Omni Spectra, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 165 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

OMNI SPECTRA, INC.
Omni Spectra , Inc. and International Union, United
Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW). Case
7-CA-6811
May 26, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZAGORIA
On December 23, 1968, Trial Examiner Abraham
H. Mailer issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, but recommending that the complaint be
dismissed. He also found that the Respondent had
not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
supporting brief,' and the Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to
a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and with the limited
exception noted herein, adopts the findings, 2
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
The General Counsel excepts only to the Trial Examiner's refusal to
issue a remedial order for the violation he found of Section 8(axl).
'The Respondent excepts only to the finding of this single 8(a)(l)
violation . As we agree with the Trial Examiner that, in any event, the
violation found would be too isolated to warrant the issuance of a remedial
order, we feel that no purpose would be served by passing on the
correctness of his finding . We therefore decline to pass on or adopt it.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ABRAHAM H. MALLER, Trial Examiner: On June 18,
1968, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
herein called the Respondent . Upon said charge, the
165
Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, on August 29,
1968, issued on behalf of the General Counsel, a
complaint against the Respondent, alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.) herein
called the Act. Briefly, the complaint alleged that the
Respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced its
employees by threatening them with termination of their
employment if they persisted in union activity, informed
employees that increases in pay would not be granted to
them because of their activities on behalf of the Union,
threatened employees with termination of employment if
they engaged in any conversations about the Union at any
time on company premises, and discriminated against its
employees in regard to hire or tenure or terms or
conditions of employment by threatening a union adherent
with discharge, by refusing her an increment in pay, and
continuously thereafter restricting her movement and
isolating her during nonworking time on company
premises, and by isolating another union adherent during
working hours in a place of work away from other
employees. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me at
Detroit, Michigan, on October 28, and 29, 1968. The
General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party
were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral
argument , and to file briefs with me. A brief was filed
only by the Respondent.
Upon consideration of the entire record and the brief,
and upon my observation of each of the witnesses, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing
by virtue of, the laws of the State of Michigan. At all
times material herein, the Respondent has maintained an
office, manufacturing plant, and place of business at
24600 Hallwood Ct., in the City of Farmington, and State
of Michigan. Respondent is and has been at all times
material herein, engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of micro wave components, connecters,
subsystems, and related products at its Farmington,
Michigan, plant, which is the only facility involved in this
proceeding. During the calendar year 1967, which period
is representative of its operations during all times material
herein, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, purchased and caused to be
transported and delivered at its Farmington, Michigan,
plant, goods and material valued in excess of $50,000,
which were transported and delivered to its plant in
Farmington, Michigan, directly from points located
outside the State of Michigan. During the same period,
the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business
operations, manufactured, sold, and distributed at its
Farmington, Michigan, plant, products valued in excess of
$50,000, which were shipped from said plant directly to
points located outside the State of Michigan. Accordingly,
I find and conclude that the Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert
jurisdiction here.
176 NLRB No. 24
166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
1. Whether Respondent interfered with , restrained, and
coerced its employees , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
2. Whether the Respondent discriminated against Stella
Maki and Ruby Faye Tucker in regard to terms or
conditions of employment because of their membership in
and/or activities on behalf of the Union, in violation of
Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
It was stipulated as follows: On April 10, 1967, the
Union filed a petition in Case 7-RC-7990. On May 18,
1967, an election was held in the aforesaid proceeding,
resulting in a certification that no representative was
chosen. On April 25, 1968, the Union filed a petition in
Case 7-RC-8930. On May 29, 1968, an election was held,
resulting in a vote of 57 to 47 in favor of the Union.
Thereafter, on June 6, 1968, the employer filed timely
objections to the election. On August 2, the Acting
Regional Director issued his report,and recommendation
as to the employer's objections, and recommended that
they be overruled. On October 25, the Board issued its
decision and certification of representatives, certifying the
Union as the collective bargaining representative in an
appropriate unit consisting basically of production and
maintenance employees.
B. Sequence of Events'
The alleged violations were testified to by two
employees of the Respondent, Stella Maki and Ruby Faye
Tucker. Stella Maki had been employed by the
Respondent since May 9, 1966. She was active in the
Union's organizational campaign, was a member of the
organizing committee, set up meetings of employees, and
got union cards signed. She had received two raises since
being employed by the Respondent, the first 3 months
after she was hired and the second 9 months after she was
hired. She has received no raise since. According to Maki,
she was interviewed by her foreman, Richard Hanby, in
August 1967, and was told that he was recommending her
for a raise. The next day he told her that his
recommendation had been rejected because she had caused
a lot of trouble - was an instigator, and that no raise
was in sight for her. In September 1967, she had another
conversation with Foreman Hanby, in which he told her
that she was causing too much trouble with the people and
that this would hold back her raise. Again in September,
she had another conversation with Foreman Hanby in
which she pointed out to him that she was teaching the
work to two girls who were drawing more pay than she
'The statements set forth m the ensuing section do not constitute my
findings , but is a summary of the testimony of the witnesses for the
General Counsel as to the alleged violations. My findings are set forth
Infra under the heading "Concluding Findings."
was and again requested a raise. Foreman Hanby rejected
her request because she was mixed up "in this thing."
