Olin Conductors

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 467 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

OLIN CONDUCTORS
Olin Conductors , Olin Mathieson Chemical Corpora-
tion and Local 124 , International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 17-CA-3912
and 17-RC-5999
August 27, 1970
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On March 20, 1970, Trial Examiner Ramey Dono-
van issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that Respondent had engaged in, and
was engaging in, certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision The Trial Exam-
iner also found that Respondent has not engaged
in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint. In addition, the Trial Examiner found
that Respondent had engaged in objectionable conduct
with respect to the election held in Case 17-RC-
5999, and recommended that the election be set aside.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof,
and the Union filed cross-exceptions. Respondent sub-
sequently filed a brief in opposition to the Union's
cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here-
by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, we do not think that
the unfair labor practices herein warrant either a
refusal to bargain, finding based on the Union's cards,
or the issuance of a bargaining order, under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B.
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575. In our view,
the 8(a)(1) violations found by the Trial Examiner
are neither so extensive in nature nor so pervasive
in character as to preclude the holding of a fair
rerun election.'
ORDER
467
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the Recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified below,
and hereby orders that Respondent, Olin Conductors,
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Sedalia, Mis-
souri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Delete paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) from the Recom-
mended Order and reletter the subsequent paragraphs,
accordingly.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b) of
the Recommended Order:
"(b) Soliciting and/or adjusting, in a context of
union organizational activity, complaints, and griev-
ances from its employees for the purpose of removing
employee support of the Union, or any other labor
organization."
3. Delete the last part of paragraph 2 of the Appen-
dix which reads "the support that a majority of
the employees had given to the Union initially and
were a material factor in causing a majority of the
employees to vote against the Union," and substitute
therefor the following: "the holding of a free and
fair election."
4. Delete the third and fourth paragraphs of the
Appendix and substitute therefor the following:
"Accordingly, our employees are advised that:"
5. Delete paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Appendix
and substitute therefor the following "We will not
solicit employee grievances in a context of union
organizational activity for the purpose of removing
employee support of the Union, or any other labor
organization."
[Direction of Second Election' omitted from publi-
cation.]
MEMBER FANNING, dissenting in part:
I would adopt the Trial Examiner's decision without
modification.
See Schrementi Bros, Inc, 179 NLRB No 147
In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity
to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right
to vote, all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters
and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them
Excelsior Underwear Inc, 156 NLRB 1236, NL R B. v Wyman-Gordon
Company, 394 U S 759 Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an
election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the
eligible voters , must be filed by Respondent with the Regional Director
for Region 17 within 7 days after the date of issuance of the Notice
of Second Election by the Regional Director The Regional Director
shall make the list available to all parties to the election No extension
of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director except
in extraordinary circumstances Failure to comply with this requirement
shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections
are filed
185 NLRB No. 56
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
My colleagues adopt the Trial Examiner's findings
and conclusions that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act in the various ways fully detailed
in his decision. They adopt as well his findings and
conclusions concerning the Union's majority status.
They reject, however, his further conclusions that
Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and that a bargaining order is a necessary
remedy if employees' desires for Union representation
are to be effectuated
The Trial Examiner based his conclusions on the
teachings of the recent Supreme Court decision in
N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575.
My colleagues' bare conclusory statement that the
unfair labor practices "are neither so extensive in
nature nor so pervasive in character as to preclude
the holding of a fair rerun election"does not persuade
me that the Trial Examiner's analysis is in error.
Accordingly, I dissent from my colleagues' failure
to find an 8(a)(5) violation and to impose a bargaining
order as a remedy for Respondent's unfair labor
practices.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
RAMEY DONOVAN, Trial Examiner- The charge in this
case was filed on May 14, 1969, by Local 124, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, herein the
Union. The General Counsel of the Board, through the
Regional Director, Region 17, issued a complaint under
date of August 29, 1969, against Olin Conductors, herein
Respondent or the Company The complaint alleges various
acts to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act Respondent denies the alleged violations. Objections
to an election that was held on May 7 and 8, 1969,
were filed by the Union and the objections were consolidated
with the aforementioned complaint for the purpose of hear-
ing A consolidated hearing was held in Sedalia, Missouri,
from September 30 through October 3 and October 28
through 31, 1969.1
In its brief, Respondent complains that the Board agent in investigating
the charge did not ascertain Respondent 's position regarding conduct
of Supervisors Manley and Cloud and that Respondent first learned
of the involvement of these two men when it received the complaint,
issued August 29, 1969 Respondent filed its answer to the complaint,
dated September 9, 1969, denying generally all allegations of unfair
labor practices Respondent made no effort , formally or informally, to
inform the Board of any information or facts regarding Manley and
Cloud after it became aware of their alleged involvement Respondent's
motion for more definite statement , dated September 23, 1969, was
ruled upon at the opening of the hearing on September 30, 1969 The
aforesaid motion referred to complaint allegations concerning Respondent
and its named supervisors and requested certain additional information
such as the names of employees interrogated and so forth No distinction
was made in the motion between Cloud and Manley and any other
supervisor and they were not expressly named by Respondent in its
motion and the same type of information was requested regarding Respond-
ent and its supervisors generally , with respect to the various complaint
allegations Respondent had adequate opportunity , if it wished , to acquaint
I JURISDICTION
At all times material, Respondent, a Virginia corporation
has operated a plant at Sedalia, Missouri, where it manufac-
tures and ships, in interstate commerce, electrical wire
and cable. In the conduct of its business, Respondent,
from its Sedalia facility, annually purchases goods valued
in excess of $50,000 from suppliers in states other than
Missouri. Also, in the course of its business, Respondent,
from its Sedalia plant, annually sells and ships goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly to enterprises located in states
other than Missouri
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act and the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In 1967-68, Respondent built a new plant in Sedalia
Construction progressed and equipment was installed until,
in July 1968, production commenced. Facilities, such as
complete indoor plumbing, various doors and related
appurtenances, were not complete at the time production
got under way but the completion of construction and
the commencement of production proceeded during the
same period.
According to Plant Manager Fredrickson and Personnel
Manager Candler, the management concept placed in effect
at the new plant was that of "participative management "
This approach involved the theory, as explained by manage-
ment, that people are basically honest and that they derive
satisfaction from achievement. A crucial aspect of the
approach is effective communication between employees
and management . Maintenance of competitive and compara-
ble working conditions, pay, and benefits also appears to
have been part of the management approach.
Some of the specific implementation of the foregoing
management approach was that production and maintenance
employees were paid a salary and not paid by the the
hour; employees were not required to punch time clocks,
and fringe benefits in the form of various types of insurance,
pensions, a thrift saving plan to which the Company contrib-
uted stock, applied to both management and rank-and-
file personnel although proportioned to the status of the
particularjobs and positions.
A booklet prepared by the Company and issued to new
employees set forth a great deal concerning company person-
nel policy. Among the statements therein was that it was
Olin's policy to pay and maintain competitive compensation
the General Counsel, off the record or on the record, with any evidence
it wished to reveal regarding Cloud and Manley , either at the inception
of the hearing or before it put on its defense or as a part of its defense
it chose the latter Respondent was not denied an opportunity to settle
the case in whole or in part at any stage Such amendments as were
permitted at the hearing were of a minor nature and sun genera with
the original complaint allegations Respondent , in our opinion , had ade-
quate opportunity for cross-examination , the preparation of its case, and
the introduction of evidence We are not persuaded that either the
Board's rules and regulations or the Administrative Procedure Act were
transgressed
OLIN CONDUCTORS 469
and insure that its pay plans reflected local and area trends.
More explicitly , management had orally taken the position
that its pay plan would be equal to or better than those
of other plants in the Sedalia area. The booklet devoted
12 pages to describing employee benefits such as 8 paid
holidays; vacations, up to 6 weeks, insurance of various
kinds; retirement plan; thrift plan; leave of various kinds,
educational assistance; and other items Under the heading
of employee-supervisor communication the booklet stressed
the importance of communication to and from all employees.
It was stated that the Company would keep employees
informed of its problems, progress and policies and encour-
aged employees to pass on to their supervisor any ideas
or suggestions and opinions about company policies and
thereby both parties could learn of "misunderstandings
and dissatisfactions . and take prompt corrective action
if needed." Employees were encouraged to go to others
in the plant regarding "ideas, suggestions or complaints"
if they were unable to go to their supervisor for some
reason
Although not set forth in the employee booklet, the
evidence is clear that it was one of management's concepts
at the Sedalia plant that its management policies of participa-
tion, effective communication, competitive wages and
attractive fringe benefits would enable the plant to be
operated without a union. Kurtz, a union adherent and
a member of the union-organizing committee, testified that
at an orientation meeting for new employees in September
1968 when he was hired, either Fredrickson or Candler
said that the plant had a new type of operation and manage-
ment felt that "we" could get along better without a union
and they wished to use this new form of operation as
long as possible although sooner or later a union would
probably come in, it was said, according to Kurtz, that
the Company was not antiunion and that the Company
had many unionized plants 2 Candler, in describing the
orientation sessions , testified to substantially the same
effect, stating that at the orientation session a short history
of the labor movement was given and the statement was
made that a majority of Olin's plants do have unions,
further, that although the Sedalia plant is not antiunion the
management believes that a union is not necessary and
management has a better way of operating than what took
place years ago when unions may have been necessary.
Since the Company regarded communication as the key
factor in its operational policy at the Sedalia plant, the
plant manager held meetings with the operating employees
at periodic intervals, about every 2 or 3 months.' At the
meetings, Fredrickson, prior to March 1969, would speak
about such matters as progress in plant construction; ho,
the plant was doing production-wise; problems of the amount
or quality of production in the plant or in particular depart-
ments; when or if some new equipment was arriving or
t The Company has 60-70 plants in the United States
' The aspect of the case pertaining to meetings both before and
after the advent of the Union in March 1969, is important and was
the subject of testimony by many witnesses called by the respective
parties We have carefully considered the record and have appraised
the witnesses and we have distilled and synthesized from the record
of testimony and exhibits our factual description of what occurred and
what the factual situation was
was ready for installation and, generally, would endeavor
to inform employees about the plant situation and its pro-
gram, policies, progress, and problems At the conclusion
of his remarks, Fredrickson would ask for questions and
employees would ask questions and would be answered
by Fredrickson The shift supervisors, who are the lowest
rank in the supervisory hierarchy, met with individual
employees at various intervals pursuant to what was known
as the "talk plan." As the name implies, the talk plan
was part of the implementation of the communications
policy between management and employees The shift super-
visor sat down with an individual who was on his shift
and would tell him how he was doing in his work, conduct,
and so forth, how he might improve or whatever, and
would invite comment from the individual from the latter's
point of view These sessions were held more frequently
with a new employee and thereafter were held at regular
intervals every few months In addition to the individual
sessions, the shift supervisor held group meetings with
all the employees on his shift.
There is little doubt that in a new plant such as the
Company's Sedalia plant there were a variety of changes
in the plant building, equipment, working conditions, and
so forth. It is probably true that most, if not all, such
changes were in the nature of improvements in working
conditions and conditions of employment and were so
regarded by both management and employees Thus, initial-
ly, the plant operated without indoor plumbing, there were
various doors that were not installed, and other items
of similar nature were not yet installed, or, like several
drinking water coolers, were in place but not hooked up
These matters were taken care of in time in the pre-
March 1969 period Changes of the foregoing nature do
not necessarily indicate any unique responsiveness or flexibil-
ity on management's part to employee complaints since
what occurred was simply completions of management plans
that had been delayed by factors not uncommon in getting
a new plant into full operation That management was
interested in having a good physical plant and a good
efficient place to work and a work force with good morale
is clear.
It is also true that during the same period management
made changes in equipment and policies at the initiation
of an employee or employees. For instance, there was
a piece of equipment, a cold weld, which initially had
to be carried around by hand; later, a suggestion was
made that the cold weld be placed on wheels Evidently,
because the suggestion was both sensible and reasonable,
this was done. In the melt cast department, a properzi
machine, whose proper operation had entailed considerable
attention, was at one point operated by a man who was
a temporary replacement for the injured regular operator
Subsequently, when the job was opened for bids, the line
of progression for bids on this machine was, at the time,
based on seniority in the line The temporary operator,
who was not in the line of progression, complained of
his exclusion from the bidding. Management then decided,
that experience on the machine should be counted and
that the temporary operator should not be bumped by
a man possessing seniority in the existing line of progression
Also, during this period, becuase of problems with the
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
properzi, a group of employees were working 6 days a
week and sometimes around the clock, A time came when
this group was supposed to work on a Sunday One of
the men, Clark, spoke to his supervisor and told the latter
that Clark would like to speak to Fredrickson. This was
arranged and Clark explained to Fredrickson that the men
wanted some time off. According to Clark, Fredrickson
made arrangements "so we could have some time off on
this particular weekend." At another time, in the same
department, the safety committee called management's
attention to a loose walkway and as a result the walkway
was welded in position.
B. Union Organization
The first indication of union interest,in the plant came
in September 1968, when the instant Union passed out
some handbills at the plant entrance. As far as appears,
this effort was brief and abortive. Later in the year, the
IAM passed out some handbills but this, too, was brief
and abortive, as was similar activity by the Teamsters
early in 1969. On February 9, 1969, representatives of
the instant Union held a meeting at a Sedalia hotel. One
employee attended. Meetings at the same location were
held on March 9 and 16, with 11 and 18 employees attending
the respective meetings at which, inter aka, union authoriza-
tion cards were signed An organizing committee of six
or seven employees was formed T',ereafter, members of
the committee distributed union authorization and member-
ship cards to their fellow employees. Union leaflets were
distributed at the plant entrances to those entering the
plant about March 17 or 18, 1969, and at various times
and places at later dates. Many leaflets bore the names
of the members of the organizing committee. Union buttons
were worn in the plant and cards were distributed in
the plant with some discussion thereon by those involved.
At least some of this activity was on working time and
although supervisors were aware of such activity no proscrip-
tion was placed thereon.
On March 18, Fredrickson received a telephone call
from Mock, a union representative, in which Mock claimed
that he had cards from Respondent's employees showing
that they wished to be represented by the Union Evidently
Mock claimed a majority since Fredrickson responded that
he had considerable doubt that Mock had a "majority
or number of cards that represented a majority " Fredrickson
declined Mock's suggestion for, a meeting to go into the
matter and asked Mock why he did not try the election
procedure.
The Union, under date of March 18, wrote to Fredrickson
claiming that it represented a majority of Respondent's
employees in an appropriate unit .' The letter stated that
it constituted "a formal and continuing demand for recogni-
tion . . . ... It was stated that if the Company doubted
' As set forth in the letter the unit was All production and maintenance
employees , employed by the employer at its Sedalia , Missouri plant,
including group leaders, leadmen, laboratory technicians , quality control
and inspection employees , shipping , receiving and store room employees,
tool room machinists, janitors and custodial employees , excluding office
clerical employees , guards , supervisors , and professional employees, as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
the Union's majority status, the Union would agree to
verification of its authorization cards by a mutually accepta-
ble impartial third party. An early meeting was proposed
Fredrickson received the letter on March 20 and respond-
ed by letter of March 21 1 In his reply, Fredrickson stated
that "we" have "a good faith doubt that the Union
represents a majority of our production and maintenance
employees. It has been our experience that union authoriza-
tion cards are an unreliable method of determining majority
status " The letter suggested that the Union use
the election procedure of the Board On March 20, the
Union filed with the Board a petition for certification
In a unit of 82 employees on March 18, the Union
had secured 53 authorization cards signed on or before
March 17; 57 signed on or before March 18; 59 signed
on or before March 20; 69 by April. The cards, all dated,
were authenticated at the hearing either by the employee
who signed the card or by witnesses who had given the
card to the respective signers and saw the latter sign or
received the signed card from the signer. There is no
evidence that any of the foregoing cards was not signed
by the employee signer whose name and signature appears
thereon.'
The Board scheduled a hearing on the petition for April
11, 1969 At a conference on that date during the time
scheduled for the hearing, the Union renewed or continued
its request for recognition. The Company declined. The
parties then agreed to a consent election and signed a
Stipulation for Certification upon consent election The
unit agreed upon and set forth in the stipulation was-
All production and maintenance employees, including group
leaders, shop service mechanics, die reamers, shipping,
receiving and storeroom employees employed by the
Employer at its Sedalia, Missouri, facility, but excluding
laboratory technicians, office clerical employees, professional
employees, and guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
The election was held on May 7 and 8, 1969 Of approxi-
mately 81 eligible voters, 34 voted for the Union and
45 against, with 1 void ballot and 1 challenged ballot
On May 14, the Union filed the instant charge as well
as timely objections to the election.
C Union Majority and Demand for Recognition
Before proceeding to consider the alleged unfair labor
practices and objections to the election, we will consider
two of Respondent's contentions: 1) that the Union's demand
for recognition was made for an inappropriate unit and,
2) that the cards were secured by improper inducement.
' On March 19 union representatives and supporters sought to meet
with Fredrickson in the plant He refused to see them on the ground
that there had been misrepresentation used in arranging the meeting
The alleged misrepresentation was that he had not been told that nonem-
ployee union representatives were to be included in the delegation
' The cards read
Authori/ation For Representation
I authorve the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers to represent me in collective
bargaining with my employer
[Name, Address Employer Classilication,
Department , Date Signed I
OLIN CONDUCTORS 471
In its brief, Respondent, in effect, contends that the
unit set forth in the consent election agreement is an,
or is the, appropriate unit and that there is no evidence
that laboratory technicians should be included in the unit.
Since the unit set forth in the Union's demand for recognition
in the letter of March 18 expressly included laboratory
technicians in the unit and the consent election agreement
expressly excluded such employees, Respondent therefore
asserts that recognition was sought in an inappropriate
unit.'
In March 1969, Respondent had five laboratory techni-
cians, including Cloud, who was made a supervisor on
March 17. The Union had two authorizations from among
the above group, one dated March 26 and one dated April
5 1 Neither card was included in our computations, above,
as to the number of cards that the Union had in March
when it made its initial demand for recognition or thereafter
With or without the inclusion of laboratory technicians
in the unit, the Union had a majority of cards at all
relevant times
At no time did the plant manager, in declining recognition
to the Union, raise the question of unit, nor did he testify
at the hearing that this was an element in his position.
The declination of recognition was asserted to be based
on the doubt as to the Union's majority which doubt
apparently was based on the belief as asserted in the March
21 letter of declination, that cards were unreliable as indicia
of employee desires and as confirmed by the refusal to
have the union cards verified by an impartial third party.
Moreover, in our opinion, the variation in unit as to laborato-
ry technicians was a minor and insubstantial variation
in the appropriate unit, the latter being the unit set forth
in the consent election agreement, agreed to by both parties
and ratified by the Board's regional director in approving
the agreement The minor variation in unit does not invali-
date the Union's demand for recognition in March, 1969,
and thereafter.'
Respondent's contention that the cards were signed by
employees as the result of improper inducement rests entire-
ly, except for one card concerning which Respondent alleges
an additional deficiency, on the fact that the Union, by
leaflet and orally, informed employees that initiation fees
would be waived for employees who signed a card before
a certain date The leaflet stated, inter aka:
Any Olin employee who joins IBEW, Local 124 before
March 31, 1969 will pay no-We repeat-no initiation
fee. Any Olin employee who might choose to become
a member after March 31, 1969 will pay an initiation
fee of only $1000
It is apparent that the above refers to joining the Union
and membership in the Union. The Union had two forms
of card of different color One was an authorization card
described, above, authorizing the Union to represent the
signer in collective bargaining. The other card was an
application for membership in the Union Some employees
signed both cards, some did not The cards introduced
in evidence at the hearing and the cards we have been
discussing were authorization cards As far as appears,
an employee could sign an authorization card in the hope
that the Union could secure improved conditions of employ-
ment and the same individual might have no intention
of becoming a union member , with or without initiation
fee. The waiving of initiation fee would therefore have
no relevance to such an individual.10
However, we feel that it is unnecessary to rest our
finding on the above distinction. We will assume, arguendo,
the situation to be the one most favorable to Respondent;
namely, that the impression was general among employees
that if you signed an authorization card or both cards
by March 31, you would not have to pay an initiation
fee '1
Proceeding on the above premise, we note that Respondent
in its brief urges us "to apply the logic of Lobue Bros "12
and that Respondent undertakes to distinguish DIT-MCO
Corp., 163 NLRB 1019. Both these cases deal solely with
objections to an election and not with a situation such
' Inasmuch as Respondent points to no other discrepancy in the
unit, we conclude that, except for laboratory technicians , the unit described
on March 18 and on April 11, when the consent agreement was signed,
was the same We note that among the inclusions in the March 18
unit were group leaders and leadmen The latter category is not mentioned
in the April 1l unit either as included or as excluded It is likely
that, on April 11, when the parties sat down to describe the unit for
the election, it was revealed that the Company did not have leadmen
Since group leaders were included in the April 11 unit and since they
would be higher ranked than leadmen and closer to the excluded superviso-
ry category , it would appear that if group leaders were included in
the unit, any leadmen would also be included if there was such a classifica-
tion at the plant Among the inclusions in the March 18 unit were
toolroom machinists No such category appears in Respondent's job
classifications , and in the April 11 unit there is the term, shop service
mechanics Quality control and inspection employees are included in
the March 18 unit but no mention of such a classification, either in
or out , appears in the April 11 unit We find no such classification
in Respondent 's list of jobs Either there was no such class of work
in the plant or quality control and inspection work may have been
performed in part by laboratory technicians or by professional employees
or other production employees without this specific classification
° Cloud was not one of the signers
° As to minor and insubstantial variations in unit see fn 4, Board
decision , and fn 11 of Trial Examiner 's decision in The Kroger Company,
165 NLRB No 131, and cases cited
11 There is no evidence in the record or even intimation that any
union representative or employee said anything about employees having
to join the Union if it secured recognition or that anything was said
to the effect that the Union was seeking in any prospective negotiations
to secure a union shop clause in the contract , requiring membership
in the Union as a condition of employment A further negative factor
even as to the unmentioned union shop possibility was, as we shall
see, the Company's strong opposition to the Union and the plant manager's
description of the Company , "as a hard bargainer " in any possible negotia-
tions with a union "Hard bargainers" are employers who rarely agree
to union shop clause contracts although, of course , it is possible and
the two factors are not necessarily self-exclusionary
11 There is limited evidence on the point Three or four signers of
authorization cards that are in evidence had been told by the employee
soliciting the cards that the Union was waiving initiation fees for those
who signed before March 31
Although there is no evidence that such was the fact, if we assume
that someone believed that by signing an authorization card he thereby
obligated himself to paying an initiation fee eventually and therefore
decided to sign the authorization card before March 31 in order to
save the fee, the obvious and easiest solution to someone who did
not wish to authorize the Union to represent him in collective bargaining
was not to sign the authorization card and eliminate any obligation
to pay an initiation or other fee
11 LobueBros , 109 NLRB 1182
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as is here presented where the 8(a)(5) allegation is based
on the position, as a necessary part of the allegation,
that the authorization cards establish a valid union majority.
The election was a central element in the reasoning of
the DIT-MCO case.
We do not view the facts in the instant case as equivalent
to the situation where a union offers $5-$25 or free life
insurance if an employee will sign an authorization card "
These are inducements of a nature that in themselves may
well induce the signing of a card irrespective of any interest
that the employee may have in union respresentation An
employee originally not in favor of a union or opposed
thereto might sign a card as the price of free insurance
But, in our opinion, this is not true of an employee who
signs a card albeit knowing that those who sign before
a certain date will not have to pay an initiation fee.
If a man is an illiterate or has no interest in books,
for any purpose, he is most unlikely to sign an authorization
or application for a book club. This would be true even
if the book club advertised that it was offering a 10 percent
reduction in rates to all those who signed membership
applications or authorizations before March 31 If an individ-
ual signs a plainly worded authorization or application
for a book club and authorizes the club to send him
and bill him for three books a year, it is reasonable to
conclude that he knew what he was doing and that he
wanted to receive some books from the club. He may
wish to read the books, or he may wish to use the books
as gifts for others; or he may want some books to fill
a bookcase, or to place under wobbly table legs, or he
may wish to be able to say that he is a subscriber to
the club. In any event, it is clear that when he signed
the authorization for the club to send him books, this
was what he authorized and what he intended. The fact
that he signed before March 31 in order to take advantage
of a 10 percent reduction in rates does not alter the fact
An association to ban all vivisection in medical research
could proclaim that it would waive its $100 initiation
fee for all those who signed authorizations permitting and
requesting the association to represent them in appearing
before a congressional committee to demand a ban on
all vivisections. Signers of such authorizations would not
include those who favored vivisection or who did not wish
the association to represent them By the same token,
those who did sign, presumably, subscribed to the purposes
of the association and wished it to represent them. The
waiver of the initiation fee had not influenced and would
not influence those who did not favor the program of
the association; the waiver of fee was simply a fringe
benefit to those who, in any event, were, or were willing
to be supporters of the purposes of the association or
who, in someone's opinion needed a little encouragement
or incentive to take an affirmative act consonant with
their views By the same token, in the instant case, the
signers of union cards authorizing the Union to represent
them in bargaining presumably intended to so authorize
the Union at the time they signed the cards The wording
of the card was clear "
D. H Overmyer Co, 170 NLRB No 69
" If it be said that an employee opposed to, or not in favor of,
union representation signed an authorization card because he believed
With respect to one card, that of employee "Block,""
Respondent, in its brief, asserts that "Block" was told
that the only purpose of signing a card was to get an
election 16 The testimony of Bolch varied at different points.
On the particular aspect above-mentioned Bolch's eventual
testimony was that a fellow employee, who gave him the
card, told him "`Sign the card and we will get an election',
something like that" and said "most of the guys had
already signed, you might as well "" Bolch took the card
home, signed it, and returned it a few days later He
also signed a union membership card concerning which
nothing had been said to him. Although Botch's authoriza-
tion card is not determinative on the issue of majority
we consider it a valid card and that it is properly included
in the union designation.
We find that the appropriate unit is that set forth in
the election agreement as described above and as set forth
in the complaint and admitted in the answer thereto. We
also find that on March 18, 1969, and thereafter the Union
had been designated as collective-bargaining agent by a
majority of the employees in the appropriate unit by reason
of valid authorization cards so designating the Union
D The Election Campaign
At this point we return to the events between March,
when the organizing commenced and the demand for recog-
nition was made, and May, when the election was held.
In March, following the advent of the Union, the Company
took steps to convince its employees that union representa-
tion was not in their best interest and to make clear,
as it had when employees were hired, that the Company
wanted to operate the Sedalia plant without a union as
baEgaining agent. As Candler testified, the Company under-
took "to wage a campaign" to defeat the Union in the
latter's effort to attain the recognition and status of collec-
tive-bargaining agent.
Higher management at the plant began holding meetings
about twice a week with lower ranking supervisors. The
latter were advised what they could and could not say
regarding the Union and were given material calculated
to be useful in defeating the Union, such as, copies of
contracts in some union plants which, by comparison, would
allegedly reveal that the Sedalia plant conditions were equiv-
the union would eventually become the bargaining agent or because
the individual felt that by signing a ard he thereh obligated himself
to eventually paying an initiation fee in the Union and therefore could
save the fee by signing the card before March 31, the answer would
be, as pointed out previously, on the latter aspect, that reason would
militate against signing any card As to the man who signed because
he wanted to be on the winning side or to go along with his fellow
workers, this may occur in many human activities Every individual
is not similarly affected, but many are Similar motivativing factors occur
in voting, purchasing of cars, houses, purchases of suits, dresses, and
other items that are in "style" or are popular The man who subscribes
to the book club because his neighbor subscribes is none the less a
subscriber
" "Block" in the transcript Evidently the name is Bolch as he printed
and signed his name on the union card which he authenticated at the
hearing
" Cumberland Shoe Corp, 144 NLRB 1268
" The card is dated March 17, at which time a majority had signed
cards
OLIN CONDUCTORS
alent or superior to those in union plants . The lower
supervisors, in turn, held meetings with their shift employees
with considerable frequency, several meetings a week in
some cases Fredrickson held 6 meetings in the plant on
March 26, 27, 28 and an equal number on May 2, 3,
5, a few days before the election. The meetings were geared
so that attendance was assured by employees on each
of the plant's various shifts. The numbers of employees
at these series of meetings ranged from 30-40 to 6, depending
on shift schedules and the staffing of the particular shift
Employees were notified by their supervisors and by notices
on the bulletin board when to attend a meeting . Typically,
a meeting was held at a change of shift. Employees going
off shift and those going on shift would attend The former
group would be paid overtime for the period of their
attendance at the meetings and the latter group would
receive regular time. The meetings varied from about I
hour to l hour 45 minutes, to 2 hours Variations were
attributable to the number of issues raised and the
discussion thereon. Although Candler was with Fredrickson
at all the March and May meetings, Fredrickson was the
spokesman, occasionally referring a matter to Candler for
comment.
A substantial number of witnesses from both sides testified
regarding the meetings Variations and conflicts in testimony
are present, not unexpectedly Some differences are explaina-
ble by reason of the number of meetings and the fact
that witnesses were not present at the same meetings
All meetings did not have the same questions and responses
although they were basically in the same general areas.
Fredrickson did not have a written speech but did have
some notes and at the May meetings he had union leaflets
and commented thereon. Some matters came up at both
the March and May meetings and witnesses may not always
have remembered correctly at which particular meeting
a subject arose.
Fredrickson began the March meetings by saying, in
substance, that it was obvious, in view of the Union's
presence and activity, that there was some unhappiness
among employees and that the Company had not been
doing as good a job as it thought it was doing and there
apparently was a better way for the Company to do things
and that the Company believed that problems could be
worked out among ourselves He said that in this area
involving the Union and union activities he could neither
make promises , nor threaten nor coerce employees, and
that when, in the meeting, questions would be asked about
aspects that would involve the foregoing areas or aspects
on which he was uncertain or could not speak, he would
raise his hand, illustrating by gesture Fredrickson then
went on to speak about the production situation in the
plant and the training of employees and a problem relating
to damage to forklift trucks. He then asked for any
questions, suggestions, problems, complaints, or comments
that the employees had.
A variety of matters was raised and addressed to Fredrick-
son by employees at the various meetings. Among the
topics was why the Company paid by salary instead of
by the hour ; a suggestion that new employees should not
begin working on a machine immediately but should spend
a few days observing an operator on the machine before
473
actually commencing work, that the trouble with the forklift
trucks was the brakes, that certain employees had to walk
a great distance in the plant to get a drink of water
because there was no water cooler in their area and why
a water cooler could not be installed in the area; why
helpers on the 54-bobbin machine were not in the line
of progression to become operators on the machine since
the helpers in many instances were the persons who trained
a new operator, why an employee, if he bid into another
line of progression, could not retain his salary and longevity
accumulated in his former fob;" if the Union came in,
what would happen to the various fringe benefits that
the employees presently enjoyed
The May meetings were also prefaced by Fredrickson
saying that he could not promise, threaten, or coerce employ-
ees and that he would raise his hand to indicate if he
could not answer a particular question He had union
leaflets in his hand and he made comments on statements
about various items in the leaflets He then asked for
questions, suggestions, and problems from the employees.
The items raised by employees pertained to the Union
and matters of interest to them as employees. Some topics
appear to have been common to both the March and
May meetings, for instance, the questions by employees
as to what would happen to existing employee benefits
if the Union became bargaining agent
The March meetings, in our opinion, to a large extent
involved the employees' airing of their problems, complaints,
and suggestions regarding their relationship with the Compa-
ny with respect to various terms and conditions of employ-
ment . Such action by the employees was in response to
the basic coloration and tenor that Fredrickson had imparted
to the meetings by his opening remarks. By referring to
the union campaign and saying that its viability indicated
that there was discontent among the employees and that
the Company had somehow fallen down on the job, and
that there must be a better way for the Company to
do things concerning employees, Fredrickson made it clear
that he wanted to correct the situation. The employees
would have been indeed obtuse not to perceive that the
plant manager was asking for the airing of complaints
or grievances that had led employees to support a union.
Not only was this apparent from Fredrickson's remarks
but Supervisor Haley, who held meetings with employees
on his shift and with those on other shifts during the
period from the latter part of March to the election in
May, had expressly said in a context of talks on the
union subject that the Company was a good-faith Company
and the employees should give it a chance, presumably,
to take care of any problems or complaints
The employees quite evidently understood that the plant
manager in March was tell.i.g them, in effect, that he
wanted to know anything that was on their minds that
had lead them to support a union . The obvious leverage
" In a line of progression the Company had a series of salary steps
which were effective after an employee had been in the preceding step
for 3 months However, if, for instance, an employee had accumulated
2 months of longevity toward the next salary step, he would lose his
longevity accumulation if he had bid into a lower line of progression
This was true in the past We shall be discussing when the situation
changed
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the situation, as indicated by Frederickson, was quickly
grasped by the employees It was not simply a situation
as in the pre-March meetings when the plant manager
discussed production and department performances and
then asked for questions at the end." In March, the focus
was placed on the union activity as an indication that
the Company had not been doing all it could and coupled
with an acknowledgment that the Company recognized
that it could and would do better and was prepared to
do so if the employees would simply advise the Company
of any problems or matters that bothered them
In response to Fredrickson' s invitation at the March
meetings, an employee in the wire strand department com-
plained of having to walk a substantial distance through
the melt cast department to the nearest water cooler and
he wanted to know why a cooler could not be placed
in or near his place of work Apparently this same matter
was raised at several of Fredrickson's March meetings
Fredrickson said that the matter would be taken under
advisement. Within 3 or 4 days a water cooler was installed
as requested.
The fact that at the plant manager's meetings in March
1969, the nature of the meeting was such that it evoked
an employee complaint about the need for a water cooler
and secured the prompt remedying for the deficiency, is
indicative of the nature of the meeting as a sort of general
complaint session. The lack of a water cooler in the particu-
lar location had been a fact since the plant had been
in operation.20 The employees who worked there had, quite
obviously, walked to other water coolers when they wanted
a drink. The shift supervisors undoubtedly were aware
that there was not a water cooler in or near the particular
department. Yet, until the plant manager, in March, in
in effect said to the employees, tell me anything that you
have on your mind, anything that has made you less
than completely happy and thus led to support of a union,
" Although the plant had paid its employees by salary instead of
by the hour, it does not appear that at any meeting prior to March
the employees had felt that meetings with Fredrickson or with their
individual supervisors were appropriate forums for general questions uncon-
nected directly with production problems . But at the March 26-28 meetings
with Fredrickson, the Company's express invitation in effect, to air any-
thing that might concern an employee , was appropriately interpreted
as wide enough to encompass questions as to why the Company paid
salaries instead of hourly wages Although it must have been a question
in the minds of some employees since the inception of the plant, this
matter had evidently not been raised at any pre-March meeting Pre-
March meetings conducted by Fredrickson were not general grievance
forums Prior to March the problem of a loose walkway was handled
by an employee safety committee and the Company took steps to have
the walkway welded This was not a matter raised at one of Fredrickson's
periodic pre-March production meetings Other such matters appear to
have been raised through routine communication between employee and
supervisor and not at the plant manager 's periodic meetings While ques-
tions had been invited and asked at such meetings in the past, the
meetings were not general grievance forums preceded by the plant manager
acknowledging that the Company had fallen down in its dealings with
employees and inviting the airing of any questions and problems that
had led employees to support or to encourage a union
10 In the beginning there were water coolers in the plant that had
not been hooked up They were hooked up around August 1968 It
was fairly clear that the water cooler that the Company installed as
a result of the complaint at the March 1969 meetings had not been
part of the Company's plans for the building
no employee had complained of having to walk considerable
distance to a water cooler 21 Since the plant manager at
the March meetings was, in effect, asking employees to
tell him where the Company had failed in satisfying them,
the employees responded And the Company in turn
responded by rectifying promptly any reasonable complaint,
e g , the water cooler installation 22
One of Respondent's witnesses, Coley, a group leader,
gave testimony about a water cooler situation that was
evidently the same situation and location as described above.
In January 1969, Coley, who worked in the melt cast
department, observed that employees from wire strand made
a practice of coming through melt cast to reach a water
cooler near a furnace. At the time, Coley, who was on
the safety committee, discussed with his supervisor the
undesirability of coming through a department without
being aware of the danger present in an area with which
one was not familiar, e g , being burned by being too
close to the furnace from which "the metal splashes out
at times", and that "there should be a water cooler installed
up in their department . . . ." This conversation between
Coley and his supervisor took place around January 15. It
was brought up again at a safety meeting I week later
Coley testified that as far as he knew nothing was
accomplished at the time about installing the water cooler.
In view of the location and the departments involved and
Candler's testimony that after August 1968, one water
cooler was installed in late March or early April and
another in mid-May 1969, it is apparent that the cooler
installed within 3 or 4 days after a complaint at the
Fredrickson open forum meetings of March 26-28, 1969,
pertained to the same location and situation raised by
Coley, without success, 2 months earlier There is no
evidence or claim that this particular water cooler situation
was being worked on for 2 months prior to Fredrickson's
meetings Rather it appears that with the advent of the
Union, the Company solicited complaints directly to the
plant manager at ehe meetings in March and promptly
remedied, within reason, any manifestation of employee
unhappiness or noncontentment
Another matter that arose several times by employee
complaints at the March meetings with Fredrickson was,
why helpers on the 54-bobbin machine were excluded from
the line of progression to become operators on the machine
when an opening arose for the higher job. There is no
evidence that over a period of months when the 54-bobbin
operation was in full swing that, from time to time, someone
did not become an operator by moving up the line of
progression from operator on the 12-bobbin machine or
" The company handbook stressed that communication was a basic
responsibility of a supervisor and that the immediate supervisor was
the primary source of "information" for an employee and the person
with whom the employee should "discuss any problems" If, for some
reason, the employee was "unable to go to your [his] supervisor", others
could be approached
" One employee , although sensing correctly the tone and tenor of
the March meetings , went a bit beyond the reasonable He asked Fredrick-
son at the meeting why , since the Company was paying by salary,
the amount could not be $ 10,000 Facetious or otherwise , the question
indicates the tone of the meeting set by Fredrickson as a general purgation
of all complaints and aspirations
OLIN CONDUCTORS
some place else in the line of progression An operator
from the latter machine, however, required some training
and breaking in on the 54-bobbin and the experienced
helper on the 54-bobbin was the source of such training
But, the helper, by reason of the Company' s engineering
and job evaluation studies of the bobbin operations and
the jobs involved, had been excluded from the line of
progression to the operatorjob on that machine
It would be surprising if at least some helpers would
not have been unhappy about the situation or that the
Company with its grasp of scientific management, and
policy of having high employee morale, did not realize
that there was at least a possibility of helper frustration
Quite evidently, however, after weighing all factors, the
Company had set up and adhered to a line of progression
from which helpers were excluded This situation continued
until the March meetings with Fredrickson. When the
subject was raised at the meetings by employee complaints
as heretofore described, Fredrickson said that the Company
would give consideration to the matter. Not long after,
in April, the helper job on the 54-bobbin was placed in
the line of progression."
We earlier described the instance, before the advent of
the Union, when the situation arose where there was a
temporary operator on the properzi machine. Later, when
the job was opened for bids, the temporary man complained
of his exclusion from the bidding. He filed a complaint
under the procedure described in the company handbook
The Company decided that he could bid on the job. This
complaint had not been elicited by the plant manager
at one of his periodic meetings.
Indeed, although not in so many words, it is our opinion
that the company handbook well describes the nature of
the plant manager 's meetings with employees before the
serious advent of a union Thus, ". . we [management]
expect to keep you informed about the company-its prob-
lems, its progress, its policies, and general information
which we think will affect you in your job." In other
words, general information about the plant, the business,
its goals and policies, and the question period thereafter,
by reason of the very tone and nature of the manager's
periodic meetings of the above type, would be germane
thereto. Such were the pre-March plant manager meetings
with employees These were not general grievance sessions.
Good management alone would dictate that top management
ordinarily would not conduct and seek to handle all individ-
ual employee unhappinesses and complaints in periodic
meetings, but would deal with broader main issues of plant
goals and policies. The handbook confirms that it is the
immediate supervisor who is to be the employee's "main
source of information" and "your problems" are to be
discussed with him. The March and May meetings of
Fredrickson assumed a different character with the plant
" Candler testified that the helper situation came to the Company's
attention in February or early March when operators on the 54-bobbin
were bidding into the insulation department The 54 helpers trained
the new operators on the 54-bobbin Nothing was done about the situation
until Fredrickson 's meetings at the end of March elicited employee
complaints at a time when the Union had claimed a majority, had
requested recognition , and had filed a petition for certification
475
manager himself countering the union situation by an effort
to elicit and to deal with any reasonably legitimate com-
plaints that any employee might have about the Company
or his work or conditions of employment
At the March meetings one or more employees asked
questions about pay and longevity when an employee bid
from one line of progression into another line of progression
into different pay steps The aspect of concern was the
initial loss of higher salary and accumulated longevity in
the 3-month grade steps if a man bid into a lower line
of progression." Fredrickson responded and also called
on Candler for further elaboration The substance of the
company response at the meeting was that it was already
company policy that an employee did not lose the salary
he was making or his accrued longevity by bidding down
into another line This was the first announcement to the
employees that such was the case All the employee witnesses
who testified on the subject testified that they had been
unaware of such a policy prior to the March meetings.
No one testified otherwise The Company admits that it
never had made any general announcement of such a policy
prior to the meeting and that such a policy was at least
a change in important respects from the policy as it had
existed as late as early 1969.
Assuming, arguendo, that the policy had in fact been
changed by the Company prior to the March meetings,
the first public announcement of a policy or a changed
policy that was beneficial to the employees has significance.
The benefit was announced in the context of the meetings
which we have described in their ambit of the Company's
efforts to rectify any causes of discontent among employees
that had led them to lend support to the Union In view
of the Company's long existing and proclaimed policy of
open two-way communication with employees about compa-
ny rules and policies, the prior nonannouncement is not
easily understood The Company furnished no explanation
why this changed policy was not publicly or generally
announced at a time antedating the Union, when the change
assertedly occurred At the hearing the Company devoted
its explanation to an effort to show that the changed
policy, although unannounced, took place prior to the March
meetings
According to Candler, the aforementioned change in
policy stemmed from the fact that at the end of January
and early February 1969, employee Cockrum bid down
into another line. He complained about the loss of his
longevity and cut in pay that resulted from the move
Candler then discussed the matter with department supervi-
sor Ruth and, according to Candler, it was decided to
change the policy so that a man would not receive a
cut or lose longevity when he bid down Apparently the
decision was made about March 10, 1969, although this
is not entirely free of doubt. The Company introduced
a memorandum, dated March 10, from Candler to his
clerk stating: "From now on, anyone bidding down in
job will hold their salary Dave Gregory, Dincell Cockrum
and Roy Dietzman should be paid backpay . . . check
" Downbidding might be motivated by the nature of the work in
the different lines and perhaps ultimate higher financial return
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
your cards . . to see if anyone else should be paid
backpay."
