Opp Textiles, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 14, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 201 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

OPP TEXTILES, INC. 201
Opp Textiles , Inc., and Covington Industries, Inc.
and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-2895
November 14, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On August 1, 1967, Trial Examiner Max Rosen-
berg issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondents had engaged
in and were engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that Respondents had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended the dismissal of such
allegations. Thereafter, Respondents filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and
answer of Opp Textiles, Inc., and Covington Industries,
Inc., herein called the Respondents .' At issue is whether
Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended , by discharging
Christine M. Bowden and Emma Jean Brown because of
their activities on behalf of Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and
whether Respondents independently violated Section
8(a)(1) by certain other acts and conduct to be detailed
hereinafter . At the conclusion of the hearing , the parties
waived oral argument . Briefs have been received from the
General Counsel and Respondents , which have been duly
considered.
Upon consideration of the entire record in this
proceeding , including the briefs of the parties , and upon
my observation of the witnesses as they testified on the
stand, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS
Respondent Opp Textiles, Inc., and Respondent
Covington Industries, Inc , are commonly owned enter-
prises which, at all times material herein, were engaged in
the manufacture and sale of wearing apparel at a plant
located in Opp, Alabama. During the annual period
material to this proceeding, Respondents manufactured,
sold, and shipped products from its Opp plant directly to
customers located outside the State of Alabama valued in
excess of $50,000. I find that Respondents, individually
and collectively, are, and have been at all material times,
employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is undisputed and I find that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that Respondents, Opp Textiles, Inc., and
Covington Industries, Inc., Opp, Alabama, their of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order.'
Delete from paragraph 2(d) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order that part thereof which reads "to be furnished" and substitute
therefor "on forms provided
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAx ROSENBERG, Trial Examiner: This matter, with
all parties represented, was heard at Opp, Alabama, on
February 15 and 16, 1967, on complaint of the General
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel contends that Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by terminating the em-
ployment of Christine M. Bowden on June 20, 1966,2 and
by separating Emma Jean Brown from her employ on July
1, because they joined and assisted the Union in its or-
ganizational campaign at the Opp plant. He further con-
tends that Respondents engaged in various acts of inter-
rogation, intimidation, and surveillance designed to in-
hibit the right of their employees to engage in protected,
concerted activities, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
Respondents assert that Bowden was discharged because
she violated a lawfullno-solicitation rule which Respond-
ents had promulgated,, and that Brown was terminated
for using profanity. Finally, Respondents deny that they,
in any manner, interfered with, restrained, or coerced
their employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in the
Act.
The complaint, which issued on November 25, 1966, is based upon
charges filed on August 11, 1966, and served on August 12, 1966
At the hearing, I granted the General Counsel's unopposed motion to
delete paragraph I I of the complaint which pertained to certain alleged
statutory misconduct by a Myrtle Johnson
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates fall in 1966
168 NLRB No. 33
202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents manufacture wearing apparel with a work
complement of 650 employees. On May 2, the Union un-
dertook a campaign to organize their employees when In-
ternational Representative Jack Dameron visited Opp at
the invitation of certain employees who expressed a
desire for collective representation.3 Following his intial
contact, Dameron increased the tempo of the campaign
and conducted union meetings on May 19 and 31 at
which authorization cards were distributed to the em-
ployees in attendance.4 Thereafter, approximately eight
additional meetings were held, i the last of which took
place on July 21. These union endeavors were not foreign
to Respondents ' ken. Indeed , Respondents ' general
manager, Henry Roberts, testified that he received daily
reports from 10 to 30 employees concerning the union
meetings when these activities "got really strong," and
obtained the names of employees who were in, atten-
dance.5
Christine Bowden was employed by Respondents for
8 years prior to her discharge on June 20, and was admit-
tedly a good worker. In the course of her duties, she at-
tached collars to shirts and worked under the supervision
of Tess Morgan. Bowden testified that she attended the
union meeting on May 31 where she signed a union card.
Thereafter, Bowden sucessfully solicited the signatures
of three fellow employees, campaigned for the Union be-
fore and after working hours and during lunch breaks,
aand continued to attend union meetings . Bowden further
testified that, on the morning of June 2, General Manager
Roberts approached her work station and handed Bow-
den a notice containing the Respondents ' no-solicitation
rule, which was also posted in the plant on that day. This
notice read: "We are again posting for your information
an important company rule concerning union or any other
outside organizing activity during working hours. The
company rule is and always has been that no employee
will be allowed to engage in union organizing activity dur-
ing his or her working hours. Any employee who does so
and thereby interferes with his or her own work or the
work of any other employee during that employee's work
time will be subject to immediate discharge."6 According
to Bowden's undisputed testimony, Roberts remarked
that "I think you need this" when he proffered the notice
to her. Later that afternoon, Bowden received a visit from
Supervisor Tess Morgan. In the course of their ensuing
conversation , and according to Bowden's testimony,
3 This was not the first attempt by the Union to obtain representative
status among Respondents ' employees , for the record shows that a similar
organizational drive was mounted at to plant in 1964.
4 Emma Jean Brown testified without contradiction that almost all of
Respondents ' employees attended the meeting on May 19.
5 Roberts conceded that his informants "possibly" mentioned specific
names of the employees who attended the meetings and did not deny that
the names of Christine Bowden and Emma Jean Brown had reached his
ear According to Roberts, "I don't remember those two names being
mentioned I am not saying that they were -not because the conversation
was rather intense down there on both sides and , you were hearing
everything all day long." In this regard , I would also note Roberts ' further
testimony that the names of Betty Grover , Louise Brunson, and Louise
Black, all of whom testified on behalf of Respondents in relation to Bow-
den's discharge , were not identified to Roberts as union adherents.
8 The General Counsel concedes that Respondents' no-solicitation rule
is a valid one and does not offend any provision of the Act.
7 This episode at Alatex resulted in unfair labor practice charges being
filed against that company by the union A hearing was held thereon, and
the Board subsequently dismissed those charges . See Alabama Textile
Products Corporation, 164 NLRB 88 . 1 would note that Morgan resides
in Brantley where the Alatex plant is situated.
Morgan inquired whether Bowden had signed a union
authorization card and the latter replied in the negative.
Morgan then asked how Bowden felt about the Union and
Bowden exclaimed that she "thought it was fine."
Whereupon, Morgan advised Bowden of some union
"trouble" during an organizational drive which had oc-
curred at an Alatex plant in the nearby community of
Brantley.7 Following the conversation, Bowden and Mor-
gan proceeded to an area in the plant where Roberts was
scheduled to deliver a speech to the employees.8
Events abided until June 20. Because of a large volume
of customer orders, Respondents required that certain
employees, including Bowden, work overtime on that
date. The normal workday at the plant runs from 7 a.m. to
4 p.m., with a lunchbreak extending from 12 p.m. to 1
p.m. When overtime becomes necessary, it is the practice
of Respondents to curtail the lunch period to 30 minutes
and the affected employee is directed to perform the
requisite duties either during the first or second half hour
of that period. At 12 p.m., Bowden went to lunch. It is
Bowden's undenied testimony that she concluded her
repast and clocked in at 12:24 p.m., and then proceeded
to her work station to commence work at 12:30 p.m. Ac-
cording to Bowden's undisputed testimony, it normally
took her 1 minute to walk from the timeclock to her
machine. As Bowden proceeded to her work station, she
passed the restroom where she met employee Betty
Grover. Like Bowden, Grover was also scheduled to per-
form overtime work beginning at 12:30 p.m. As the two
employees walked down an aisle to their respective
machines, Bowden informed Grover that the Union had
scheduled a meeting for that evening and inquired
whether the latter would care to attend. Grover replied
that she would ask her husband whether he had any ob-
jection to her attendance and Bowden suggested that
Grover bring her husband along. As these individuals
continued to walk to their work stations, they passed em-
ployee Margie Carnley and Bowden informed Carnley of
the scheduled union meeting. According to Bowden, she
did not accost any other employee as she proceeded to
her machine and she commenced work at 12:30 p.m., the
appointed time.
Bowden's testimony that she started work precisely at
12:30 p:m. was corroborated by Clara Kelly, an em-
ployee who operated a machine directly in front of Bow-
den. Kelly testified that she and Bowden had clocked in
8 It is undisputed that, on May 19, the same day on which the first
union meeting was scheduled , Roberts delivered a speech to his em-
ployees in which he outlined the benefits which Respondents were cur-
rently providing to the employees He then informed them of the time and
place of the meeting , and suggested that they attend the convocation in
order to make up their minds as to whether they desired representation by
the Union It is uncontroverted, and I find, that the scheduling and the
conduct of union meetings in Opp and vicinity were common knowledge
among Respondents ' employees and the citizenry in that locale in his
complaint , the General Counsel alleges that Roberts' address to the em-
ployees on May 19 created the impression of the surveillance of their
union activities , and therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act In view
of the contents of Roberts' speech, and the facts that most everyone knew
of the meetings and that Respondents acquired this knowledge from em-
ployees themselves, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed, under
the peculiar circumstances of this case , to sustain this allegation in the
complaint and I shall therefore dismiss it
During his speech to the employees onJune 2, which Bowden and Mor-
gan attended, Roberts informed the employees of the no-solicitation rule,
a copy of which he had delivered to Bowden earlier that day.
OPP TEXTILES, INC. 203
at the same time and began walking to their machines.
During their journey, they came abreast of Grover, and
Bowden and Grover conversed as they proceeded to their
work stations. According to Kelly, Bowden and Kelly
reached their work area and the latter, noticing it was
12:30 p.m., stated, "It's time to work," and both resumed
their duties at that time.
At approximately 3:45 p.m. on June 20, Bowden was
summoned by Morgan to the office of Jim Moore,
Respondents ' production manager . It is Bowden's
testimony that, in the presence of Morgan and Grover,
Moore inquired whether Bowden had read Respondents'
notice which forbade union solicitation during working
hours and Bowden remarked that she had. Moore then
asked at what time Bowden had clocked in and Bowden
replied that she had done so at 12:24 p.m., and had
resumed work at 12:30 p.m. Moore stated that he had
learned from Grover that Bowden had solicited Grover's
attendance at a union meeting and that this solicitation
took place as late as 12:40 p.m., when Bowden should
have been working. Bowden protested that her conversa-
tion with Grover lasted only 2 to 3 minutes and that she
had returned to work at the requisite time. However,
Moore asserted that he was convinced that Bowden had
breached Respondents' no-solicitation rule and an-
nounced that she was being discharged for soliciting for
the Union on company time. A final paycheck was drawn
for Bowden which reflected that she was paid for 8-1/2
hours on that day. On June 25, Bowden returned to the
plant to discuss her discharge with General Manager
Roberts. Bowden told Roberts that she was not satisfied
with the manner in which Respondents had separated her.
Roberts expressed ignorance as to the termination and
promised to interview the employees to ascertain all the
facts surrounding her separation. A few days later, Bow-
den once more visited the plant to receive Roberts' deci-
sion. Roberts was absent, in consequence of which Bow-
den spoke to Moore. Moore explained that he had con-
ducted another investigation of the incident on the in-
struction of Roberts and that he had again learned from
Bowden's fellow employees that she commenced work on
June 20 after 12:30 p.m. Bowden requested Moore to
summon these employees so that she could confront them
but Moore refused, stating that it would be unfair to them.
Thereupon, Bowden left the plant.
In support of their defense that Respondents
discharged Bowden solely because she had violated
Respondents ' lawful no-solicitation rule by soliciting
Grover' s attendance at a union meeting and attempting to
obtain her union membership during working hours,
Respondents rely primarily upon the testimonial aver-
ments of Grover, Morgan, Moore, Roberts, and an em-
ployee named Louise Brunson.
On direct examination , Betty Grover testified that she
had been assigned to work overtime at 12:30 p . m. on June
20 and had taken her lunchbreak at 12 p.m. At 12:25
p.m., after having eaten , and as she was preparing to visit
the restroom and punch the timeclock, Grover was
beckoned by Bowden who requested that Grover attend
a union meeting . According to Grover , she and Bowden
then embarked upon a lenghty discussion concerning the
benefits and detriments of unionization for a period of 10
minutes. Throughout their conversation , Grover claimed
that she constantly sought to break off the discussion and
return to work. Glancing at a clock, Grover noted that it
was 12 : 35 p.m . and she detached herself from Bowden
and returned to her machine . While doing so, she noticed
that Bowden commenced to converse with another em-
ployee identified as "Margie," who apparently is the Mar-
gie Carnley to whom Bowden adverted in her testimony.
Grover further testified that she reached her machine at
12:35 p. m. but , because she was "too nervous" to resume
work , she remained beside her machine until 1 p.m. when
she finally began to perform her duties. According to
Grover, her "nervous" state developed from her
knowledge that Respondents forbade the discussion of
union activities on company time, although Grover ad-
mittedly failed to apprise Bowden of this circumstance
during their conversation.
Agitated by her transgression, Grover testified that she
felt impelled to summon Supervisor Tess Morgan to re-
late the circumstances and content of her conversation
with Bowden "because I knew that you weren't supposed
to be talking union or doing anything like that during
working hours."9 When Morgan appeared, Grover stated
that she had not clocked in at 12:30 p . m. because she had
entered into a discussion with an employee concerning
the Union' s organizational efforts and, at Morgan's
prodding, Grover identified Bowden as that employee.
Morgan then asked whether Grover would unfold her tale
to Production Manager Moore, and Grover did so. Later
that afternoon , Grover was again invited to Moore's of-
fice for a confrontation with Bowden in the presence of
Moore and Morgan . Grover repeated her story that Bow-
den had detained her beyond the 12:30 deadline for the
resumption of work by soliciting the former to join the
Union and attend a union meeting . Bowden rejoined that
she had resumed her duties at 12:30 p . m., an utterance
which Grover flatly contradicted. About a week later,
Grover was once more called into Moore's office,
together with other employees , where she repeated her
accusations against Bowden.10
On cross-examination, Grover testified that her con-
versation with Bowden began at 12:25 p.m. and lasted 10
minutes. When pressed as to the length of the discussion,
Grover replied " I can't put it down to the minute, but we
had been talking I guess, 4 or 5 minutes , I suppose."
Despite the fact that Grover made no mention of the
presence of an employee named Louise Brunson -on
direct examination , on cross-examination Grover as-
serted that Brunson walked by Bowden and Grover dur-
ing their conversation and asked them to move so that she
could pass down the aisle. Grover further testified that,
at the inception of her discussion with Bowden, which
began at 12:25 p.m ., Bowden raised the matter of the
union meeting . According to Grover, when Bowden
"started talking [about the Union] I was afraid other peo-
ple knew it and, I would try to get off on another subject
and she would start talking about something else." When
Grover was reminded that Respondents ' no-solicitation
rule did not preclude the discussion of union topics by
B Morgan was on her lunchbreak between 12 p in and I p in and there- Moore testified that Grover had reported to Moore that Bowden said
fore was unaware of the conversation between Bowden and Grover "something to the effect that [Bowden ] was going to whip her if she did
10 Grover testified that, during this meeting with Moore, the latter re- not sign a Union card " Morgan's testimony is silent on this subject and
marked that "he was afraid we were going to have a killing over this " even Grover's testimony failed to corroborate Moore's assertion
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees on their own time, Grover rejoined that "I
don't care anything about talking about the Union." With
respect to the reason for reporting the conversation with
Bowden to Morgan, Grover stated that she did so
because "I knew right then we were doing something
wrong." However, Grover then made the curious obser-
vation that she had no fear that she would lose her job as
a result of her discourse concerning the Union with Bow-
den. Finally, Grover repeated that she did not clock in
until 1 p . m., and remained beside her machine , because "I
knew I couldn't go back to work because that [her discus-
sion with Bowden] made me so nervous," although
Grover concedely continued the discussion with Bowden
on her own volition."
Tess Morgan, the supervisor of both Grover and Bow-
den, testified that her department was experiencing a
work backlog and for this reason her girls were requested
to work overtime during the lunchbreak. About 1 p.m.,
she was summoned by Grover to the latter's work station
where Grover advised Morgan that Bowden had detained
her from resuming work for about 5 to 10 minutes after
the normal starting time of 12:30 p.m. by talking about
the Union. Morgan reported this intelligence to Produc-
tion Manager Moore and the latter instructed her to sum-
mon Grover to his office. It is Morgan's testimony that,
in Moore's office, Grover reiterated that she had been ac-
costed by Bowden as she was in the process of returning
to her job after her lunchbreak and that Bowden solicited
Grover to attend a union meeting . During their discus-
sion, Grover noticed that it was too late to clock in for the
12.30 p.m. starting time and, instead, she stood by her
work station until I p.m. Moore inquired whether Grover
would be amenable to confront Bowden concerning this
incident, and Grover replied in the affirmative. Moore
then instructed Morgan to interview other employees in
order to establish whether the conversation between
Bowden and Grover did in fact occur on company time.
According to Morgan, she sought out employee Louise
Brunson who related that, at 12:30 p.m., while on her way
to clock out,12 Brunson approached Bowden and Grover
in an aisle and requested that they move so that she could
pass by. Brunson was, at this point, 25 feet from the
timeclock and she punched out at 12:34 p.m. Morgan re-
ported this information to Moore. On direct examination,
Morgan testified that she did not interview any other em-
ployee about this incident. On cross-examination, she
again asserted that she did not talk to any other employee
concerning Bowden's conduct. However, when pressed
on this matter , Morgan then admitted that she had made
inquiries of employees Clara Kelly, Peggy Pittman, and
Trudy Bryan, who worked in close proximity to Bowden,
as to the exact time at which Bowden returned to work on
June 20, and each employee uniformly responded that
Bowden resumed work at 12:30 p.m. For a reason
nowhere explained on this record, Morgan stated that she
chose not to believe these employees. When questioned
as to the Company's policy regarding clocking in by tardy
employees, Morgan explained that it would have been
"fine" if Grover had clocked in and commenced work at
12.35 p.m. because of the existing work backlog, and
because Respondents consistently excused tardiness
when accounted for by a "good reason." Morgan then ad-
mitted that, although she did not know whether Grover's
excuse for being tardy was a satisfactory one, no discipli-
nary action was taken against Grover by Respondents or
even contemplated.
Later on the afternoon of June 20, Morgan called Bow-
den into Moore's office to confront Grover. Grover re-
peated her accusation that Bowden had engaged her in a
conversation concerning a union meeting after 12:30 p.m.
when both employees were supposed to be at work, and
Bowden steadfastly maintained that her discussion with
Grover had ended prior to that point in time and that she
was at her machine at 12:30 p.m. Rounding out Morgan's
testimony, she freely admitted that she spoke to her em-
ployees concerning the Union and overheard their con-
versations regarding this subject. Morgan also allowed as
how she had discussed with Bowden the Union's efforts
to organize the plant, but insisted that their discourse was
conducted "in a joking way." However, Morgan was
quick to deny that, on June 2, she had inquired whether
Bowden had executed a union authorization card, denied
that she had questioned whether Bowden had seen any
such cards; denied that she had asked Bowden how the
latter felt about the Union; denied that Bowden had said
she thought the Union was "fine", and, denied that she
had informed Bowden of any "trouble" which the Alatex
plant in Brantley had experienced with the Union,
proclaiming that she did not "know of any trouble about
the Union at Brantley."13 Finally, Morgan testified that
she had supplied the names of employees in her depart-
ment who were "standing around and talking too much"
during working hours to General Manager Roberts prior
to June 2 because this conduct impeded production, in
consequence of which Roberts personally distributed to
the suspected ringleaders a copy of Respondents' no-soli-
cation rule. At the outset of her testimony along this line,
Morgan stated that she tolerated talking by employees
during worktime "if it is a short period of time," but de-
nied that she had revealed the names of individual em-
ployees to Roberts for receipt of a copy of the rule
because they were overheard, or were suspected of, talk-
ing about the Union, and professed that she had never
inquired into the subject of their conversations. When re-
minded that the no-solicitation rule made no mention of
proscribing the art of conversation by employees while at
11 Grover's antiunion proclivities, and the most probable cause of her
"nervous" state which prompted her to inform on Bowden concerning the
latter's asserted violation of Respondents ' no-solicitation rule, may well
be explained by her testimony regarding her meeting with counsel for the
General Counsel at a local store sometime prior to the hearing herein
Counsel inquired whether Grover would be willing to answer some
questions posed by him, to which she replied" I told you I had to call my
boss and see if it was all right When you [the General Counsel ] told me
who you were I wasn't going to talk to you until I found out if it was all
right " Thereafter, Grover telephoned her "boss" and "he advised me not
to talk to anybody but you [Grover] could if I wanted to " Counsel did
not press Grover for responses to his questions
IL Brunson had received permission to work the first half hour of her
lunch period in order to deliver Avon cosmetic products to her fellow em-
ployee-customers during the balance of that period
19 As indicated heretofore, Morgan lived in Brantley Production
Manager Moore testified that Alatex "was having a lot of trouble with the
Union" as a result of a "wildcat strike " In Moore's words, "It wasn't
anything to speak of in a big way at first , and then it started spreading like
wild fire Pretty soon it was dust the topic of the day When you came to
work in the morning you expected to hear it "
OPP TEXTILES, INC. 205
work, Morgan admitted that she had learned that the girls
were talking about the Union and this prompted her to
single out the discussion leaders to Roberts which led to
the personal conveyance of a copy of Respondents' no-
solicitation rule to them.
Production Manager Jim Moore testimonially related
that, when he returned from lunch on June 20, Morgan
reported to him that Bowden "had cornered [Grover] in
an aisle" after their lunchbreak and that Grover "couldn't
get away from [Bowden], that [Bowden] persisted in
talking to [Grover] about the Union meeting ... that
night," and that this enforced conversation lasted from
"five to ten minutes" after 12:30 p.m., upsetting Grover
to such an extent that she did not begin work until 1 p.m.
Moore summoned Grover and questioned her in detail
about the incident as well as her failure to resume her du-
ties "at the time she got through with the conversation."
Moore testified that he was satisfied with Grover's ex-
planation that she was too "nervous and upset" to return
to work until 1 p.m., and that no discipline was meted out
to her, following which she agreed "to testify or sign an
affidavit to the effect that this had happened." Thereu-
pon, Moore caused Morgan to investigate the matter.
Morgan subsequently reported that she had spoken to
employee Louise Brunson who had finished her work at
12:30 p.m., "picked up her Avon material and went up
the aisle and had to ask these two girls to move aside to
let her get to the clock," and Brunson then went directly
to the timeclock to punch out. Upon checking Brunson's
timecard, Moore noted that she had clocked out at 12:34
p.m. Moore remarked that "I know that it doesn't take
over a half a minute to walk from where they [Bowden
and Grover] were talking ... to go to the time clock."
According to Moore, he sought to assure himself that
Grover 's and Brunson 's statement of events was accu-
rate, and he therefore directed Morgan to interrogate
other employees to ascertain whether the reports of
Grover and Brunson concerning this episode possessed
validity. On direct examination, Moore testified that
Morgan's endeavors in this direction drew a blank
because the employees who worked adjacent to Bowden
"did not want to get involved," although he then
grudgingly conceded that "[s]ome girls were non-com-
mittal, wouldn't say one way or the other. Some said that
Christine was back at her machine at 12:30." On cross-
examination, Moore stated that, while he did not entirely
discount the recitation of those employees who said that
they and Bowden had commenced work at 12:30 p.m., he
nevertheless chose to reject their version of events
because "in any area you have friends, and close friends
and, they knew what was going on in the area," although
there is nothing in this record which even remotely sug-
gests that these employees where any more friendly
toward Bowden than to Grover or Brunson.
Following the confrontation between Bowden and
Grover, Moore reached the conclusion that "all the
evidence pointed to the fact that [Bowden] was talking
about 12:30 and that she had violated the company rule,"
and he therefore discharged her. Despite the fact that
Bowden allegedly was 5 to 10 minutes late in reporting
for work, Moore paid her for the period of her tardiness.
A few days thereafter, at the request of Roberts, Moore
conducted another investigation into Bowden's conduct
on Jane 20 and again was convinced that her separation
was warranted because she had breached Respondents'
no-solicitation rule. According to Moore, Bowden was
the only employee ever to be discharged for violating the
rule during the entire course of its existence ," and it is
undisputed that she was the only individual to be ter-
minated at the plant for an infraction of the rule without
receiving a prior warning. 15
Although Bowden was allegedly discharged because of
her disregard for Respondents' no-solicitation rule on
June 20, Moore became more expansive during the
course of his testimony concerning Bowden's derelictions
in this regard. According to Moore, employee Louise
Black reported to her supervisor, Tess Morgan, that
Bowden "was trying to get her to sign a Union card dur-
ing working hours," and that this report found its way to
Moore. It is Moore's testimony that Bowden 's solicita-
tion of Black occurred "along about the same time" that
Bowden received a copy of Respondents' no-solicitation
rule on June 2, although Morgan testified that this intel-
ligence was received at a time prior thereto, and Black
placed the date of this report as June 20, the same day on
which Bowden was discharged. Moore also testified that
he had gotten another report from Morgan that Bowden
had solicited the union membership of another employee
named Hart prior to June 2, and this prompted Roberts
to convey a copy of the rule to Bowden on that date. Mor-'
gan failed to mention in her testimony that she had
received any such report from Hart concerning the
latter's solicitation by Bowden. Moore also averred that
he had first learned that the Union was active in organiz-
ing Respondents' employees "around the first of May,"
that this activity increased throughout June, and that it
was no "secret" to him because "all the employees ...
talked to me in the lunch periods and breaks" concerning
the organizational drive. Moore then stated he and
Roberts decided to issue notices containing the no-sol-
icitation rule on June 2 because there was an unusual
number of conversations taking place during working
hours in that month. At first, Moore claimed that he was
totally unaware of the content of these conversations.
Subsequently, he admitted that from "what I had heard
and - from talking to certain individuals ," he concluded
"that this talk was being caused by the Union activity. 1116
Louise Brunson testified that, after her lunch on June
14 The parties stipulated, between August 1965 and June 1966, each
new employee was informed of the rule on the date of his hire Moreover,
the record shows that the rule was posted in the plant in March 1964,
when the Union embarked upon its initial campaign to organize Re-
spondents ' employees
15 Roberts also acknowledged that Bowden was the only employee to
be discharged for violating the no-solicitation rule
Is Moore testified that between 20 and 25 employees out of a work
complement of 650 were singled out to receive the no-solication rule on
June 2 General Manager Roberts also conceded that copies of the rule
were handed to designated employees because of their suspected involve-
ment in union activities
The General Counsel contends that Respondents distributed the rule to
employees who were known or suspected union supporters, and that this
distribution created the impression among these individuals that their
union activities were under Respondents ' surveillance and also in-
timidated the recipients, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I find
no merit in this contention It is undisputed that the conversations in
which the employees were observed to have engaged took place during
working hours I can perceive of no statutory impediment to an em-
ployer's reminding or warning his employees who are overheard in union
discussions on company time that they may be discharged under a lawful
no-solicitation rule for doing so Consequently , I shall dismiss the allega-
tions in the complaint insofar as they relate to this contention
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
20, she received a visit from Supervisor Morgan. The
latter inquired whether Brunson had observed any of the
employees conversing when Brunson took her
lunchbreak. Brunson replied that she had encountered
Bowden and Gover in an aisle and asked them to step
aside so that she could continue on to the timeclock to
punch out. On direct examination, Brunson claimed that
she had quit work at 12:30 p.m. and proceeded to the
timeclock. According to Brunson's calculations, it would
normally take her 22 seconds to reach the clock after her
encounter with Bowden and Grover in the aisle. Brun-
son's timecard indicates that she clocked in at 12:34 p.m.
Brunson 's direct testimony darkly hints that she was
detained for several minutes after 12:30 p.m. by the union
discussion which took place between her two fellow em-
ployees. On cross-examination, however, Brunson
changed tack and stated that she left her machine at ex-
actly 12:30 p.m. and that it took her only 20 seconds to
get from her machine to the timeclock. Brunson then
brought herself to admit that Bowden and Grover saw her
coming and made way for her immediate passage.
I credit the testimony of Christine Bowden and the sup-
portive testimony of Clara Kelly, and find that Bowden
was discharged on June 20, not because she had offended
Respondents' no-solicitation rule by engaging in a discus-
sion pertaining to the Union with Grover after 12:30 p.m.
and while on company time, but because she was a
known, active supporter of the Union in its campaign to
organize Respondents' employees. I am fortified in this
conclusion by an assessment of the testimony of Grover,
Morgan, Moore, Brunson , and Roberts, which I deem to
be so fraught with implausibilities, inherent probabilities,
and contradictions, as not to warrant credible acceptance.
Thus, Bowden testified that, on June 2, she was inter-
rogated by Supervisor Morgan as to whether she had
signed a union card, and Morgan queried Bowden about
her sympathies for the Union. During their conversation,
Morgan outlined the "troubles" which the Union had
caused at an Alatex company plant in nearby Brantley,
where Morgan lived. Morgan conceded that she had
spoken to the employees about the Union during the
course of its campaign, overheard their talks about that
campaign, and admitted that she had spoken on this sub-
ject with Bowden, albeit "in a joking way." However,
Morgan denied that she had inquired into whether Bow-
den had joined the Union, or whether Bowden was
favorably disposed toward the Union, and disclaimed that
she had made any reference to "troubles" caused by that
labor organization at Brantley on the ground that she was
ignorant "of any trouble about the Union at Brantley." I
deem it not only implausible, but patently incredible, that
Morgan could have been unaware of the union campaign
in Brantley in light of the testimony of Moore, who
resided in Opp, that a "wildcat strike" at the Alatex plant
"started spreading like wild-fire," that the strike became
the "topic of the day," and that when "you came to work
in the morning you expected to hear [about] it."
Moreover, Morgan failed to impress this Trial Examiner,
either by her demeanor while testifying on the stand, or
by the content of her testimony, that she was worthy of
belief. I find that, on June 2, Morgan interrogated Bow-
den as to whether the latter had signed a union authoriza-
tion card, and also asked Bowden whether the latter was
sympathetic to the Union's cause. I therefore conclude
that, by the foregoing conduct of Morgan, when viewed
against the backdrop of the other statutory intrusions
committed by Respondents, as hereinafter found,
Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
With respect to her discharge, Bowden testified
without contradiction that she clocked in at 12:24 p.m. on
June 20 and proceeded to her work station, which would
have normally taken her 1 minute to reach. As she walked
toward her machine, she engaged Grover in a conversa-
tion for 2 or 3 minutes concerning a union meeting that
evening. Bowden swore that she reached her machine and
commenced work at 12:30 p.m., the appointed time.
Bowden's testimony in this regard was corroborated by
that of Clara Kelly, and by at least two other fellow em-
ployees who worked in close proximity to Bowden and
whom Morgan `and Moore questioned during their in-
vestigation of this episode. Grover, the prime mover in
the discharge of Bowden, insisted that her discussion with
the latter lasted until 12:35 p.m., while Moore testimoni-
ally reported that it extended until as late as 12:40 p.m.
However, Grover admitted that she had conversed with
Bowden for 4 or 5 minutes after being accosted by Bow-
den at which point Brunson approached and requested
clearance to pass down the aisle, a distance, according to
Brunson , of 25 feet from the timeclock. Curiously,
Grover made no mention of meeting Brunson during her
direct examination by Respondents' counsel, recalling
only that Margie Carnley was engaged in a conversation
with Bowden during their journey to their machines. In
light of Moore's testimony that it would have taken Brun-
son about 30 seconds to proceed to the timeclock from
the point of her encounter with Bowden and Grover, and
Brunson's testimony that it required only 22 seconds to
walk from her machine to the timeclock and that she was
not impeded by her two fellow employees as she
proceeded directly to the clock, I deem it inherently im-
probable that Brunson could have passed Bowden and
Grover at such a point in time to cause the former to
clock in at 12:34 p.m., or that Bowden could have begun
work at 12:35 p.m., as Grover related, or at 12:40 p.m. as
Moore recounted.
