Olean Case Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 29, 1974

208 N.L.R.B. 793 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

OLEAN CASE CORP. 793
Olean Case Corporation and International Union of
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case 3-CA-5357
January 29, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
union membership , and suggesting to them that it would be
futile to support the above -named Union , and that it
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging
its employee Bonita Carpenter . The proceeding was
initiated by a charge filed by the above-named Union on
July 9, 1973, pursuant to which General Counsel issued a
complaint on August 17, 1973.1 On September 19, hearing
was held in Olean, New York.
On the basis of the entire record herein , including my
observation of the witnesses , I hereby make the following:
On October 30, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Olean Case Corp.,
Olean, New York, its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge ' s resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
E In the absence of exceptions thereto , we adopt pro forma the
Administrative Law Judge 's findings that Plant Manager Sullivan's and
Foreman Arnold 's remarks to employee Carpenter that "it would do her no
good to get the union in" were not violative of Sec 8 (a)(1) of the Act, as
alleged in the complaint
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge : This case
involves allegations that the above-named Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employ-
ees with discharge , interrogating employees about their
i Unless otherwise indicated all dates hereinafter are in 1973
2 Commerce is not in issue The complaint alleges, the answer admits,
and I find that Respondent meets the Board 's direct outflow standard for
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of commercial carrying cases and
related products with its principal office and place of
business in Olean , New York.2 Respondent has only been
in operation since on or about March 27 at which time it
took over the operations of a firm known as Porto Case.
Bonita Carpenter had been an employee of Porto Case
since April 1969 and was continued in the employment of
Respondent when Respondent took over the operations of
Porto Case. She was employed as a machine operator
making shoe bags. In mid -June , Carpenter became
interested in obtaining union representation and obtained
union authorization cards from a representative of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (here-
inafter referred to as IBEW) which she distributed to other
employees soliciting signatures . She obtained about 25
signed cards but was unable to make contact with a
representative of the IBEW to turn over the cards . For this
reason , she destroyed the cards authorizing representation
by the IBEW, and on June 28 she contacted a representa-
tive of the Charging Union herein and obtained authoriza-
tion cards from him which she received on June 30. On
July 2, she passed out the cards at work and again obtained
approximately 25 signatures . According to Carpenter,
sometime in mid-June she had a conversation with
Foreman James Arnold3 at her machine in which she
remarked that things had not improved in the last 5 years
and that maybe a union would help. Arnold replied that it
wouldn't do any good to get the Union in, that it would not
help her . Later that same day, Arnold had another
conversation with Carpenter at her machine in which he
told her that if any one signed any union cards they would
be fired . Carpenter couldn't say who initiated the conversa-
tion nor did she testify to any response.
On one occasion during the same period of time , several
employees observed Plant Manager Lyle Sullivan in the
work area with a union card in his shirt pocket . According
to Carpenter , she had a conversation with Sullivan at her
machine in which he asked her why she didn't give him a
card to sign . Carpenter replied by asking him why he didn't
the assertion of jurisdiction.
3 The name of Arnold is incorrectly spelled in the record
208 NLRB No. 120
794 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sign the one he had in his pocket and return it to her.
Sullivan apparently did not reply directly to Carpenter's
question but said that it would not do any good to get a
union in there anyway, that the employees were nov going
to get any more . Employee Carol Chapman testified she
overheard this remark . Employee Deborah Neff had
noticed the card in Sullivan 's pocket, and to tease him she
asked him if he was going to join the Union . Neff testified,
"He looked at me funny and he said it wouldn't do you
any good and he looked kind of mad so I didn 't pursue it."
That same day , Carpenter had another conversation with
Sullivan wherein he told her that any one who signed a
union card would be fired . He- also said again that it
wouldn 't do any good to try to get a union in the plant
because the employees wouldn't get any more than they
were getting before . Carpenter made no reply.
Carpenter testified that on Friday, June 28 , she was in
the lunchroom and Foreman Arnold came in. She asked
him if she could have a. couple of hours off on July 3, and
he replied that it was okay as far as he knew . Carpenter
then asked him about the week after July 4, for her
vacation and Arnold replied again that it was okay as far
as he knew.
On July 2, Sullivan again told Carpenter at her machine
that any one who signed a' union card would be fired.
Carpenter's response to this was that he could not fire
people for trying to get a union in or fire them for joining
the Union.
On July 3, Carpenter left work at 1:07 p.m. The regular
end of the work shift was 4 p .m. Foreman Arnold was
away from the plant on vacation and Carpenter did not say
anything to any other supervisor about leaving early.