Cockrum left the Company on March 14. Although
it is not clear, he may have been informed by the time
he left that he would receive backpay for the money he
lost when he bid down in January and February 1969
Gregory and Dietzman, as well as White, Clark, and Kurtz
who had all lost money by bidding down in the January-
March period were unaware of any change in company
policy until Fredrickson announced it at the March 26-
28 meetings. The payroll records of all 6 men, aforemen-
tioned, including Cockrum, were admittedly changed so
that they reflect no loss of pay, from January 1969 on,
by reason of having bid into a lower line of progression
In short, the original entries in January-March, which
showed what occurred at the time, namely, lower pay
when the individual bid down, have been changed to show
the new policy, announced by Fredrickson at the March
meetings, as, in effect from January on. Neither Candler
nor anyone else was able to state when the payroll records,
above, were actually changed.25
In any event, with the possible exception of Cockrum,
the March Fredrickson meetings were the first time any
employee, including Gregory, Dietzman, Clark, White, and
Kurtz, was aware that the Company had changed its policy
on downbidding. The six employees who had actually
incurred losses in pay when they bid down in January-
March 1969, received, at a later date, backpay pursuant
to the new policy Candler testified that the employees,
above, probably did not receive their backpay until after
the March meetings.26
It is the opinion of the Examiner that Fredrickson,
at the March meetings with employees, after referring to
the presence of the Union as an indication of employee
dissatisfaction and an indication that the Company was
not treating the employees as it should, did, in effect,
solicit and invite the airing of employee dissatisfactions
with a view to correcting such matters and thus remove
all or some of the causes and the reasons that, in the
Company's view, had led to employee support of the Union
This conduct was central to the campaign that the Company
admittedly embarked on to defeat the Union It occurred
after the Union did represent and had claimed that it
represented a majority of Respondent's employees in an
appropriate unit; and at a time after the Union had requested
recognition from Respondent as the collective-bargaining
agent and had filed a petition for certification with the
13 The only other evidence bearing on this matter is a posted notice,
signed by Candler, dated April 1969 , explaining the pay system and
giving examples of what occurs when an employee bids from one line
to another
" It is clear that five of the men did not receive their backpay
until after the March meetings and received it in April and May However,
in the question addressed to Candler at the hearing regarding time
of receipt of backpay by employees, one of the names expressly included
in the question was that of Cockrum As indicated, Candler replied
that the backpay probably was not received until after the March meetings
which were 2 weeks after Cockrum had left the Company (March 14)
If the new policy was in effect on March 14 it would seem reasonable
to believe that Cockrum would have received, when he left , all pay
due him, including backpay
Board. We find such conduct by Respondent to constitute
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 2'
In the Company's 29-page employee handbook which
every new employee had received, 12 pages, as previously
noted, were devoted to setting forth and describing employee
fringe benefits, exclusive of wages. The benefits included
8 paid holidays; vacations up to 6 weeks; a variety of
insurance coverages, a retirement plan with rights and
provisions for either "early" or "normal" retirement; a
thrift plan to which the Company contributed common
stock proportionate to individual investment in the plan;
paid sick leave, an educational assistance program for further
formal education, and various other benefits.21 Simply as
a matter of general observation and without undertaking
any expert or comparative judgment, it can be said that
the Company had a benefit program that would be well
regarded by employees This is confirmed by the fact that
in both the March and May meetings conducted by Fredrick-
son and in the meetings conducted by supervisors during
this period, the question arose many times from employees
as to what would happen to existing benefits if the Union
was successful in gaining bargaining rights. There was
obvious concern and interest in this area which, in our
opinion, would not have been the case if the benefits were
minimal or poorly regarded.
In one of its leaflets the Union set forth its program
for the plant. Such things as a substantial blanket wage
increase, increased shift bonus, additional paid holidays;
and so forth, were enumerated, but, on the whole, the
various existing benefits at the plant were not specifically
mentioned. Rather, the benefits were covered by item 10
in the program which said, "the retention and improvement
of all other benefits and working conditions" in a contract
" "The Respondent's main purpose was to learn what complaints
the employees had which might cause them to "ant d union
[Such conduct] would naturally lead the employees to believe that
Respondent was inviting direct dealing and thus suggesting that union-
organizing activities were unnecessary Conduct of that nature, when
engaged in , as we find it was here , for the purpose of undermining
union organizational efforts, constitutes an infringement of employee
rights under Section 7 of the Act" International Harvester Co, 179
NLRB No 124 "We can conceive of no conduct which is more calculated
to undermine the Union and dissipate its majority than when the employer,
as here, solicits and adjusts employees' grievances and engages in collective
bargaining with them while conducting a campaign against unionization,
particularly where, as here , the Respondent 's efforts were successful
Texaco Inc (Evansville, Indiana Bulk Station), 178 NLRB No 72
"[The Board] found that reference [in a speech by the plant manager]
to the fact that the Company was now actually looking into better
insurance programs exceeded permissible limits of expression since it
constituted a promise of benefit calculated to influence the outcome
of the runoff election-[which] tended to suggest that ' the source
of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits
must flow and which may dry up if it is not obligated ' (Citing NLR B
v ExchangePartsCo, 375 U S 405 (1964))
"We conclude that this finding of the Board is supported by substantial
evidence The mere fact that the employees had heard similar
promises in the past does not change the fact that the promise was
renewed and the benefit made to appear more imminent in an effort
to infringe upon the employees ' freedom of choice for or against the
Carmen [Union] " N.LR B v United States Railway Equipment Co.,
424 F 2d 86, (C A 7)
_' Among a number of additional benefits the booklet listed Workmen's
Compensation and Social Security From the booklet's description under
these headings , the Company was complying with state and Federal
law, respectively
OLIN CONDUCTORS
Since the Company and the Union were both issuing
numerous leaflets and letters, a letter signed by Candler
was sent to all employees on the important subject of
benefits. The first paragraph of the Company letter stated
the belief that the Company's benefit program for "salaried
employees" at its Sedalia plant was "among the finest
available anywhere . . These benefits were established
for you when we started the Sedalia plant on a full-salaried,
non-union basis These benefits are guaranteed to all
salaried employees If any union should gain representation
of our plant . . , it can attempt to improve benefits by
negotiations, and if it fails in this attempt, it may strike
Negotiations involve a give and take; therefore, your
present benefits may be the subject of negotiations
Remember No union can guarantee that your benefits will
remain unchanged "
Before describing the balance of the letter, it is appropriate
to comment on the foregoing. We do not consider the
statements therein to be illegal or untrue but it is of
some importance to understand what the Company was
telling its employees about existing benefits since we will
be considering other evidence on the company position
regarding benefits and the entire picture is appropriately
viewed in an overall context.
As we read the first paragraph, and, as we believe the
employees, who were more sensitive than we are on the
subject of how the advent of a union would affect their
existing benefits, read it, the following emerges as to what
the letter said and how it was understood: This outstanding
benefit program was entirely attributable to the Company
when it started the plant "on a non-union basis" and
with employees whom it decided to pay by salary and
not by wages. Under the aforementioned conditions the
Company has "guaranteed" and will guarantee the existing
benefits to all salaried employees. How important was and
is the nonunion basis to the fine benefit program and
is there a significant or necessary nexus between the two?
We employees do not really know but we do know that
every employee is given an orientation talk in which the
Company states that it wants to operate a nonunion plant
and considers a union unnecessary; and during this current
campaign the plant manager and the supervisors are express-
ing their opposition to having a union and in numerous
leaflets and letters the same position is expressed and the
disadvantages of having a union are stressed. We also
note that in this letter of Candler's he apparently considered
it important to state expressly that the benefits were estab-
lished by the Company when it started the plant on a
"nonunion basis." The Company's benevolence and good
will could have been referred to by simply stating that
the Company established the benefits when it started the
plant. The Company also said in this same connection
that the Company "guaranteed" the benefits
An obvious question that occurs to the reader of the
letter at this point is, what happens to the benefits, described
in the foregoing nonunion reference, if a union comes
into the plant. What does the letter say about this. It
states that a union may try to improve the benefits and
may have to strike if it fails to secure company agreement
to improve benefits. Whether by strike or otherwise the
Union is either successful or unsuccessful in improving
benefits If successful, there is no concern by the employee
477
since existing benefits have not only been preserved but
improved. But suppose the Union does not strike to improve
benefits because the main concern of employees is to preserve
existing benefits which they regard as good, or suppose
the strike to improve is unsuccessful Assume therefore
that the matter of improving benefits is laid to rest.
After speaking about possible attempts by a union to
improve benefits, what does the letter say about simply
the preservation and continuance of existing benefits In
this first paragraph of the letter it is said that "your
present benefits" may be the subject of negotiations which
is a "give and take" process What does that mean? Well,
if the Company "gives" more benefits or continues existing
benefits the Union may "take" either alternative. When
the employees were asking questions about what happens
to our benefits if a union comes in, they were not concerned
about the foregoing situation They were expressing concern
about whether the existing benefits would be lost or taken
away if a union came in. Realistically and actually, they
were not thinking that the union advocated the abolition
of existing benefits, that the Union wanted to "take" the
benefits away. The Union program was to preserve and
improve existing benefits. The Company was aware of this
and this letter, a part of its campaign to defeat the Union,
was directed to the employees' expressed concern about
possible loss of existing benefits with the advent of the
Union.
The "give and take" in negotiations regarding "present
benefits" about which the initial part of the company letter
spoke was therefore not calculated to stimulate thought
about "give and take" in the direction described above
in our preceding paragraph. The "give and take," upon
analysis, focused on the possibility of "take" by the Company
in negotiations, by not continuing existing benefits. Whereas
on a "nonunion basis" the Company, as the letter said,
had been, and was, guaranteeing the benefits, this was
not true if a union came in because the Union could
not "guarantee that your benefits will remain unchanged."
Since neither Union nor employees would be adverse to
change if benefits were improved, who would be interested
in a union guarantee against change in that direction
The change, of which the letter spoke that the Union
could not, assertedly, guarantee against, was a downward
change such as the discontinuance of existing benefits in
whole or in part The Company maintained and "guaran-
teed" the existing benefits prior to the union advent so
the most obvious aspect of the "give and take" and what
was meant by saying that the Union could not guarantee
against change in benefits, was that the Company would
propose and quite possibly effectuate the discontinuance
of benefits that had been established when the plant was
instituted on a nonunion basis.
The letter thereafter set forth the existing benefits and
concluded with the following:
We stress again that these benefits automatically apply
only to salaried employees of Olin at Sedalia, and
that all benefits would be negotiated from scratch if
a union represented you. Remember! Only Olin Conduc-
tors can guarantee you the above benefits. [Emphasis
ours up to the word "you", "Only" emphasized in
original letter.]
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
If there was a degree of uncertainty and uneasiness
conveyed in the first part of the letter as to what would
happen to existing benefits if a union came in, the last
paragraph clarified the matter. As far as benefits were
concerned, when a union secured representative status, the
Company said, in effect, that we start with a blank piece
of paper, i.e, from scratch. All benefits would have to
be negotiated from scratch If the Union wants the employees
to have any of the existing benefits they will have to
negotiate for them and convince the Company to agree
to continue existing benefits Otherwise, the benefits, which,
according to the letter, impliedly had ceased with the
Union's securing representative status, remain in the discard
and are no part of the clean slate from which the negotiations
from scratch begin For instance , if the Union and employees
want the existing 8 paid holidays, the Company may or
may not agree. Perhaps the Company would offer only
6 holidays or no holidays or no vacations or insurance
when there is a union in the picture. As the letter said,
only the Company can guarantee you "your present bene-
fits."
The above theme was reiterated in another bulletin or
leaflet issued by Candler on April 14. It was entitled,
"What A Union Means to You [the employees]." Among
7 paragraphs of detriments and disadvantages of a union,
there was included the following:
Negotiated Benefits. All your benefits (Medical, Surgi-
cal, and Life Insurance etc.) are subject to negotiation.
Benefits that now are yours [when there is no union]
would have to be negotiated in bargaining for a union
contract [and you may end up with none of the existing
benefits, including medical, surgical, life insurance etc ]
Since what the Company had said and was saying in
written form to its employees about benefits had a durability
and definiteness beyond oral statements, the latter were
heard in an overall context of the Company's basic written
pronouncements and explanations. Moreover, in their many
oral speeches and statements on the subject of benefits,
neither Fredrickson nor any supervisor repudiated or made
statements inconsistent with the written statements Indeed,
in essential respects, the oral statements were confirmatory
of the written.
There is some conflict among witnesses as to whether
Fredrickson, in speaking about benefits if the Union came
in, said that they would be negotiated from scratch or
did not use the phrase "from scratch." Overall, we do
not view the resolution of this aspect as of critical importance
but we do not find that Fredrickson used the phrase "from
scratch." He said, in substance, that all existing benefits
would be negotiated and would be subject to the "give
and take" of negotiations. It is, as indicated above, our
view that the written and oral statements were intermeshed
as part of overall composite statements by the Company.29
19 One of the witnesses wno testified that it was his recollection
that Fredrickson used the words "from scratch" in saying that all benefits
would be negotiated if the union came in , later stated that it was possible
that he was thinking about what the company had said in its letter
about bargaining from scratch This is illustrative of the overall message
which we believe was conveyed to the employees by the Company's
written and oral statements
Since the words, "from scratch", were used in a company
letter to the employees, there is no particular reason why
Fredrickson would have deliberately sought to avoid it
while speaking on the same subject. He simply used different
words. The letter, in our opinion, did represent the company
position and there was no conflict in oral and written
statements. The use or nonuse of a few particular words
at one time or another is not determinative if the basic
theme is, as was the case, unchanged and no effort, express
or otherwise, was made to repudiate, alter, or modify one
statement or another
Further, with respect to what Fredrickson and other
supervisors said orally about benefits, we find that in most
instances they were asked questions about benefits by
employees at the numerous meetings being held by the
Company in its campaign against the Union in the period
March 26 to the May election. The questions in substance
were, what happens to our existing benefits if the Union
comes in. We find that Supervisor Haley, who conducted
many meetings with his shift employees on the union subject
and who also was delegated to address other shifts on
the same subject, during the above period, said at a meeting,
as testified to by employee White, that, if we had a union,
the benefits would all have to be "renegotiated"; we would
have to start it all over and each one would have to
be renegotiated separately. We find that Supervisor Manley,
in a "talk-plan" discussion with Jobe, an employee on
his shift, said that, if a union came in, we would have
to negotiate for benefits we already had and there would
be give and take We credit employee Gregory that Fredrick-
son said in a meeting that if a union came in all existing
benefits would be negotiated or would have to be negotiated,
with no guarantee as to existing benefits. Kreisel, a supervi-
sor and company witness, who, as a former rank-and-
file employee had been opposed to the Union, testified
that, in April, Haley was asked at a meeting whether
the men would have any benefits if they voted for a union.
Haley replied that the benefits would have to be negotiated.
At another meeting, according to Kreisel, Fredrickson said
that all benefits would be negotiated. At this and other
meetings, as Kreisel and others testified, Fredrickson also
said that the Company was a "hard negotiator" when
dealing with unions. He said that at the Company's Chatta-
nooga plant, which was unionized, there had been strikes
and supervisors had run the plant at 50 percent capacity
during the strike.