On December 22, 1967, the last workday before
Christmas, the employees worked a short day. At
lunchtime, in the lunchroom, another employee handed
Maki some envelopes which bore the printed name and
address of the Regional Director of the Union. Hanby
who allegedly was standing about 6 feet away from her,
asked Maki what the employee had given her. Maki
replied, "Nothing." Thereupon, Hanby, allegedly told her
in effect that if it was some of those cards and if he
caught her with those cards, she would be fired.
In the latter part of April 1968, Maki again spoke to
Foreman Hanby about her raise. According to Maki,
Hanby replied that she had been making a lot of trouble,
but he didn't think she was going to have to wait much
longer for a raise. In May, Foreman Hanby allegedly told
Maki that he didn't want her to talk to the employees at
any time in the plant; that she was getting them all stirred
up.
In the early part of June, Maki went on vacation.
Before she did so, she obtained some yellow membership
cards (as distinguished from the green authorization cards)
and turned them over to employee Ruby Faye Tucker,
who was also active in the Union's campaign, to get them
signed. Tucker distributed them to other employees to
obtain the signatures. One of the employees to whom she
gave cards was Shirley Foster. When Maki returned from
her vacation, around June 14, she went to Foster at 7
a.m., and asked for the signed cards. Foster did not give
her the cards and said nothing. At break at 9 a.m., Maki
again asked Foster for the cards, but did not receive them.
That afternoon, between 2 and 3:30 p.m., on company
time, Foster gave the cards back to the signers thereof.
Foster's actions apparently angered Tucker whose work
station was next to that of Foster. Tucker admittedly
"told Shirley Foster off" on company time. Foster
thereupon apparently became upset, and she and another
employee, Ellen Powell, complained to Foreman Barsanti.
The latter transmitted the complaint to Supervisor Peter
Hegg.
Maki and Tucker were separately called into the office
of Gary Petersen, personnel and industrial relations
manager of Respondent. Supervisor Hegg was present at
each conference. According to Maki, Petersen told her
that she was an instigator and was not to be caught
talking to anyone in the plant either on her lunch hour or
during the break periods. Supervisor Hegg told her to stay
in her car on those occasions. According to Tucker,
Supervisor Hegg told her, "This is a one-way
conversation. You are on a one-way road, and there is no
turning back. We know of your union activities . . . and
you can do that on your break or anytime you want to."
Either Hegg or Petersen allegedly told her that if she was
brought into the office one more time, she would be fired.
Supervisor Hegg also told her that she would be moved to
another bench and they would see how that worked out.
The next day, Tucker was transferred to a work area
some 20 feet away from that of Foster.
In August 1968, Maki, while working, broke a drill,
part of which entered her thumb. According to Maki, she
asked Foreman Hanby to send her to a doctor, but Hanby
replied that she had missed so much work and advised her
to get another girl to help her. Maki thereupon went to
the ladies room and pulled out the portion of the drill
with a tweezer and went back to work. She later went to
her own physician on her own time. In September 1968,
OMNI SPECTRA , INC. 167
Maki accidentally cut her thumb while working. Her
thumb bled profusely and she went to the restroom and
ran cold water over it . Another employee reported the
incident to Personnel Manager Wallet who immediately
delegated another employee to take Maki to a doctor.
Maki admittedly was paid for the time she lost in going to
the doctor.
C. Concluding Findings
1. The failure to grant Maki a wage increase
Maki' s testimony detailed above with regard to her
several attempts to obtain a wage increase must be
considered in relation to the testimony of Personnel and
Industrial Relations Manager Petersen and Foreman
Hanby. Petersen testified credibly that when he assumed
that position in April 1967 , the Respondent had no overall
policy on granting raises ; rather , this was handled by
individual departments most of which granted merit raises
to employees on the basis of reviews after 3 months, 9
months , and annually thereafter . In June 1967 , Petersen
standardized the periods for all departments on the above
basis . In addition , he introduced a performance evaluation
form which was to be completed by the foreman on each
scheduled performance review.
