, assisted Bonilla with the application. When they got to the
question on the application about why Bonilla was no longer working for the Company, they 15
decided that Bonilla should call Zarate and ask him again. So, Bonilla called Zarate on his cell
phone, putting it on speaker so that Welsh could listen and be a witness to it. When Zarate
answered, Bonilla said that he was filing for unemployment and needed to know why he had
been let go. Zarate replied, “Because you are fighting with my drivers” and “I don’t want my
workers fighting.” Bonilla responded that he didn’t have any issues with anybody and to give 20
him an instance where he had fought with another driver. Zarate replied that he didn’t want to
discuss or argue about it with Bonilla, that he just didn’t need him anymore, and hung up.22
Bonilla thereafter filed the unemployment insurance application, which was not opposed
or contested, and was granted benefits. In the meantime, the following Friday morning, August 25
31, he also went back to the Company’s facility to inquire about his final paycheck, which as of
that morning he had still not received in the mail. Cubillos and Macias, another Teamsters
organizer in the office, went with him for support. When they got to the facility, Cubillos, who
drove, stayed in the car while Bonilla and Macias walked up to the gate and spoke to the guard.
Zarate came out shortly thereafter and Bonilla told him he was there to pick up his check. Zarate 30
said he had already mailed it, but Bonilla replied that he had not received it. So, Zarate told them
to follow him to his office; that he would write Bonilla a new check and that Bonilla should
cancel the old check when he received it.
When they arrived at the office, Zarate called his son and asked him to bring in Bonilla’s 35
paperwork. While they were waiting, Macias, whom Bonilla had introduced as his nephew,

21 Tr. 146–147, 154, 184–185, 330, 371–374. See also the parties’ stipulation regarding
Bonilla’s phone records, Tr. 200–202. Bonilla initially testified that Zarate replied, “Because
you are fighting with my drivers.” (Tr. 184). However, he subsequently testified that Zarate said
that he didn’t want to argue with him anymore (Tr. 185), and this was corroborated by Cubillos’s
testimony about what Bonilla told him immediately after the call (Tr. 85). Again, the record as a
whole indicates that Bonilla’s initial testimony simply confused the August 25 phone
conversation with another phone conversation he had with Zarate 2 days later on August 27,
discussed infra.
22 See Tr. 84–88, 185–188, 200–202, 243–247.
JD(SF)–03–19
12
asked Zarate whether Bonilla would get paid for vacations, and Zarate said no. Macias also
asked why he had fired Bonilla, and Zarate said because he’d been “having problems with
drivers fighting.” Bonilla said that wasn’t true, and continued to press Zarate for the real reason,
but Zarate just repeated that he didn’t want any problems. Zarate then handed Bonilla the new
check and escorted him and Macias out.235
Zarate disputed certain parts of the foregoing account, particularly Bonilla’s and
Cubillos’s testimony regarding the August 25 phone conversation. He admitted that he called
Bonilla that evening but denied that he told Bonilla he was terminated. He testified that the only
reason he called Bonilla was because the daytime yard attendant told him that Bonilla’s assigned 10
truck had been parked in the wrong spot and emptied out. Zarate testified that when he asked
Bonilla what had happened, why his truck was empty, Bonilla said, “Don’t worry about it, I’m
not coming back, just wait for your surprise,” and hung up with no further discussion or
argument. (Tr. 344, 352–353, 369).
15
There are numerous problems with Zarate’s testimony, however. First, Zarate never
explained why he called Bonilla on a Saturday evening solely to question him about such a
seemingly minor matter rather than waiting until Monday morning. Second, Bonilla specifically
disputed Zarate’s account of the call, denying that he told Zarate he was not coming back (or that
he had a “surprise” for him). Third, Zarate admitted that there were no internal company records, 20
memoranda, or email communications indicating that Bonilla had quit. (Tr. 31, 185, 374–375.)
Fourth, Zarate did not deny saying that Bonilla had been terminated for “fighting” with
coworkers when he received the phone call the following Monday about Bonilla’s
unemployment application. (Zarate testified that he thought the call was actually from the
unemployment office.) Nor did he offer an alternative version of what he said. Fifth, Zarate 25
admitted that he did not subsequently contest Bonilla’s unemployment application.24 (Tr. 30–31,

