Olivier Paterour

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 29, 2019

14777969 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/777,969 09/17/2015 Olivier PATEROUR 022044-0443279 1057
909 7590 07/29/2019
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP
PO Box 10500
McLean, VA 22102
EXAMINER
CUNNINGHAM, KEVIN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2461
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte OLIVIER PATEROUR
____________

Appeal 2018-008808
Application 14/777,969
Technology Center 2400

Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1 and 4–16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Das and Alfano. App. Br. 3–4; see also Adv. Act. 1; Ans.
2–8. Claims 2 and 3 have been canceled. Adv. Act. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 The Appeal Brief identifies AIRBUS DS SAS as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 2.
2 Rather than reiterate each and every argument of Appellant, and finding
and conclusion of the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed May 21,
2018, “App. Br.”), the Reply Brief (filed September 12, 2018, “Reply. Br.”),
the Examiner’s Answer (mailed July 12, 2018, “Ans.”), the Advisory Action
(mailed January 2, 2018; “Adv. Act.”), the Final Office Action (mailed
September 18, 2017, “Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed November
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to “a system and a method for managing the
connectivity of at least one terminal via a mobile server for communicating
through at least one telecommunications network.” Spec. 1:10–13.
Claim 1 is independent. The claims have not been argued separately
with particularity and, therefore, stand or fall together. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). An understanding of the invention can be derived from a
reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below with some
formatting added:
1. A mobile server for managing the connectivity of
at least one terminal for communicating through one or a
plurality of telecommunications networks, the mobile server
comprising:
at least one terminal communication module configured
to communicate with said terminal;
a plurality of network communication modules
configured to communicate with a plurality of
telecommunications networks;
a storage area in which are stored connectivity parameter
values of the terminal enabling the terminal to connect to the
mobile server,
the mobile server being configured to:
connect to the plurality of telecommunications
networks via the plurality of network communication
modules,
extract a set of connectivity parameter values of
the terminal from the storage area, allow or not allow, on
the basis of the extracted set of connectivity parameter
values, a connection of the terminal via at least one of the
terminal communication modules so that the terminal

12, 2015, “Spec.”) for their respective details.
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communicates applicative data through at least one of the
telecommunications networks via said at least one of the
terminal communication modules and at least one of the
network communication modules,
wherein the connectivity parameters are organised
in the storage area in the form of a tree structure
including a plurality of hierarchized objects each
grouping together one or a plurality of connectivity
parameters, and
wherein the tree structure is based on the Open
Mobile Alliance (OMA) model and wherein the objects
are manipulated using the Open Mobile Alliance Device
Management protocol.

References and Rejections
1. Claims 1 and 4–16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Das et al. (US 2013/0137423 A1; published May 30,
2013) (“Das”) and Alfano et al. (US 2013/0031234 A1; published Jan. 31,
2013) (“Alfano”).3 Ans. 2–8; see also Final Act. 3–9.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejection of claims 1 and 4–16 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this

3 In the Final Office Action, claims 1 and 4–16 were rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Das, and claims 2 and 3 were
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Das and Alfano. Final
Act. 3–9. Appellant filed an amendment after the Final Office Action,
requesting that the limitations of dependent claims 2 and 3 be amended into
independent claim 1 and that claims 2 and 3 be canceled. Amendment After
Final Office Action 2–3 (filed December 18, 2017). The Examiner entered
these amendments (Adv. Act. 1) and explains that “newly amended claim 1
(which now incorporates the limitations of original claims 2 and 3) would be
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decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made, but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. Having
considered Appellant’s arguments presented in the Appeal Brief and Reply
Brief, we agree with the Examiner that all the pending claims are
unpatentable over the cited combination of references. We adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth in the rejection from which this appeal is
taken and in the Examiner’s Answer. We provide the following explanation
to highlight and address specific arguments and findings primarily for
emphasis.
CLAIMS 1 AND 4–16: OBVIOUSNESS OVER DAS AND ALFANO.
Appellant presents a series of arguments for the § 103 rejection of
claim 1. App. Br. 3–20. Appellant does not argue the § 103 rejections of
claims 4–16 separately with particularity beyond the arguments advanced for
claim 1. App. Br. 20–26. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 103
rejection on the basis of claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re
King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies on Das for teaching the
entirety of the claim, except for the known techniques of organizing data in a
tree structure that has hierarchized objects and is based on the OMA (Open
Mobile Alliance) model, and manipulating objects using the OMA Device