It is our opinion that written and oral statements by
Company representatives regarding existing benefits, an area
of great sensitivity and concern to the employees, were
misleading and conveyed the basic theme that, as soon
as a union was certified or was recognized, the existing
benefits became no more than a blank piece of paper
or a clean slate. As the Company told the employees,
the benefits were given by the Company to employees
when it established the plant on a "non-union" basis and,
under such conditions, were guaranteed by the Company
and "only" the Company could "guarantee" the existing
benefits, i.e , the continuation of the existing benefits. But,
if a union came in, since "no union can guarantee that
your benefits will remain unchanged," "all benefits would
be negotiated from scratch" and, starting with a clean
OLIN CONDUCTORS 479
slate, the parties will negotiate about benefits What the
Company was saying was that to secure any benefits, the
Union will be obliged to negotiate or renegotiate each
benefit and since only the Company can grant or guarantee
any benefit, the Union will have to persuade and convince
the Company in negotiations to continue any existing benefit
or benefits, let alone to persuade and convince the Company
to improve existing benefits. Inasmuch as, in the Company's
words, negotiations were a "give and take" process and
the Company was a "hard bargainer," it is obvious, and
certainly implied, that the Company may not agree to
continue all or some existing benefits For instance, what,
in effect, was being said to the employees when the Company
stated that "all benefits would be negotiated from scratch
if a union represented you" and that each existing benefit
would have to be renegotiated is this; Since it is starting
from scratch, the Union, in negotiations, if it wants paid
holidays and insurance for the employees, may propose
that the contract provide for 8 paid holidays and health
insurance, both existing benefits at the plant The Company,
may be unwilling to agree to 8 paid holidays and may
propose 6; or the Company may express the view that
it is unwilling to agree to provide health insurance In
any event, if the Union wants any of the existing benefits
in the contract, it will have to negotiate for each one
and it will be dealing with a Company that described
itself to the employees as a "hard bargainer" in dealing
with unions }0
In describing to employees what would happen to existing
benefits if a union came in, the Company was not simply
expressing an opinion. If a union obtained bargaining rights,
it would have to deal with the Company and among the
subjects would be benefits. The Company's statements to
employees, therefore, as to what happened to existing bene-
fits if a union came in was a statement of Company position
regarding benefits that the Company could and would
implement with the advent of a union. The statement
about all existing benefits having to be negotiated from
9cratch or renegotiating each existing benefit, if a union
came in, is as affirmative a statement and as much within
the control of the Company as would be a statement
by a company that if a union came in the plant would
be closed. The Company informed its employees of what
its position was as to existing benefits if a union came
in and, in effect, that such would be its position in dealing
with the union.
In our opinion, when a union is recognized or wins
an election and is certified, or otherwise is the collective
bargaining agent , and thus comes into the plant, nothing
happens, by reason of that fact alone, to existing wages,
hours, or other conditions of employment, including existing
fringe benefits such as vacations, insurance, and so forth.
The employer may not change conditions of employment
unilaterally with the advent of a union Assume either
party initiates negotiations about wages and fringe benefits
The Union proposes higher wages and additional and
improved benefits. The Company does not agree. Existing
10 The illustration we have given is a simplified one but one quite
consonant with what the Company was saying to employees who were
not experts in labor law
wages and other benefits continue during negotiations. If
the Company proposes to cut existing wages and to eliminate
all or some existing benefits, the obligation on both parties
is that their bargaining proposals and negotiations thereon
be in good faith within the obligation imposed by Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. Nothing happens to existing wages,
benefits, and other conditions during the bargaining.
Employer adherence to a proposal to cut or to eliminate
existing wages and benefits" would not be legally tenable,
in our opinion, if the reason for such a bargaining position
was the advent of the Union in the plant. The employer
could not legally urge that its existing wages and benefits
were the result of its voluntary action in paying such
wages and benefits to its employees in the plant, when
it was established on a nonunion basis, and, therefore,
when a union came in, all existing conditions ceased and
the negotiations to establish some wage level or some benefits
would have to start from scratch. If the employer had
a reason, unconnected with the advent of a union, for
reducing existing wages and reducing or eliminating existing
benefits, the position would be tenable. For instance, a
general economic depression or a major downturn in a
particular business could well be consistent with a good
faith proposal for wage and benefit cuts. In short, presuma-
bly, the cut would have been necessary and forthcoming
whether or not a union came into the plant The advent
of a union cannot be focused upon or be given as a
reason for taking away existing benefits or pointed to as
creating a situation where all benefits must be negotiated
from scratch or renegotiated 32
By its statement of position regarding existing benefits
if a union came into the plant, Respondent, in our opinion,
in effect, threatened its employees with the loss, or possible
loss, of existing benefits and with the preservation and
redemption of existing benefits as attainable only by bargain-
ing-from-scratch-negotiations of the Union with an employer
who described itself as a hard bargainer when it was dealing
with a union. Implicit in the foregoing detriment attached
to the advent of a union was the converse benefit of
the continuation of existing benefits if the plant remained
nonunion, as it had been when the Company established
and guaranteed the benefits which, in the Company's words,
no union could guarantee . We find such conduct to be
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In the various talks during the period aforementioned,
Fredrickson and lower supervisors dealt with a variety
of topics in response to questions and also made speeches
on statements setting forth reasons why it was not in
the best interest of employees to vote for the Union. It
was pointed out that unions could and did fine members
11 Both wages and fringe benefits are conditions of employment and
their status is governed by the same legal considerations when a union
is the collective-bargaining agent
" In negotiations , the parties may or may not trade off one or more
terms of employment against others They may agree , for instance, on
a 15-percent wage increase but with elimination of an existing educational
fund program financed by the employer Each party agreeing for different
reasons and for reasons on each side that are, respectively , regarded
as good This type of activity, however, is not negotiating all benefits
from scratch, nor is it what the Company statements conveyed
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
who returned to work during a strike or who exceeded
union -imposed production quotas; wage rates at the Compa-
ny's unionized Chattanooga plant were compared with rates
at the Sedalia plant , that the Company customarily looked
for supervisory material among its high producing employees
but with a union this was very difficult since a union
tended to level production and to discourage high producers
Areas which require more consideration are company
statements about plant expansion ; cost-of-living increases;
and layoffs.
The company employee handbook refers to a policy
of paying competitive compensation based on continuing
studies . It states that such studies will be conducted at
least annually and, if justified by the study , revisions will
be made on July 1 of each year . On its face, in our
opinion , this policy is not necessarily a policy of cost-
of-living adjustments If other employers and employees
in the area did not receive a cost-of-living adjustment,
presumably a policy of competitive compensation would
not require such an adjustment
Employee White testified that Fredrickson, in one of
his talks during the period we are discussing , referred
to the wage evaluation that was coming up in July Fredrick-
son said that if the Union came in, the Company would
probably not go through with this since it would want
to hold everything back for bargaining purposes Adams,
like White, a General Counsel witness, stated that at a
Fredrickson talk he attended, there was a question about
the July wage evaluation , Fredrickson held up his hand
and said there might be something but he would not say
any more . Kurtz, another General Counsel witness, testified
that, at a meeting , he asked Fredrickson about the July
wage evaluation Fredrickson replied that he could not
speak any further on the wage evaluation . At another
point Kurtz testified that someone asked about a cost
of living wage increase Fredrickson said that, in the July
wage evaluation , this would all be considered and " it
would at least cover the cost of living raises as it had taken
place in the last year " Elsewhere in his testimony Kurtz
stated that , when Fredrickson was asked about the cost of
living, he said that it was one of the matters about which he
could not talk , but said we are considering it Coley, a
group leader and company witness, testified that
Fredrickson said that the cost of living was going to be
evaluated and wages adjusted in July but that, if the Union
came in, this would have to be held back for bargaining
Fredrickson' s testimony on this aspect was limited to a
response to company counsel 's question, i.e
Q. Did you ever tell employees if the union came
in evaluations in July would be done away with?
A. No
Considering the number of meetings that Fredrickson
and other supervisors held with employees during this
period and the number of topics that were covered, it
is not easy to decide precisely what was said . The Examiner's
evaluation overall is that, in substance , Fredrickson affirmed
the existence of the Company 's comparative wage evaluation
program ; that he did not say whether there would or
would not be an increase in July, whether on a cost of
living basis or otherwise ; that he did say, in substance,
that when a union secured bargaining rights, the contract
negotiation process was such that the Company would
use any prospective steps it might have otherwise contem-
plated as part of its bargaining position for the terms
of a contract " For instance, as the Examiner sees it,
after considering all the testimony and the witnesses' accura-
cy and precision or lack thereof, if the Union won the
May election and bargaining took place in May and June
or beyond, the Union might ask a 20-percent wage increase,
the Company might offer 10, figuring therein a wage evalua-
tion that might reflect justification for an 8-percent increase.
The Union might argue that the Company was in effect
offering only a 2-percent increase since it would have given
8-percent in any event And so the bargaining would go
on with arguments and counterarguments. Briefly stated,
this is what we believe using or holding something for
bargaining purposes in the aforementioned context meant
We do not find Fredrickson's remarks, set forth above,
to be illegal or unprotected.
With regard to plant expansion, we find that, in substance,
Fredrickson said that Olin might expand its operations
at Sedalia or on the West Coast and that development
and expansion depended on business, the performance of
the plant, and related economic factors. In our opinion,
Fredrickson did not threaten that there would be layoffs
if the Union came in Nor, in describing bargaining between
a union and a company, where, he said, they would start
far apart in demands and gradually narrow their differences
and with possible agreement ending in a contract, or disa-
greement, ending in a strike, did Fredrickson exceed permis-
sible limits. We do not think it was improper to mention
that there had been a strike at the Company's Chattanooga
plant, with the Company operating the plant with supervi-
sors during the strike. Describing the Company as a hard
bargainer was not illegal in itself There is no evidence
or attempt to show that this description was inaccurate.
We do not equate hard bargaining with illegal bargaining
With the Company and the Union contending for the
allegiance of employees, the latter are not imposed upon
by being aware that neither path is entirely free of thorns.
If the Union had had an 8-year relationship with five
Olin plants in which the Union had never felt obliged
to strike to secure a good contract, this fact could have
been publicized by the Union as tending to show that
a good contract at Sedalia might be anticipated without
resorting to a strike Conversely, the Company could indicate
possibilities in the other direction Nor are we convinced,
as one witness testified, that Fredrickson said that the
Company had something good in mind, presumably for
the employees, if the Union lost the election
With respect to interrogation, employee White testified
that in the latter part of March his supervisor, Cloud,
had a "talk-plan" session with him After discussing White's
work and job performance with him, White states that
Cloud asked him if he was in favor of the Union and
White said he was. Cloud then gave his views to the
effect that he thought the Union was not the best way
" It it doubtful, if the Union won the election in May, that the
Company could go ahead unilaterally and adjust wages because of a
wage evaluation study it had made in the period after the election
OLIN CONDUCTORS 481
to go; and that if the Union came in , it could be bad
for business and there could be layoffs. Cloud states that
after the talk plan material was covered, he simply asked
White if he had received the Company letters (and other
material on the union subject) and if he had any problems
or questions. Cloud denies asking White if he favored
the Union or saying that a union could be bad for business
and that there could be layoffs
This White and Cloud incident is not easily resolved.
In many respects we considered White a reliable witness
and we have credited him on other aspects of his testimony
Cloud was not particularly impressive, in our opinion
However, we believe that White may have in his testimony
confused Cloud with someone else In his testimony, White
states that, following the above remarks, he and Cloud
continued their conversation and, as White was preparing
to leave, Cloud said, "You may be right about the Union;
I know very little about the Union. I have been a foreman
all my life "
Cloud had been working for the Company a little over
a year. He became a shift supervisor about March 17,
1969. A shift supervisor is the lowest ranking supervision
in the plant. White and Cloud were on a first name basis
and their relationship was a friendly one To the Examiner,
it is highly unlikely that Cloud, in connection with saying
that he knew little about the Union, in effect explained
the statement by saying to White that he, Cloud, had
been a foreman all his life. The latter remark was patently
untrue as both men must have known and it served no
useful purpose in the circumstances 34 We recognize that
the unpersuasive nature of one aspect of White's testimony
about his conversation with Cloud does not per se destroy
the possible accuracy of the earlier portion of the same
conversation. Nor do we believe that White was otherwise
an unreliable witness regarding other matters. However,
we are not prepared to credit White on the critical part
of his testimony regarding what Cloud said to him
Employee Jobe, a member of the union-organizing com-
mittee, testified that a day or two after the union meeting
in Sedalia on March 16, 1969, he was standing in the
plant's electric department. It was apparently in the morning
at the beginning of a shift According to Jobe, his supervisor,
Manley, wearing his street clothes, was coming in and
"just sort of a greeting of the morning, the first thing
he said, `How many do you have signed up, Stan? [Stanley
Jobe]." Jobe said, "quite a few." At the time, Jobe had
a group of union authorization cards sticking out of the
shirt pocket of the coveralls he was wearing Jobe states
that he and Manley then had a brief discussion about
the union activities Jobe did not recall any details of
such additional conversation Manley denies that he had
" There is no evidence that Cloud was a foreman prior to employment
by Respondent Moreover, the possibility is unlikely since, if Cloud
had been a foreman , it would appear that it would not have taken
him 6 months with Respondent to reach the lowest rung on the supervisory
ladder Respondent 's plant was a new one , with an indigenous work
force, and with supervisors , with the exception of top officials , evidently
recruited locally Additionally, even prior foremanship would not be
consistent with the assertion of having been a foreman all his life since
the latter would include a substantial period when he was not a foreman
at Olin
any conversation with Jobe about union cards or that
he asked Jobe how many he had gotten signed
At prior places of employment Manley had been a com-
mitteeman in a Steelworkers local union and had also
belonged to another union The employees, including Jobe,
who worked under Manley at the Sedalia plant, were general-
ly aware of Manley's past union relationships Jobe, as
a member of the union-organizing committee whose name
appeared as such on union campaign literature, made no
secret of his own union role He wore a union button
and carried union cards in his pocket while at work. He
testified that he talked about the Union in the plant and
passed out cards to other employees on company premises.
Manley and other supervisors were aware of such activity
but did not interfere
Under the circumstances aforedescribed, the Examiner,
while finding that the conversation with Manley, as
described by Jobe, did take place, does not find the casual
inquiry of, "How many do you have signed up, Stan,"
to be illegal In our opinion, Jobe was not being coerced
nor can the inquiry be regarded as inquisitorial We do
not regard the statement of Manley as serious interrogation
in a genuine effort to obtain confidential information and
we do not believe that Jobe so regarded it. In view of
Jobe's open and well known union activity and solicitation
in the plant, Manley's remark was little different than
saying. in Jobe's words, as "just sort of a greeting of
the morning," "How are you doing, Stan." If an employee
was known as a dedicated fisherman and frequently talked
about his fishing in the plant and had various hooks and
trout flies visibly attached to his pocket, it might be quite
normal for his foreman to greet him by saying, "How
many have you caught, Joe" In the Manley remark we
do not find a coercive or inhibitory element.75
Sometime in April 1969, Manley had a "talk plan"
conference with Jobe Manley reviewed Jobe's work perform-
ance with him and told him that he was doing fine. The
two men then sat around awhile and, according to Jobe,
the talk got around to unions. Manley said that, if a
union came in, we would have to negotiate for benefits
that we already had and in the give and take we would
lose some Manley did not refer to this conversation in
his testimony The discussion of benefits by Manley formed
part of the overall evidence in our consideration of the
Company's expressed position on benefits if a union came
in. It is part of the context of the benefit subject, as
treated by the Company in its letter to the employees
and the statements by supervisors regarding benefits, if
a union came into the plant. We have previously expressed
our views on this matter.