23 See Tr. 88–91, 126–127, 131–132, 189–191, 225, 253–268, 270–279, 314–324. See also
Zarate’s testimony, Tr. 30–31, 345, 351–352. At some point during the visit, Bonilla also told
Zarate that he wanted to check his previously assigned truck to see if he had left a metal pipe or
tube and wood frame in it. However, Zarate told him the truck had been cleaned out and/or was
not in the yard. See Tr. 266–267, 315, 317–318. See also Zarate’s testimony, Tr. 345, 351.
24 See Skyline Transport, 228 NLRB 352, 357 (1977) (rejecting the employer’s position that
the alleged discriminatee had quit, in part because the blue-slip the employer gave him did not
state he had quit and the employer did not oppose his application for unemployment
compensation). See also Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461,
1464–1465 (5th Cir. 1989) (jury’s determination that Pepsi discharged Hansard was supported
by sufficient evidence, including “the absence of any Pepsi records to indicate that Hansard quit
and Pepsi’s failure to contest Hansard’s unemployment benefits”), cert. denied 493 U.S. 842
(1989); and Hetzberg v. SRAM Corp., 1998 WL 887079 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1998) (“If it is true
(as the parties’ submissions suggest) that a voluntary quit would have disqualified Hertzberg
from receiving unemployment benefits, the fact that SRAM chose not to oppose her application
. . . has obvious potential relevance” and is properly considered by the factfinder), rejecting the
contrary view in Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., 1994 WL 118517 (N.D. Ill. March
31, 1994).
JD(SF)–03–19
13
365.) Although he explained that he didn’t “know how that works,” it is unlikely that the
founder and longtime general manager of an interstate trucking company that employs 80–90
drivers would not know that employees who voluntary quit are ineligible for unemployment
benefits, and that an employer may dispute an application on that ground to avoid subsequent
benefit charges or higher tax rates.25 Finally, Zarate did not deny telling Macias that Bonilla was 5
terminated for “fighting” with the drivers when he and Bonilla came to the facility on August 31
to get Bonilla’s final paycheck. (See Tr. 345, 351–352.)
Thus, for these and the other reasons previously discussed (including the credited
evidence that Zarate had threatened to terminate Bonilla for “fighting” with coworkers just a few 10
days earlier), a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that Zarate did, in fact,
terminate Bonilla on August 25. This leaves only the question of whether the termination was
unlawfully motivated. Again, the parties agree that Wright Line sets forth the proper analytical
framework for addressing this issue. Applying that framework, as discussed above the General
Counsel satisfied the required initial burden of showing that Bonilla engaged in union activity, 15
that the Company knew or suspected it, and that the Company had animus against that activity.
Further, as with Zarate’s decision to send Bonilla home early on August 24, the Company failed
to meet its burden of showing that it would have terminated Bonilla anyway regardless of his
union activity. Indeed, the Company does not even contend that there was any legitimate or
lawful reason to terminate him. Rather, its sole contention, which as discussed above is contrary 20
to a preponderance of the credible evidence, is that Bonilla quit.
Accordingly, Zarate’s termination of Bonilla on August 25 violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act as alleged.
25

25 Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1256 (West) provides in relevant part:
An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the
director finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without
good cause or that he or she has been discharged for misconduct connected with
his or her most recent work.
An individual is presumed to have been discharged for reasons other than
misconduct in connection with his or her work and not to have voluntarily left his
or her work without good cause unless his or her employer has given written
notice to the contrary to the department as provided in Section 1327, setting forth
facts sufficient to overcome the presumption. The presumption provided by this
section is rebuttable.
See also the State of California, Employment Development Department (EDD) website, at
https://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de231z.pdf; at https://edd.ca.gov/Unemployment/
How_to_Minimize_UI_Taxes_Test.htm; and at https://www.edd.ca.gov/unemployment/
responding_to_ui_claim_notices.htm. Judicial notice is taken of these EDD website materials.
See FRE 201; Lucky Cab Co., 366 NLRB No. 56 (2018); U.S. v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th
Cir. 2017); and U.S. ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Global Inc., 48 F.Supp.3d 1362, 1381–1382 (C.D.
Cal. 2014).
JD(SF)–03–19
14
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
a. Interrogating Bonilla about his union support and activities on or about August 7, 5
2018; and
b. Threatening Bonilla with job loss on or about August 7 and 21, 2018
because of his union support and activities.
10
2. The Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by:
a. Refusing to assign Bonilla further work after 9:50 am on August 24, 2018; and
b. Terminating Bonilla on August 25, 2018.15
3. The Company’s foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Company did not violate the Act by creating the impression of surveillance on or 20
about August 7 in the manner alleged in the complaint.
REMEDY
The appropriate remedy for the violations found is an order requiring the Company to 25
cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and to take certain affirmative action. Specifically,
the Company must offer Bonilla full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed. The Company must also make Bonilla whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of its unlawful refusal to assign him additional 30
work on August 24 and termination of his employment on August 25. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
compounded daily as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).26
35
In addition, the Company must compensate Bonilla for any adverse tax consequences of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director a report allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar years. See AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB
No. 143 (2016).
40

26 The General Counsel requests that the Company also be ordered to make Bonilla whole for
“any consequential economic harm.” However, this would require a change in Board law. See
Dura-Line Corp., 366 NLRB No. 126, slip op. at 4 n. 18 (2018). Accordingly, the request is
denied.
JD(SF)–03–19
15
The Company must also compensate Bonilla for his search-for-work and interim
employment expenses, regardless of whether those expenses exceed interim earnings. See King
Soopers, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 93 (2016). The search-for-work and interim employment expenses
shall be calculated separately from taxable net backpay, with interest compounded daily as
prescribed in New Horizons, supra, and Kentucky River Medical Center, supra.5
Further, the Company must remove from its files any references to its unlawful refusal to
assign Bonilla further work on August 24 and termination of his employment on August 25, and
notify Bonilla in writing that this has been done and that those actions will not be used against
him in any way.10
Finally, the Company must post a notice to employees in both English and Spanish
notifying them of their rights under the Act and the Board’s decision and order. The
English/Spanish notices must be posted at the facility in all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. As the record indicates that the drivers spend most of the time away 15
from the facility, and that the Company therefore regularly communicates with them by text
message (Tr. 144), the Company must also distribute the English/Spanish notices directly to
them in this manner, as well as by any other electronic means, including email and posting on an
intranet or an internet site, if the Company customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. See Dish Network Corp., 366 NLRB No. 119, slip op. at 13–14 (2018). As all of the 20
unfair labor practices were committed by General Manager Zarate, and the record indicates that he
personally hands out the paychecks to the drivers each week (Tr. 344, 346), he will also be required
to distribute the English/Spanish notices to the drivers with those paychecks if he customarily
distributes notices or memoranda to the drivers in this manner. See Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc.,
142 NLRB 23 (1963).25
The General Counsel requests that Zarate also be required to personally read the notice to
employees during work time (or to allow a Board agent to do so in his presence). However, the
Board considers this an extraordinary remedy that is properly ordered only in particularly
egregious cases, such as those where the high-level manager committed numerous unfair labor 30
practices that directly affected the entire employee unit and/or did so in a public way such as by
giving threatening or otherwise coercive speeches at compulsory employee meetings. See El
Super, 367 NLRB No. 34, slip op. at 1 (2018); and AdvancePierre Foods, Inc., 366 NLRB No.
133, slip op. at 5 (2018), and cases cited there. Further, the alternative notice-distribution
remedies described above should be sufficient to ensure that all of the drivers are adequately 35
informed of their rights and the Board’s decision and order. Accordingly, the request for a
notice-reading remedy is denied.
The General Counsel also requests a visitorial clause requiring the Company to grant
Board agents reasonable access to the facility to monitor compliance with the notice-posting 40
requirement. However, the Board has declined to include such provisions in remedial orders
absent a showing that the respondent has a history of failing to comply with Board orders or is
otherwise likely to try and evade compliance. See Domsey Trading Corp., 310 NLRB 777, 813–
814 (1993), enfd. 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994); and Dauman Pallet, Inc., 314 NLRB 185, 210
(1994), and cases cited there. See also El Super, above (deleting a similar access remedy from 45
JD(SF)–03–19
16
the ALJ’s order). The General Counsel has failed to make any such showing here. Accordingly,
the request for an access remedy is denied as well.
ORDER27
5
The Respondent, Pacific Green Trucking Inc., Wilmington, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
10
(a) Interrogating employees about their union sympathies and activities.
(b) Threatening employees with job loss because of their union support and activities.
(c) Refusing to assign work to employees because of their union support and 15
activities.
(d) Discharging employees because of their union support and activities.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of 20
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s order, offer Ricardo Bonilla Colindres 25
(Bonilla) full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed.
(b) Make Bonilla whole for any loss of earnings and benefits suffered as a result of 30
the discriminatory refusal to assign him work and termination of his employment, in the manner
set forth in the remedy section above.
(c) Make Bonilla whole for his reasonable search-for-work and interim employment
expenses, in the manner set forth in the remedy section above.35
(d) Compensate Bonilla for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-
sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 21, within 21 days of the
date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar year.40

27 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules,
be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–03–19
17
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of the Board’s 5
order.
(f) Within 14 days of the date of the Board’s order, remove from its files any reference
to the unlawful refusal to assign work to Bonilla and termination of his employment, and within
3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done and that those actions will not be 10
used against him in any way.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Wilmington,
California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”28 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s 15
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent in both English and Spanish and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the
Respondent shall distribute the English/Spanish notices to its employees by text-message and by
other electronic means, such as email or posting on an intranet or an internet site, if the 20
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. The Respondent’s
general manager, Vicente Zarate, shall also distribute the English/Spanish notices to the
employees with one of their weekly paychecks if he customarily distributes notices or
memoranda to employees in this manner. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If, during the 25
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
Wilmington facility, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all employees employed by the Respondent at any time since August 7, 2018.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a 30
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2019
35
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge
40

28 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
c- - 9.--4 k -f
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you about your union sympathies and activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of your job because of your union support and activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to assign you work or discharge you because of your union support and
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s order, offer Ricardo Bonilla Colindres
(Bonilla) full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed.
WE WILL make Bonilla whole for any loss of earnings and benefits suffered as a result of our
discriminatory refusal to assign him work and termination of his employment, plus interest.
WE WILL make Bonilla whole for his reasonable search-for-work and interim employment
expenses, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Bonilla for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum
backpay award, and file with the Board a report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar year.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the date of the Board’s order, remove from our files any reference
to our unlawful refusal to assign work to Bonilla and termination of his employment, and within
3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done and that those actions will not be
used against him in any way
PACIFIC GREEN TRUCKING INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office
set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
U.S. Courthouse, 312 N. Spring St., 10th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-226775 or
by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (213) 634-6502.