Maki' s performance review was originally scheduled for
February 1968, but was postponed to April , because she
had been absent from work approximately 6 weeks
between June and August 1967, because of an automobile
accident . In April, the performance review was again
rescheduled , this time until June 1968 , because Maki had
been away from work approximately 9 weeks between
February and April , due to illness and surgery.
Postponement of performance reviews where an employee
had been absent for a considerable period was in
accordance with company policy and had been applied to
salaried employees , as well.
Foreman Richard Hanby testified credibly that in
August 1967 , he had conferences with each of the
employees under his supervision , including Maki, to
familiarize them with the new performance review form.
During these interviews , he went through the process of
rating the employees to demonstrate how the new rating
process worked . He told Maki that she rated as an
average employee . Maki ' s interview was not for the
purpose of determining whether she was then entitled to a
merit increase . Such a review in her case was not due until
February 1968.
Hanby admitted having only one conversation with
Maki in September 1967, wherein Maki pointed out to
him that the two girls she was instructing were receiving
more pay than she was . He testified credibly that he did
not discuss the matter with her , but told his then
immediate superior , Bert Hanson , about Maki's
complaint . Hanby heard no more about it.
According to Hanby's credited testimony, he did review
Maki' s performance rating in June 1968 , recommended
her for an increase although he rated her attendance as
being below average . He transmitted this recommendation
to Superintendent Hegg who rejected the
recommendation.
I have credited the testimony of Petersen and Hanby,
both of whom testified in a straighforward manner, over
the testimony of Maki . Furthermore , the circumstances
support their version as against that of Maki. Thus, Maki
was not due for a merit increase in August 1967 , when she
claimed that she was given her performance review by
Hanby and was told by him that her union activities
would keep her from getting a raise. As indicated above,
the conference in August 1967 was not , in fact, a
performance review for the purpose of a merit increase,
but was a conference merely to acquaint Maki , and the
other employees , with the new performance rating sheet.
In these circumstances , the facts negate Maki's testimony
that in August 1967, Hanby told her that he had
recommended her for a raise and, again , the following
day, that his recommendation had been turned down
because she caused a lot of trouble , etc., and that there
was no raise in sight for her. The extentions of her review
periods, first from February 1968 to April , and then from
April to June , because of Maki 's long absences appear to
be pursuant to company policy . Such extentions were
applied in the cases of other employees as well, and do
not appear to have been prompted by any union activity
on the part of Maki . Moreover , this is partially
corroborated by Maki' s admission on cross-examination
that in April 1968, Foreman Hanby had told her that she
had been missing work . This admission by Maki is
inconsistent with her other testimony to the effect that
Foreman Hanby told her that she had been making a lot
of trouble , but he didn 't think that she would have to wait
much longer for a raise . In fact, the testimony is, in itself,
contradictory . For, if Hanby thought that Maki was
making a lot of trouble (and this, as Maki contends, was
holding up her raise), why would Hanby assure her that
she wouldn 't have to wait much longer for a raise?
In view of all the foregoing , I find and conclude that
the Respondent did not threaten Maki that she would not
get an increase in pay nor did it refuse to grant her a
wage increase because of her membership in and/or
activity on behalf of the Union. Accordingly, the
complaint should be dismissed in this regard.
2. Threats to fire Maki
Maki's testimony regarding the incident of December
22, 1967, to the effect that she was handed some
authorization cards and envelopes by another employee,
was observed receiving them by Foreman Hanby , and was
admonished by him that if he caught her with those cards,
she would be fired , was not corroborated and was vague
in several respects. Thus , she did not identify the person
who allegedly handed her the cards . With regard to what
Hanby told her , Maki testified on cross -examination: "He
said , ` If I catch you collecting cards at any time or
discussing anything in this plant you will be fired.'
Something like that ." (Emphasis supplied .) Also, with
regard to the time that the incident occurred , Maki twice
testified that the incident occurred during lunch. On
cross-examination , when it was suggested to her that
Hanby had gone on vacation that day, she changed her
testimony to state that the incident could have occurred
during the break period at 9 o 'clock , and then later
corrected her testimony to state that the break on that
day came at 10 o'clock.
Foreman Hanby denied that the incident occurred. He
testified that he was due to start his vacation on that day,
but came to the plant in the morning to do some paper
work , and left at 9 o 'clock . On the other hand, employee
Richard Harmon testified on rebuttal that he saw
Foreman Hanby in the cafeteria at the 10 o'clock break,
that he, employee Glenn Barnstable , and Hanby were
sitting at a table , that Barnstable asked Hanby why he
was at the plant when he was supposed to be on vacation,
168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and that Hanby replied something to the effect that he did
not have anything to do "because my wife kicked me out
of the house."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the credibility of
both witnesses is in this instance open to attack. However,
the General Counsel had the burden of proof, and I find
Maki's testimony to be too equivocal to form the basis for
a finding of violation. Accordingly, I recommend that the
complaint be dismissed in this regard.
