ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

14535756 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/535,756 11/07/2014 Lawrence NELSON ORA141021 (O-338) 9279
51444 7590 05/11/2020
Kraguljac Law Group/Oracle
4700 Rockside Road
Summit One, Suite 510
Independence, OH 44131
EXAMINER
SEVEN, EVREN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2812
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DDay@KragLaw.com
MPusti@KragLaw.com
PTOMail@KragLaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LAWRENCE NELSON,
TIMOTHY MCAULIFFE, and
DAVID SISKA
____________

Appeal 2019-003073
Application 14/535,756
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.

PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Oracle International Corporation as
the real party in interest. Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Sept. 14, 2018,
2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
A. Background
The invention is directed to systems and methods “that provide
synchronization (syncing) or reconciliation of two types (two channels) of
consumption data (e.g., measurements) derived from a same consumption
meter (e.g., a ‘smart’ meter).” Spec. ¶ 12. The Specification discloses that a
consumption meter measures usage of a resource (e.g., electricity, natural
gas, or water) by a customer of a utility. Id. ¶ 1. Typical consumption
meters have two channels of consumption data (e.g., interval consumption
data and register consumption data). Id. According to the Specification, the
two sources of consumption data can create problems for a utility because a
consumer may complain if the two types of consumption data are too
different, which increases consumer support costs and possibly causes
regulatory issues. Id. In view of this, the Specification discloses a process
in which it is determined whether two types of consumption data are
unsynchronized and, if so, the two types of consumption data are
synchronized. Id. ¶¶ 40–42.
Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal
Brief, is illustrative.
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
establishing, by a processor of a computing device, a first
communication channel over a network connection between the
computing device and a consumption meter that collects
consumption data associated with a location consuming a

2 Our Decision also refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed Nov. 7, 2014,
the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) dated Apr. 4, 2018, the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) dated Jan. 8, 2019, and the Reply Brief
(“Reply Br.”) filed Mar. 8, 2019.
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resource, wherein the first communication channel is used for
receiving from the consumption meter transmissions of register
consumption data corresponding to a singular scalar reading of
consumption of the resource by the location over a determined
period of time;
establishing, by the processor, a second communication
channel over the network connection between the computing
device and the consumption meter, wherein the second
communication channel is used for receiving transmissions
from the consumption meter of interval consumption data
corresponding to multiple readings of consumption of the
resource by the location over multiple time intervals;
receiving, over the first communication channel by the
processor, the register consumption data;
receiving, over the second communication channel by the
processor, the interval consumption data;
calculating, by the processor, a difference between a total
consumption value of the register consumption data and a total
consumption value of the interval consumption data over a
period of time;
determining, by the processor, that the register
consumption data and the interval consumption data are
unsynchronized with each other based upon the difference
exceeding a determined threshold;
synchronizing, by the processor, the register consumption
data with the interval consumption data when the determining
indicates that the register consumption data and the interval
consumption data are unsynchronized with each other, wherein
the synchronizing comprises adjusting at least one of the
register consumption data or the interval consumption data so
that the total consumption value of the register consumption
data matches the total consumption value of the interval
consumption data over the period of time; and
outputting, by the processor, the register consumption
data and interval consumption data after the synchronization to
at least one data structure.
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Independent claim 11 recites “[a] computing system, comprising,”
among other things, a processor connected to memory and a module stored
on a non-transitory computer readable medium and configured with
instructions that, when executed, cause the processor to perform functions
similar to the method of claim 1. Appeal Br. 29–30 (Claims App.).
Independent claim 16 recites “[a] non-transitory computer-readable medium
storing computer-executable instructions that are part of an algorithm that,
when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform a method”
having steps similar to those of claim 1’s method. Id. at 32–34.Each
remaining claim on appeal depends from claim 1, 11, or 16.
B. The Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lacking
patent eligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–4.

OPINION
After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and
each of Appellant’s contentions, Appellant does not identify reversible error
with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20. Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In
re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the
Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the
examiner’s rejections.”)). We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of those
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claims for the reasons expressed in the Final Action, the Answer, and
explained below.
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, our
inquiry focuses on the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and
Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts the Court has determined are abstract ideas and, thus, patent
ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices (e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20);
mathematical formulas (e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978));
and mental processes (e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
Concepts the Court has determined are patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr,
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450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth,
vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does
not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
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implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are,
as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the
guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 We perform this evaluation by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance — Section III(A)(2),
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
C. Analysis
We now apply the 2019 Revised Guidance to the claims. Appellant
presents arguments for claims 1 and 2. Appeal Br. 10–23. Therefore, we
address claims 1 and 3–20 as a first group and claim 2 as a second group.
Claims 3–20 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 1
1. Step 2A, Prong One — The Judicial Exception
Under Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance and the
October 2019 Update, we first look to whether claim 1 recites a judicial
exception, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
The Examiner concludes that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Specifically, the Examiner determines limitations of claim 1 are directed to
the abstract ideas of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data as well as
collecting information, analyzing the information, and displaying certain
results. Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner also determines that claim 1’s
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“calculating . . . a difference” step is directed to “mathematical analysis.”
Ans. 4–5.
Appellant argues claim 1 does not reasonably correlate to any of the
abstract idea groups set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance. Reply Br. 4–5.
As Appellant acknowledges (Reply Br. 2), the 2019 Revised Guidance was
issued after the Final Office Action and one day before the Examiner’s
Answer was mailed. As a result, the rejection does not explicitly address the
three categories of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
However, the Examiner identifies the abstract idea claimed as “gathering
and manipulating data and displaying certain results” together with citations
to Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 4; Ans. 3. These citations undergird
the mental processes category in the October 2019 Update and establish that
the Examiner rejects claim 1 on the basis that it is directed to mental
processes. October 2019 Update, 7. Moreover, Appellant acknowledges
this abstract category by arguing (Reply Br. 5) the claimed process cannot be
performed in the mind. In addition, the Examiner characterizes the
“calculating” step as a “mathematical” operation. Ans. 5.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites abstract ideas,
namely mental processes and a mathematical concept. For example, claim 1
recites the following mental process steps: “receiving . . . register
consumption data”; “receiving . . . interval consumption data”; “determining
. . . that the register consumption data and the interval consumption data are
unsynchronized with each other”; “synchronizing . . . the register
consumption data with the interval consumption data . . . so that the total
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consumption value of the register consumption data matches the total
consumption value of the interval consumption data”; and “outputting . . .
the register consumption data and interval consumption data after the
synchronization.” Appeal Br. 25–26 (Claims App.). As the Examiner
indicates, the “receiving” limitations are directed to collecting information,
the “determining” and “synchronizing” limitations are directed to analyzing
the information, and the “outputting” limitation is directed to displaying
results of the collection and analysis.
We also agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4–5) that the “calculating”
limitation of claim 1 is directed to a mathematical concept because this
limitation is directed to a mathematical function (i.e., the mathematical
calculation of a difference between two sets of data over a period of time).
See October 2019 Update, 4.
Appellant asserts that the Examiner’s analysis is conclusory and lacks
legal precedent. Appeal Br. 12–13. This argument is unpersuasive because
the case law the Examiner cites illustrates that certain limitations of claim 1
are directed to abstract ideas, for the reasons discussed above.
Appellant also argues the limitations of claim 1 cannot be performed
in the human mind because the human mind cannot be connected to a
network, cannot establish channels over a network, and cannot synchronize
data in a data structure. Reply Br. 5. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Although claim 1 recites receiving two types of consumption data over first
and second communication channels of a network connection, these
operations nevertheless regard the abstract process of collecting
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information.5 Moreover, in this case, a person is able to perform practically,
in his or her mind, the receipt of two data types by, for example, visually
observing the data. A person is also able to practically determine a
difference between the two data types, including a visual comparison of a
difference to a determined threshold. See Spec. ¶ 40 (Describing one
embodiment of logic configured to determine unsynchronized consumption
data as a calculated difference being greater than a determined threshold
between total consumption value of the primary consumption data and a
total consumption value of the secondary consumption data, over a same
period of time). We note that claim 1’s “determining” step does not require
a specific threshold or difference so any difference between the two types of
data meets the claimed step. Further, a person is able to practically
synchronize two differing types of data by simply making one type of data
match the other as claim 1 recites. See id. ¶ 42. In other words, one can
simply replace one set of data with the other to provide two perfectly
matched and synchronized data sets. The “outputting” limitation is abstract
as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. SAP America, Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (merely presenting the
results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without
more, is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis).