On July 5, the next workday, Carpenter discovered on
reporting to work that her timecard,was missing from the
rack and she went to see Sullivan to ask him about her
timecard. According to Carpenter, Sullivan told her that
she had quit . She asked him what he meant, that if she had
quit she would not be there . He told her she had walked off
the job without telling any one and she replied that she had
asked Foreman Arnold before and she didn 't think it was
necessary to tell him and besides he was busy on a sewing
machine that had broken down , another foreman was also
busy, and she figured that they knew she was going to
leave.
Sullivan told her that Dr. Tripodi , one of the owners of
the Company , didn't want her working there any longer,
and Carpenter asked to speak to him. Sullivan checked
with Tripodi and reported to Carpenter that Tripodi
wouldn 't talk to her. Carpenter refused to leave and waited
around until about 9 a.m. At one point , Personnel
Manager Anthony Brunsing came out and spoke to her
and told her she was fired as far as he was concerned.
Carpenter told him she didn't know why and Brunsing said
because she was incompetent.
On July 9 , the Union filed a petition for an election and
an election was held on September 5, in which a majority
of the valid votes cast were for representation by the Union
and on September 13, the Union was certified.
On September 17, Bruning asked employee Deborah
Neff if she had joined the Union . She told him no.
Bruning had a tablet in his hand at the time with a list of
names and he put a notation next to Neff's name
indicating that she had not yet joined. Bruning told Neff
that he wanted her to know that the plant did not have to
be a closed shop and that if she joined the Union dues
would be taken out of her wages., According to employee
Lois Adams, Brunsing also asked her if she had joined the
Union and when she didn't answer he repeated the
question and told her that the Company would find out
any way. Adams them told him that she had joined.
Brunsing then made a notation on the tablet that he was
carrying.
Brunsing asked employee Carol Chapman if she had
joined the Union and she also replied not yet. As in the
case of the others he made the notation on the tablet he
was carrying and he told Chapman that he wanted to
inform her that according to law the plant did not have to
be a closed shop , and the employees who were working
there who didn't join the Union would get the same
benefits without having to pay dues and initiation fees.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The principal issue presented by the foregoing is
Respondent's motive in discharging Carpenter . According
to General Counsel , Respondent discharged Carpenter
because of her union activities. and he predicates this
contention on her role as principal union organizer, the
threats of discharge which she testified to, and her
testimony that she did not leave work without permission.
Among these elements of proof, only one can be said to be
undisputed and that is Carpenter's role as principal union
organizer. Moreover, a finding that Respondent knew of
her role is clearly warranted . Respondent's plant is a`small
one employing about 30 employees and Carpenter's
activities were in the plant . It is undisputed that on one
occasion Sullivan observed an employee returning a card
to Carpenter and while he may not have been able to see
the card closely enough to be certain that it was a union
card , it is inconceivable that he did not know what it was in
light of the fact, again undisputed, that he had been given a
union card earlier by an employee which he had carried in
his shirt pocket. These circumstances are sufficient to
warrant an inference of company knowledge . In addition,
there are the conversations about the Union between
Foreman Arnold and Carpenter, which are not denied, and
the conversations between Carpenter and Sullivan, which
are denied, but as to which I credit Carpenter. On the basis
of the foregoing, I find that Respondent knew of
Carpenter's union activities.
It is , of course, not enough to show that Carpenter
engaged in union activities and that Respondent knew it; it
must also be shown that she was discharged because of
those activities, and, in this connection, "The issue ... is
not, of course, whether or not there existed grounds for
discharge ... apart from [Carpenter's] union activities.
The fact that the employer had ample reason for
discharging [her] is of no moment. It was free to discharge
[her] for any reason good or bad, so long as it did not
discharge [her] for [her] union activity. And even though
the [discharge] may have been based upon other reasons as
well, if the employer was partly motivated by union
activity, the .[discharge was ] violative of the Act." N.L R.B.
OLEAN CASE CORP.
v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352,
355 (C.A. 2, 1962).
In my judgment the evidence preponderates in favor of a
finding that Carpenter's discharge was motivated by her
union activities. In the first place, I find, contrary to the
testimony of Foreman Arnold, that Carpenter requested
and received permission to leave work early on July 3. This
finding is based on the fact that Carpenter was corroborat-
ed by employee Carol Chapman about having requested
permission of Foreman Arnold to leave work early on July
3. Chapman 's testimony differed in some respects, from
Carpenter's, but not in such a way to lead me to believe
that she was corroborating Carpenter because they were
friends. Arguably, had such been the case, her testimony
would have been tailored more carefully to Carpenter's.
Moreover, Chapman testified that on the afternoon of July
3 Sullivan asked her about Carpenter's having left the
plant and she told him Carpenter had permission to leave.