rejected for the same reasons as original claim 3 (which included the
limitations of original claims 1 and 2)” (Ans. 2). The Examiner’s Answer
restates the grounds of rejection such that claims 1 and 4–16 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Das and Alfano. Ans. 2.
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Management Protocol, for which the Examiner cites Alfano. Ans. 3–4
(citing Das Fig. 1, ¶¶ 5, 9, 38, 40–43, 64–65, 77, 93–94, 98; Alfano ¶ 30);
see also id. at 8–15 (additionally citing Das Fig. 5, ¶¶ 35–36, 38, 39, 45, 47,
93, 95; Alfano ¶¶ 13, 30, 40–42); Final Act. 3–4, 8–9. We begin our
analysis with a brief review of the Das reference.
Das relates to a multi-mode access point that may provide network
connectivity access to access terminals. Das ¶ 33, Fig. 1 (items 108, 110,
112). In a disclosed embodiment, an access terminal may connect to an
access point. Id. ¶ 33, Fig. 1 (items 102, 104, 106). The access point may
communicate over various communication links with one or more network
entities, which may comprise a part-circuit switched network, a packet-
switched network, or some other suitable wireless communication network.
Id. ¶¶ 35–36, Fig. 1 (items 134, 136). Here, the access point may
communicate with network entities via multiple radio access technologies
(“RATs”), including wireless wide area network (“WWAN”) and wireless
local area network (“WLAN”) (e.g., Wi-Fi) technologies. Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
Notably, the access point may include an access control component that
determines which access terminals can access a given RAT or the type of
service that may be provided. Id. ¶ 40. For example, access may be
provided only if the access terminal is a member of a group associated with
the access point that supports the given RAT. Id. ¶ 41. In addition, the
access terminal may maintain an access control list identifying such member
groups. Id. ¶ 42. Access also may be restricted based on an access
terminal’s Medium Access Control (“MAC”) address. Id. ¶ 65. Once the
access point has allowed a connection to be established between the access
terminal and a given network entity, data (e.g., voice, data, multimedia
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services) may be provided from the given network entity to the access
terminal via the access point. Id. ¶¶ 5, 77 (discussing streaming of video
data).
Appellant contends the Examiner errs because Das’s access point does
not teach “a mobile server . . . comprising . . . a plurality of network
communication modules configured to communicate with a plurality of
telecommunications networks,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 3–11; Reply
Br. 2–9. In particular, Appellant asserts that each of Das’s access points
includes only a single network communication module (i.e., a network
interface) configured to communicate with a single telecommunications
network, whereas the claim requires a plurality of network communication
modules configured to communicate with a plurality of telecommunications
networks. App. Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 5–9. Here, Appellant further asserts that
Das’s “network entities represent functionalities of a (single) network, as
opposed to a plurality of telecommunications networks.” App. Br. 9
(emphasis omitted). We are not persuaded the Examiner errs.
Das discloses that an access point may include at least one—e.g.,
more than one—communication device (e.g., a plurality of network
interfaces), for communicating with network entities. Das ¶¶ 95, 104. Das
further discloses that an access point may communicate over various
communication links with a plurality of network entities. Id. ¶ 35. Further,
Das’s access point is multi-modal. Id. ¶ 38. In other words, it supports
multiple RATs covering different types of networks, both cellular and
wireless (WWAN (2G/3G/4G), WLAN (Wi-Fi), etc.). Id. ¶ 38. These
disclosures show that Das’s access point may include, not just one, but a
plurality of network communication modules configured to communicate
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with a plurality of network entities. Further, Das’s disclosure of network
entities satisfies “a plurality of telecommunications networks.” Although
Das discloses embodiments in which each network entity represents a
particular functionality of a single network, Das also discloses that a
network entity may be the network itself, such as a part-circuit switched
network, a packet-switched network, or some other suitable wireless
communication network. Das ¶ 36. Importantly, we remind Appellant that
“[a]ll the disclosures in a reference must be evaluated, including
nonpreferred embodiments.” Application of Mills, 470 F.2d 649, 651
(CCPA 1972); see also In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“A reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its
primary purpose.”).
We also disagree with Appellant’s assertion that Das’s access point is
not a “mobile server.” App. Br. 8–9; Reply Br. 2–5. To the contrary, the
recited “mobile server” broadly but reasonably reads on Das’s access point.
Compare Spec. 4:9–5:25, with Das ¶¶ 33, 35–36, 38–42 & Fig. 1. In fact,
Appellant’s Specification describes its mobile server as a mobile “access
point,” configured to manage locally the connectivity of a plurality of
terminals by allowing only those terminals having certain connectivity
parameters (e.g., an allowable MAC address) to communicate through a
plurality of networks. See, e.g., Spec. 4:9–14, 7:21–27. Das similarly
describes a multi-mode access point that can control an access terminal’s
access (e.g., by employing restrictions for MAC address filtering) to network
service or connectivity across different RATs. Das ¶¶ 33, 36, 38–42, 65.
Appellant’s Specification further discloses that a mobile server can be
enabled to establish a first communication link with a first
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telecommunications network and a second communication link with a
second communication network. Spec. 5:21–25. Das similarly describes its
access points as communicating over various communication links with a
plurality of network entities. Das Fig. 1, ¶ 35. To the extent Appellant is
arguing that claim 1 requires a mobile server that is in communication with,
or belongs to, a plurality of telecommunications networks at a single
moment in time, such an interpretation is unreasonably narrow and is not
commensurate with the scope of the claim language. Rather, claim 1 merely
requires a mobile server comprising network communication modules
configured to, or programmed such they can communicate with, different
telecommunications networks.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that Das teaches
a mobile server comprising a plurality of network communication modules
configured to communicate with a plurality of telecommunications
networks. Ans. 3 (citing Das ¶¶ 38, 93); see also id. at 8–9 (citing Das
¶¶ 35–36, 95); Final Act. 3.
Appellant next argues the Examiner errs in finding that the wireless
communication devices of Das (Das Fig. 5, items 504, 506) teach “both the
claimed ‘at least one terminal communication module configured to
communicate with said terminal’ and the claimed ‘plurality of network
communications modules configured to communicate with a plurality of
telecommunication networks,’ as recited in claim 1.” App. Br. 12.
Appellant explains that, “[c]onsistent with the principle that all limitations in
a claim must be considered to be meaningful, it is improper to rely on the
same structure in Das as being responsive to two different elements in claim
1.” Id. at 11.
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Appellant’s contention is not responsive to the Examiner’s rejection.
The Examiner does not rely on the same element of Das for teaching each of
the disputed limitations. See Ans. 3 (citing Das ¶¶ 38, 93–94); Final Act. 3.
Rather, as the Examiner explains, Das’s wireless communication devices
(Das Fig. 5, items 504, 506) have been cited as teaching the claimed
“terminal communication modules,” whereas Das’s communication devices
(Das Fig. 5, item 516) have been cited as teaching the claimed “network
communication modules.” Ans. 11. Appellant does not persuasively rebut
these findings in their Briefs. Moreover, the cited disclosures of Das teach
or at least suggest the disputed claim limitations. In particular, Das’s
wireless communication devices 504 are terminal communication modules
because they are “transceivers[] for communicating with . . . access
terminals[] via different radio access technologies.” Das ¶ 94. Das’s
communication devices 516 are network communication modules because
they are “network interface[s] for communicating with . . . one or more
network entities.” Id. ¶ 95.
Appellant further contends the Examiner has not made a prima facie
case of obviousness because the proposed rationale to combine Das with
Alfano—“in order to improve management of clients by implementing open
mobile alliance group guidelines and standards”—is unsupported and, thus,
inadequate. App. Br. 15–17; see Ans. 4. Appellant submits that “[t]he
Office has not explained how the implementation of the storing scheme of
Alfano at the access point of Das would ‘improve management of clients’
and what ‘connectivity parameters’ of Das would be subject to such
organizing and why the resulting organizing would indeed ‘improve
management of clients.’” App. Br. 17.
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We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. Although Appellant is
correct that “[t]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness,” In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), “[a] brief explanation may do all that is
needed if, for example, the technology is simple and familiar and the prior
art is clear in its language and easily understood.” Paice LLC v. Ford Motor
Co., 881 F.3d 894, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Here, the Examiner’s proposed rationale to combine the teachings of
Das and Alfano—“in order to improve management of clients by
implementing open mobile alliance group guidelines and standards”—albeit
brief, is adequate. In the Answer, the Examiner explains that
[i]t is well known in the art that Open Mobile Alliance is
an open standard for the mobile phone industry since
2002 that facilitates mobile service interoperability
worldwide, where open standard means it is publically
available (Wikipedia entry or see Para [0019] US
2004/0133632, which mentions an OMA standard from
2002). OMA is used to provide industry wide
interoperability standards, so there is clearly motivation
to combine Das and Alfano and motivation to use OMA
specifications and standards.
Ans. 12. We agree. An ordinarily skilled artisan would have known that
modifying Das to implement OMA guidelines and standards, as taught by
Alfano, would improve the management of clients, for example, by
facilitating mobile service interoperability and reducing implementation
efforts (e.g., time to market). Moreover, the Examiner’s Answer provides
additional reasoning why a ordinarily skilled artisan would have been led to
combine the teachings of Das with those of Alfano:
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Further Alfano discloses organizing information in a
hierarchical tree structure, Para [0030]. Another
motivation to combine is that using a hierarchical tree
structure is an efficient organization method that allow
faster lookup of information. The applicant also argued
the examiner did not say what connectivity parameters
would be subject to the tree organization. In response,
the access list and/or membership of terminals in a closed
subscriber group are the connectivity parameters used to
determine what RATs the access terminal can access,
Para [0040-42], that can be organized using the tree
structure.
Id. at 12–13. Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s
explanation or additional reasoning in the Reply Brief. Further, Appellant
does not point to any evidence of record that the combinations would be
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
“represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007)). Nor does Appellant
provide objective evidence of secondary considerations, which our
reviewing court guides “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.”
Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder Sys., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
We find the above reasons more than adequate to support the
Examiner’s proposed combination. Therefore, we are not persuaded the
Examiner errs.
Appellant also contends that Alfano is non-analogous art because “the
disclosure of Alfano has nothing to do with that of Das.” App. Br. 17–18.
We disagree.