5 The Federal Circuit has recognized “that defining the precise abstract idea
of patent claims in many cases is far from a ‘straightforward’ exercise.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In view of this, the Federal Circuit has defined the
“basic thrust” of a claim, something that is wholly consistent with the
description of an invention, to determine the particular abstract idea or ideas
to which the claim may be directed. Id. at 1150–51.
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Appellant contends the Examiner erred in identifying the abstract idea
and the Examiner merely separated physical structure from what the
Examiner believes is not physical structure. Appeal Br. 11–14. Appellant’s
argument is not persuasive. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the
claim recites any judicial exception or abstract idea, which claim 1 does for
the reasons we explain above. In Step 2A, Prong Two, we look to whether
the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application and
whether the claim provides an inventive concept sufficient to transform the
judicial exception into patent eligible subject matter, which we analyze
below. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
In view of the foregoing, claim 1 reasonably involves mental
processes, including evaluation and judgment, and a mathematical concept.
The 2019 Revised Guidance expressly recognizes mental processes and
mathematical concepts as constituting abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Accordingly, the “receiving,” “calculating,” “determining,”
“synchronizing,” and “outputting” limitations of claim 1 recite judicial
exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter under Step 2A, Prong One.
2. Step 2A, Prong Two — Integration into a Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance and the
October 2019 Update, we consider whether claim 1 as a whole integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The October
2019 Update explains that “[a]n important consideration to evaluate when
determining whether the claim as a whole integrates a judicial exception into
a practical application is whether the claimed invention improves the
functioning of a computer or other technology.” October 2019 Update, 12.
Here, Appellant contends the claimed invention amounts to something
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significantly more than an abstract idea under the Alice and Mayo
framework because the claimed invention provides an improvement.
Appeal Br. 13–16, 20–21; Reply Br. 5–9. Specifically, Appellant argues the
claimed invention “improves an existing technological process of
maintaining accurate data from acquiring and processing consumption data
from consumption meters by implementing a novel data synchronization
technique.” Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Appellant explains that the
invention provides an improvement by calculating a difference between two
types of consumption data and, if the difference exceeds a threshold,
synchronizing the two types of data by adjusting at least one of them so their
total consumption values match over a period of time. Id. at 14–15 (citing
Spec. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18). This argument relies upon the abstract ideas to which
claim 1’s “calculating,” “determining,” and “synchronizing” limitations are
directed. However, “a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC
v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Further, to the extent Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to eligible
subject matter because the invention is “novel” (Appeal Br. 14), this
argument is also unpersuasive. “The question . . . of whether a particular
invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a
category of statutory subject matter.’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis omitted)); see also Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)
(“[G]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
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satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (A novel and non-obvious
claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible.);
Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from
demonstrating § 102 novelty.”).
Appellant cites Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) in support of the claimed invention providing an improvement in
technology. Appeal Br. 13–14. In Enfish, the claims at issue were not
directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of Alice because they were
found to be “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers
operate, embodied in the self-referential table.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336
(emphasis added). As the Examiner explains, whereas Enfish regarded the
improved operation of a computer, claim 1 merely uses computer processors
to perform calculations. Ans. 5. Appellant does not adequately explain how
claim 1’s method improves the operation of a computer apart from
performing calculations. As discussed above, the asserted improvement
derives from the judicial exceptions to which claim 1 is directed.
In addition to the “receiving,” “calculating,” “determining,”
“synchronizing,” and “outputting” limitations, claim 1 also recites the
“establishing” limitations for establishing first and second communication
channels over a network connection via a processor for receiving the two
types of consumption data. These “establishing” limitations do not integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application because they merely define
communication channels related to the data gathering steps. Insignificant
data gathering steps “add nothing of practical significance to [an] underlying
abstract idea.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.
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Cir. 2014).
In consideration of the above analysis and claim 1 as a whole,
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive that claim 1 integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application in a way that “imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, claim 1 is directed to abstract
ideas.
3. Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Because claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas, we evaluate the
additional elements of the claim, individually and in combination, to
determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept.
As an initial matter for the inventive concept analysis, Appellant
argues that the claim must be considered as a whole and all elements of the
claim must be considered for the analysis of an inventive step. Appeal Br.
16–18; Reply Br. 10–13. This is incorrect because it is the additional
elements of a claim that are analyzed, individually and as an ordered
combination, to determine whether the additional elements amount to
significantly more than the exception itself. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56 (“if a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial
exception” the Office then “evaluate[s] the additional elements individually
and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an
inventive concept”).
Appellant contends claim 1 contains an inventive concept because the
combination of claim limitations is not well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Appeal Br. 18–22; Reply Br. 9–14. Appellant also argues
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that whether an element is well-known, routine, and conventional is a
question of fact and the Examiner has not met the burden of establishing that
the combination of elements is well-known, routine, and conventional.
Appeal Br. 20–22. Appellant, however, refers to limitations that are directed
to judicial exceptions when making this argument. See Appeal Br. 18, 21–
22; Reply Br. 12–13. As a result, the arguments do not reflect a correct
analysis of whether the additional elements provide an inventive concept
under the 2019 Revised Guidance and, therefore, are unpersuasive.
Regardless, we consider whether the additional elements of claim 1,
considered individually and as an ordered combination, provide an inventive
concept.
The Examiner concludes, and we agree, that the claims do not contain
any additional elements, individually or in combination, that amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds
that claim 1 includes the additional elements of a processor, a computing
device, and first and second communication channels over a network
connection between the computing device and a consumption meter. Id. at
3–4. These claim limitations, which essentially establish first and second
communication channels via the processor relate to routine data gathering of
the two types of consumption data. Routine data-gathering steps are
“insufficient . . . to constitute an inventive concept.” Solutran, Inc. v.
Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In
addition, the Specification describes the first and second communication
channels as conventional structures. Spec. ¶ 1; Final Act. 4. Thus,
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has not met a factual burden fails to
address the Examiner’s findings regarding these additional elements.
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Appellant makes a general argument that there is no express statement
in the Specification or a statement made during prosecution demonstrating
that the claimed combination of elements (including those directed to
judicial exceptions) are well-understood, routine, and conventional, but this
does not address the additional limitations the Examiner addresses or the
Examiner’s specific finding regarding the Specification’s disclosure. Reply
Br. 13. In addition, Appellant’s general assertions that limitations of claim
1, including those directed to judicial exceptions, are not well-understood,
routine, and conventional do not identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s
finding or conclusion.
With regard to the processor of claim 1, the Examiner finds this is an
“off-the-shelf, generic computing device.” Final Act. 4 (citing Electric
Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1350). Further, the Supreme Court has held “the
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. We
agree that claim 1 recites the processor with a high level of generality that
appears to be no more than a conventional processor of a computing device.
The Specification does not indicate that the processors contemplated for
Appellant’s invention are anything other than generic processors performing
generic functions. Spec. ¶¶ 68, 72, 75. Thus, the additional elements of
claim 1 do not indicate an inventive concept when evaluated individually.
The additional elements of claim 1 also do not indicate an inventive
concept when considered as an ordered combination. Nor does Appellant
explain that the additional elements are arranged in an unconventional
manner or that they operate in an unconventional manner, such as to achieve
an improvement. As a result, the additional elements of claim 1,
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individually and in combination, fail to provide an inventive concept such
that the claims recite “significantly more” than an abstract idea.
Overall, claim 1 appears to merely apply the abstract ideas with
generic structures, including a generic computer, which is of the sort the
Supreme Court determined to be patent-ineligible in Alice:
Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible
application requires “more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract
idea] while adding the words ‘apply it.’”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting 566 U.S. at 72). Stated differently, “merely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Therefore, on the record
before us, we are not persuaded that the additional elements of claim 1
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, such as by
indicating an inventive concept.
In summary, we have carefully considered Appellant’s arguments but
are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1
and 3–20.
Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites:
The computer-implemented method of claim 1,
comprising:
receiving the register consumption data and the interval
consumption data out-of-order over the first communication
channel and the second communication channel;
in response to the register consumption data being
received and a portion of the interval consumption data being
received, utilizing the register consumption data to fill gaps in
the interval consumption data to create adjusted interval
consumption data, wherein the gaps correspond to portions of
the interval consumption data not yet received due to the out-of-
Appeal 2019-003073
Application 14/535,756

19
order receipt of the register consumption data and the interval
consumption data over the first communication channel and the
second communication channel; and
synchronizing the register consumption data with the
adjusted interval consumption data.
Appeal Br. 26–27 (Claims App.).
Appellant asserts that claim 2 is a combination of elements that is not
well-understood, routine, and conventional, the Examiner provides no
analysis for claim 2, and claim 2 integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application by filling in data gaps and providing the improvement
argued above by Appellant. Appeal Br. 22–23; Reply Br. 9, 15.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Examiner correctly
concludes that claim 2 regards additional steps pertaining to the identified
judicial exceptions. Final Act. 4; Ans. 7. Claim 2’s “receiving” limitation
regards routine data gathering of the two types of consumption data, albeit as
“out-of-order” data. The “in response to” and “synchronizing” limitations
regard analyzing and processing the data. Therefore, to the extent claim 2
provides an improvement, it is due to the judicial exceptions to which claim
2 is directed. Further, claim 2 contains no additional elements beyond the
judicial exceptions to analyze under the inventive concept step of the 2019
Revised Guidance. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive that
claim 2’s limitations, individually or as an ordered combination, amount to
significantly more than the judicial exceptions.
For these reasons and those the Examiner provides, we uphold the
Examiner’s rejection of 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent
eligible subject matter.

Appeal 2019-003073
Application 14/535,756

20
DECISION
Upon consideration of the record, and for the reasons given above, in
the Final Office Action, and in the Examiner’s Answer, the decision of the
Examiner rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent
eligible subject matter is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20

AFFIRMED