Such a statement, which Sullivan did not deny was made,
made prior to the discharge of Carpenter and before the
charge filed in the instant case, lends strong support to
Carpenter's and Chapman's assertion that Carpenter
requested and received permission from Arnold to leave
work early on July 3:
This showing that Respondent's asserted reason for
discharge is false ". . warrants the inference that some
other reason was being concealed." NLRB. v. Joseph
Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A. 1, 1966). But that is
only one circumstance that leads to the conclusion that the
real reason Carpenter was discharged was because of her
union activities. Other circumstances compel the same
conclusion. Thus, when. Carpenter reported for work on
July 5 and was accused of leaving work early without
permission , she told Sullivan she had permission from
Arnold. In light of that assertion, it appears to me that an
employer would normally withhold discharge until the
assertion could be verified. As I understand Sullivan's
testimony, he did not do this because Foreman Arnold
would have told him before he left for his vacation if he
had given Carpenter, or any other employee, permission to
leave work early during the week he was to be away and
Arnold had said nothing to him. I might have given
credence to such an explanation had Sullivan merely
suspended Carpenter until he had an opportunity to verify
her assertion. Instead, he chose to fire her precipitately. As
a matter of fact , even before July 5 Sullivan had been put
on notice by Chapman that Carpenter might have received
permission to leave work early, yet he undertook to confer
with other management officials and obtained their
agreement to discharge her without even giving Carpenter
an opportunity to explain her leaving work early. In
addition, the very day Carpenter left work early he posted
a notice to employees about the company rule that
employees desirous of time off must request permission to
be off at least 2 days ahead of time. Such a rule had been in
existence for some time, and no explanation was given why
Arnold deemed it necessary to post a notice on July 3 just
because Carpenter had left work early. Such hasty action
suggests that leaving work early without permission was
4 The complaint did not allege that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I)
of the Act by Arnold's threat of discharge , but Carpenter's testimony that
795
only a pretext to discharge Carpenter because of her union
activities.
Further support for a finding of unlawful motivation is
to be found in Respondent's threats to discharge anyone
who signed union cards and its interrogation of employees.
Insofar as the threats are concerned, they are based on the
testimony of Carpenter herself . The striking , similarity
between the statements she attributed to Arnold and
Sullivan, and the fact that she was the alleged discrimina-
tee and the only one to attribute threats of discharge to
supervisors, caused me to question whether Carpenter was
a credible witness . In concluding that she was ,. I have
considered among other things the fact that Arnold and
Sullivan were shown to be untrustworthy witnesses on the
issue of permission to leave work early , the fact that
Chapman corroborated Carpenter as to part of one
conversation with Sullivan , the fact . that employee Neff,
who impressed me as a credible witness , attributed to
Sullivan a remark similar to that attributed to him by
Carpenter, and the fact that Arnold did not deny making
the statements attributed to him . Accordingly,on the basis
of the credited testimony of Carpenter , I conclude not only
that the threats of discharge support a finding that her
discharge was unlawfully motivated, but also, as alleged in
the complaint, that the threats were violative of Section
8(axl) of the Act 4
As to the interrogation by Brunsing , there is no dispute it
occurred . The only question is whether it was unlawful. In
my judgment, it clearly was. In the first place , from the
description of the interrogation given by Adams, Chap-
man, and Neff, in particular, the fact that Brunsing had a
tablet with the names of employees, the inference is
warranted that the interrogation was not limited to those
three employees, but rather that it included all or a
substantial number of employees. If Adams', Chapman's,
and Neff s description of the interrogation is typical of the
approach followed by Brunsing , and there is no reason to
believe it is not, he did not tell employees the purpose of
his inquiry and he did not give employees assurances
against reprisal . According to'Brunsing , he interrogated the
employees "for personal records and payroll deductions or
anything that would come about that I would have to
execute in any position ." While such an explanation might
be plausible under other circumstances , it is implausible
when it occurs on the heels of the Union 's certification and
before the Union has even made its initial contact for
negotiations . Unions may nearly always demand union-
security and checkoff provisions in any contract negotiat-
ed, but Brunsing's anticipation is out of the ordinary.
Significantly , he did not give the employees the reason he
gave at the hearing. To the contrary, his remarks to Neff
and Chapman indicate that his purpose was to dissuade
employees from joining the Union and thereby undermine
its support . Under the circumstances , including Respon-
dent's other unfair labor practices found herein, I find the
interrogation to have been coercive and violative of
Section 8(axl) of the Act, and although it occurred after
Carpenter's discharge , the union animus reflected by such
he had uttered such a threat was received into evidence without objection
and I view the issue as having been fully litigated.
796 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conduct supports the finding that Respondent discharged
Carpenter because of her union activities.