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Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior
art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of
endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if
the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the
inventor is involved.
In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Examiner
explains, Alfano and Das are analogous art at least because they are in the
same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention—i.e., electronic
communication techniques—and they all disclose related technologies—i.e.,
the transmission of digital information (Alfano) and wireless communication
networks (Das and Appellant’s invention). Ans. 13.
Appellant next contends the Examiner errs because Alfano “is wholly
silent as to the aspects of organizing ‘the connectivity parameters [. . .] in the
storage area [of the mobile server].” App. Br. 18 (emphasis omitted). We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention.
Each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in isolation,
but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.
See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (explaining that when the
rejection is based on a combination of references, one cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually). Here, the Examiner
finds, and we agree, that the combination of Das and Alfano (i.e., not Alfano
alone) renders the disputed limitation obvious. See Ans. 3–4 (citing Das
¶¶ 42–43, 98; Alfano ¶ 30); see also id. at 13; Final Act. 8–9. In particular,
Das teaches or suggests “a storage area in which are stored connectivity
parameter values of the terminal enabling the terminal to connect to the
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mobile server” with its disclosures of a data memory for storing information
and access control list that identifies member access terminals. Das ¶¶ 42–
43, 98. Alfano discloses implementing a device management (DM) tree
object that supports OMA DM protocol, wherein the management objects
are organized as nodes and can be manipulated by a DM server using OMA
DM protocol. Alfano ¶ 30. Thus, Alfano evidences that the recited
techniques of organizing data in a tree structure that has hierarchized objects
and is based on the OMA model, and manipulating objects using the OMA
Device Management Protocol, were known in the art. Appellant cites no
evidence to suggest that applying Alfano’s known technique to Das’s access
point—to produce an access point configured to extract connectivity
parameters organized in the storage area in a tree structure based on the
OMA model—would have been uniquely challenging or anything more than
a routine exercise of applying known techniques to achieve predictable
results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416–17 (explaining as examples of
combinations likely to be obvious “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods . . . when it does no more than yield predictable
results” and “the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior
art ready for the improvement”); Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162 (citing
KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). And as discussed above, the Examiner’s proposed
rationale to combine these teachings of Das and Alfano is adequate.
Regarding Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner’s proposed
combination of Das and Alfano “is born from the use of impermissible
hindsight” (App. Br. 19) and “would require a complete redesign of Das’s
system” (Id.), Appellant does not provide any persuasive evidence or
reasoning to support this assertion. It is well settled that mere attorney
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arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual
evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA
1974) (attorney argument is not evidence). And as discussed above,
Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence that the proposed
combination would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162 (citing KSR,
550 U.S. at 420). Accordingly, this assertion is entitled to little probative
weight.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 4–16 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED