Overnite Transportation Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 1331 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION CO. 1331
Overnite Transportation Company, Inc. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union 385,
AFL–CIO. Cases 12–CA–19417 and 12–CA–
19636
November 30, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On June 4, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Richard
H. Beddow Jr., issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
and answering brief. The Respondent filed a reply brief
and an answering brief to the General Counsel’s cross-
exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for conclusion of law 3:
“3. By promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing a
lunchbreak rule which prohibits driver employees from
taking their lunchbreaks at the Respondent’s service cen-
ter after the sixth hour of work, or which requires driver
employees to take lunchbreaks between their fourth and
sixth hour of work, in order to limit opportunities for its
driver employees to engage in union activities, and by
impliedly threatening an employee with discharge be-
cause of his union sympathies, the Respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act, and thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.”

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions, unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
We correct the judge’s inadvertent error in sec. II, par. 6, of the deci-
sion, in which he referred to an incident involving supervisor Jonas
Smith and employee David Fox as occurring on April 18, 1998. Based
on the credited testimony, the correct date is April 2, 1998.
2 Consistent with the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions, we shall
revise the conclusions of law, recommended Order, and notice in ac-
cordance with the complaint allegations, which are supported by the
record. We shall also modify paragraph 2(b) of the recommended
Order to conform to the Board’s decisions in Indian Hills Care Center,
321 NLRB 144 (1996), and Excel Containers, Inc., 325 NLRB 17
(1997).
In the remedy section of his decision, the judge cited Passavant
Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), for the proposition
that the Respondent must repudiate its illegally promulgated lunchbreak
rule. While we agree that the rule should be rescinded, we find it un-
necessary to rely on Passavant Memorial Area Hospital. We rely
instead on Youville Health Care Center, 326 NLRB 495, 496 (1998)
(Board ordered respondent to rescind discriminatorily promulgated rule
restricting employee discussions of working conditions).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Overnite
Transportation Company, Inc., Ocoee, Florida, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act by promulgating, maintaining, or
enforcing a written or oral rule which prohibits employ-
ees from taking their lunchbreaks at Respondent’s ser-
vice center after the sixth hour of work, or which requires
employees to take lunchbreaks between their fourth and
sixth hour of work, in order to limit opportunities for its
driver employees to engage in union activities.
(b) Impliedly threatening employees with discharge
because of their union sympathies.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind
the lunch policy promulgated on April 3, 1998, and re-
move from its files any records or reference reflecting
each employee’s acknowledgement of receipt of the writ-
ten policy and within 3 days thereafter notify the em-
ployees in writing that this has been done and that the
records will not be used against them in any way.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Ocoee, Florida, facilities, copies of its policy repudia-
tion and copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 12, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

332 NLRB No. 138
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1332
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respon-
dent at any time since April 3, 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
in Section 7 of the Act by promulgating, maintaining, or
enforcing a written or oral rule prohibiting our driver
employees from taking their lunchbreaks at our service
center after the sixth hour of work, or which requires our
driver employees to take lunchbreaks between their
fourth and sixth hour of work, in order to limit opportu-
nities for driver employees to engage in union activities.

WE WILL NOT impliedly threaten our employees
with discharge because of their union sympathies.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, rescind the lunch policy promulgated on
April 3, 1998, and remove from our files any records or
reference reflecting each employee’s acknowledgement
of receipt of the written policy and, within 3 days there-
after, notify the employees in writing that this has been
done and that the records will not be used against them in
any way.
OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
Thomas W. Brudney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Tommy D. McCutchen and Kenneth F. Sparks, Esqs., of Chi-
cago, Illinois, for the Respondent.
Jack Barmon, of Orlando, Florida, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD H. BEDDOW JR., Administrative Law Judge.
This matter was heard in Orlando, Florida, on March 12, 1999.
Subsequently, briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the
Respondent. The proceeding is based on a charge filed April 8,
1998,1 by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union
385, AFL–CIO. The Regional Director’s consolidated com-
plaint dated October 29, 1998, alleges that Respondent, Over-
night Transportation Company, Inc., of Richmond, Virginia,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by
changing and enforcing new lunchbreak rules in order to pre-
vent or limit employees’ participation in union activities and by
threatening or impliedly threatening employees with discharge
because of their union membership or activities.
