ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 11, 20202019003073 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/535,756 11/07/2014 Lawrence NELSON ORA141021 (O-338) 9279 51444 7590 05/11/2020 Kraguljac Law Group/Oracle 4700 Rockside Road Summit One, Suite 510 Independence, OH 44131 EXAMINER SEVEN, EVREN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2812 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): DDay@KragLaw.com MPusti@KragLaw.com PTOMail@KragLaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte LAWRENCE NELSON, TIMOTHY MCAULIFFE, and DAVID SISKA ____________ Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, and JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Oracle International Corporation as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Sept. 14, 2018, 2. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 A. Background The invention is directed to systems and methods “that provide synchronization (syncing) or reconciliation of two types (two channels) of consumption data (e.g., measurements) derived from a same consumption meter (e.g., a ‘smart’ meter).” Spec. ¶ 12. The Specification discloses that a consumption meter measures usage of a resource (e.g., electricity, natural gas, or water) by a customer of a utility. Id. ¶ 1. Typical consumption meters have two channels of consumption data (e.g., interval consumption data and register consumption data). Id. According to the Specification, the two sources of consumption data can create problems for a utility because a consumer may complain if the two types of consumption data are too different, which increases consumer support costs and possibly causes regulatory issues. Id. In view of this, the Specification discloses a process in which it is determined whether two types of consumption data are unsynchronized and, if so, the two types of consumption data are synchronized. Id. ¶¶ 40–42. Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief, is illustrative. 1. A computer-implemented method comprising: establishing, by a processor of a computing device, a first communication channel over a network connection between the computing device and a consumption meter that collects consumption data associated with a location consuming a 2 Our Decision also refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed Nov. 7, 2014, the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) dated Apr. 4, 2018, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) dated Jan. 8, 2019, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed Mar. 8, 2019. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 3 resource, wherein the first communication channel is used for receiving from the consumption meter transmissions of register consumption data corresponding to a singular scalar reading of consumption of the resource by the location over a determined period of time; establishing, by the processor, a second communication channel over the network connection between the computing device and the consumption meter, wherein the second communication channel is used for receiving transmissions from the consumption meter of interval consumption data corresponding to multiple readings of consumption of the resource by the location over multiple time intervals; receiving, over the first communication channel by the processor, the register consumption data; receiving, over the second communication channel by the processor, the interval consumption data; calculating, by the processor, a difference between a total consumption value of the register consumption data and a total consumption value of the interval consumption data over a period of time; determining, by the processor, that the register consumption data and the interval consumption data are unsynchronized with each other based upon the difference exceeding a determined threshold; synchronizing, by the processor, the register consumption data with the interval consumption data when the determining indicates that the register consumption data and the interval consumption data are unsynchronized with each other, wherein the synchronizing comprises adjusting at least one of the register consumption data or the interval consumption data so that the total consumption value of the register consumption data matches the total consumption value of the interval consumption data over the period of time; and outputting, by the processor, the register consumption data and interval consumption data after the synchronization to at least one data structure. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 4 Independent claim 11 recites “[a] computing system, comprising,” among other things, a processor connected to memory and a module stored on a non-transitory computer readable medium and configured with instructions that, when executed, cause the processor to perform functions similar to the method of claim 1. Appeal Br. 29–30 (Claims App.). Independent claim 16 recites “[a] non-transitory computer-readable medium storing computer-executable instructions that are part of an algorithm that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform a method” having steps similar to those of claim 1’s method. Id. at 32–34.Each remaining claim on appeal depends from claim 1, 11, or 16. B. The Rejection The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lacking patent eligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–4. OPINION After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s contentions, Appellant does not identify reversible error with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”)). We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of those Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 5 claims for the reasons expressed in the Final Action, the Answer, and explained below. A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, our inquiry focuses on the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts the Court has determined are abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20); mathematical formulas (e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts the Court has determined are patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 6 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 7 implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 4 We perform this evaluation by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 8 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. C. Analysis We now apply the 2019 Revised Guidance to the claims. Appellant presents arguments for claims 1 and 2. Appeal Br. 10–23. Therefore, we address claims 1 and 3–20 as a first group and claim 2 as a second group. Claims 3–20 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 1 1. Step 2A, Prong One — The Judicial Exception Under Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54. The Examiner concludes that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Specifically, the Examiner determines limitations of claim 1 are directed to the abstract ideas of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data as well as collecting information, analyzing the information, and displaying certain results. Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner also determines that claim 1’s Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 9 “calculating . . . a difference” step is directed to “mathematical analysis.” Ans. 4–5. Appellant argues claim 1 does not reasonably correlate to any of the abstract idea groups set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance. Reply Br. 4–5. As Appellant acknowledges (Reply Br. 2), the 2019 Revised Guidance was issued after the Final Office Action and one day before the Examiner’s Answer was mailed. As a result, the rejection does not explicitly address the three categories of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance. However, the Examiner identifies the abstract idea claimed as “gathering and manipulating data and displaying certain results” together with citations to Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 4; Ans. 3. These citations undergird the mental processes category in the October 2019 Update and establish that the Examiner rejects claim 1 on the basis that it is directed to mental processes. October 2019 Update, 7. Moreover, Appellant acknowledges this abstract category by arguing (Reply Br. 5) the claimed process cannot be performed in the mind. In addition, the Examiner characterizes the “calculating” step as a “mathematical” operation. Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, namely mental processes and a mathematical concept. For example, claim 1 recites the following mental process steps: “receiving . . . register consumption data”; “receiving . . . interval consumption data”; “determining . . . that the register consumption data and the interval consumption data are unsynchronized with each other”; “synchronizing . . . the register consumption data with the interval consumption data . . . so that the total Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 10 consumption value of the register consumption data matches the total consumption value of the interval consumption data”; and “outputting . . . the register consumption data and interval consumption data after the synchronization.” Appeal Br. 25–26 (Claims App.). As the Examiner indicates, the “receiving” limitations are directed to collecting information, the “determining” and “synchronizing” limitations are directed to analyzing the information, and the “outputting” limitation is directed to displaying results of the collection and analysis. We also agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4–5) that the “calculating” limitation of claim 1 is directed to a mathematical concept because this limitation is directed to a mathematical function (i.e., the mathematical calculation of a difference between two sets of data over a period of time). See October 2019 Update, 4. Appellant asserts that the Examiner’s analysis is conclusory and lacks legal precedent. Appeal Br. 12–13. This argument is unpersuasive because the case law the Examiner cites illustrates that certain limitations of claim 1 are directed to abstract ideas, for the reasons discussed above. Appellant also argues the limitations of claim 1 cannot be performed in the human mind because the human mind cannot be connected to a network, cannot establish channels over a network, and cannot synchronize data in a data structure. Reply Br. 5. These arguments are unpersuasive. Although claim 1 recites receiving two types of consumption data over first and second communication channels of a network connection, these operations nevertheless regard the abstract process of collecting Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 11 information.5 Moreover, in this case, a person is able to perform practically, in his or her mind, the receipt of two data types by, for example, visually observing the data. A person is also able to practically determine a difference between the two data types, including a visual comparison of a difference to a determined threshold. See Spec. ¶ 40 (Describing one embodiment of logic configured to determine unsynchronized consumption data as a calculated difference being greater than a determined threshold between total consumption value of the primary consumption data and a total consumption value of the secondary consumption data, over a same period of time). We note that claim 1’s “determining” step does not require a specific threshold or difference so any difference between the two types of data meets the claimed step. Further, a person is able to practically synchronize two differing types of data by simply making one type of data match the other as claim 1 recites. See id. ¶ 42. In other words, one can simply replace one set of data with the other to provide two perfectly matched and synchronized data sets. The “outputting” limitation is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more, is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis). 5 The Federal Circuit has recognized “that defining the precise abstract idea of patent claims in many cases is far from a ‘straightforward’ exercise.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In view of this, the Federal Circuit has defined the “basic thrust” of a claim, something that is wholly consistent with the description of an invention, to determine the particular abstract idea or ideas to which the claim may be directed. Id. at 1150–51. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 12 Appellant contends the Examiner erred in identifying the abstract idea and the Examiner merely separated physical structure from what the Examiner believes is not physical structure. Appeal Br. 11–14. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites any judicial exception or abstract idea, which claim 1 does for the reasons we explain above. In Step 2A, Prong Two, we look to whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application and whether the claim provides an inventive concept sufficient to transform the judicial exception into patent eligible subject matter, which we analyze below. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56. In view of the foregoing, claim 1 reasonably involves mental processes, including evaluation and judgment, and a mathematical concept. The 2019 Revised Guidance expressly recognizes mental processes and mathematical concepts as constituting abstract ideas. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, the “receiving,” “calculating,” “determining,” “synchronizing,” and “outputting” limitations of claim 1 recite judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter under Step 2A, Prong One. 2. Step 2A, Prong Two — Integration into a Practical Application Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we consider whether claim 1 as a whole integrates the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The October 2019 Update explains that “[a]n important consideration to evaluate when determining whether the claim as a whole integrates a judicial exception into a practical application is whether the claimed invention improves the functioning of a computer or other technology.” October 2019 Update, 12. Here, Appellant contends the claimed invention amounts to something Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 13 significantly more than an abstract idea under the Alice and Mayo framework because the claimed invention provides an improvement. Appeal Br. 13–16, 20–21; Reply Br. 5–9. Specifically, Appellant argues the claimed invention “improves an existing technological process of maintaining accurate data from acquiring and processing consumption data from consumption meters by implementing a novel data synchronization technique.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Appellant explains that the invention provides an improvement by calculating a difference between two types of consumption data and, if the difference exceeds a threshold, synchronizing the two types of data by adjusting at least one of them so their total consumption values match over a period of time. Id. at 14–15 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18). This argument relies upon the abstract ideas to which claim 1’s “calculating,” “determining,” and “synchronizing” limitations are directed. However, “a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Further, to the extent Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to eligible subject matter because the invention is “novel” (Appeal Br. 14), this argument is also unpersuasive. “The question . . . of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis omitted)); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013) (“[G]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 14 satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible.); Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.”). Appellant cites Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) in support of the claimed invention providing an improvement in technology. Appeal Br. 13–14. In Enfish, the claims at issue were not directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of Alice because they were found to be “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (emphasis added). As the Examiner explains, whereas Enfish regarded the improved operation of a computer, claim 1 merely uses computer processors to perform calculations. Ans. 5. Appellant does not adequately explain how claim 1’s method improves the operation of a computer apart from performing calculations. As discussed above, the asserted improvement derives from the judicial exceptions to which claim 1 is directed. In addition to the “receiving,” “calculating,” “determining,” “synchronizing,” and “outputting” limitations, claim 1 also recites the “establishing” limitations for establishing first and second communication channels over a network connection via a processor for receiving the two types of consumption data. These “establishing” limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because they merely define communication channels related to the data gathering steps. Insignificant data gathering steps “add nothing of practical significance to [an] underlying abstract idea.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 15 Cir. 2014). In consideration of the above analysis and claim 1 as a whole, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive that claim 1 integrates the judicial exception into a practical application in a way that “imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas. 3. Step 2B — Inventive Concept Because claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas, we evaluate the additional elements of the claim, individually and in combination, to determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept. As an initial matter for the inventive concept analysis, Appellant argues that the claim must be considered as a whole and all elements of the claim must be considered for the analysis of an inventive step. Appeal Br. 16–18; Reply Br. 10–13. This is incorrect because it is the additional elements of a claim that are analyzed, individually and as an ordered combination, to determine whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (“if a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial exception” the Office then “evaluate[s] the additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive concept”). Appellant contends claim 1 contains an inventive concept because the combination of claim limitations is not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 18–22; Reply Br. 9–14. Appellant also argues Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 16 that whether an element is well-known, routine, and conventional is a question of fact and the Examiner has not met the burden of establishing that the combination of elements is well-known, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 20–22. Appellant, however, refers to limitations that are directed to judicial exceptions when making this argument. See Appeal Br. 18, 21– 22; Reply Br. 12–13. As a result, the arguments do not reflect a correct analysis of whether the additional elements provide an inventive concept under the 2019 Revised Guidance and, therefore, are unpersuasive. Regardless, we consider whether the additional elements of claim 1, considered individually and as an ordered combination, provide an inventive concept. The Examiner concludes, and we agree, that the claims do not contain any additional elements, individually or in combination, that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds that claim 1 includes the additional elements of a processor, a computing device, and first and second communication channels over a network connection between the computing device and a consumption meter. Id. at 3–4. These claim limitations, which essentially establish first and second communication channels via the processor relate to routine data gathering of the two types of consumption data. Routine data-gathering steps are “insufficient . . . to constitute an inventive concept.” Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In addition, the Specification describes the first and second communication channels as conventional structures. Spec. ¶ 1; Final Act. 4. Thus, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has not met a factual burden fails to address the Examiner’s findings regarding these additional elements. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 17 Appellant makes a general argument that there is no express statement in the Specification or a statement made during prosecution demonstrating that the claimed combination of elements (including those directed to judicial exceptions) are well-understood, routine, and conventional, but this does not address the additional limitations the Examiner addresses or the Examiner’s specific finding regarding the Specification’s disclosure. Reply Br. 13. In addition, Appellant’s general assertions that limitations of claim 1, including those directed to judicial exceptions, are not well-understood, routine, and conventional do not identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s finding or conclusion. With regard to the processor of claim 1, the Examiner finds this is an “off-the-shelf, generic computing device.” Final Act. 4 (citing Electric Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1350). Further, the Supreme Court has held “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. We agree that claim 1 recites the processor with a high level of generality that appears to be no more than a conventional processor of a computing device. The Specification does not indicate that the processors contemplated for Appellant’s invention are anything other than generic processors performing generic functions. Spec. ¶¶ 68, 72, 75. Thus, the additional elements of claim 1 do not indicate an inventive concept when evaluated individually. The additional elements of claim 1 also do not indicate an inventive concept when considered as an ordered combination. Nor does Appellant explain that the additional elements are arranged in an unconventional manner or that they operate in an unconventional manner, such as to achieve an improvement. As a result, the additional elements of claim 1, Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 18 individually and in combination, fail to provide an inventive concept such that the claims recite “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Overall, claim 1 appears to merely apply the abstract ideas with generic structures, including a generic computer, which is of the sort the Supreme Court determined to be patent-ineligible in Alice: Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application requires “more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting 566 U.S. at 72). Stated differently, “merely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Therefore, on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the additional elements of claim 1 amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, such as by indicating an inventive concept. In summary, we have carefully considered Appellant’s arguments but are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3–20. Claim 2 Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites: The computer-implemented method of claim 1, comprising: receiving the register consumption data and the interval consumption data out-of-order over the first communication channel and the second communication channel; in response to the register consumption data being received and a portion of the interval consumption data being received, utilizing the register consumption data to fill gaps in the interval consumption data to create adjusted interval consumption data, wherein the gaps correspond to portions of the interval consumption data not yet received due to the out-of- Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 19 order receipt of the register consumption data and the interval consumption data over the first communication channel and the second communication channel; and synchronizing the register consumption data with the adjusted interval consumption data. Appeal Br. 26–27 (Claims App.). Appellant asserts that claim 2 is a combination of elements that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional, the Examiner provides no analysis for claim 2, and claim 2 integrates the judicial exception into a practical application by filling in data gaps and providing the improvement argued above by Appellant. Appeal Br. 22–23; Reply Br. 9, 15. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Examiner correctly concludes that claim 2 regards additional steps pertaining to the identified judicial exceptions. Final Act. 4; Ans. 7. Claim 2’s “receiving” limitation regards routine data gathering of the two types of consumption data, albeit as “out-of-order” data. The “in response to” and “synchronizing” limitations regard analyzing and processing the data. Therefore, to the extent claim 2 provides an improvement, it is due to the judicial exceptions to which claim 2 is directed. Further, claim 2 contains no additional elements beyond the judicial exceptions to analyze under the inventive concept step of the 2019 Revised Guidance. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive that claim 2’s limitations, individually or as an ordered combination, amount to significantly more than the judicial exceptions. For these reasons and those the Examiner provides, we uphold the Examiner’s rejection of 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent eligible subject matter. Appeal 2019-003073 Application 14/535,756 20 DECISION Upon consideration of the record, and for the reasons given above, in the Final Office Action, and in the Examiner’s Answer, the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent eligible subject matter is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation