Operating Engineers Local 370

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 2004

341 N.L.R.B. 822 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 822
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
370 and Melvin E. Thoreson. Case 19–CA–
27935
April 30, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND WALSH
On September 24, 2002, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Kennedy issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions as
modified below and to adopt the recommended Order.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, Operating
Engineers Local 370 (the local), unlawfully discharged
its paid organizer, Melvin Thoreson, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, because he repeatedly
criticized the Local for allowing employers to cease mak-
ing pension fund contributions on behalf of probationary
apprentices. The judge dismissed the complaint, finding
that the Respondent’s decision to discharge Thoreson
was not motivated by animus against union organizing,
that its action did not tend to encourage or discourage
union membership, and further that Thoreson’s conduct
was neither concerted nor protected. No exceptions were
filed to the dismissal of the 8(a)(3) allegation.
As the judge stated, “[A] more complex question is
presented under Section 8(a)(1).” Unlike the judge, we
will assume, without deciding, that Thoreson’s conduct
was for “mutual aid or protection” within the meaning of
Section 7 and that it was therefore both protected and
concerted. We conclude, however, that the Respondent
has a strong legitimate interest in ensuring that its em-
ployees cooperate with its policies and that this interest
outweighs whatever Section 7 interest Thoreson may
have had in criticizing those policies. We therefore af-
firm the judge’s finding that Thoreson’s discharge did
not violate the Act.2

1 No party excepted to the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling the Charging Party that it denied
his unemployment application because he filed an unfair labor practice
charge.
2 In agreeing with his colleagues that the judge correctly dismissed
the complaint allegation that the Respondent unlawfully discharged its
paid organizer, Melvin Thoreson, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) because
he disparaged the Local for allowing employers to cease making pen-
sion contributions on behalf of probationary apprentices, Member
Schaumber would adopt the judge’s analysis on this issue. However,
he would not rely on fn. 6 of the judge’s decision.
Facts
In April 2000, Thoreson was named the Local’s organ-
izer by its business manager, Curtis Koegen, who also
serves as an employee trustee of the union pension fund
and as chairman of the Local’s negotiating committee.
Thoreson was responsible for locating and organizing
nonunion employers and employees operating heavy
equipment in the construction and construction-related
industries within Respondent's work jurisdiction. He
also led Construction Organizing Membership Education
Training (COMET) classes that taught members how to
organize.
From April 2000 until February 6, 2002, Thoreson or-
ganized no companies and no employees on his own. In
July 2001, concerned about Thoreson’s poor perform-
ance, Business Manager Koegen brought Richard Pound,
the International’s organizing representative, into the
Local to work with Thoreson three or four times a week
in an effort to improve his organizing results. Koegen
told Pound that Thoreson would be terminated if his or-
ganizing results did not improve. Later that summer,
with Pound’s assistance, Thoreson had his lone success
as an organizer: organizing a company with four em-
ployees.
Members of the Local participate in the Engineers Lo-
cal 370-AGC Retirement Trust of the Inland Empire
(pension fund). The collective-bargaining agreement
requires member employers to contribute to the fund at a
certain sum for each compensable hour worked by em-
ployees.
In 2001, the Local realized that the number of mem-
bers leaving the union each year exceeded the number of
new members gained. The Local also found that em-
ployers were not hiring enough apprentices to sustain the
apprenticeship program. After researching the practices
of sister locals and other construction industry unions,
the Local discovered that some unions sought to resolve
these types of problem by waiving employer pension
contributions for apprentices. As a result, at its May 4,
2001 meeting, the pension fund’s board of trustees rec-
ommended that employer contributions be discontinued
for probationary apprentices, conditioned on an amend-
ment of the collective-bargaining agreement. On June
27, 2001, a letter of understanding, signed by Koegen,
acting as the chairman of the negotiating committee,
amended the collective-bargaining agreement, waiving
pension contributions by employers for probationary
apprentices.
In late 2001, several months after the contribution
waiver was put into effect, Thoreson overheard Shelly
Street, an apprentice, talking about the policy. She ex-
plained the waiver to Thoreson. After admitting he did
341 NLRB No. 114
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 370 823
not know the reason for the waiver and needed to learn
more about it, Thoreson stated that the waiver was not a
good idea and criticized it as a product of unwise conces-
sionary bargaining.
At least once, and perhaps twice, in late 2001, Thore-
son discussed the contribution waiver with Koegen.
Koegen explained the reasons for the decision to Thore-
son, and Thoreson then expressed his disagreement with
the policy. In late January 2002, Thoreson had a similar
exchange with Mike Mitchell, the Local’s assistant busi-
ness agent, concerning the waiver. On January 29, 2002,
Thoreson discussed the contribution waiver with appren-
tices in his COMET class. On February 1, at a union
meeting, Thoreson raised the waiver issue during the
report of Danny Thiemans, the apprenticeship coordina-
tor. Thiemans then explained the rationale for the waiver
to Thoreson and others at the meeting. The next week,
Thoreson discussed the issue again with Assistant Busi-
ness Manager Mitchell. A day later, Thoreson discussed
the waiver with several apprentices, including Street.
The next morning, Thoreson discussed the waiver again
in his COMET class. During a break in the class, one of
the students, apprentice Jerome Morris, expressed his
discontent with the waiver to Thoreson.
That night, February 6, Thoreson attended a regular
union meeting run by Mitchell. When the meeting came
to new business, Thoreson asked Mitchell why the
waiver was implemented. Mitchell pointed out that he
had explained the decision to Thoreson several times, but
explained it once again. At that point, Mitchell answered
questions about the policy from the audience. The issue
was then discussed by Mitchell, Thoreson, and members
of the audience, including Morris. After ten to fifteen
minutes, discussion ended, and Mitchell gaveled the is-
sue closed.
Mitchell’s action angered Thoreson, who wanted to
say more about the waiver. Thoreson picked up his pa-
pers and left the room. He sat in his truck for a period,
and then returned to the meeting. Upon his return,
Thoreson gave his regular organizer’s report. However,
when he was finished, he once again began to discuss the
waiver. At some point in his discussion, Thoreson
turned to Mitchell and commented that the Local was
“f—ing” the apprentices.
The next morning, Mitchell telephoned Koegen and
described Thoreson’s behavior at the meeting. Koegen
told Mitchell to terminate Thoreson.3 Later that morn-
ing, Mitchell informed Thoreson that he was terminated.

3 The judge found that even before the February 6 meeting, Koegen
had become dissatisfied with Throseson’s performance as an organizer,
did not regard him as an asset to the Union, and had decided to dis-
The Judge’s Decision and the Parties’ Positions
The judge dismissed the complaint allegations chal-
lenging Thoreson’s discharge. As to the 8(a)(1) allega-
tion,4 in the judge’s view, mutual aid or protection of
employees within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act
was not Thoreson’s purpose, and his activity, therefore,
was neither concerted nor protected. The judge found
that Thoreson’s actions were not concerted, insofar as he
was not acting with or on the authority of other employ-
ees, but rather solely on his own behalf. His rhetoric, the
judge found, was more in the nature of an individual
seeking to position himself for a run at union office. And
his behavior was “not that of an individual seeking to
protect the interests of employees. Instead, it was to
challenge the integrity of the service which the Union
provides to its membership.” The judge found that a
union employee (as opposed to a union member) who
disparages the way the union represents its members is
no more protected than any other employee who dispar-
ages his employer’s product or service.
In exceptions, the General Counsel argues that Thore-
son was engaged in intraunion and other protected con-
certed activities at the February 6 meeting, and that his
statement to the effect that the Local was abusing the
apprentices was not so egregious that it lost the protec-
tion of the Act. He therefore contends that Thoreson was
discharged for his protected activity. The Respondent
contends that the judge correctly found that Thoreson’s
conduct was neither concerted nor protected intraunion
activity, that a union may properly value loyalty and co-
operation of its employees, and that, in any event, Thore-
son was discharged for his utter failure as an organizer,
compounded by his unprofessional behavior at the Feb-
ruary 6 meeting—not for his alleged protected activities.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judge’s
dismissal of the complaint.
Analysis
The issue before us is whether a union may lawfully
discharge a paid employee in a key position such as
Thoreson’s for criticizing the union’s collective-
bargaining policies and decisions. Two distinct ques-
tions are presented. The first is whether Thoreson’s
criticism of the union’s contribution waiver policy is
concerted activity that is protected from employer inter-
ference by Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act. Unlike the
judge, we will assume, without deciding, that as a statu-

charge him because of reports concerning “Thoreson’s desultory ap-
proach to his job.” No exceptions have been filed to that finding.
4 As noted, supra, the judge found that the discharge did not violate
Sec. 8(a)(3), and no exceptions were filed to this finding.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 824
tory employee himself,5 Thoreson was engaged in con-
certed activity at the February 6 meeting consistent with
the “mutual aid or protection” clause of Section 7. See
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (statutory
definition of “employee” intended to protect employees
when they engage in otherwise proper concerted activi-
ties in support of employees of employers other than
their own; in recognition of this intent, “mutual aid or
protection” language of Section 7 encompasses such ac-
tivity). See also Service Employees Local 254 (Brandeis
University), 332 NLRB 1118, 1122 & fn. 13 (2000)
(steward had Section 7 right to question adequacy of his
union’s representation of the bargaining unit). That,
however, does not end our inquiry.
A second question is whether the Respondent has a le-
gitimate countervailing interest that outweighs the exer-
cise of Thoreson’s Section 7 rights. In determining
whether employer actions constitute unlawful interfer-
ence with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights,
the Board and the courts may balance employees’ Sec-
tion 7 rights with their employer’s countervailing legiti-
mate interests. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc., supra (employees’
right to distribute newsletter on employer’s property,
protected under “mutual aid or protection” clause of Sec-
tion 7, balanced against employer’s property rights); Re-
public Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797–798 (1945)
(“adjustment between the undisputed right of self-
organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act
and the equally undisputed right of employers to main-
tain discipline in their establishments”). We, therefore,
will balance Thoreson’s (assumed) right to engage in this
activity against the legitimacy of the employer interest at
stake.
In this case, the employer interest at stake—i.e., the
Respondent’s institutional interest as both an employer
and a union—is well grounded in federal labor policy.
The Board and the courts have treated union-employee
loyalty to the union as a legitimate consideration and
have permitted unions to terminate various staff mem-
bers for dissident activities. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456
U.S. 431 (1982); Brandeis University, supra, 332 NLRB
at 1122; Shenango, Inc., 237 NLRB 1355 (1978). Simi-
larly, as the exclusive representative of employees, the
Union has a legitimate interest in speaking with one
voice. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975). As
the Supreme Court there observed, a union has “a legiti-
mate interest in presenting a united front . . . and in not
seeing its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by

5 The Respondent has not asserted that because Thoreson carries out
its policies he is a managerial employee, excluded from the coverage of
the Act.
subgroups within the unit separately pursuing what they
see as separate interests.” Id. at 70.
Accordingly, the Board has long held that a union has
a right to demand cooperation from its paid employees
and appointed representatives, and may discharge or re-
move those who are hostile to or in disagreement with
the leadership in the interest of promoting internal unity.
Thus, in Shenango, supra, the Board found that the union
president lawfully removed a plant safety committee
chairman who campaigned for another candidate, be-
cause “the union is legitimately entitled to hostility to-
wards dissidence in such positions where teamwork, loy-
alty and cooperation are necessary to enable the union to
administer the contract.” In Brandeis, supra, the Board
held that the union lawfully removed a member from his
position as union representative on the contractual labor-
management committee because the member’s interest
“in being elected to his union positions does not out-
weigh the Union's legitimate interest in ensuring the un-
divided loyalty of those who represent it in dealing with
the employer about working conditions.” 332 NLRB at
1123.6
In light of these precedents,7 Koegen and Local 370
could legitimately demand the loyal service and coopera-
tion of Local 370’s employees in important positions like
Thoreson’s in the implementation of its policies. Thore-
son, however, was anything but cooperative. Even after
Local 370 officials Koegen, Mitchell, and Thiemans re-
peatedly explained the reasons for the contribution
waiver, Thoreson persistently criticized it in the course
of his employment teaching COMET classes, as well as
in union meetings. Thoreson essentially took it upon
himself to protest the contribution waiver on behalf of
the apprentices and used his position to do so.
Thoreson’s uncooperative behavior reached a cres-
cendo at the February 6 union meeting. At that meeting,
Thoreson raised the issue once again. After yet another
round of explanations of the policy by Assistant Business
Agent Mitchell, and a 15–20 minute discussion of the
issue, Mitchell gaveled the issue closed. Angered that he
was unable to say more, Thoreson stormed out. When he
6 Similarly, in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 442 (1982), the Su-
preme Court held that nothing in the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act prohibited an elected union president from removing
appointed business agents who campaigned for another candidate,
because a union president must have the power to appoint agents of his
choice to carry out his policies.
7 Although Brandeis and Shenango involved alleged violations of
Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), rather than Sec. 8(a)(1), they describe the legitimate
interest at stake here and apply a balancing test that is appropriate here
as well. Both types of cases implicate conflict between two important
elements of our federal labor policy: the protection of employees’ Sec.
7 rights and the legitimate interest that unions have in the loyalty of
their employees to union policies.

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 370 825
returned, taking advantage of the fact that his regular
organizing report gave him the floor, Thoreson launched
additional attacks on the waiver, including his statement
that the Local was “f—ing” the apprentices.
Local 370 had a legitimate interest in the support of its
key paid employees for its contribution waiver policy.
Therefore, it had legitimate and substantial reasons to be
hostile to Thoreson for his relentless attacks on that pol-
icy. Brandeis, 332 NLRB at 1122, citing Shenango, 237
NLRB at 1355.
By contrast, Thoreson’s Section 7 interests, if any, are
much less substantial. By Thoreson’s own admission,
the contribution waiver had no impact on his own work-
ing conditions as an employee of the Local. To the ex-
tent that Thoreson's conduct might be described as mak-
ing common cause, as an employee, with the apprentices,
his efforts were not directed toward the apprentices' em-
ployers, but toward the policies of their bargaining repre-
sentative, which happened to be his employer.8 In this
particular context, we conclude that any arguable Section
7 interest belonging to Thoreson was outweighed by the
strong legitimate interest of Local 370 in ensuring loyalty
by its key paid employees to its policies. Accordingly,
Thoreson’s discharge did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Local 370, its officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

Daniel Sanders, for the General Counsel
Steven A. Crumb (Crumb & Munding), of Spokane, Washing-
ton, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Spokane, Washington, on June 25–26, 2002, on a
complaint issued on April 30, 2002, by the Regional Director
for Region 19. The complaint is based upon an unfair labor
practice charge filed by Melvin E. Thoresen, an individual
(Thoresen or the Charging Party), on February 15, 2002,1 and
amended on April 30. It alleges that Respondent, International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 370, AFL–CIO (Respon-
dent) has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act). Respondent denies the allegations and

8 Because Local 370 took no action against Thoreson as a union
member, there is no reason to believe that union members not em-
ployed by the Local would fear that they would risk union discipline if
they protested the contribution waiver.
1 All dates are 2002 unless otherwise indicated.
asserts that Thoresen did not engage in activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act
ISSUES
The issue presented is whether Respondent, a labor organiza-
tion acting in its capacity as an employer, unlawfully dis-
charged Thoresen, employed as a staff member, serving as one
of its organizers. The General Counsel asserts that Thoresen
was fired for his concerted protected activity and/or because of
his internal union activities. Respondent contends it fired
Thoresen for good cause and that Thoresen’s conduct did not
rise to the level of activity protected by Section 7, adding that
Thoresen was failing to perform his job adequately and that the
incident which triggered the discharge was not protected by the
Act. In addition, there is an allegation that Respondent’s busi-
ness manager threatened to resist Thoresen’s unemployment
compensation claim because he had filed this unfair labor prac-
tice charge.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits that it is a labor organization organized
as an unincorporated association, headquartered in Spokane,
Washington. It represents employees in collective bargaining
with their employers and further admits that during the calendar
year 2001 it collected and received dues and initiation fees in
excess of $100,000, of which more than $50,000 was remitted
to its parent, the International Union of Operating Engineers,
AFL–CIO, located in Washington D.C. Accordingly, I find
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7).
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent is a labor union whose geographical jurisdiction
extends east from the 120th meridian in Washington State (in-
cluding the Tri-Cities of Pasco, Kennewick, and Richland), to
the Idaho border and further east to cover much of Idaho). Its
principal offices are in Spokane, but it is divided into districts,
each of which has an office, including one in Pasco. Its busi-
ness manager is Curt Koegen; the assistant business manager is
Mike Mitchell. Respondent employs several individuals, in-
cluding office clerical employees, a dispatcher, and at least one
organizer. The alleged discriminatee, Mel Thoresen was for-
merly employed as an organizer. Respondent negotiates a mas-
ter collective-bargaining agreement with the Inland Northwest
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors on behalf of its
member contractors, covering their construction industry em-
ployees who operate heavy equipment and machinery. One of
the contract’s provisions creates an apprenticeship program. In
addition, the collective-bargaining contract establishes a pen-
sion fund. Both are operated under the Taft-Hartley Act as
joint labor-management trusts.
During 2001 and early 2002, Respondent, the apprenticeship
program and the pension plan realized that the number of retir-
ees was exceeding the number of new entrants into the industry.
In 2001, the apprenticeship plan sought to increase the number

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 826
of apprentices working in the field, and added 35 new appren-
tices. Simultaneously, all three entities discovered that em-
ployers were not hiring apprentices with the frequency and the
numbers needed to sustain the program. Not only would the 35
get insufficient employment, but there was a serious risk that
they would quit the program in favor of some other kind of
livelihood. Both the apprenticeship officials and the union
leadership realized something needed to be done. Looking at
sister locals and other construction industry unions, they
learned that those unions had sought to resolve the same prob-
lem by waiving pension contributions from employers on be-
half of the first-year apprentices. Respondent, after some care-
ful thought, accepted a recommendation from its apprenticeship
coordinator to try the same thing. On May 4, 2001, the appren-
ticeship trust approved a waiver of pension contributions for the
first 1600 hours worked by an apprentice. This waiver was
incorporated into the collective-bargaining agreement by a
letter of understanding on June 27, 2001. The pension trust had
no difficulty accepting the waiver, finding that it was not ad-
verse to the fund.2 The waiver was implemented immediately
thereafter.
The change was discussed at various union meetings which
occurred around that time, but did not seem to draw much at-
tention from the membership.
B. Mel Thoresen
Between 1994 and 1998, Respondent, under a predecessor
administration, employed Mel Thoresen as a business agent
attached to the Pasco district. As work slowed down at the
Hanford plant, Thoresen was laid off. When Koegen became
the business manager in 2000, he appointed Thoresen as the
Local’s organizer. Thoresen worked out of a basement office at
the Union’s Spokane headquarters.
Thoresen was an at-will employee. None of Respondent’s
employees are represented by a labor union, although it appears
that most, including Thoresen, are members of Respondent.
During this entire time period, Thoresen was entertaining
thoughts about running against Koegen, seeking the job of
business manager. A decision did not need to be made for
some time, as the end of Koegen’s term was in the distant fu-
ture.
As an organizer, it was Thoresen’s responsibility to locate
nonunion employers performing business within Respondent’s
“work jurisdiction,” i.e., operating heavy equipment in the con-
struction and construction-related industries. Richard Pound,
an International organizer, testified that an organizer’s job re-
quires him to be out of the office about 85 percent of the time,
and that the job is not a 9 to 5 responsibility, but more of a 5 to
9 one. During his nearly 2 years as an organizer, Thoresen only

2 See Union Exh. 20, an explanatory letter from the trust fund man-
ager, received by stipulation in lieu of testimony. Though written a
year later, it clearly explains that the waiver did not threaten the integ-
rity of the pension fund. It was in good financial health; moreover, it
already had accounted for dropouts during their first 1600 hours. Fur-
thermore the waived contributions, if maximized for all 35 apprentices
was $140,000; yet that only amounted to 8/10,000 of 1 percent of the
Fund’s assets. Finally, the amount of benefits their contribution would
have generated was so small as to be actuarially immeasurable.
organized one company, and that with Pound’s assistance. It
netted only four new members.
During the summer of 2001, Koegen realized that Thoresen
had not obtained recognition from any employers during his
incumbency. He had reports that Thoresen was spending most
of his time in the office, rather than in the field. He had even
heard reports that Thoresen was spending time playing on his
personal laptop computer. Moreover, he knew that Thoresen
was not keeping up-to-date on his weekly activity reports and
he was having some difficulty in tracking what Thoresen was
doing.3 However, Thoresen did have other duties. These prin-
cipally consisted of teaching the so-called COMET (Construc-
tion Organizing Membership Education Training) classes.
Conducted mostly during the winter, these were training classes
regarding first, the need to organize and second, teaching orga-
nizing techniques including “salting.” In any event, Koegen
contacted Pound and arranged for Pound to come into Respon-
dent’s geographical territory to try to energize Thoresen.
Pound reports that getting Thoresen motivated took a great deal
of “caffeine,” but once past that hurdle Thoresen would get
started. Even so, it was Pound who noticed the concrete pump-
ing equipment leading to Thoresen’s only success. Indeed,
Thoresen had driven by the employer’s yard innumerable times
unaware that there was an employer located there which should
have been a target.
At one point during that summer, Thoresen became aware
that Koegen was beginning to doubt him. He knew Koegen
had made entries on his reports suggesting that Koegen was
displeased with his performance as an organizer. It does not
appear that Thoresen understood that Koegen had sought
Pound’s assistance because he doubted Thoresen’s capability.
Thoresen’s performance compares poorly with that of business
agent-cum-assistant business manager Mike Mitchell during the
same period. Mitchell signed up three to four employers per
year for a total of six–eight. 4
C. Thoresen’s Behavior Concerning the Apprenticeship Pen-
sion Contribution Waiver
Although the apprenticeship pension waiver had been im-
plemented in June 2001, Thoresen inexplicably was entirely
unaware of it. Sometime in late 2001 or early 2002, Thoresen
3 In fact Thoresen testified he did not turn in the bimonthly report
covering October and November 2001, until sometime in December.
Furthermore, his entries often stopped at midday, contained some odd
entries (attempted phone calls, errands to the supermarket, shoveling
snow), and excessive time in performing relatively simple tasks such as
drawing up boilerplate intraunion charges against union members.
And, he never turned in any activity report for January 2002, or that
portion of February before he was discharged. Koegen testified that he
never saw the October-November bimonthly report until late February
2002 when he finally acquired the material from Thoresen’s laptop.
Koegen’s testimony suggests that Thoresen never did turn in those
reports.
4 Although Pound’s performance as an organizer for sister Local 302
far exceeded anyone’s performance for Respondent, it may be inappro-
priate to compare the two as Local 302 is much larger and includes
western Washington, a far more populous area. It is also not clear that
the time periods are the same. Even so, Thoresen’s success rate is most
unimpressive.