Mothersbaugh, a member of the employee organizing
committee , whose name appeared on union leaflets, and
who wore a union button in the plant, testified that, a
day or so before the May election, his supervisor, Gibson,
who was "grinning," asked him if he had made up his
" It can also be noted that in this case there is no indication that
the company opposition to the Union relied on knowing the number
of cards that the Union secured or did not secure The Company's
position was, in effect , that the cards mean nothing and even if the
Union had a majority of cards , the real test was an election
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mind how he wanted to vote. Mothersbaugh testified that
he knew Gibson was kidding and Mothersbaugh took the
question as a joke because Gibson knew how Mothersbaugh
stood on the union The relationship of the two men to
each other was a friendly one Mothersbaugh does not
remember what else was said and evidently both men
considered the question as not requiring an answer
Apparently the General Counsel has abandoned the alle-
gation that Gibson engaged in illegal interrogation of Moth-
ersbaugh , since in his brief he states, ". . Gibson asked
Mothersbaugh a question, which both concede to be nothing
more than rhetorical in view of Mothersbaugh's open sup-
port of the Union, as to how Mothersbaugh intended to
vote." In any event, the Examiner finds no illegal interroga-
tion by Gibson.
Later, on the same day as the above incident, as Mothers-
baugh was preparing to leave work, he encountered Gibson
Mothersbaugh remembers only a part of the conversation,
but it evidently was on the union topic. He states that
Gibson said that "unionism was the same thing as Commu-
nism" and that Gibson was not "kidding" and was "mad"
when he made the remark The remark made Mothersbaugh
mad and he told Gibson that "the nonunion company
was Communism and in the Union everyone had an equal
voice." The employee then left.
The General Counsel argues in his brief that an epithet
such as the above "when the user of the statement, the
employee's boss was obviously incensed and angered, consti-
tuted a threat." We have considered the General Counsel's
contention and the case cited. We are not persuaded that
Gibson's remarks to Mothersbaugh, involving the use of
the word "Communism" as to unions, constituted a violation
of the Act and we so find.
Lindemann, another employee member of the organizing
committee, testified that early in May, after Fredrickson
had conducted his meetings with employees in May, and
shortly before the election, Fredrickson was in the plant
and spoke to Lindemann as the latter was working. Linde-
mann states that Fredrickson spoke about the wire that
the employee was processing and how it was running
After a brief discussion along the foregoing lines, Fredrick-
son asked Lidemann if he knew how he, Lindemann, was
going to vote.J6 Lindemann replied that it was quite obvious
how he was voting because he was a union organizer."
Fredrickson then said that if there were any questions
that arose in Lindemann's mind he would be glad to
answer them. This was the end of the conversation Accord-
ing to Lindemann, in the past, prior to the May incident,
above, he had seen Fredrickson in the plant work area
at various times and it was not uncommon for Fredrickson
to say "hello" or "hi" or "good morning" to him and
to ask how things were going and how the wire was
coming and so forth There was, however, no particular
social relationship between the two men other than the
" "After a little short discussion he asked me [Lindemann ] if I knew
how I was going to vote
Q If you knew how you were going to vote?
A Yes, sir "
" Lindemann 's name as a member of the organizing committee appeared
on union leaflets He wore a union button in the plant
plant relationship of general manager and a rank-and-file
employee. Prior to the May occasion there had been no
conversation between Fredrickson and Lindemann on the
union subject.
Fredrickson testified that in the March-May 1969 period
he had probably spoken with Lindemann three or four
times Fredrickson states that in no conversation did he
ask the employee how he was going to vote. Respondent's
counsel then asked his witness,
Q. Did you have a conversation with him concerning
the Union at all?
A. There was one, perhaps two, conversations.
Q Tell us what was said.
A. I did with Jim [Lindemann], as I did several
other employees, asked them if, as the election neared,
if they had any questions or if there was any informa-
tion, statements or fact that they had been told that
they would like to crosscheck or double check, I had
resources and help, that I could sometimes get informa-
tion that they could use to help make up their minds
or they could use and crosscheck something that had
been told them.
The Trial Examiner credits Lindemann's testimony con-
cerning his conversation with Fredrickson The conflict
in the testimony of the two men, in our opinion, is whether
Lindemann was asked initially if he knew how he was
going to vote There is little other difference in the two
versions, except as to detail, regarding Fredrickson's asking
the employee if he had any questions or sought information
about the subject matter of the conversation, which was
obviously the election and its issues
While the question was addressed to Lindemann by the
plant manager and not by some minor supervisor, we
do not regard this fact alone as highly significant or disposi-
tive in the circumstances of this particular case. Fredrickson
not infrequently was in the plant work area and had often
passed the time of day or spoken to Lindemann concerning
how the work was going. The election and the voting
was a first time situation in the plant so obviously it
was not a prior type of reference. We do not regard the
question addressed to the employee as coercive or hostile
in content or in the context of all the circumstances. There
is no evidence of a policy or an act of company reprisal
against any individual for signing a union card or for
being active in the union cause. Nor is there evidence
that the Company had conducted or was conducting an
inquisitorial poll of the employees overall either as to wheth-
er they had signed union cards or as to how they were
going to vote
The question, do you know how you are going to vote,
is equivalent , in our opinion , to, have you made up your
mind or have you decided how you are going to vote
Appropriate answers could be, yes, I know how I am
going to vote; no, I do not know at this point how I
will vote 38 In a plant where a strongly coercive atmosphere
had been engendered by direct threats of ad hominem
'" A third answer could be that it is a matter personal to me whether
or not I know how I will vote
OLIN CONDUCTORS
reprisals and by actual reprisals, the question might well
have been answered in either of the two foregoing ways,
probably the latter This would be particularly true if
the employee was apprehensive or had reason to be. Receiv-
ing answers of the foregoing type, it is a matter of speculation
whether, if the reply had been, yes, I know how I am
going to vote, there would have been a further question
and, if so, whether it would have been, are you going
to vote for or against the Union. What actually occurred
was that, to Lindemann, his prounion sentiments were
so obvious and unconcealed and apparently proclaimed
and adhered to without any apprehension, that he said
to Fredrickson that "it was quite obvious how [he] was
voting because [he] was a union organizer" In effect,
he was saying not only that he had made up his mind
and knew how he was going to vote, but was saying,
and did say, in effect, that it was obvious that he was
voting for the union. It is quite clear, we believe, that
Lindemann replied truthfully to the inquiry and did so
without fear of reprisal.
If, in total context, employer questioning was coercive,
e.g., asking an employee if he had signed a union card
and threatening discharge if he did not revoke; or questioning
an employee in a situation where known unionists had
been discharged, we would not regard the fact that a
questioned union employee answered truthfully as disposi-
tive of whether the questioning was coercive. However,
the Board, in deciding whether polling of employees is
illegal, appears to attach some importance to the actual
or potential element of whether polled employees answer
truthfully or not. In Struksnes Construction Co., 165 NLRB
No. 102, the Board stated that ". any attempt by
an employer to ascertain employee views and sympathies
regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal
in the mind of the employee if he replies in favor of
unionism and, therefore, tends to impinge on his Section
7 rights." Lindemann, of course, in our opinion, replied
strongly in favor of unionism without fear of reprisal.
Also, in Strucksnes, in referring to its original decision
in which it found the poll lawful, the Board noted as
one of the factors in its initial decision the fact that "the
evidence failed to establish that the employees answered
untruthfully but, even if they did, their answers did not
result from any threats of reprisal." In its later decision
the Board did not repudiate the original criteria but indicated
that, but for special circumstances at the time of remand,
it would have added additional criteria, (1) calling a meeting
by the employer to advise employees of the purpose of
the poll and (2) conducting the poll in a manner to preserve
voter secrecy. Since the employer had not also satisfied
these criteria, the Board indicated "Respondent's conduct
would probably be found unlawful if this case was now
before us for initial determination under the new rule."
Struksnes is on its facts a polling case and the decision
deals with polling. Blue Flash Express, Inc, 145 NLRB
1368 was also a polling case. A poll is a canvass of all
or of a representative number of employees as a group
or body. The criteria applicable to polling, in our opinion,
may have some applicability to cases involving individual
questioning of an employee but they cannot be applied
mechanically to every situation where a supervisor asks
483
an employee a question pertaining to union sentiment or
views, regardless of the surrounding circumstances in the
particular case. As the Board in Strukesnes, referring to
Blue Flash, said, the basic question was "whether a poll
interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees" and the
answer " must be found in the record as a whole."
To complete our analysis of the Fredrickson-Lindemann
conversation we feel obliged to state our view as to why
Lindemann was asked if he had decided how he was going
to vote. In short, if Fredrickson was not coercing Linde-
mann, why did he ask him the question. In our opinion,
in the light of all the evidentiary circumstances, it was
as obvious to Fredrickson as it was public and obvious
to Lindemann that the latter was a union organizer and
that the odds were overwhelmingly against the possibility
that Lindemann was, or would say that he was, opposed
to the Union or would vote against it. What Fredrickson
was engaged in, in our opinion, was a conversational gambit
hoping that he might draw the employee into some discus-
sion, brief or otherwise, about some of the advantages
or disadvantages of a union or that the employee might
ask a question or make a statement along such lines and
afford Fredrickson an opportunity to give some counterun-
ion points.J9 Although the possibility of achieving anything
was remote, Fredrickson had nothing to lose But Linde-
mann, in response to Fredrickson's question, by coming
out strongly for the Union, obliterated any possible discus-
sion unless Fredrickson chose to argue with him or threaten
him because of such a position Fredrickson then, and
somewhat confirmatory of our view of what the whole
episode was all about, said, in substance, well, if you
have any questions or want some particular information
about the matter, I will be glad to respond. We do not
find that the Fredrickson-Lindemann incidenlit constituted
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
There was considerable testimony about statements made
by Supervisor Haley in meetings with groups of employees
in the April-May 1969 period
Haley states that he expressed the view that a union
was not necessary at the plant He read or passed around
an article from a Kansas City newspaper about the fact
that the Royal Company was closing its Springfield, Missouri
plant, because of world-wide competition in its product
and because of increased costs at its Springfield plant.
The article also said that a strike of union workers at
the plant had tied up production for 2 months. Haley
indicated that the strike and the excessive demands of
the union had left the Company unable to compete in
the market 60 The Trial Examiner is of the opinion that
the foregoing did not exceed the bounds of Section 8(c)
of the Act
In his talks Haley mentioned the possibility of strikes
where an employer and union did not agree in negotiations.
He said that Olin was a hard negotiator and that there
" The Company, of course, was admittedly campaigning for a no-
union vote
10 In his brief, the General Counsel states that in a case or cases
involving Royal there was no allegation that the plant was forced to
close because of union demands Assuming that this is the fact, we
do not regard it as diapositive of the matter we are considering
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had been several strikes at the Company's unionized Chatta-
nooga plant In the event of a strike, he said the Company
would probably try to maintain production at some level
with the help of supervisors We do nol find the mention
of the possibility of a strike and the other factors aforemen-
tioned to have exceeded the bounds of free speech or
that they constituted threats."
Haley had copies of union contracts with him at some
of his meetings and he compared wages therein with wages
at the Sedalia plant He also said that since the Union
was based in Kansas City, employees in Sedalia could
not expect much service on their particular problems, he
said that members at Sedalia could be called out in a
sympathy strike if there was a strike elsewhere
A General Counsel witness, Kurtz, testified that Haley
said he belonged to the NFO which he said was a kind
of a union; that Haley also said that he did not know
what would come of the union movement, that it might
die out or pick up; that if there were any raises he hoped
the men would get them because he would then receive
a raise that was as good or better White, also a General
Counsel witness, testified that Haley said that he belonged
to a sort of a union and that the men should do what
was best for their own interest and that he was for them
since the more they received, the more he received White
states that Haley, in one talk, stated that it was the plant
electrical maintenance employees who were principally inter-
ested in having the I.B.E W and that the Union would
not benefit others. White also states that Haley referred
to the plant electrical employees as S O.B.'s who were
not worth what they were being paid We do not find
that these references to the electrical employees were illegal
or that they created an impression of surveillance. The
electrical employees wore union buttons at work, they were
prominent and active in organizing and did not conceal
their union sympathies We find no creation of an impression
of surveillance by Haley or other management people,42
and we believe that an opinion, whether true or not, that
there was a basic affinity or attraction for the I.B.E.W.
on the part of electrical workers was not illegal Nor
do we find any other illegal statements among those
described in this and in the proceeding paragraph
Haley testified that he spoke about the Company's annual
wage evaluation, in July The evaluation, described in the
handbook, was part of the policy to keep wages competitive
with those in the area. He said that if the Company
was a good-faith Company, as it said it was, it would
take increases in the cost of living index into consideration
at the wage evaluation; but, if a union had a contract
for 3 years, there would be no cost of living adjustment
until the contract expired unless there was a wage reopener
provision in the contract. White testified credibly that Haley
had said that he was confident that Olin would consider
and give a cost of living adjustment under its wage evalua-
" What Haley and other management people said about existing benefits
and that all would have to be renegotiated has been discussed at another
point of this decision
" There is, in our opinion, no substantial evidence that Fredrickson
or Candler engaged in ,urvedlance or created an impretioon of surveillance
about cards or otherwise
tion . He states that Haley pointed out that the employees
now had their wages evaluated every year but that, if
there was a union, the contract would fix the wages for
the period of its term. Gorden, an employee witness, testified
credibly that Haley had said that we would probably receive
a cost of living increase under the July wage evaluation,
that he pointed out that, when there was a 2 or 3 year
contract, you did not receive benefits adjustments as rapidly
as under present conditions. Hoos, another employee wit-
ness, testified that when Haley was asked about the Company
policy for a July wage adjustment, he said that if the
Union came in the employees would probably never find
out what the Company would have done.
Insofar as Haley expressed his views regarding the Compa-
ny's annual wage evaluation as being quicker and more
flexible than the situation where wages are fixed for a
contract period, we do not find any illegality 43 However,
in equating the Company' s annual wage evaluation as tanta-
mount to a cost of living evaluation, Haley injected an
element not found in the company description of its wage
evaluation policy. The latter was an evaluation to insure
that the Company was paying comparable wages to other
plants in the area. If cost of living increases had not
been given by other plants, there was nothing in company
policy referring to a commitment to grant increases solely
because of increased living costs. There is no evidence
regarding cost of living increases having been given in
the area yet Haley spoke with great confidence that Olin
in its July evaluation would at least increase wages to
match the rise in the cost of living As far as appears,
this cost of living increase aspect has not existed as a
policy antedating the coming of the Union, but it appeared
in Haley's talks to employees prior to the election, during
the union campaign for recognition, and the Company's
campaign against such status In view of the increase in
the cost of living throughout 1969, of which everyone
was aware, it is evident that a matching cost of living
increase under the existing nonunion no-contract state of
affairs at the Company was a definite benefit. This benefit,
defined and predicted by Haley, contrasted by direct implica-
tion with the detriment inherent with the advent of a
union when the policy would assertedly cease. We find
this aspect of Haley's talk to be in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act
Haley testified that he told the employees that, with
a union , there would be rigid job specifications and there
would be less flexibility in moving employees around than
at present As a result more people would have to be
hired and, if there was a downturn in business, it probably
would result in layoffs. Hoos testified to the same effect.
Kurtz testified that Haley had said that, under present
conditions, if there was a slowdown in production, men
could be moved from department to department but under
a union there would be layoffs. The Examiner believes
that, in substance Haley pointed out that there was a
" in fact, unions, in denying responsibility for inflation and a wage-
price spiral, claim that union wages, being fixed by contract, fall behind
price increases and then, when a contract comes up for negotiation,
the union is attempting to catch up and there is in fact a price-wage
spiral rather than the other way around
OLIN CONDUCTORS
greater possibility of layoff in the event of a slowdown
under a union because a union required more rigid job
classification descriptions and this made for less flexibility
in moving people to different jobs. We regard this as
an expression of opinion and open to counterarguments
and opinion from the Union and its supporters. We do
not find it illegal.
The Objections to the Election
The objections are as follows 44
2 A The letter to employees of April 11, 1969 contains
implied threats of loss of existing benefits if the Union
is chosen. The letter is General Counsel's Exhibit 12-
0. We have discussed this and related aspects of the compa-
ny's statements regarding benefits in our decision. We sustain
the objection.
B. The booklet accompanying the above letter is anti-
union and implies that unionization is a threat to job
security. The Examiner is of the opinion that the booklet
is protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. We do not sustain
this objection
C. The letter of May 3, 1969 announces increased benefits,
implied promises of benefits and misleading statements.
The Examiner does not agree that the letter states or
implies what is asserted in the objection and is of the
opinion that statements or implications therein are protected
by Section 8(c) We do not sustain the objection
3. Supervisors in interviews with employees threatened
reprisals and loss of benefits if they supported the Union
and were promised benefits if they did not. Also material
misrepresentations of fact were made We sustain this objec-
tion only to the extent of our findings and conclusions
regarding the company's statements on the subject of bene-
fits, including, but not limited to, Supervisor Haley's state-
ments regarding a cost of living increase in July 1969
under existing pre-union and non-union policies
4. At captive audience meetings with employees, the
Company solicited grievances, resolved grievances, or prom-
ised that it would. Company also made promises of benefits
if Union was rejected and threats of reprisal of loss of
benefits if it was not rejected. We sustain this objection
to the extent found in our decision as to company statements
regarding benefits and company solicitation and adjustment
of complaints and problems in context of expressed-company
concern about employee dissatisfactions that led to union
movement
5 Company accelerated wage increases for a substantial
number of employees during pendency of election. We
do not sustain this objection because we are not aware
of evidence to sustain it. If the reference is to backpay
in prior down bidding situations , we have discussed this
in our decision at an earlier stage.
" We are not setting forth the objections verbatim in its brief, the
Union states " We rely on the same conduct to establish our
election objections that the General Counsel has presented in support
of the unfair labor practice allegations " The Union states that it does
not rely on objection 1 and 7 and did not litigate such objections
at the hearing Accordingly, the Examiner does not sustain objections
1 and 7
485
6 During "the critical period herein" the Company
instituted a benefit by payment of time and one-half for
Sunday work and made substantial increases in the employ-
ees' thrift plan.
The matters of time and one-half for Sunday work,
and the increased contribution to the thrift plan, were
not alleged as unfair labor practices by the General Counsel
and he expressly so stated at the hearing
In late February or early March 1969, supervisors and
possibly some employees made it known to Candler that
there was considerable dissatisfaction among employees on
the 21 turn not being paid time and one-half for Sunday
Work" Because it was company policy to pay as well
as, or better than, other employers in the area, Candler
checked with several named companies and found that
Pittsburgh-Corning did pay time and one-half for any Sun-
day work as such On March 7, 1969, Candler wrote
to Seymour, head of Olin Aluminum Division operations,
whose office was in New York Candler advised Seymour
of the broad based complaints he had received about failure
to pay premium pay for Sunday work, he mentioned his
survey of area firms and that Pittsburgh-Corning did pay
time and one-half; he reminded Seymour of the Sedalia
plant's policy to pay comparable wages; and concluded-
We plan to begin paying time and a half for Sundays,
as such, subject to your comments I would appreciate
hearing from you soon so that we can take the
appropriate action.
Between March 7 and 17 there was one or more telephone
conversations between Seymour and Candler on the above
matter On March 17, Seymour wrote to Candler confirming
"our telephone conversation," and authorizing time and
a half for Sunday work pursuant to the pledge to pay
comparable wages. On March 17 and 18, Fredrickson and
Candler held meetings at the plant loading dock with
30-35 employees on the 21 turn It was announced that
the Company, after checking, had ascertained that Pitts-
burgh-Corning paid time and one-half for Sundays and
that Respondent would do likewise pursuant to its compara-
bility pledge. Thereafter, apparently, it was not clear when
the new pay policy became effective and, on March 19,
Candler posted a notice referring to a misunderstanding
about the March 17 and 18 announcement and stating
that the effective date of the new pay was March 23,
not April 1
The Union points to the fact that there were union
meetings in town on March 9 and 16 and that time and
a half for Sunday work was one of the topics discussed.
There is no evidence that the Company was aware of
these meetings on the dates they were held or that it
knew what topics were discussed The Company's awareness
of the Union evidently began when leaflets were distributed
on March 17 or 18 In any event, under all the circumstances,
including Candler's clear recommendation to Seymour on
" The 21 turn was a 4-shift arrangement by which, in effect, the
plant operation involved was continuous An employee's work period
on the 21 turn would run 7 days from, for instance, Wednesday This,
of course , meant that he worked on Sunday as part of his normal
work period (the details of having 2 days off thereafter need not concern
us) and he was not paid time and one-half for Sunday work
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
March 7, we believe the time and one-half decision antedated
the Union's appearance When the matter was finalized,
we do not regard it as unusual or illegal that the Company
sought to communicate it promptly to the employees affect-
ed. It, no doubt, was helpful to the Company to do so,
but the Company was garnering the normal and legitimate
advantage arising from its March 7 decision and recommen-
dation. The alternative was to delay or to withhold the
announcement because the Union was in the picture. With-
holding a benefit for such a reason could have been viewed
as a detriment or a deterrent because of union activity.
We also believe that, since the company announcement
to the employees, that time and one-half would be paid
for Sundays, occurred on March 17 and 18, and the union
petition for certification was filed on March 20, the alleged
improper action antedated the petition and thereby rendered
the objection untimely under Board policy. We do not
sustain the objection.
The Olin Incentive Thrift Plan allowed for employees
to contribute certain percentages of their pay to the plan.
It was part of the plan that the Company would contribute
20 to 50 percent of its monthly earnings to the plan,
with such contributions being invested in Olin common
stock. The exact percentage of company contribution was
to be determined prior to July 1 of each year by the
Board of Directors. The plan was not confined to Olin's
Sedalia plant.
Olin's Board of Directors, on March 27, 1969, approved
an increase in the corporation's contribution to the thrift
plan from 30 to 35 percent, effective for the plan year
July 1, 1969, to June 30, 1970. Thereafter, various written
announcements to this effect went out from the corporate
president on April 14, 1969, to heads of the various corporate
divisions and to staff members of management at the differ-
ent plants, including Sedalia. About April 22 or 23, the
fact that Olin's contribution to the thrift plan was being
increased from 30 to 35 percent was evidently made known
at the Sedalia plant
The evidence regarding the thrift plan's history is rather
limited in the record. Apparently, the plan was established
on July 1, 1964. The increase in the Company's contribution
to the plan in 1969 was the third such increase since
the plan's inception. The Company's contribution to the
plan had been 30 percent since July 1, 1967, which would
indicate that 1967 was the most recent prior increase
The Sedalia plant began operations in 1968.
On the evidence before us, the increase in company
contribution on a multiplant basis was a normal business
action, decided upon and dete;mined at the corporate,
not the plant, level. Increases had been given in prior
years for reasons that, as far as appears, had nothing
to do with union activity There is no evidence that warrants
a different conclusion as to 1969 and in the absence of
some evidence of this nature, we are unable to rely on
suspicion or conjecture.°6 We do not sustain the objection.
On the basis of the objections sustained it is recommended
that the election be set aside.
" Possible areas of evidence in a situation such as was presented
would be that it might be shown that in prior years the Board of
Directors met in June Why did they meet in March in 1969 Perhaps
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
For reasons set forth at length in our decision, it has
been found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by its conduct and statements soliciting, expressing
a willingness to rectify, and rectifying grievances and com-
plaints of its employees, all in the context of a union
organizational effort and a pending petition. It also has
been found that Respondent's statements to its employees
regarding the status of existing benefits, such as that bargain-
ing would be from scratch and each benefit would have
to be renegotiated, in the event a union became collective-
bargaining agent in the plant, were in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act It was further found that the statements
by Supervisor Haley regarding cost of living increases under
existing nonunion company policy were in violation in
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as more fully described and
found in our decision.
We also find that Respondent, "by engaging in the forego-
ing conduct and refusing to recognize the Union as majority
representative of its employees, violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act "°
THE REMEDY
The evidence is clear and admitted, and we have so
found, that Respondent engaged in a campaign to defeat
the Union in the election. That this campaign was designed
to, and did, undermine the support that a majority of
employees had given to the Union when they signed clear
and readily understandable authorization cards is also clear,
in our opinion. The Union lost the election. The fact,
that Respondent waged a campaign against the Union
that was, in some respects, not illegal, does not alter the
fact that Respondent also engaged in illegal conduct that,
in our opinion, was effective, and it is not possible to
distinguish the legal from the illegal in their effect upon
the employee voters The Union was defeated by an overall
campaign of legal and illegal tactics and statements, and
because of this the election should be set aside.
The more challenging problem is whether a bargaining
order should issue or whether the unfair labor practices
should be remedied by what the Supreme Court has referred
a very good explanation was forthcoming, perhaps not Perhaps the
Board had always met in March Suppose it was shown that the corpora-
tion's earnings in 1969 were less than in 1968, when, admittedly, no
increase in contribution was voted Why the increase in 1969 But there
is no evidence along either the foregoing or any other related line
that appears in the record
" In All-Tronics, Inc, 175 NLRB I10, there was 8(a)(I) conduct in
the face of a union majority, demand and refusal of recognition, and
an election to which objections were sustained The allegations were
8(a)(1) and (5) violations The case was initially decided on the Board's
standards of good or bad-faith doubt and violations of Sec 8(a)(1) and
(5) were found and an order to bargain issued In a supplemental decision,
the Board reconsidered the case in the light of the Supreme Court
guidelines set forth in the Gisell case, infra The Board then found
once more that there was a refusal to bargain in violation of Sec 8(a)(5)
and (1) and reaffirmed its order to bargain The above quotation is
from the Board Supplemental Decision
See also the explication of Gissel and its application here under the
caption of the "The Remedy" in the instant decision , infra.
OLIN CONDUCTORS 487
to as the Board's traditional remedies and thereafter a
new election or a rerun election be held. The matter is
not one of first impression and the governing authority
is N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)
The Court had little difficulty with the Board's authority
to issue a bargaining order in 8(a)(5) situations "where
an employer has committed independent unfair labor prac-
tices which have made the holding a fair election unlikely
or which have in fact undermined a union's majority and
caused an election to be set aside." In context, at this
particular point of the decision, the Court, in our opinion,
in referring to conduct which has made the holding of
a fair election unlikely, is not dealing with a rerun election
situation. It is speaking of a possible initial election in
the face of independent unfair labor practices that have
already occurred. When the Court speaks of the situation
where an election has been held and set aside, the context
of the paragraph indicates that it is referring to not only
an election situation but also to one where the Union
had a valid card majority Literally, in such a situation,
the Court stated that if the unfair labor practices had
undermined the Union's majority and caused the election
to be set aside, a bargaining order could appropriately
issue . Does this mean that the nature of the unfair labor
practices, the possibility of their being remedied by a Board
remedial order, and the holding of a fair rerun election,
are irrelevant considerations whenever the Board has reason-
ably concluded that the unfair labor practices undermined
the Union majority and caused the election to be set aside?
The Court's decision affords considerable basis for con-
cluding that the answer to the foregoing question is affirma-
tive. In the same paragraph in which it spoke of unfair
labor practices that undermined the Union and caused
the election to be set aside, the Court observed that "If
the Board could enter only a cease and desist order and
direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding
the employer. ." The Court went on to mention the
time lapses in the administrative process and the diminution
of opportunity to reverse the results of an initial election
in a rerun election. Moreover, the Court appeared to implic-
itly emphasize that its unqualified statement that the critical
factor as to the propriety of a bargaining order was, whether
the unfair labor practices had undermined the Union and
caused the election to be set aside, and not the nature
of the unfair labor practices or their remediable or irremedia-
ble nature. It did this by referring to a study of election
cases and observing that there appeared to be a difference
in the effect of various types of unfair labor practices
and their remediable or irremediable quality Thus:
The study shows further that certain unfair labor prac-
tices are more effective to destroy election conditions
for a longer period of time than others. For instance,
in cases involving threats to close or transfer plant
operations, the Union won the rerun only 29% of
the time, while threats to eliminate benefits or refuse
to deal with the Union if elected seemed less irremedia-
ble with the Union winning the rerun 75% of the
time
It is apparent that either of the foregoing types of unfair
labor practices referred to in the study cited by the court
could reasonably be found to have undermined a union
and caused an election to be set aside but the Court
did not qualify its statement regarding the propriety of
a bargaining order, when the unfair labor practices had
undermined the Union and caused an election to be set
aside, by conditioning the statement on the nature of the
unfair labor practice, its remediable or irremediable nature,
or the possibility of a fair rerun election in lieu of a
bargaining order Further to emphasize this position the
Court said.
If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's
strength and destroying the laboratory conditions neces-
sary for a fair election, he may see no need to violate
a cease and desist order by further unlawful activity.
The damage will have been done, and perhaps the
only fair way to effectuate employee rights is to reestabl-
ish the conditions as they existed before the employer's
unlawful campaign [in view of the next sentence it
is clear that the conditions to be reestablished of which
the Court speaks are not conditions for a rerun election
but the condition where a majority of employees had
designated, by cards, the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative]. There is, after all, nothing
permanent in a bargaining order ...