According to Maki, another incident occurred in the
early part of May 1968. She testified that she was
standing in the aisle (presumably during a break ) talking
to employees Richard Harmon, Barbara Kowalski, and
Tucker. When she looked up, she noted that Supervisor
Hegg and Foreman Hanby were watching them. She
thereupon suggested to the other employees that they have
coffee, and they did so. When she came back from her
break, Foreman Hanby allegedly told her that he did not
want to see her talking to any of the employees at any
time in the plant; that she was getting them all stirred up;
and that if she were caught again she would be fired, or
"something like that ." It does not appear from Maki's
testimony whether Kowalski, Tucker, and Harmon were
with her when Hanby spoke to her. In any event,
Kowalski was not called upon to corroborate Maki, and
although Tucker and Harmon later testified, neither
attempted to corroborate Maki's testimony. Foreman
Hanby denied that the incident occurred. There is a
circumstance which supports Hanby's denial, viz, on May
9, 1968, Respondent posted on its bulletin board a
"Special Notice" in which it stated:
Your Employee Handbook contains rules with respect
to solicitations and distribution of literature on
Company premises by employees. These rules are not
intended to restrict the rights of employees to engage in
activities for or against any labor organization as
provided by law.
Employees may engage in activities for or against any
labor organization on Company premises during their
non-working periods, provided they do not interfere
with the work of other employees or neglect their own
work. Literature may also be passed out under the same
conditions so long as it is not strewn about the premises
and creates no housekeeping problem.
In sum , I do not credit the testimony of Maki in this
respect, and I do not find that Respondent violated the
Act. Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in this regard.
3. The alleged discrimination with regard to Maki's
injuries
Maki's testimony that Foreman Hanby refused to let
her go to the doctor after she had accidentally driven part
of a drill into her thumb was denied by him. I find it
difficult to believe Maki's testimony to the effect that
Hanby told her to return to work because she had missed
so much time and suggested to her that another employee
help her. Such action by Hanby would have been contrary
to Respondent's instructions to its employees in the
Hourly Employee Handbook which admonishes
employees: "In case of injury or illness, immediately
notify your supervisor. Do not try to treat your own or
another employees's injury." It is unrealistic to believe
that Hanby' s interest in production would be served by
having an employee with an injured thumb continue to do
production work. Moreover, if Hanby did, in fact, refuse
to send Maki to a doctor, it is somewhat surprising that
Maki did not appeal to Hanby's superior. The second
instance in which Maki was injured while working
demonstrates that Respondent's policy of having injured
employees treated by a doctor was fully carried out.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that the Respondent did
not discriminate against Maki in the drill incident because
of her union membership and/or activities. The complaint
should therefore be dismissed in this regard.
4. Respondent ' s meetings with Tucker and Maki
As noted above, on or about June 14, 1968, Tucker
admittedly "told off" Foster on working time about the
latter's conduct in refusing to turn over to Maki the
membership cards which Foster had solicited and
returning those cards to the signers thereof. Foreman
Barsanti observed that Foster and another employee, Ellen
Powell, were emotionally upset and so informed
Superintendent Hegg. Superintendent Hegg interviewed
Powell and Foster separately, and both informed him that
they were being harassed by Maki and Tucker.
Superintendent Hegg then conferred with Personnel
Manager Petersen, and they decided to talk to Maki and
Tucker. Tucker was then summoned to Petersen's office.
According to Tucker, Superintendent Hegg told her:
"This is a one-way conversation. You are on a one-way
road, and there is no turning back. We know of your
union activities , and ... you can do that on your break or
any time you want to." She was also told that if she was
brought into the office one more time, she would be fired.
Hegg also told her that they would move her work station
to another bench and see how that worked out.
Petersen's and Hegg's versions are substantially
different. They testified as follows: When Tucker arrived
at the office, she inquired whether or not she was going to
get a chance to speak on her own behalf. Superintendent
Hegg replied that this was a one-way conversation, that
they were going to do the talking and she was going to do
the listening . Tucker was informed that fellow employees
had complained that she was harassing them about the
membership cards. Both Petersen and Hegg told her that
she could carry on her union activities in any way during
the lunch period, break time, and before or after work,
but whatever she did during those periods had to be done
in such a manner that it didn't "bubble over" into the
working time and have an adverse effect upon other
employees. They did admit telling her that her work
station would be moved.
Maki was then summoned into Peterson's office. Before
going in , Maki indicated that she wanted a witness, but
her request was refused. According to Maki, Peterson had
told her that she had been causing much trouble, was an
instigator, and had better not be caught talking to
anybody in the plant at any time. Maki replied that she
seldom spoke to anybody in the plant, because she and
others went out to lunch every day. Superintendent Hegg
then told her, "I wouldn't go out any more. I would stay
on the premises and eat in my car."
Here, again, Petersen's and Hegg's versions are
substantially different. According to their testimony, Maki
was told substantially the same thing that Tucker was told
with regard to union activities, viz., that she could carry
them on before and after work, during the lunch period,
and during rest periods, that she should so conduct such
activities that they would not "bubble over" into working
time. Both Petersen and Hegg denied that there was any
OMNI SPECTRA, INC.
conversation concerning Maki's taking her lunch period
and rest periods in her car . In this connection , Foreman
Hanby testified that Maki had asked him whether she
could take her break in her car , and he replied that he
would check with Superintendent Hegg , and that Hegg
replied that he did not care where she took her break, if it
was in the car, or in the cafeteria , but that if she left the
company premises , she would have to punch out and
punch back in.' Superintendent Hegg corroborated
Foreman Hanby's testimony in this regard.
Maki testified that thereafter she and several other
employees went with her to have their lunch in her car.
About a month later , Foreman Hanby told her not to got
out to her car anymore . According to Foreman Hanby,
sometime in June or July , he noticed that the employees
that were taking their break in Maki ' s car were coming
back 2 or 3 minutes late from their break , and he told
them that if this trend continued he would ask them to
take their breaks in the plant.
From my observation of the demeanor of Petersen and
Hegg while they were testifying , I credit their version of
what occurred at these conferences . Conversely , I did not
find Maki' s and Tucker ' s testimony convincing.
Furthermore , Petersen ' s and Hegg 's statements to these
employees regarding their right to engage in union activity
on nonworking time was in accord with a special notice
dated May 9, 1968 , which Respondent had posted on its
bulletin board . However , it should be noted that the
statements made to Maki and Tucker during these
conferences contained a special condition , viz., that they
should so conduct their nonworking time union activities
in such a manner that such activities did not " bubble
over" into working time . This was an improper restriction
on their activities , for it was a warning to the employees
that they should tone down their union activities during
their free time , and in effect made them responsible for
the aftereffects which their activities might have upon the
other employees . Yet the Board has long recognized that
the exercise of rights protected by the Act frequently
produces "some irritation to employees, or unrest in a
plant . . . ." (Stuart F . Cooper Co., 136 NLRB 142, 144.)
Absent special circumstances , such incidental effects do
The parking lot was considered to be part of the company premises
169
not justify any restriction on the activities of the
employees during nonworking time. To the extent that
such admonition constituted a restriction on the union
activities of these employees during nonworking time, it
was violative of the Act.
With regard to Maki's taking her lunch and break
periods in her automobile, I again credit the testimony of
Petersen and Hegg to the effect that no such condition
was imposed upon Maki, and I also credit the testimony
of Foreman Hanby to the effect that it was Maki who
requested this privilege which was granted by Hanby after
consultation with Superintendent Hegg. I therefore find
and conclude that Maki was in no way restricted by the
Respondent as to where she could spend her lunch and
break periods. The complaint should therefore be
dismissed in this regard.
With respect to the transfer of Tucker's work station, I
find that the Respondent did not thereby discriminate
against her because of her union membership and/or
activities. Since the incident between Tucker and Foster
had admittedly occurred on working time, it was not
inappropriate for the Respondent to move Tucker from a
work station immediately beside that of Foster to a
distance of about 20 feet away. Nor was Tucker placed in
isolation as she contends. The work stations of other
employees were in the same row as that of Tucker's new
work station, although not immediately beside her. To the
extent that the complaint alleges that Tucker was by the
foregoing conduct discriminated against because of her
union membership and/or activities, the complaint should
be dismissed.
Inasmuch as the only violation which I find that the
Respondent has committed was an admonition that
Tucker and Maki should keep their union activities from
"bubbling over" into working time, I conclude that it is
too isolated to warrant the issuance of a remedial order.
Allied Chemical Corp., National Aniline Division, 143
NLRB 260, and cases cited at page 263. My
Recommended Order will, therefore, provide for the
dismissal of the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint herein should be, and hereby is,
dismissed.