In addition to the foregoing, in arriving at. Respondent's
motive in discharging Carpenter, I have taken into
consideration Respondent's attempt at the hearing to
assign additional reasons for discharging Carpenter. These
additional reasons were tardiness and unsatisfactory work.
As to her tardiness,' Foreman Arnold had no complaint
and her' tardiness record was no worse than that of
Deborah Neff who had never been warned that tardiness
could result in disciplinary action. As to her work
performance, Foreman Arnold deemed it satisfactory,
while Sullivan painted her as incompetent. In so doing, he
gave further indication that Respondent's real motive in
discharging Carpenter was her union activity.
Finally, there is evidence that during her 4 years'
employment under the supervision of Sullivan, Carpenter
had been told on a few occasions that she was fired. It
appears that this was principally because of excessive
talking and insubordination. However, Carpenter was
never actually fired. On every occasion when Sullivan told
her she was' fired the statement was retracted and ' she
remained employed.It is significant that the only excep-
tion was the discharge on July 5 and it is equally significant
that by that date Carpenter had become . the union
organizer.
In short, all the circumstances described above warrant
the inference that Carpenter's discharge was motivated by
her union activities. I so find.
All that remains for consideration are Arnold's and
Sullivan's remarks to Carpenter that it would do her no
good to get a union in., The complaint alleges that these
remarks were, violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act. I do
not agree..The remarks contained no threats of reprisal,
nor promise of benefit, nor did Arnold or Sullivan indicate
that the selection of a union would do no good because
Respondent would engage in unlawful conduct. According
to my understanding of Board cases in this area, a
statement suggesting to employees the futility of selecting a
union to represent them is unlawful where the statement
conveys the idea that it would be futile because the
employer would not bargain with it or engage in some
other unfair labor practice.5 No such idea was suggested by
Arnold or Sullivan in his remarks and I shall recommend
dismissal of the complaint allegation relating thereto.
II. THE ' EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring
in connection with its operations described above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several' States and tend to
lead to ' labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
III. THE REMEDY
Having found `that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(axl) and (3) of the
Act, I shall' recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom' and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent discharged Bonita
Carpenter because of her union activities , I shall recom-
mend that it be ordered to offer her immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job or, if such job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and
to make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have
suffered by reason of her unlawful discharge by payment
to her of a sum of money equal tq that which she normally
would have earned as wages , from the date of her
discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement , less net
earnings, to which shall be added interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum in accordance with the formula set
forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent
strike at the very heart of employees' rights safeguarded by
the Act. I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be
placed under a broad order to cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act. N.LRB. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120
F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Olean Case Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees about their union mem-
bership and by threatening employees with discharge if
they sign union cards, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Sections 8(aXI) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By discharging Bonita Carpenter because of her
union activities, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Sections 8(ax l) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The evidence is insufficient to warrant a finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by telling
employees that it would be futile to support the above-
named Union.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
' Compare M. B. D. Company, 193 NLRB 494 , and Howard Manufactur-
ing Company, Inc., 180 NLRB 220.
OLEA'N CASE CORP.
ORDER 6
Respondent, Olean Case Corporation, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf
of, International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, or, in any other labor organization, by
discharging employees because of their union activities or
otherwise discriminating against them in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any terms or conditions of
their employment.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge if they sign
union cards.
(c) Interrogating employees about their union member-
ship in a manner or under circumstances constituting
interference with, and restraint and coercion of, employees
in their exercise of Section 7 rights.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights , to self-
organization, to form , join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended:
(a) Offer to Bonita Carpenter immediate , full and
unconditional reinstatement to her former job or, if such
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to, her seniority or other' rights or
privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay she may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her
by payment to her of a sum of money equal to the amount
she normally would have earned as wages from the date of
her discharge to the date of her reinstatement in the
manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board and its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports and all other records
relevant and necessary to a determination of the amounts
of backpay due under the terms of this recommended
Order.
(c) Post at its Olean, New York, place of business copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." v Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 3, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative , shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced , or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegation of the
797
complaint found not to have been sustained by a
preponderance of the evidence ,be dismissed.
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , recommendations . And recommended Order herein, shall, as
provided in Sec . 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
I In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be read -Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence , the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law when we discharged
Bonita Carpenter because of her activities on behalf of the
union and the Board has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees because of their
activities on behalf, or support , of the International
Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL offer Bonita Carpenter her job back, or, if
her job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job,
and we will pay her the wages which she lost because
we discharged her unlawfully.
WE WILL NOT question employees about their union
membership.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge
because they sign union cards.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
You are free to become and remain members of
International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
OLEAN CASE CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may' be
directed to the Board's Office, 9th Floor, Federal Building,
Ill W. Huron Street , Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone
716-842-3100.