The Court then goes on, as we read its decision, to
make reasonably clear that it has been discussing, above
described, pervasive unfair labor practices and that practices
that undermine a union 's majority and result in the setting
aside of an election are such, i e., pervasive.48 This is evident
from the Court's statement that-
The only effect of our holding here is to approve
the Board use of the bargaining order in less extraordi-
nary cases marked by less pervasive practices which
nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majori-
ty strength and impede the election forces.
It will be noted that in contrast to the first category
previously discussed by the Court in which the pervasive
unfair practices undermined majority strength, it is now
speaking of less pervasive practices which have only "the
tendency to undermine majority strength." The key factor
in both categories is the undermining of the union majority.
In the first category, pervasive unfair practices undermine
the union majority but in the second category, the unfair
practices, not being pervasive, have only a tendency to
'" A lower court had admitted the possibility and appropri ateness
of a bargaining order "in 'exceptional ' cases marked by 'outrageous'
and 'pervasive ' unfair labor practices [since] ' their coercive effects
cannot be eliminated by traditional remedies We would assume
that these "exceptional," "outrageous ," and "pervasive" unfair labor prac-
tices to which the lower court was referring were such steps as the
discharge of union adherents and organizers or blunt warnings of the
plant closing if a union was voted in As we have endeavored to show,
however, the Supreme Court , judging from what it said as described
heretofore , was not confin ing the propriety of a bargaining order to
exceptional or outrageous unfair practices but stated that, if the unfair
practices were pervasive enough to have undermined a union majority,
and to have resulted in the setting aside of the election, a bargaining
order was appropriate We take pervasive in this connection to mean
that if the unfair practice was diffused to all the employee electorate
or most of them and was with regard to a subject , or was of a nature,
that it undermined their support of the union, then it is the pervasive
unfair practice of which the Court is speaking even though it may
not be outrageous in the sense of discharging all union activists and
coercion of that nature
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
undermine Also, in the first category, the pervasive practices
which undermined the majority, caused the election to
be set aside by this very fact, while, in the second category
of less pervasive practices having a "tendency" to undermine
the majority, they have only a tendency to impede the
election process but not necessarily to destroy it The third
category, of which the Court speaks is " . a third
category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices,
which , because of their minimal impact on the election
machinery , will not sustain a bargaining order "d9
With respect to the second category, above, "the less
pervasive practices which have the tendency to under-
mine majority, strength and impede the election process,"
the Court stated:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the
effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election
(or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies,
though present , is slight and that employee sentiment
once expressed through cards, would, on balance, be
better protected by a bargaining order, then such an
order should issue
The Court, then, in remanding three of the cases to the
Board , for a finding in a specific area, indicates that,
absent an affirmative finding that "an election would defi-
nitely be a more reliable test of the employees' desires
than the card count taken before the unfair labor practices
occurred," the Board's authority, if not, possibly, its obliga-
tion, to issue a bargaining order, is manifest (Emphasis
supplied) 50
The evidence in the instant case has convinced the Exam-
iner that Respondent 's unfair labor practices , in conjunction
with other statements and activities that were antiunion
but not illegal, effectively undermined the Union's majority
and warrant the setting aside of the election If the matter
of remedy was one of first impression, we would recommend
that the election be set aside; that a cease and desist
and affirmative statement order be issued to remedy the
unfair labor practices, since we consider them remediable;
and that a rerun election be conducted at an appropriate
time However, the applicable guidelines are to be found
in the Gissel Packing case, above, and we apply those
standards to the matter of appropriate remedy
We have described the three categories of unfair labor
practices set forth in the Court's decision. In our opinion,
" In connection with the third category we believe that the Court's
description thereof again makes clear the crux of the first and second
categories The first category, involving undermining the existing majority,
had a maximum and destructive impact on the election machinery, the
second category involved practices only tending to undermine majority
and only tending to impede the election machinery, the third category
involved minor unfair practices not undermining the majority and having
a minimal impact on the election machinery
'° "Nor did it [the Board ] make a finding that , even though traditional
remedies might be able to ensure a fair election , there was insufficient
indication that an election (or a rerun in General Steel ) would definitely
be a more reliable test of the employees ' desires than the card count
taken before the unfair labor practices occurred We think it possible
that the requisite findings were implicit in the Board 's decisions below
to issue bargaining orders (and to set aside the election in General
Steel) " The Court went on to say that because the Board's practice
at the time required it to phrase its findings in terms of an employer's
good- or bad -faith doubts, it was remanding "these [3] cases to the
Board for proper findings [of the nature indicated by the Court, above] "
the instant case does not fit into the third category and
we therefore eliminate it from further consideration on
the question of remedy.51
In our opinion , the instant unfair labor practices fall
in category one of the Court's decision since the unfair
practices were pervasive and, in our opinion, the unfair
practices "in fact undermined a union's majority and caused
an election to be set aside." The unfair labor practices
were the soliciting of grievances and complaints and express-
ing a willingness to correct them at general meetings reach-
ing the entire employee electorate , and correcting them,
all in a context of express reference to the union campaign;
and the Respondent's written and oral statements to all
the employee electorate , regarding existing benefits, were
pervasive and did undermine the Union's majority and
caused the election to be set aside. For reasons previously
set forth in our analysis of the Gissel decision, we do
not read that decision as defining outrageousness or heinous-
ness as necessary ingredients of cases falling within category
one We do not view the instant unfair labor practices
as brutal or outrageous such as outright discharges of
union adherents or threats to close the plant but we do
not regard them as minor infractions and we find them
to have been pervasive among the entire electorate and
to have been material factors in undermining the Union
and nullifying the election."
Since, from our reading of Gissel, a factual situation,
as here, that falls within category one, merits or requires
a bargaining order as the appropriate remedy, we so recom-
mend.
Although we believe that the instant facts place the
case within category one, above, we will discuss the possible
applicability of category two (approval of "the Board's
use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases
marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still
have the tendency to undermine majority strength and
impede the election processes"). We would agree that this
case is "less extraordinary ," than some , both as the term
"extraordinary " is usually understood or even in the sense
of being less extraordinary because less outrageous. We
do not agree that the unfair practices here were "less
pervasive" than pervasive practices falling under category
one. The instant practices , in our opinion , were about
as pervasive as any unfair practices could be They reached
the entire employee electorate and did so effectively We
do not agree that the instant unfair practices had simply
"a tendency to undermine majority strength." We are per-
51 " a third category of minor or less extensive unfair labor
practices which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery,
will not sustain a bargaining order " Gissel, above
" We have spoken earlier of the connotation of the word "pervasive"
as used by the Court By way of further amplification , we note that
in describing the third category of unfair practices the court used the
words "minor or less extensive unfair labor practices [with] minimal
impact on the election machinery " Obviously, the terms "extensive"
and "pervasive" convey the same basic thought Extensive or pervasive
unfair practices refer to the reach or the range or the number of employees
affected if the practices , although extensive , have little impact and
do not reach areas of material employee sensitivity , they will not undermine
the union Pervasive practices are both extensive in reach and of a
nature to undermine the Union and nullify the election They need
not be "outrageous "
OLIN CONDUCTORS
suaded and convinced that the unfair practices were material
factors in undermining the union majority and that, in
conjunction with other aspects of the antiunion campaign
that were not illegal, the union majority was undermined.
Nor would we agree that the unfair practices had only
a "tendency to impede the election processes." In
our opinion, the unfair practices, by undermining the union
majority, frustrated and nullified the election, the election
process.
Assume, however, arguendo, that the instant facts some-
how place the case within category two. Applying the
Gissel standards to situations that are found to belong
in category two, it would be our opinion that, with the
use of traditional remedies, a fair rerun election would
be feasible and would be feasible in the instant case, if
it is in category two However, even this posture, in our
opinion, would not be possible here in view of an additional
amplification by the Court regarding category two situations
We believe that it would be difficult not to find that
"even though traditional remedies might be able to ensure
a fair election, there was insufficient indication that an
election (or a rerun. ) would definitely be a more reliable
test of the employees' desires than the card count taken
before the unfair labor practices occurred " While we believe
that a fair election is a better method of determining
employee desires than a card count, we cannot definitely
state that, after unfair labor practices are remedied by
traditional methods and thus we "might be able to ensure
a fair election," that a rerun election "would definitely
be a more reliable test of the employees' desires than
the card count taken before the unfair labor practices
occurred " Employees' desires, like any human desires,
are fairly complicated and difficult to divine. We believe
an election would be the more reliable test but, under
all the circumstances posed, we would hesitate to say that
the election would "definitely" be the more reliable test
than would the voluntary cards, signed before any unfair
labor practices What lingering or subliminal effect the
latter might have, we do not know
In circumstances such as the Court was discussing, it
is fairly clear that by positing the necessity of a finding
of the above nature, the Court has placed the burden
on those, including the Board, who might opt for traditional
remedial action and a rerun election in category two situa-
tions. The Court could have placed the burden differently,
to wit, unless the Board found that reliance on the card
count "would definitely be a more reliable test of the
employee's desires" than a fair election after the unfair
practices had been remedied, then an election would be
appropriate. Instead, and, we assume, not inadvertently
but deliberately, since the Court was setting forth a standard
or criteria to be met, the Court's formulation places the
burden in the other direction and unless it is found that
an election "would definitely be the more reliable test
of the employees' desires" than the pre-unfair labor practice
card count, the latter presumably prevails and there is
no rerun election 57
" It does not follow that if we are unable to find that an election
would definitely be a more reliable test of employee desires, that we
would therefore find, or that it follows, that the failure to find the
489
Accordingly, pursuant to Gissel and pursuant to any
reasonably applicable Gissel standard as defined by the
Court, it is our opinion, that a bargaining order must
be, and is, the appropriate remedy in the instant case
We accordingly recommend such an order
We also recommend that Respondent cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices and recognize and bargain
with the Union, upon request, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of employees in the appropriate unit. We
deny the Union's motion for additional relief as set forth
in its motion We are not persuaded that such additional
relief is appropriate.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law
and upon the entire record, it is recommended that Olin
Conductors, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
I Cease and desist from-
(a) Refusing to recognize and to bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employ-
ees in the appropriate unit described hereinabove in the
decision with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions
of employment.
(b) Soliciting complaints and grievances from its employ-
ees, in a context of union organizational activity, for the
purpose of removing or rectifying, and by removing or
rectifying in whole or in part, such complaints and griev-
ances that may have led employees to support the Union
(c) Stating to employees by a combination of written
and oral means that the advent of a union would mean
that all existing benefits would have to be negotiated for
from scratch and that, in effect, unless the Union was
successful in renegotiating each existing benefit and having
them placed in effect, such benefits would not exist inasmuch
as the negotiations would have started from scratch insofar
as benefits were concerned
(d) Stating to employees for the first time and at a
time when a union organizational campaign and a petition
for certification were pending that, in July 1969, absent
a union presence in the plant as bargaining agent, at least
a cost of living increase would be given pursuant to an
established wage evaluation procedure although such wage
evaluation program had theretofore made no claim to being
a cost of living escalator provision but merely a program
to maintain wages and conditions of employment at levels
comparable to those in other plants in the area.
(e) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act
foregoing is equivalent to a finding that a card check would definitely
be (or is) a more reliable test of employee desires than an election
However, for all practical purposes, the Court, by placing the burden
in the election path, has in effect, made the card check an almost
impregnable determinant of employee desires in category two situations
We would be inclined to believe that almost all rerun elections, after
the use of traditional remedies, will be found in category three situations,
and not in other categories
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
its employees in the appropriate unit
(b) Post at its Sedalia, Missouri, plant, copies of the
notice attached marked "Appendix."54 Copies of said notice,
on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for
Region 17, shall, after being signed, be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customar-
ily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that said notices are not defaced or covered
by other material.
(c) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the service of this decision and recom-
mended order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the election held on May
7 and 8, 1969, in Case 17-RC-5999, be set aside
" In the event no exceptions are riled as provided by Sec 102 46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board,
the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order
herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulation,
be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and
order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of
a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading
"Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be
changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board "
51 If these Recommendations are adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region
17, in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial, at which the Company, the Union, and
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
were represented by attorneys and called and examined
witnesses and introduced evidence, the Trial Examiner,
who heard the evidence, has issued a decision in which
he found that the Company had engaged in certain violations
of the National Labor Relations Act and, to correct the
violations, he recommended certain action to be taken
by the Company.
In essence, it was found that the Union, the IBEW, had
received valid signed authorizations from a majority of
the employees in the unit; that the Union so informed
the Company; and requested that the Company recognize
the Union as the employees' collective-bargaining representa-
tive; the Company refused; thereafter an election was sched-
uled and held, the Union lost the election; it was found
that after the Union had received authorizations from a
majority of the employees and before the election, the
Company campaigned against the Union, and in important
respects, committed unfair labor practices as part of the
campaign, it was found that the unfair labor practices
were a material factor in undermining the support that
a majority of the employees had given to the Union initially
and were a material factor in causing a majority of the
employees to vote against the Union.
To remedy the situation brought about by the Company's
unfair labor practices, a decision of the United States
Supreme Court, dealing with similar situations in other
cases, has prescribed the remedy, and the Trial Examiner
here has prescribed the same remedy, which is that the
Company cease its unfair practices and recognize and bar-
gain with the Union as the collective-bargaining agent of
all employees in the unit because the Union had been
designated by a majority of the unit employees as their
representative unitl the Company undermined such employ-
ee support by its unfair labor practices. Accordingly, you
are advised that:
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain col-
lectively with Local 124, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of employees in the appropriate
unit. The unit is.
All production and maintenance employees,
including group leaders, shop service mechanics,
die reamers, shipping, receiving and store room
employees employed by the Company at its Sedalia,
Missouri, plant, but excluding laboratory techni-
cians, office-clerical employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT advise employees, when a union
campaign is going on and when an election is pending,
that they will receive at least a cost of living wage
increase as a result of a wage evaluation, when, prior
to the union campaign, neither in the Company's
employee handbook nor elsewhere, was there provision
that the employees had a cost of living escalator as
part of their employment conditions.
WE WILL NOT, as part of a campaign against a
union, solicit employees to tell management of any
complaints and grievances employees had that might
have led them to support a union, for the purpose
of enabling management to remedy such complaints
and grievances and thus demonstrate that management
and not a union was the party to whom they should
give allegiance and that a union was completely unnec-
essary.
WE WILL NOT inform employees, in writing or
orally, that if a union becomes the bargaining agent,
all existing benefits will have to be negotiated from
scratch and that unless the Union is able to successfully
renegotiate each existing benefit, the said benefit will
have ceased since the negotiations on benefits would
have started from scratch or from zero benefits.
WE WILL NOT in any other like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees n the
exercise of their rights under the law
OLIN CONDUCTORS 491
OLIN CONDUCTORS , OLIN This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
MATHIESON CHEMICAL anyone.
CORPORATION This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
(Employer) from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
Dated By its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, 610
(Representative ) Federal Building , 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Mis-
(Title) souri 64106, Telephone 816-374-5181.