There are additional reasons which persuade me that
the testimonial assertions of Bowden and Kelly should be
believed. Grover displayed a pronounced antipathy
toward the Union as evidenced by her assertion that,
although her discussion with Bowden concerning the
union meeting on June 20 originated during their lunch
period and therefore was privileged under Respondents'
no-solicitation rule, she did not "care anything about talk-
ing about the Union" at any time. Grover revealed her
further dislike for the Union and its adherents by her
testimonial responses that she refused to answer any
questions posed by counsel for the General Counsel con-
cerning this case during a meeting at a local store until she
had received clearance from her "boss." Moreover,
Grover testified that the reason for her failure to resume
work at 12:35 p.m. on June 20 was bottomed on her "ner-
vous" condition occasioned by Bowden's discussion of
union affairs on company time - stating that "I knew right
then that we were doing something wrong," yet Grover
made the remarkable confession that she had no fear that
she would lose her job with Respondents even though she
had engaged in a union discussion with Bowden, and not-
withstanding that she continued the forbidden discourse
on company time.
Morgan's testimony regarding her investigation of
Grover's indictment against Bowden is even more im-
plausible. Having been charged by Production Manager
OPP TEXTILES, INC. 207
Moore to verify Grover's version of events, Morgan
selected Brunson as the first target for her inquiry. Mor-
gan did not illuminate this record with her reasons for ini-
tially contracting Brunson, who must have worked at a
considerable distance from Bowden," to corroborate
Grover's accusation, and she summarily rejected without
plausible explanation the information which Kelly and at
least two other employees, who worked-near Bowden,
had provided that they, together with Bowden, began
work precisely at 12:30 p.m. Moreover, despite the fact
that Grover also discussed the Union with Bowden dur-
ing working hours and failed to return to work until 1 p.m.
although it was "fine" for her to do so at 12:35 p.m., Mor-
gan exonerated Grover of any wrongdoing. Moore was
hardly more persuasive in his sworn testimony. At the
outset, Moore testified that Morgan was unable to obtain
any statements from Bowden's fellow employees con-
cerning the Grover affair because they "did not want to
get involved" or were "non-committal." He then
acknowledged, however, that "some said that [Bowden]
was back at her machine at 12:30 p.m.," but he distrusted
their reports because he harbored a belief, unsubstan-
tiated on this record, that they were friendly toward Bow-
den. Furthermore, Moore claimed that he had received
reports from Morgan that Bowden had been guilty of sol-
iciting the union membership of employee Louise Black
on company time which occurred "along about the same
time" that Respondents distributed a copy of the no-sol-
icitation rule to Bowden on June 2, and that Bowden had
solicited employee Hart at some time prior to that date.
I find it implausible that, possessed of this knowledge,
Moore would have failed to discipline Bowden for these
infractions, or even warned her of them, if they indeed
had occurred, in view of General Manager Roberts'
testimony that the notices embodying the no-solicitation
rule "were given to the [employees on June 2] to save
them [their jobs] because there was a possibility that
they might break the rule and we actually gave it [the
rule] to them because we didn't want them to," and his
further testimony that employees were warned by
Respondents when an offense against the rule was un-
covered.
It is undisputed and I find that Bowden joined the
Union while attending a union meeting on May 31, and
thereafter, during an upswing in the Union's organiza-
tional campaign at Respondents' plant, she solicited the
union membership of her fellow employees and attended
the union meetings held during the month of June. Based
upon the testimony of both Moore and Roberts, I find
that they became apprised of the union drive at its very
inception on May 2, that "all the employees. . . talked to
[Moore] in the lunch periods and break" about the
progress of the campaign, and that Roberts received daily
reports from between 10 and 30 employees concerning
the union meetings and the identity of employees who at-
tended them. In light of Roberts' failure to deny that the
name of Bowden had come to his attention during these
discussions with his informants, and the testimony of
Moore and Roberts that Bowden was one of the few em-
ployees selected to receive a copy of the no-solicitation
rule on June 2 because she was suspected of being a lead-
ing proponent of the Union, I am convinced and find that
Respondents knew that Bowden was a most active sup-
porter of the Union during the month of June when the
union campaign "got really strong." I have heretofore
found, based upon credited testimony, that Bowden ac-
tually clocked in at 12:30 p.m. on the date of her
discharge, and I therefore conclude that she was engaged
in a protected, concerted activity when she solicited
Grover's attendance at a union meeting while on her
lunchbreak. Accordingly, I find that Bowden was singled
out for discharge on June 20, not because she par-
ticipated in union activities in disregard of Respondents'
no-solicitation rule, but because Respondents sought to
rid themselves of a known, active union adherent. I con-
clude that, by the foregoing conduct, Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.18
I turn next to the termination of Emma Jean Brown, the
other alleged discriminatee. Brown had been employed
by Respondents for over 2 years and worked on the flight
suit line under Supervisor Minnie Lou McCurley until
she lost her employment on July 1. Brown first learned
about the Union during its organizational drive at the
Alatex company plant in Brantley and, after speaking to
Union Representative Dameron about the possibility of
unionizing Respondents' plant, she attended the initial
union meeting on May 2 and urged several of her fellow
employees to attend. Brown went to the next meeting on
May 19 and executed a union authorization card. Some-
time thereafter, she was elected to the Union's shop com-
mittee and she successfully solicited the membership of
approximately six employees while on her way to work or
at the employees' homes.
On May 19, General Manager Roberts delivered a
speech to his employees in which he noted that a union
meeting was to be held that night and, after evaluating the
potential results of unionization, he urged them to go to
the meeting and find out for themselves whether or not
they desired collective representation. On some undeter-
mined date following this speech, Brown testified that Su-
pervisor McCurley approached her machine and inquired
what Brown thought of Roberts' address. Brown replied
that she was confused because Roberts had uttered cer-
tain untruths about the Union and she was unable to un-
derstand why Roberts would do so. At this juncture, ac-
cording to Brown, McCurley instructed her to provide
the names of the employees on the flight suit line who had
gone to this union meeting, but Brown demurred. McCur-
ley then remarked that Brown "might be surprised, that
I [McCurley] already know."
On June 14, Brown was summoned into the office of
Production Manager Moore. Moore showed Brown a
copy of a notice of a union meeting which had been
posted in the ladies' room and asked whether Brown had
10 Inasmuch as Brunson performed her duties at a distance , measured
in time, of 22 seconds from the timeclock, while Bowden was located ap-
proximately 60 seconds from the clock, and as neither impressed me
physically as being a hare rather than a tortoise, I find that Brunson's
machine most probably was located quite a distance from Bowden's
11 The General Counsel alternatively contends that, even assuming
Bowden was terminated for soliciting on company time, her separation
was nevertheless in violation of Section 8(a)(3) because it resulted from
Respondents' discriminatory application of its otherwise lawful no-sol-
icitation rule In this connection , counsel argues that the disparate treat-
ment afforded to Bowden is reflected by the fact that Respondents per-
mitted other forms of solicitation during working hours and considerable
testimony on this issue , much of which is conflicting , was adduced In
view of my findings and conclusion that Bowden was discharged for en-
gaging in concerted, protected activity during nonworking time, I deem it
unnecessary to pass on this alternative contention
208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
seen the notice. Brown replied in the affirmative. Moore
thereupon inquired whether Brown had posted it and
Brown denied having done so. She then inquired why
Moore "was picking on her," and Moore, with Brown's
personnel jacket in front of him, stated that the capital
letter "A" which appeared on her job application seemed
to coincide with the same letter which appeared on the
handwritten union notice. Moore's accusation drew
Brown's anger and, after leaving his office and encounter-
ing McCurley, Brown blurted "Damn the Company,
damn Mr. Moore, and several other damns." The follow-
ing day, Brown returned to Moore's office where, in the
presence of Moore and McCurley, she apologized for
having "damned" Respondents and Moore. Moore stated
that he had learned from McCurley the day before that
Brown had turned her "time in" to McCurley and had
quit. Brown vehemently denied that she had informed
McCurley that she was severing her employment ties, or
had given Respondents a 2-week notice of quitting, and
asked Moore to produce her "resignation papers" but
Moore refused, stating that "it was not necessary that
[Brown] see them" and adding that Brown could no
longer change her mind about quitting. In this connection,
Brown testified that, 2 or 3 weeks earlier, she had in-
formed McCurley that she was experiencing difficulty in
obtaining a babysitter for her young child and that she
"might" have to resign unless the situation improved.
However, Brown insisted that she told McCurley she
would give McCurley ample notice in advance of any
decision to leave the Company, but Brown adamantly
professed that no such notice was ever conveyed to her
supervisor. On July 1, the last workday prior to the plant
vacation period, Brown told McCurley that she would
like to speak with Moore again in order to retain her job.
McCurley replied that "I can tell you you can't get your
job back, after July the 1st we don't want you on the pre-
mices [sic] anymore." That afternoon, Brown visited
Moore and stated "I want to ask for my job back." Moore
retorted "I can't give you your job back because you have
upset supervision. Ass of 4:00 you are through with the
company." Concluding Brown's testimony, she averred
that she had never been criticized by Respondents for her
work performance or her conduct prior to the incident in-
volving the union notice in the ladies' room, and, although
she had "sassed" Supervisor McCurley on several occa-
sions, she had never been warned or reprimanded for
doing so.
McCurley's version of her dealings with Brown is as
follows. Brown had worked under her supervision for
over 2 years on the flight suit line, and, in McCurley's
estimation, Brown "was a good operator and I liked her
very much." McCurley testified that, sometime in June,
she was beckoned by Brown while at work. When Mc-
Curley approached, Brown exclaimed, "I want you to
give me my Goddam time," meaning that Brown decided
to quit. When McCurley sought the reason for Brown's
precipitous action,19 the latter stated "Well, old man
Moore called me in his office and he accused me of
putting a notice in the bathroom concerning the Union."
McCurley proceeded to assure Brown that she must be
mistaken about the accusation and that Moore had in-
tended to interrogate other operators concerning this
matter. However, Brown persisted in her belief that she
had been personally singled out by Moore as the culprit
in an episode in which she had taken no part, and se
seemed to be enraged. According to McCurley, she at-
tempted to calm Brown without success and Brown ex-
claimed that General Manager Roberts had worked in a
unionized plant for 20 years and "He just don't want any
of his employees to have any of it [union benefits]. He
wants it all for himself." McCurley again sought to blunt
Brown's anger, but Brown continued by remarking that
"If they don't have any more confidence in me than that,
I will turn in my time ." Brown then added, I want to tell
you one thing, I haven't been for the Union but, starting
today I will fight for it and I will work for it day in and day
out." In the course of her diatribe, Brown uttered such
profanities as "Damned old man Roberts" and she also
"damned" Moore and the Respondents, although she did
not so condemn McCurley. On several occasions during
their conversation, Brown repeated that she desired "to
turn her time in." It is McCurley's testimony that she of-
fered to permit Brown to take a few days off in order to
calm down. However, McCurley then proceeded to
Moore's office where she reported the incident to him.
McCurley further testified that, on the following morn-
ing, Brown paid her a visit and stated that Brown wished
"to take her time back and not quit." McCurley rejoined
that "I am afraid we can't cancel your time. You have lost
all respect for me and for the Company and Mr. Moore
and Mr. Roberts." McCurley asked why Brown had
changed her mind, and Brown replied that it was her
husband's doing. Brown inquired why other girls were al-
lowed to revoke their resignations and she was not, and
McCurley stated that "under the circumstances that she
turned her time in and I could not take her time back."
Subsequently, McCurley learned from other operators
that Brown intended to return to work after the vacation
period and that "she wasn't going to quit that I would
have to fire her ...." On July 1, at Brown's request, Mc-
Curley made an appointment for the former to see Moore.
While McCurley and Brown waited in Moore's office,
Brown remonstrated that she had been mistreated and
that she wished to continue working with Respondents.
On direct examination by Respondents' cousel, McCur-
ley stated that she responded to Brown's protestations of
mistreatment by saying that "I thought I had been real
nice to her that I could have let her go then [on June 14]
but, that I couldn't because I wanted to be nice to her."
On cross-examination, however, McCurley then related
that Brown had "turned in her time and worked out her
two weeks notice. You can work out a one week notice or
a two week notice. And, she worked her time out. I let her
work her time out." Finally, McCurley conceded that
Brown was separated from her employment on July 1,
not because she had previously "turned in her time," but
because she had used profanity. When Moore arrived, he
informed Brown that "she had lost her respect for super-
vision and for the girls, the girls around her and for the
company and everything else and that it would be better
for her if she did not work any longer."
It is McCurley's further testimony that she had ex-
perienced previous profane "flare-ups" by Brown and
that she had warned Brown on each occasion after which
19 McCurley testified that Brown had stated a few months previously
that she might have to resign because of babysitting problems However,
Brown did not again broach the matter and McCurley assumed that the
problem had been satisfactorily resolved
OPP TEXTILES, INC. 209
Brown apologized, but McCurley stoutly maintained that
Brown did not offer an apology to the former or Moore
when she uttered her "damns" in June. McCurley ad-
mitted that other girls on her line had "flared up," that
such conduct was not entirely unusual, and that she "oc-
casionally" warned the offenders .20 When questioned as
to whether any employee had ever been discharged for
using the word "damn," McCurley related that she had
caused the immediate discharge of an employee who used
that term about 8 or 10 years previously, but could not re-
call the name of the individual. When asked why Brown
was not immediately terminated for uttering this curse,
McCurley gave the anomalous reply that "Brown wasn't
fired," but that she had merely turned in her time and
worked out her 2 weeks' notice. McCurley also denied
that Brown's termination had any connection with her en-
gagement in union activities, stating that her first aware-
ness of Brown's union sympathies commenced in mid-
June when Brown decided to quit and remarked that she
would thereafter champion the Union's case. However,
McCurley then made the remarkable statement that,
about 3 or 4 weeks prior to this incident, Brown had
volunteered that she had attended a union meeting and
knew the names of the leading union proponents who
worked for the Company.
Regarding her conversation with Brown concerning the
Union, McCurley corroborated Brown's testimony that
the latter had engaged in a union discussion, and placed
this occurrence during the early part of June. McCurley
also conceded that Brown had made the remark that the
latter believed that Roberts had spoken certain untruths
during his speech to the employees on May 19. However,
McCurley insisted that Brown volunteered the informa-
tion that she had gone "to the meeting and there was
about twenty or twenty-two there" and "I could tell you
who the ringleaders are that are working for the Company
that was there" but "I won't." Moreover, McCurley
denied that she had told Brown that the latter "might
be surprised," that McCurley already knew the names of
the ringleaders. Finally, McCurley testified that she had
a "good bit" of discussions concerning the Union with
her employees commencing around the first of June.
When pressed as to the times when these conversations
took place, McCurley stated that her discourses with all
but Brown occurred during lunch or break periods,
but that she talked with Brown during working hours,
a remarkable circumstance in light of Respondents'
rule which forbade the discussion of union topics on
company time and of which McCurley was abundantly
aware.
Concerning Brown's separation, Moore testified that
he called Brown into his office on June 14 because he had
learned that union notices were being posted on the
ladies' restroom walls. Moore was unable to ascertain
who was responsible for the posting, in consequence of
which he decided to summon several girls who worked
adjacent to the restroom and query them about the
matter. According to Moore, he determined to speak with
Brown tirst because "she was the closest to the
restroom" and he had noted that she stopped and spoke
with many operators that day and "she appeared to be the
ringleader in that area as far as conversation was con-
cerned." When Brown was summoned to the office,
Moore explained to her that he did not know who had
placed the union notices on the wall and then commented
that "she was one of the main girls we were going to talk
to." After Brown stated that Moore was accusing her of
posting notices, an act which she denied, Moore assured
her that he was not accusing her of anything and repeated
that she was "just one of the girls I want to talk to."
Brown became considerably excited by the discussion
and Moore sought to soothe her ruffled feelings, after
which Brown returned to work Moore testified that
Brown was not interviewed for the purpose of determin-
ing whether she was the guilty party because, in his
words, "I didn't care whether she did it or not." Moore
then stated that Brown "was called in to try to stop this
restroom posting of notices" and conceded that she was
the only employee to be summoned for an interview.
Moore was also questioned as to whether he had com-
pared Brown's capital "A" on her job application and the
"A" which appeared on the union notice, and he denied
that he had done so. However, he admitted that Brown's
personnel file was lying on his desk in sight of Brown, giv-
ing the curious explanation for its presence that "I wasn't
sure that I knew all the names of the girls in the plant"
and "I also was checking to see how the production of
each girl was," although McCurley testified that Brown
was "a good operator" and there had never been any
complaints registered against her production.
Following this interview, McCurley reported to Moore
that Brown had "just cussed everybody in the company
out" and had told McCurley "to turn her Goddamn time
in, and that she didn't want to work for the company any
more, that she would work up to payday and that was it."
Moore replied that, because of this use of profanity,
Brown had displayed disrespect toward the Company and
McCurley and should have been fired on the spot. How-
ever, inasmuch as McCurley had assured Brown that she
would turn in her time and allow her to work until the va-
cation period, Moore "felt like we should let her work."
Subsequently, McCurley told Moore that Brown desired
to cancel her resignation and Moore stated that he would
not take her back because of her profanity. At a later
meeting with Brown, Moore so informed her. At the out-
set of his questioning along this line, Moore claimed that
he had never had any case of profanity brought to his at-
tention during the course of his employment with
Respondents. He then acknowledged that a certain
amount of profanity was normal among the employees in
the plant, but characterized the words that Brown used as
being too "severe." Finally, Moore admitted that the
word "damn" had been previously directed at him and
that this curse did not offend his sensitivities. Rounding
out Moore's testimony, he declared that, while he had
received reports concerning union activities at the plant
since early May and had spoken to Roberts on this sub-
ject, he was unaware that Brown was a union adherent.
20 Estelle Donaldson was called as a witness by Respondents' counsel "two weeks, at vacation time " Donaldson testified that she had never
and swore that she heard Brown use profanity during a conversation with heard Brown or any other employee use profanity prior to this instance In
McCurley in which Brown repeatedly stated that she desired to have Mc- light of McCurley's testimony that Brown had "flared up" and had uttered
Curley "turn in her Goddam time " However, Donaldson then remem- profanities on earlier occasions, I am not persuaded that Donaldson's
bered that Brown indicated that she wished to defer her resignation for testimony merits accreditation
210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I credit the testimony of Emma Jean Brown concerning
the events leading to her discharge and her union conver-
sation with McCurley. Brown testified in a forthright
manner and her testimony contains both consistency and
plausibility.
I find that Brown was one of the earliest supporters of
the Union , having attended the initial organizational
meeting on May 2 and having urged her fellow employees
to do so as well. On May 19 , she signed an authorization
card at a union meeting that evening , was elected to the
shop committee , and thereafter successfully solicited six
other employees to join the Union . General Manager
Roberts admitted and I find that he had received daily re-
ports from as many as 30 employees concerning union
meetings and learned of the identity of the employees in
attendance , and he did not deny that the name of Brown
had been brought to his attention . Moore also conceded
and I find that "all the employees ... talked to" him at
breaktimes since as early as May 2 about the progress of
the union drive . For more than 2 years, Brown toiled for
Respondents and was, in McCurley's words, a "good
operator" whom McCurley personally liked. On June 14,
Moore discovered that union notices were being posted
in the ladies ' restroom , and I find that he summoned
Brown into his office on that date because he suspected
that she was the culprit based upon his observation that
she "appeared to be a ring leader in that area as far as
[Union ] conversation was concerned." I therefore do not
credit Moore's assertion that he "didn't care" whether or
not Brown had posted the notices and that he did not ac-
cuse her of doing so, nor do I credit his denial that he
pointed out to Brown the favorable comparison of the
capital "A" on her job application with the "A" on the
handwritten notice . Moore admitted that he had placed
Brown 's personnel folder on his desk during his interview
but explained that he took this measure because he did not
know all of the operators and he decided to check on their
production abilities. I deem Moore 's explanation in this
regard both implausible and improbable for I find it incon-
ceivable that Moore would not have known of Brown's
identity in view of his studied observation of her activities
which resulted in their meeting , because Brown was a
"good operator" whose production had never been
criticized and inasmuch as the record fails to establish
that production records are contained in personnel
jackets. Outraged by Moore's accusation, I find that
Brown vehemently denied that she was responsible for
the posting and returned to work , where she commenced,
in McCurley's presence, to condemn with damnation
Moore , Roberts, and Respondents. I also find, based
upon McCurley ' s undisputed testimony, that Brown
castigated Roberts because he had enjoyed the benefits
of a labor organization for 20 years at another plant but
had chosen to deny his employees similar emoluments at
the Opp installation , and Brown proclaimed that she
would immediately "fight for [the Union] and ... work
for it day and day out." McCurley testified that, after as-
signing the respective parties to purgatory, Brown
requested that her supervisor turn in "her Goddamn
time" and that Brown chose not to work for Respondents
any longer because they lacked confidence in her. I do
not credit the testimony of McCurley or Moore that
Brown had manifested her intention to quit on June 14,
because I also deem their testimonial recitations on this
score to be inherently improbable. Moore related that he
had decided, on McCurley's recommendation, to allow
Brown to continue to work until an undisclosed pay date,
and then stated that he permitted her employment to con-
tinue until the vacation period which commenced on July
1. McCurley averred that Brown had given the former a
2-week notice of her intention to resign, and that her em-
ployment status was retained until July 1. Not only does
the record fail to establish that Respondents' gesture of
benevolence by extending her job security was trans-
mitted to Brown by either Moore or McCurley, but, if my
mathematics are correct, the 2-week notice period should
have expired on June 28 following Brown's alleged
resignation on June 14. Moreover, Moore and McCurley
professed that, but for Brown's profanity on June 14, she
would have remained in Respondents' employ. Neverthe-
less, McCurley conceded that she had experienced previ-
ous "flare-ups" and instances of profanity by Brown, as
well as by other employees, which she tolerated, and
Moore, while conceding that profane words were uttered
in the plant and the epithet "damn" had been directed
toward him on past occasions without recrimination, he
suddenly concluded that Brown's use of that word in con-
nection with his name was too "severe" on this occasion
and justified her loss of employment. If Brown's verbal
transgressions were of such gravity, I fail to perceive why
she was not immediately discharged when she uttered
them, in view of McCurley's testimony that another em-
ployee who had used the expression "damn" was in-
stantly terminated some 8 or 10 years before.
Viewing the testimony as a whole, I am convinced and
find that Respondents knew or suspected that Brown was
a most active union supporter among the operators on the
flight suit line under McCurley's supervision. I also find
that any doubt as to Brown's sympathies for that labor or-
ganization were dispelled when, after being questioned by
Moore concerning the posting of a union notice in the
ladies room, Brown swore that henceforth she would be
in the forefront of the union movement. I therefore find
that Respondents discharged Brown on July 1, not
because she had used profanity or had resigned her posi-
tion on June 14 due to her anger over being accused of
posting the union notice, but because she had manifested
a deep interest in assisting the Union. Accordingly, I con-
clude that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act when they struck her name from their employment
rolls. I also credit Brown's testimony that, in early June,
McCurley asked Brown to supply the names of the em-
ployees on the flight suit line who had attended a union
meeting, and created the impression of the surveillance of
the employees' union activities by stating that she was al-
ready aware of their identity. I conclude that, by this con-
duct, Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that Respondents engaged in
further incursions into the statutory rights of its em-
ployees. Employee Shirley Bullard testified that she had
attended a union meeting on May 19, the date on which
General Manager Roberts addressed his workers and
suggested that they go to the meeting to assess the
benefits which the Union promised over those which the
Respondents had already put into effect. On June 2, she
received a copy of Respondents' no-solicitation rule from
production Manager Moore. Bullard recited that she cam-
paigned on behalf of the Union before work and during
her lunchbreaks. In early June, Bullard had a conversa-
tion with Jeanette Day, her supervisor. Also present was
fellow employee Nellie Sims. The discussion centered
around the Union and Day interrogated Bullard about
discussions concerning this organization's campaign and
OPP TEXTILES, INC. 211
distributing authorization cards to her fellow employees.
Bullard denied that she had engaged in this activity during
working hours, and asked how she possibly could "turn
out my production like I can and talk about the union all
day like you say I do?" Day insisted that she overheard
Bullard discussing the Union and observed the latter
passing out cards during lunchbreaks. When Bullard
protested that she did not possess any authorization cards
for distribution, Day inquired how an employee named
Josephine Blue managed to have such a card in her
pocketbook, to which Bullard replied that Day should
direct her inquiry to Blue. Day then added that "I know
that you did go to the union meeting on Monday because
your car was seen down there." Bullard retorted that she
did not attend this assemblage and that whoever reported
this to Day had uttered a falsehood. Employee Nellie
Sims, who was privy to this discussion because Bullard's
machine was located directly behind hers, corroborated
Bullard's testimony in all respects.
I credit Bullard and Sims, not only because of the sincere
and forthright manner in which they gave their testimony,
but because the testimony of Day impressed me as being
both contradictory and implausible. When questioned as to
whether she had any conversation with Bullard concern-
ing the Union, Day initially replied "I don't know if the
Union was mentioned," but then acknowledged that a
discussion of this topic did take place. According to
Day's account of this incident, she noticed that Bullard
and Sims were talking while they should have been work-
ing and she approached their machines in an attempt to
correct this situation. As she proceeded to their work sta-
tion, Day overheard Bullard speaking in a loud voice and
Day believed that Bullard "wanted me to hear her
because she was real loud," although Day failed to ex-
plain the basis for her belief and although both Day and
Bullard knew that Respondents' no-solicitation rule made
it a dischargeable offense to discuss union subjects on
company time. While Day stated that she could not re-
member exactly what was said by Bullard, she did recall
a remark by Bullard "about somebody telling lies on her'
and Day also heard her utter that "she had been going to
Union meetings and that we didn't know who it was but
we would be surprised to know who had been but, she
had been accused of it." When asked whether, in this con-
versation, Bullard made the inquiry as to how she could
possibly keep up her production if she had spent the day
talking about the Union, an accusation attributed to Day,
Day did not deny making this comment, simply asserting
that she could not remember. Throughout her testimony,
Day insisted that the entire subject of Bullard's union
proclivities and activities was volunteered by Bullard and
Day denied asking any questions on these subjects. How-
ever, after Bullard repeated her statement "about some-
body seeing her car somewhere," Day conceded that she
inquired "If you weren't there, how did your car get
there?" I deem it unreasonable that Day would have
posed this query in response to a declarative assertion by
Bullard that someone had seen the latter's automobile at
a union meeting, unless Day had already learned or
suspected that Bullard's vehicle was noted in the vicinity
of the meeting. Moreover, Day denied telling Bullard that
she had passed out union cards and denied asking "how
did that card get in Josephine Blue's pocketbook?"
Nevertheless, Day admitted that she was aware that Bul-
lard had been distributing authorization cards to em-
ployees because "I had been told that she had been."
Finally, Day acknowledged that Bullard was one of three
girls in her department who was handed a copy of
Respondents' no-solicitation rule because Bullard was in
a group of employees where excessive talking during the
union campaign had been taking place.
In sum, I find that, in the middle of June, Day engaged
Bullard and Sims in a discussion concerning the Union
during which she interrogated Bullard regarding the
latter's distribution of authorization cards and her engage-
ment in other protected, concerted activities. I also find
that Day asked Bullard how employee Blue came to pos-
sess a union card. Finally, I find that Day informed Bul-
lard that the former knew that Bullard had attended a
union meeting because her automobile was observed at
that gathering. I conclude that the foregoing acts of inter-
rogation interfered with, restrained, and coerced Bullard
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7, and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). I also conclude that
Day's remarks concerning Bullard's attendance at a
union meeting and the presence of her vehicle thereat
created the impression of surveillance of Respondents'
employees' union activities, and constituted a further
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the statute.
Margie Ruth Short, an employee with more than 91
years' seniority at the plant, worked under the supervi-
sion of Tess Morgan and joined the Union on May 30. It
is Short's uncontroverted testimony that, in early June,
she was handed a copy of the no-solicitation rule by
General Manager Roberts with the comment, "Margie,
I want to make sure that you get one of these." Short
further testified without contradiction that, around the
middle of June, she had returned to her machine after a
visit to the restroom and Roberts was waiting at her work
station. Short commented to Roberts "if I knew you were
out here I would not have come back." Short commenced
work, at which juncture Roberts exclaimed, "Margie
Ruth, I have warned you the last time about your union
activity." When Short attempted to respond, Roberts
cautioned her to "Just hush, I don't want to hear anything
from you."
Based upon Short's undenied testimony, I find that, in
the middle of June, Roberts warned Short against engag-
ing in union activities without regard to time or place. By
this conduct, I conclude that Respondents additionally
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act, I shall recommend that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondents discriminatorily
discharged Christine M. Bowden on June 20, 1966, and
Emma Jean Brown on July 1, 1966, I shall recommend
that Respondents offer them immediate and full reinstate-
336-845 0 - 70 - 15
212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment to their former or substantially equivalent employ-
ment and make them whole for any loss of pay they may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination practiced
against them, by payment to them of a sum equal to that
which they normally would have earned from the dates of
their discharge to the dates of offer of reinstatement, less
their net earnings during said periods. The backpay pro-
vided for herein shall be computed in accordance with the
Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per-
cent per annum computed in the manner prescribed in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
Because of the nature and extent of the unfair labor
practices engaged in by Respondents, which evince an at-
titude of opposition to the purposes of the Act in general,
I deem it necessary to recommend that Respondents
cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon
the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions, and upon the entire record in the case, I
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents are employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Christine M. Bowden and Emma
Jean Brown, thereby discriminating in regard to their hire
and tenure of employment, in order to discourage mem-
bership in and activity on behalf of the Union, Respond-
ents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of _the Act, the Respondents have engaged in and
are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and the entire record in this case, and pur-
suant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended , I recommend that Respondents, Opp
Textiles, Inc., and Covington Industries , Inc., Opp,
Alabama, their officers , agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in and activities on be-
half of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of their em-
ployees, by discharging any employee, or in any other
manner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment , or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union activities , sympathies , and desires , and those
of their fellow employees ; creating the impression of the
surveillance of their employees ' union activities; and
warning employees against engaging in union activities.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization , to form labor organizations , to join or assist
the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Christine M. Bowden and Emma Jean
Brown immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent employment and make them
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a
result of the discrimination practiced against them in the
manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Notify Christine M. Bowden and Emma Jean
Brown if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement upon ap-
plication in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Post at their plant in Opp, Alabama, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix. `21 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 15, after being duly signed by a representative,
shall be posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60 con-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.22
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
herein be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not heretofore found.
21 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall-be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
22 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondents have taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activi-
ties on behalf of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
OPP TEXTILES, INC.
America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, by discharging any of our employees or in any
other manner discriminating against our employees
in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or
any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union activities, sym-
pathies, and desires or those of their fellow em-
ployees; WE WILL NOT create the impression that we
are spying on the union activities of our employees;
and WE WILL NOT warn our employees against en-
gaging in union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization , to form labor or-
ganizations , or to join or assist the above-named
Union or any other labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing , and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
WE WILL offer Christine M. Bowden and Emma
Jean Brown immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent employment and
make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a
result of our discrimination against them.
213
WE WILL notify Christine M. Bowden and Emma
Jean Brown if presently serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States of their right to full reinstate-
ment upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
All our employees are free to become or remain or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
above-named Union or any other labor organization.
Dated By
OPP TEXTILES, INC., AND
COVINGTON INDUSTRIES,
INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024 Federal
Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans,
Louisiana 70113, Telephone 527-6361.