On a review of the entire record in this case and from my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a nationwide motor common carrier of general
commodities and operates a terminal in Ocoee, Florida. It an-
nually derives gross revenues in excess of $50,000 from the
transportation of general commodities from Ocoee to points
outside Florida. It admits that at all times material is and has
been an employer engaged in operations affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2) and (7) of the Act. It also
admits that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent’s Ocoee terminal has approximately 72 em-
ployees, including 23 city drivers (also known as pick-up and
deliver drivers) who leave the service center in the morning to
deliver or pick up freight from customers to bring back to the
service center at the end of their shifts. One half of the freight
handled at Ocoee was delivered or picked up by appointment.
City drivers report to work between 3 a.m. and 9 a.m., return to
the terminal generally between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m., and they
generally are running their routes, either delivering or picking
up freight, between their 4th and 6th hour of work.

1 All following dates will be in 1998, unless otherwise indicated.
OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION CO. 1333
Respondent also employs road or line haul drivers that drive
between different terminals where they drop off trailers and
pick up other trailers to bring back to the Ocoee terminal. Most
road drivers leave the terminal on their routes after 9 p.m. City
drivers are paid on an hourly rate, whereas road drivers appar-
ently are compensated on a mileage basis.
Jonas Smith is the terminal’s “outbound” dock supervisor, is
in charge of activities from midafternoon until midnight and
has nominal responsibility for city drivers returning to the ter-
minal. Mark Campbell was the operations manager at Ocoee
until he was transferred to a position as terminal manager in
Decatur, Alabama, in October 1998. Chuck Graham became
the Ocoee terminal manager in June 1997 when he replaced
former manager, Edgar Dycus.
The Ocoee terminal is not unionized and the Union has not
filed a petition seeking to represent its driver employees since
1987. For several years prior to 1998, however, city driver
David Fox had been engaging in union activities, such as talk-
ing about the Union to other drivers before and after work in
the employee parking area and in the drivers’ breakroom inside
the terminal after returning from his route. He had not openly
displayed his union sympathies to management until on or
about March 5, when he began to wear a hat that said “Overnite
Teamsters” and about 1 month later, he began to occasionally
wear a union T-shirt at work (since about June 30, Fox has been
out of work on workers’ compensation leave).
City driver Daniel Lago began talking to other drivers, dis-
tributing union literature, and soliciting authorization cards in
early 1998 but he did not openly display his union sympathies
to management until about June 18, when he began to wear a
hat that said “Overnite Teamsters.” Lago continued to wear
this or a similar hat every day at work, and also regularly wore
buttons and pins identifying his union sympathies. Both Ter-
minal Manager Graham and Operations Manager Campbell saw
Fox and Lago wearing their union hats and T-shirts at work.
Smith acknowledged that he had seen Fox with the Teamsters
but could not recall if he had paid any attention to that prior to
April when he had a brief conversation with Fox about the tim-
ing of Fox’s lunchbreak.
Although Smith did not attend employee morning meetings
because of his work schedule, he was aware that the Union was
attempting to organize the Respondent nationwide and he knew
that the Company opposed these efforts. On the afternoon of
April 18, Smith saw Fox turn in his paperwork and then “just”
stand and talk to a mechanic and a road driver. He testified that
he asked Fox what he was doing and if he was still on the
clock. When Fox replied yes, he was on his lunchbreak, Smith
asked him why, and assertedly said, “normally you don’t come
in an [sic] take your lunchbreak at the end of the day” and he
allegedly just walked off.
Fox testified that after Smith asked him what he was doing,
he replied that he was taking his lunchbreak and Smith then
told Fox to “get off the clock and get off the property, you can’t
take your lunch at terminal, you have to take if before you get
here.” Fox replied that this was news to him, and then followed
Smith’s instructions. Smith said he understood the lunchbreak
policy to require employees (especially those at the facility) to
clock out for 30 minutes after 6 hours at work but that he didn’t
tell city drivers when to take their lunchbreaks.
On April 3, the day after Smith spoke to Fox, the Respondent
promulgated the following written policy with respect to lunch-
hours for employees at the Ocoee terminal, and it required each
city driver to sign in acknowledgement of receipt:
IT IS MANDATORY THAT ALL EMPLOYEES
TAKE A LUNCH WHEN WORKING 6 HOURS OR
MORE PER DAY.
LUNCH MUST BE TAKEN BETWEEN THE 4TH
AND 6TH HOUR FROM THEIR STARTING TIME
FOR THAT DAY WITH LUCH BEING COMPLETED
AT THE 6TH HOUR.
THERE WILL BE NO EXCUSES FOR LUNCH TO
BE TAKEN ANY OTHER TIME EXCEPT FOR THE
4TH THROUGH 6TH HOUR FROM THE STARTING
TIME OF THAT DAY. THIS POLICY HAS ALWAYS
BEEN IN PLACE BECAUSE IT IS A FEDERAL LAW
AND WE WILL FOLLOW THIS PROCEDURE EACH
AND EVERY DAY.

Campbell and Graham both understood that since 1987, Re-
spondent had an unwritten policy that city drivers received an
unpaid half-hour lunchbreak when they worked more than 6
hours and that the Respondent automatically deducted one half
hour from each city driver’s pay each day the driver worked
more than 6 hours (as reflected on their daily trip cards). Prior
to April, both Fox and Lago (as well as former city driver Ed-
ward Ginn), never were told to take his lunchbreak before the
6th hour of work, or between the 4th and 6th hour of work and
that they took a lunchbreak whenever it was convenient after
getting the most freight off the truck. If time permitted, it was
done on route, generally after the 6th hour, frequently on the
way back to the terminal, and sometimes back at the terminal in
plain view of supervisors such as Smith, Graham, and Camp-
bell. These drivers also observed that other city drivers ap-
peared to follow the same practice. Graham has never issued a
corrective action report or discharged an employee for violating
the policy and however, there is no evidence that any city driv-
ers have violated, since it was promulgated, however, there is
no indication that the Respondent has taken any affirmative
action to repudiate its memo. The Respondent has a written
policy concerning union solicitation, which permits employees
to engage in union solicitation on Respondent’s property only
during “non-working time.” Graham testified that lunchbreaks,
when taken pursuant to this solicitation policy, constitute “non-
working time,” and that city drivers can engage in union solici-
tation during their lunchbreak only if they take their lunchbreak
between their 4th and 6th hour, as required under the
lunchbreak new policy.
On July 28, Graham called a mandatory meeting of all city
drivers at the terminal in order to discuss union-related prob-
lems. Just before the meeting began, Graham spoke to Lago
individually, complemented him on his neat appearance, noting
that his hair was cut and his beard was trimmed. Lago, who has
recently had a hair cut, replied that the Union was talking about
having job actions at some of the union-represented terminals,
and that he may be involved in walking on a picket line, so he
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1334
wanted to look presentable. Lago testified that Graham replied:
“I’d be more concerned about my future with Overnite, because
at this time it’s real iffy.” Lago did not respond. Lago testified
that Graham turned to walk away and repeated the statement,
and the words “real iffy.”
Graham admitted that he had an exchange with Lago but tes-
tified that he never told Lago that “his future in the company
was iffy because of his union activities.” He was not asked
whether he spoke the words attributed to him by Lago. Graham
also testified that he never told Lago that all union employees
would soon be out of the Company and that he read verbatim
from press releases prepared for him by Respondent at its cor-
porate headquarters. He admitted, however, that he deviated
from the press releases, and testified that he was instructed to
“answer any questions that we knew we had the answer to.”
III. DISCUSSION
The issues in this case arose where the Respondent formal-
ized lunchbreak rules shortly after union supporter David Fox
began to overtly display his union sympathies and after a su-
pervisor saw him talking to other employees when he had fin-
ished his daily run and returned to the terminal. Thereafter,
Dock Supervisor Smith told him to get off the dock and off the
property and the terminal manager issued a lunchbreak memo
and held a meeting where he read a company press release con-
cerning union organizing attempt and then allegedly told an-
other overt union supporter that his future with the Company
was “really iffy.”
Here, city driver Fox had engaged in covert union activities
with other employees for several years and in early March,
contemporaneously with ongoing union organizational activi-
ties at other terminals in Florida, he overtly began to wear a
union hat (and occasional T-shirt). The employer was opposing
the organizational efforts and Managers Campbell and Graham
otherwise were aware of Fox’s actions and, subsequently, the
similar overt action of driver Daniel Lago. Although supervi-
sor Smith could not “recall” if he had “paid any attention” to
Fox’s union paraphernalia, I find that all three supervisors had
knowledge of both Fox’s and Lago’s union sympathies at the
time of the respective alleged violations.
First, I credit the evidence that Smith told Fox that he could
not be on the clock, on lunchbreak, after returning to the termi-
nal and told him to get off the clock and off the property. The
next day management codified this rule with a newly printed
and posted rule requiring lunch only between the 4th and 6th
hour. The Respondent defends its actions by asserting that it
had legitimate reasons for its rule, that the rule was not promul-
gated in response to union activity, that the rule doesn’t prohibit
Section 7 activity, and that it has not enforced the rule for that
purpose.
Contrary to the Respondent’s contentions, I find that the tim-
ing of the enforcement of the unwritten rule and its immediate
issuance and posting in written form implies that it occurred in
response to the employees’ recent overt union activities and
because of the Respondent’s suspicion that Fox’s belated
lunchbreak conversation with other employees related to union
activities.
While the rule might have greater applicability to the dock
workers and other employees under Smith’s supervision, it is
clear that in the past it had not been applied to city drivers who,
by the nature of their jobs and in the furtherance of the interest
of the employer and its customers, generally attempted to ac-
complish their deliveries during the 6–hour period proscribed in
the rule. Moreover, Smith’s remarks to Fox (I credit Fox’s spe-
cific recall over Smith’s partial failure to recall all that he said
before, “just walking off”) included the admonition to “get off
the clock and get off the property” and imply management’s
displeasure with his use of nonworking time for possible union
activities. This supports the conclusion that Smith’s comment
was unlawfully motivated and intended to restrict Fox’s poten-
tial union activities and, accordingly, I find that Smith’s action
was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged.
I credit Fox’s testimony that it was his practice to get all de-
livery freight off his vehicle before taking his lunchbreak, that
he left the terminal at 8 a.m., and at various times did not have
his lunchbreak until after 3 p.m. and only infrequently before
the 6th hour. He also sometimes took his lunchbreak back at
the terminal (10 times in 14 years), but more frequently would
stop on his way back at a convenience store about 6 miles from
the terminal and sit for 30 minutes with a soda. Otherwise, the
testimony of other city drivers, including the Respondent’s own
witness, driver Eric Nieves (and his timecards), show that driv-
ers regularly started lunchbreaks after the 6th hour.
It is well established that an employer violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by implementing a new policy in response to
a union organizing campaign, or by enforcing previously unen-
forced policies, where the employer’s purpose in so doing is to
restrict opportunities for employees to engage in union activi-
ties, see, for example, Tualatin Electric, 319 NLRB 1237, 1237
(1995); Wellstream Corp., 313 NLRB 698, 698 (1994); Ideal
Macaroni Co., 301 NLRB 507 (1991), Horton Automatics, 289
NLRB 405 (1988); and especially, Miller Group, 310 NLRB
1235 (1993).
Here, the promulgated rule appears to be overly broad and it
has the effect of changing the manner in which city drivers
arrange their work schedules and it also has the effect of pre-
cluding city drivers from engaging in protected concerted ac-
tivities after they complete their runs and return to the terminal.
Also, I find the Respondent’s reasons (including productivity
and safety claims), are patently pretextual and I am not per-
suaded that the Respondent needed to take its action regarding
compliance with purported “federal” law at the time it did.
Otherwise, there is no demonstrated compelling reason for the
Respondent’s actions that would require the Board to excuse
the Respondent’s actions, compare Watsonville Register-
Pajaronian, 327 NLRB 957 (1999).
While the Respondent asserts a number of “reasons,” they
appear to be after the fact excuses and I am not persuaded that
these reasons, legitimate or not, were evaluated prior to its sud-
den decision to react to Fox’s suspected union activities. Oth-
erwise, there is no evidence that Campbell and Graham
checked federal law requirements when they were assertedly
alerted by a comment and “guidelines” offered on February or
March by an auditor firm, its parent company. Nothing was
done until April 3 just after Fox became overt in his union ac-
OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION CO. 1335
tivities and immediately after he was observed and warned
about talking to other employees after he had returned to the
terminal.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the General
Counsel has persuasively shown that the reason for the April 3
lunch policy change, was not those asserted by Respondent, and
that the true reason was an intent to limit opportunities for em-
ployees, such as Fox, to engaged in union activities. Accord-
ingly, I find that the Respondent is shown to have violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act in these respects, as alleged.
Respondent has failed to take any timely, unambiguous ac-
tion to repudiate the April 3 lunch policy memorandum or to
give employee assurances that it will not interfere with their
Section 7 rights and the retention of an illegal but unenforced
rule is unlawful because it tends to chill the exercise of em-
ployee Section 7 rights, see NLRB v. Beverage Air Co., 402
F.2d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1968).
City driver Daniel Lago began to overtly display his union
sympathies about June 18 and he convincingly described how a
short time later Graham spoke to him before a mandatory driver
meeting and complemented him on his neat appearance. Lago
recalled that he recently had his haircut and beard trimmed, and
that he made a reply to the effect that wanting to look present-
able as he might be walking a picket line. Lago recalls that
Graham replied: “I’d be more concerned about my future with
Overnite, because at this time it’s real iffy” and he heard Gra-
ham repeat the phrase “real iffy” as he walked away.
Graham recalled that he had a one to one exchange with
Lago after a meeting held at the terminal at the end of July and
that in the meeting he discussed the threatened strike by Union
members at various of Respondent’s unionized terminals, in-
cluding nearby Miami, and Graham recalled that Lago asked
him “how will I be affected—or how will I be affected or how
will I be thought of about the strike” and that he then instructed
Lago that he would be expected to come to work. Graham
testified that he never told Lago that “his future in the company
was iffy because of his Union activities” but he was not asked
whether he ever uttered the words attributed to him by Lago.
Except for the fact of when the exchange took place (before or
after the meeting), it is clear that a conversation took place and
that a subject matter of the meeting involved a threatened
strike. Lago’s recall is consistent with the sequence of events,
while Graham’s testimony does not refute the exact statement
Lago claims Graham uttered and I find that Graham’s testi-
mony appears to be evasive, without being clearly untruthful.
Graham also testified that he has sent seven Ocoee drivers to
Miami as strike replacements and that the meeting at which he
and Lago spoke

was in the heat of the threatened strike. I had employees in
Miami. We were struggling at the time to service our cus-
tomers, to be honest with you. When you lose seven people
out of your operation at one time, it’s tough.

Under these circumstances, I find it likely that Graham would
respond to Lago’s somewhat flippant remark in the manner
attributed to him by Lago and, accordingly, I find Lago’s testi-
mony to be credible and more trustworthy than Graham’s
equivocal answers.
I find that the meeting concerned the Union’s organizing ef-
forts at other terminals, that Lago was a known union sympa-
thizer and that he had made a remark about walking a picket
line. As noted above, I have also found that Graham responded
with a remark that Lago’s needed to be concerned with his
future with the Respondent because it was “real iffy,” I find
that such a remark, by the principal management official at the
terminal, clearly, supports a conclusion that an employee would
reasonably believe that Graham was threatening adverse em-
ployment prospects for engaging in union activity. Accord-
ingly, I conclude that Graham’s remark reasonably tends to
restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ rights guaranteed
under the Act and I find that the Respondent’s action was
unlawful and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as al-
leged.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an Employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By enforcing an unwritten lunchbreak rule on a city
driver, by promulgating and posting a written rule requiring the
lunchbreak to be between the 4th and 6th hour, and by impli-
edly threatening an employee with discharge because of his
union sympathies, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has en-
gaged in unfair practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it necessary to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, this action
shall include repudiation of its illegally promulgated policy in a
manner consistent with the Board’s decision in Passavant Me-
morial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138, (1978), and cases cited
therein.
Because of the nature of the violations it is unnecessary that
a broad order be issued, see Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]