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 370 827
had a conversation with Respondent’s dispatcher, Shelley
Street. Street thought that the policy was unwise, and Thoresen
agreed. Shortly thereafter, Thoresen spoke to Koegen about it.
Koegen told him that he didn’t like it either, but there seemed
to be little choice in the matter, explaining the reasoning behind
it. He observed that the idea had come from apprenticeship
coordinator Danny Thiemens. Sometime in January, Thoresen
spoke to Mitchell about it, and Mitchell, too, explained the
logic behind the decision. Both men expressed some misgiv-
ings over the waiver, but stood by it as a matter of economic
necessity. Thoresen, however, could not accept it.
On February 1, Respondent conducted a general union meet-
ing in Spokane. The meeting was chaired by Mitchell, as
Koegen had departed for a 6-week program in Boston at the
Harvard Business School. During that meeting, Thiemens gave
his routine apprenticeship committee report. Thoresen took
advantage of the opportunity to publicly question Thiemens
about his recommendation and the apprenticeship committee’s
decision. Thoresen’s questioning was aggressive, derisive, and
scornful. He asserted that the waiver was nothing more than
concessionary bargaining which he believed was contrary to
proper trade union philosophy. Thiemens, like Koegen and
Mitchell before him, again explained the reasoning behind the
waiver. This was the first time Thoresen had publicly chal-
lenged the policy.
Shortly thereafter, Thiemens telephoned Mitchell about an-
other matter. During their conversation Thiemens wondered
why Thoresen had attacked him over the waiver. Mitchell was
sympathetic to Thiemens and told him he would try to smooth
the matter over with Thoresen.
Thoresen testified that he received a telephone call from
Mitchell the following day in which Mitchell instructed him to
apologize to Thiemens. He regarded it as a threat to his job if
he did not do so. Mitchell describes the conversation far more
benignly. He says that after he informed Thoresen that Thie-
mens had been offended, Thoresen asked him what he should
do, “Apologize?” Mitchell says he replied, “Well, that
wouldn’t be a bad idea.”
Believing he had been threatened with discharge, Thoresen
spoke to both the dispatcher and the office secretary about what
had transpired. He says they were sympathetic to his point of
view.
On Wednesday, February 6, Thoresen traveled to Pasco to
conduct a COMET class during the day and to attend the Un-
ion’s district meeting scheduled for Kennewick in the evening.
During the class, he sought to explain to the two attendees what
kind of conduct constituted protected concerted activities
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. He contended that
his conduct to protest the waiver was protected.
That evening he joined Mitchell at the head table during the
union meeting. When Mitchell reached a point in the meeting
where he opened the floor to new business, Thoresen raised the
waiver issue again. A discussion concerning the waiver lasted
for about 15 minutes, during which Mitchell explained to the
approximately 31 attendees the logic behind the waiver. About
that point, the discussion seemed to die down, but Thoresen
continued to expostulate his point of view. Declaring that
Thoresen was “beating a dead horse to death” Mitchell finally
gaveled the issue closed and sought to move the meeting for-
ward.
Thoresen, incensed by being gaveled down, collected his be-
longings, stood up and, making a show, visibly walked out of
the meeting. He walked outside to his pickup truck. After a
few minutes he was joined by one of the attendees from the
COMET class who persuaded him to return to the meeting.
Thoresen did so a few minutes later, sitting in the rear of the
room. Mitchell continued to go through the meeting’s agenda,
eventually reaching a point where he called for an organizer’s
report, asking Thoresen to present it. Thoresen walked to the
front of the room, but instead of giving his report, resumed his
criticism of the Union’s grant of the waiver. He was quite ve-
hement, going so far as to say that the union was “f—ing” the
apprentices. There is evidence that his performance lasted as
long as 10 minutes. No one interrupted him, and when he was
done, he turned to his organizing report and gave it in a profes-
sional manner.
Afterwards, at least one and probably two or three individu-
als approached Mitchell to complain that Thoresen had behaved
inappropriately and unprofessionally. Mitchell himself was
stunned by Thoresen’s performance. He could not understand
why Thoresen would not accept the policy; was fighting about
it more than 6 months after it had been put in place; had earlier
insulted Thiemens; and was denigrating the integrity of the
decision. Furthermore he could not understand why Thoresen
felt it necessary to grandstand in the fashion that he had. He
believed Thoresen had behaved in a manner inconsistent with
that of a hired employee who, even if he disagreed with a par-
ticular employer policy, was nonetheless obligated at the very
least to tolerate, if not endorse, it. He drove back to Spokane.
Mitchell says that he had become so exercised about Thore-
sen’s behavior he was unable to sleep that evening. Early in the
morning he telephoned Koegen in Boston to describe what had
happened. Koegen testified that he was already dissatisfied
with Thoresen’s performance as an organizer and did not regard
him as an asset to the Union. While in Boston he had heard
some additional negative reports concerning Thoresen’s desul-
tory approach to his job and had told Lynne Sorensen, the
bookkeeper, to make out two checks for Thoresen before she
left on her vacation that week. Cutting two checks meant that
he had already decided to discharge Thoresen.
After listening to Mitchell’s description, Koegen decided
that he would not wait any more to let Thoresen go. He in-
structed Mitchell to discharge Thoresen at that point. Later that
morning, upon Thoresen’s arrival at the Spokane office,
Mitchell discharged him.
Thoresen did not take it well and some name calling ensued.
He had downloaded some union material onto his laptop com-
puter and refused to turn it over to Mitchell, although he re-
turned the office and car keys, relinquished the car and rejected
an offer to drive him home.
Subsequently, Thoresen filed for unemployment compensa-
tion but was initially turned down as he had failed to properly
complete his claim form. Respondent did not oppose his un-
employment compensation claim. Nonetheless, when Thoresen
learned that the State had denied his request for unemployment
benefits, he telephoned Koegen’s cell phone number. He

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 828
reached Koegen as he was at the airport and complained that
Respondent had denied him unemployment benefits.5
Koegen admits the following conversation occurred. He tes-
tified:

[WITNESS KOEGEN] I was in a crowded airport when he
called me on the cell phone. I think the conversation started
out that, “Curt, this is Mel, and do you realize you denied my
unemployment?”
JUDGE KENNEDY: And what was your response?
THE WITNESS: “Yes.” And he said, “Nobody else ever had
their unemployment denied.” And I was mad. He had made
no comment or no attempt to contact me, so he kind of caught
me off guard, and I was mad. I said that nobody else ever
filed an unfair labor practice. But I did say that.

Later, Thoresen filed an appeal concerning the denial of un-
employment benefits. Respondent did not file any opposition
and the initial denial was reversed in favor of granting him full
benefits, retroactive to his discharge. Thus, there is no evi-
dence that Respondent actually prevented Thoresen from ob-
taining his benefits and it is apparent from the evidence that the
only reason the unemployment authorities denied his initial
application was because he failed to fill it out properly.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A labor union, in its capacity as an employer, is subject to
the same rules as any other employer engaged in interstate
commerce and subject to the jurisdiction of the Act. Office
Employees Local 11 (Oregon Teamsters) v. NLRB, 353 U.S.
313 (1957). Indeed, Section 2(2) of the Act specifically recog-
nizes that labor unions are employers when acting as an em-
ployer. Accordingly, the Board has developed a body of juris-
prudence dealing with the union and protected activities en-
gaged in by the employees hired by a labor union. These indi-
viduals usually include office clerical staff, but occasionally
cover “professionals” such as business agents and organizers.
To the extent that these individuals are statutory employees as
defined by Section 2(3) they enjoy the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act. That section reads in pertinent part:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, . . . .

In his brief, counsel for the General Counsel makes two al-
ternative arguments. First, he asserts that Thoresen’s conduct
was protected as an intraunion activity and, second, that Thore-
sen’s conduct was concerted and protected as defined by Sec-
tion 7. He concludes, as he must, by asking whether or not
Respondent discharged Thoresen for either, or both of, those
two reasons. If so, under that logic, the dismissal would consti-
tute a violation of Section 8(a)(1), or, independently, Section
8(a)(3). The General Counsel asserts that the evidence supports

5 Thoresen did not understand the unemployment claims procedure
very well, believing that the employer, not the State agency, made the
decision whether to grant or deny benefits.
the conclusion that Respondent did discharge Thoresen for
either or both of those reasons.
Respondent, to the contrary, argues that none of Thoresen’s
conduct constitutes protected concerted activity, whether in-
traunion or not. It observes that the driving reason behind the
discharge was Thoresen’s utter failure as an organizer com-
pounded by his behavior toward Thiemens and his unprofes-
sional conduct at the February 6 meeting in Kennewick. It
draws a distinction between what he said and thought about the
pension waiver issue and the theatrical manner in which he
took over a union meeting, misusing his organizer’s report slot
and turning it into a soapbox attack on the services which the
union provides its members. In some respects, it argues,
Thoresen appeared to be behaving as if he was running for a
union office, rather than as a professional organizer, for his
performance was inconsistent with his station. That Thoresen
used vulgar language in the process only served to highlight his
lack of professionalism.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that this case
does not involve any claim that Thoresen was exercising rights
guaranteed him under the Labor Management and Disclosure
Act of 1959. It is true that Thoresen is a union member and
under that statute has certain free speech rights and the right to
redress insofar as any reprisals may be taken against his status
as a union member. There is no contention that Respondent has
taken any reprisal whatsoever against Thoresen’s status as a
union member. Indeed, the only discipline it has taken against
him was the discharge; Respondent has not sought to bar him
from access to employment as an equipment operator. He has
signed and continues to seek work from the out-of-work-list
which the Union has established for its represented trade work-
ers. Therefore, no Section 8(b)(1)(A) issue is presented..6
The seminal case in the 8(a) side of the Act concerning a un-
ion’s treatment of its own employees is Retail Clerks Local
770, 208 NLRB 356 (1974). In that case the newly elected
president of the local union determined to discharge six of the
union’s employees because they had supported the opposition
candidate. Each of them had been active engaging in the in-
traunion activity of supporting the previous president. The new
president explained that it was in the best interest of the mem-
bership to expect unqualified, loyal, and dedicated service to
the union. He did not regard those who supported his opponent
to have those attributes so he discharged them. The Board
6 While not directly germane to the issues here, some of the Board’s
union employee jurisprudence arose in response to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967),
and Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). In Carpenters Local 22
(Graziano Construction Co.), 195 NLRB 1 (1972), the Board said it
had been “charged by the Supreme Court with the duty of determining
the overall legitimacy of union interests, and must therefore take into
account all Federal policies and not limit ourselves to those embodied
in our own Act.” Recently, the Board overruled Graziano and its prog-
eny while interpreting Sec. 7 in an 8(b)(1)(A) context. See Office Em-
ployees, Local 251 (Sandia Corp.) 331 NLRB 1417 (2000). There the
Board recognized that Sec. 7 did not have so broad a reach, and re-
turned to the law as it stood before Graziano. The principal observa-
tion here is that reliance on any part of that jurisprudence which relies
on Graziano to determine the breadth of Sec. 7 must be done with care.

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 370 829
rejected the General Counsel’s 8(a)(3) complaint observing that
the discharges were not motivated by union animus and that the
conduct would not have the foreseeable effect of either encour-
aging or discouraging union membership. It further observed
that they were not engaged in traditional union organizing, i.e.,
seeking separate and independent representation. Nor were
those employees seeking to redress grievances within the
framework of the existing employer-employee relationship.
Instead, their purpose was to effect a change in the top man-
agement of their employer. The Board further observed that the
Act does not provide protection to those employees who choose
to influence or produce changes in the management hierarchy.
Congruent with that analysis, no union animus can be dis-
cerned here, either. Thoresen was not engaging in union orga-
nizing or seeking separate and independent representation.
Neither was he attempting to redress some perceived the griev-
ance within the framework of his employer-employee relation-
ship. Instead, he was speaking out against an announced policy
of the union as an institution. This conduct did not encourage
or discourage union membership within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3).7 Accordingly, even though Thoresen’s conduct may
properly be described as “intraunion,” it is not the kind of union
activity which Section 8(a)(3) aims to protect. If that were the
case, union employees everywhere would be free to go their
own direction without regard for their employer’s requirements.
They could just claim that whatever they were doing was “un-
ion activity” and obtain 8(a)(3) protection. That, of course, is
absurd. All employers, even labor unions in their capacity as
an employer, have the right to insist that employees perform the
duties for which they are hired and to comply with company
policies which are lawful and not contrary to public policy.
Accordingly, the 8(a)(3) aspect of this case is governed by the
Board’s decision in Retail Clerks Local 770, supra, and will be
dismissed.
A more complex question is presented under Section 8(a)(1).
The mutual aid and protection clause of Section 7 has a broader
sweep. Recently the Board adopted Judge Mary Miller Crac-
raft’s analysis in a similar case. Specifically see Plumbers
Local 412, 328 NLRB 1079 (1999). She observed that Section
7 includes activity which might not readily be perceived as
protected concerted activity, including nascent protected activ-
ity. She noted that the Board in Meyers Industries (Meyers II),
281 NLRB 882 (1986),8 “fully embraced” the Third Circuit’s
rule set forth in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683 (1964). In Mushroom the court said “mere talk” can
only be found concerted when it is “looking forward to group
action.” Meyers II does say that concerted activity will encom-
pass individual employees seeking to initiate or to induce or
prepare for group action as well as individual employees to
bring group complaints to management. Supra at 887. Fur-
thermore, Judge Cracraft recognized that concerted activity

7 Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act states in pertinent part: “It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer—by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term and condition of employment to
encourage or discourage union membership in any labor organization.”
8 Enfd. 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205
(1988).
need not be limited to the employees of a single employer.
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Washington State
Service Employees, 188 NLRB 957 (1971). Employees may
support employees of employers other than their own without
relinquishing the protections of Section 7. Even so, neither
Judge Cracraft nor the Board was able to find an 8(a)(1) viola-
tion when the respondent union discharged its clerical em-
ployee who had sought the assistance of her employer-union’s
executive board and had spoken to the next-door apprenticeship
trust’s clericals about her wage rate. The evidence showed that
the charging party was acting on her own. She did not claim
that she was acting on anyone else’s behalf, or seeking to initi-
ate, induce or prepare for group action when she met with the
trust’s clericals.
Here, the General Counsel does assert that the Charging
Party was speaking on behalf of others and was seeking to in-
duce statutory employees, i.e., the union membership, to take
group action to change the policy concerning the pension
waiver for first-year apprentices. While the argument has a
certain facial appeal, in the final analysis it does not withstand
scrutiny. For the behavior to be concerted activity Meyers II
requires the individual employee to be acting with or upon the
authority of other employees and not solely on his own behalf.
There is only sparse evidence that Thoresen actually spoke to
any affected first-year apprentice, much less obtained any war-
rant to speak on his or her behalf.9 He says that he spoke to
two clericals in the Spokane office, but does not contend that he
was seeking their support or calling them to any group action.
At the Pasco COMET class he did interest two members in the
problem, and they thought it was a good idea if he were to
speak about it at the meeting. He does not go so far as to say
they were asking for any specific group action. The aim was an
open discussion about the waiver. That is what happened.
Thoresen’s principal conduct, therefore, was to speak out at
both the Spokane and Kennewick meetings expressing his dis-
may with the waiver, seeking to air his concerns and perhaps
start a discussion about its wisdom.
The question which may properly be asked about these meet-
ings is whether or not Thoresen was initiating or inducing any-
one to engage in group action for their mutual aid and protec-
tion. The answer, rather, clearly seems to be no. On both occa-
sions he was speaking not as one of the Union’s employees, but
as a union member. He was expressing serious disagreement
with a decision which the elected administration had made. He
regarded the decision as a detriment to unionism in general, i.e.,
concessionary bargaining. He thought concessionary bargain-
ing was inimical to the union movement. It is true that he also
viewed the impact of the decision as being detrimental to the
well being of the first-year apprentices. He did not seem to
understand, or perhaps believed to the contrary, that the deci-
sion had no financial impact on the pension trust or its ability to
9 Thoresen says that during a January 29 COMET class in Spokane
he asked two apprentices if they were aware of the waiver, essentially
informing them of it. He does not contend they asked him to do any-
thing about it or that he offered to do anything about it. This does not
qualify as initiating or inducing or preparing for group action.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 830
provide pension payments to those first-year apprentices if and
when they ever reached retirement eligibility.
His rhetoric sounds more in the nature of an individual seek-
ing to position himself for a run at union office. He had re-
jected every explanation which had been offered him for the
decision. Moreover, he had taken no steps to confirm what he
had been told. Instead, he engaged in speechifying, in Spokane
publicly charging the apprenticeship coordinator, Danny Thie-
mens, with acting stupidly, if not incompetently. In Kennewick
Thoresen triggered a 15-minute floor discussion and when the
meeting’s chairman gaveled the discussion finished, he refused
to accept the ruling. Instead, in a theatrical manner, he furi-
ously stepped down from the dais, gathered his belongings and
left the meeting. A few minutes later he returned, but not to the
dais. Instead he sat in the back of the room. Then, when in-
vited to report on his duties as an organizer, he took the oppor-
tunity to spend the first 10 minutes or so resuming his rant
about the policy. Finally, when done, he gave his organizing
report.
His behavior here was not that of an individual seeking to
protect the interests of employees. Instead, it was to challenge
the integrity of the service which the Union provides to its
membership. In essence, he was saying that the service which
the union was providing to the first-year apprentices was inade-
quate, if not some sort of betrayal of union principles. While
this sort of rhetoric is probably protected by the LMRDA, inso-
far as the free speech rights of a union member is concerned, an
employee who maligns his employer’s product or service in
such fashion is not protected (save perhaps by a whistleblower
law of some type).
How, for example, would this be different from an engineer
volunteering to his employer’s customer that the product had
been made with a lesser grade steel than could have been used?
Or, perhaps, an insurance salesman telling a potential customer
that the product his company offered was inferior compared
with what could be purchased from a competitor? In either
case, the employee has said something to the customer which
would result in the customer concluding that he should not do
business with this employer.
Rather clearly, Respondent’s customers are its members.
Thoresen, during both of these meetings, was telling the mem-
bership that its leadership was doing a bad job of providing
employee representation. He was not particularly interested in
protecting first-year apprentices whose pension rights would
not come into focus until their careers ended, no doubt many
years in the future. Thoresen was interested in casting the cur-
rent leadership in a bad light, most likely because he thought he
could be perceived as a better advocate for the union movement
than they.
Accordingly, I am unable to conclude that Thoresen was en-
gaged in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. Mutual aid
or protection of employees was not Thoresen’s purpose. His
activity, therefore, was neither concerted nor protected. As I
am unable to find any violation of the Act, this aspect of the
complaint will be dismissed. As a prima facie case has not
been established, it is unnecessary to assess whether Respon-
dent would have discharged Thoresen because of his other
shortcomings.
However, Koegen’s remark to Thoresen on the telephone to
the effect that Respondent had opposed Thoresen’s application
for unemployment compensation benefits because he had filed
an unfair labor practice charge is a clear violation of Section
8(a)(1).10 United Parcel Service, 327 NLRB 317 (1998), enfd.
228 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2000) (review sought on other issues);
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). Suggesting to an
employee that he has been denied a benefit, including those to
which he is entitled by law, because he has sought the assis-
tance of the Board is a clear interference with the rights guaran-
teed employees by Section 7 of the Act. Access to the Board is
a paramount right which warrants protection under nearly all
circumstances. The mere fact that Respondent had not actually
interfered with Thoresen’s efforts to obtain unemployment
compensation is irrelevant. Koegen told Thoresen that he had
been denied that right because he had exercised his statutory
right to file a charge under the Act. The statement alone is
sufficient to warrant a remedy.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. The affirmative action shall also
require Respondent to post a notice to employees announcing
the remedial steps it has undertaken.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and analysis, I is-
sue the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, a labor organization, is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The General Counsel has failed to make out a prima facie
case that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it discharged its employee Mel Thoresen on February 7,
2002.
3. In late February 2002, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when its business manager, Curt Koegen,
told Thoresen that he had been denied unemployment compen-
sation benefits because he had filed unfair labor practice
charges.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local 370, AFL–CIO, Spokane, Washington, its officers,
agents, and representatives shall
1. Cease and desist from

10 This conduct is also a probable violation of Sec. 8(a)(4) as well,
although not alleged in the complaint. It is unnecessary to analyze this
further, as the remedy would not change in any event.
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 370 831
(a) Telling employees that they have lost a legal right such as
unemployment compensation because they chose to filed unfair
labor practices charges with the Board.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its at
its headquarters and district offices in Washington and Idaho,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.” 12 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 19, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material (b) Within 21 days after ser-
vice by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to com-
ply.

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
MAILED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to mail and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT tell employees that they have lost a legal right
such as unemployment compensation because they or someone
on their behalf have filed charges with the Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,
LOCAL 370, AFL–CIO