Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 23, 1975

218 N.L.R.B. 785 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

OHIO VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 785
Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council , United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO and Maureen J . Smith. Case 9-CA-
8417
June 23, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On September 13, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Maurice S. Bush issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief. Respondent filed
a brief in support of the Decision of the Administra-
tive Law Judge and in opposition to the exceptions of
the General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered;' the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm,the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
only to the extent consistent herewith.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent Union, acting as an employer, violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating,
harassing, and- intimidating employee Maureen
Smith and by threatening her with a' reduction in
wages because of her union activity. We agree.
However, we fmd merit in the General Counsel's
exceptions to: (1) the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to fmd that Respondent further violated
Section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating and
intimidating employee Sharon Veazey; (2) his con-
clusion that Respondent's actions in reducing em-
ployee Smith's job duties, while taken for the purpose
of inducing her to resign her employment, were
nevertheless not violative of Section 8(a)(3); (3) his
recommendation that the 8(a)(1) violations he found
did not warrant or necessitate a remedial order; and
(4) his recommended Order dismissing the complaint
herein in its entirety.
Respondent Council is the central governing body
for a number of affiliated local craft unions in and
around Cincinnati, Ohio. Its full-time administrative
head, District Secretary Arthur Galea, has superviso-
ry authority over the business representatives of the
affiliated' local unions and over Respondent's two
3 All dates hereinafter are in 1974, unless otherwise indicated.
s We also note that, contrary- to the Administrative Law Judge's
assertion , the General Counsel's brief to him (and the attached proposed
conclusions of law) clearly allege that Veazey was unlawfully interrogated
218 NLRB No. 116
office employees, Charging Party Maureen Smith
and Sharon Veazey.
1. On February 8, 1974,1 employee Smith execut-
ed a card authorizing Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local 388, AFL-
CIO (hereinafter OPEIU), to represent her for
purposes of collective bargaining. Subsequently, on
February 13, District Secretary Galea received a
letter from OPEIU in which it claimed to represent a
majority of Respondent's office employees and
requested recognition as their collective-bargaining
representative.
Immediately upon receipt of the OPEIU letter,
Galea angrily confronted Smith, in Veazey's pres-
ence. Frequently shouting, he sharply questioned
Smith on why she had joined OPEIU without
confiding in him beforehand and, after she respond-
ed by citing her interest in union fringe benefits,
Galea replied, "If you wanted the two weeks
vacation, then why in the blank didn't you come to
me?" He also asked, "Didn't you know that
everybody has been trying to keep that blankety
blank Union out of here?" Finally, Galea threatened
that he would negotiate with OPEIU for contractual
terms which would reduce Smith's then current
salary. During the course of this same incident,
Galea confronted Veazey and asked her, "Did you
join the Union also?" Veazey responded, truthfully,
that she had not.
As previously set forth, the Administrative Law
Judge found that Galea's interrogation of, and
threats to, Smith were violative of Section 8(a)(1). No
exceptions to these findings were filed and, in
agreement therewith, we find that the record amply
supports them. However, the Administrative Law
Judge dismissed the complaint' s '8(a)(1) allegation
vis-a-vis employee Veazey on the asserted grounds
that there was no evidence of her being coercively
interrogated, she did not testify, and the General
Counsel's brief did not request such a funding. We
disagree.
Uncontradicted record testimony shows that Veaz-
ey was present during Galea's display of anger
toward Smith for seeking union representation and
his threats of reprisal. Further, during the midst of
this confrontation she herself was questioned as to
her possible union membership."In light of these facts
and circumstances, we sustain the complaint's
allegation that Veazey was coercively, interrogated
and intimidated in derogation of her Section 7
rights.2 Accordingly, we find Respondent's conduct
and intimidated, in violation of Sec . 8(axl), in the exercise of her protected
rights under the Act. The General Counsel's brief also, set forth the facts
relating thereto.
786 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with respect to her to be violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
2. As found by the Administrative Law Judge,
and not excepted to, starting about February 23,
Galea embarked on a course of conduct intentionally
designed to reduce Smith's work responsibilities for
the deliberate purpose of causing her to resign her
job. He did this by transferring the bulk of her duties
to Veazey. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law
Judge determined that Galea's actions were not
violative of Section 8(a)(3) because, as found by the
Administrative Law Judge, those actions were not
motivated by an intent to discourage union activities
or punish Smith for engaging in them. Rather, he
found that Galea desired to punish Smith because
she had shown a lack of personal loyalty by siding
with his intraoffice enemies against him. The
Administrative Law Judge further found that the
actions Galea took against Smith were totally
unrelated to her union activity or interests. We
disagree.
In evaluating Galea's motivation, the Administra-
tive Law Judge principally relies on an incident
which occurred on February 23. On that date, during
a conversation with Smith on another subject, Galea
gratuitously voiced bitter criticism of two business
representatives of unions-affiliated with Respondent
Council. He stated that these men were "rotten"
because of certain of their intraunion activities, that
they were "no good," and that they were "trying to
use" employee Smith. Smith replied that the people
Gales was talking about were her friends and would
continue to be so until they proved otherwise. The
Administrative Law Judge characterized Smith's
response as a "fervid defense" of Galea's enemies
which engendered in him the wrath and hostility
which motivated his subsequent actions against her.
It appears from the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision that it is largely on the basis of this incident
that he reached his conclusion that Galea discrimi-
nated against Smith because of her display of lack of
personal loyalty to him by siding with his intraoffice
enemies . We find that the record does not support
the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion.
First, we do not read the credited testimony as
justifying the Administrative Law Judge's characteri-
zation of Smith's behavior as constituting a "fervid
defense" of Galea's enemies. The Administrative
Law Judge fails to give proper weight to the fact that
Smith did not make her one-sentence response until
after Galea had personally involved her by making
the accusation that the "rotten" individuals referred
to were "trying to use" Smith. She did not gratuitous-
ly attempt to defend these persons against her
superior's criticism , but responded only when Galea
connected her to them.
.Secondly, apart from Galea's own remarks on
February 23, cited above, there is no record evidence
whatever that Smith, in fact, ever took sides against
Galea with his intraoffice enemies or that Galea ever
had reasonable grounds for believing that she did.
The testimony of Galea himself does not assert that
Smith was allied with his opponents.
Finally, in analyzing this issue, the Administrative
Law Judge failed to give adequate weight to the
credited testimony of Business Representative Joseph
Rayburn that on March 5 Galea stated that he was
"going to get rid" of Smith, and then commented
that, "They think they got me buffaloed with this
union bit. But, we'll work it out yet." The Adminis-
trative Law Judge interpreted the "they" in the above
quotation as referring to union business representa-
tives hostile to Galea who, in the view of the
Administrative Law Judge, had put Smith "up to
seeking out union representation in order to embar-
rass Galea." However, there is no record evidence
which would indicate that Smith's union activity was
other than self-generated and, accordingly, the
Administrative Law Judge's statement is seen as pure
conjecture lacking evidentiary support.
Moreover, assuming, arguendo, the validity of the
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Galea
did not oppose the unionization of Respondent's
office employees per se, but retaliated against Smith
for' joining a union only because his intraunion
opponents had urged her to do so for their own
ulterior purposes, we would still ford that Galea's
discriminatory actions against Smith were motivated,
at least in part, by his intent to discourage her
membership in OPEIU. Under the circumstances
herein, we regard any ultimate reason lying behind
Galea's opposition to Smith's union activity as being
irrelevant. It is sufficient that he opposed it and then
used discriminatory means to retaliate against her
when she persisted. Accordingly, we fmd that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act when,
through its agent Galea, it discriminatorily modified
the working conditions of employee Smith because of
her union activity and membership.
3. Although, as previously set forth, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge found that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its unlawful interroga-
tion of, and threats against, Charging Party Smith, he
concluded that a remedial order was neither warrant-
ed nor necessary because the chances for repetition
of such unlawful conduct were "virtually nil." In so
fording, he principally relied on his determinations
that: (1) the violations found were isolated; (2)
District Secretary Galea's unlawful actions arose not
from any antipathy toward the unionization of
Respondent's employees, but from anger that his
secretary did not take him into her confidence
OHIO VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 787
beforehand concerning her interest in obtaining
union representation; (3) Galea "has shown peni-
tence for his unlawful conduct" by taking actions to
cooperate with and benefit the OPEIU and its
representation of Respondent's employees; and (4)
Respondent's diminution of employee Smith's job
-responsibilities was partially justified by her conduct
in taking sides with Galea's intraoffice opponents
who used Smith in their infighting against him.
In light of the additional violations of the Act
found herein, supra, the vehemence displayed by
Galea in making his interrogations and threats, and
record evidence which shows that his hostility toward
Smith-based, at least in part, on her union
activity-continued for a substantial period subse-
quent to the unlawful acts of February 13, we cannot
conclude that the unlawful conduct which occurred
in this case was isolated
With regard to Galea's asserted lack of any
generalized antipathy toward unions or toward the
idea of union representation for Respondent's
employees, we find such factor to be irrelevant under
the circumstances herein. For, regardless of any
prounion views which Galea may have held, it was,
in fact, Smith's union activity which triggered his
hostility against her. In our view, when an employer
acts so as to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights
because he is angry at the "disloyalty" or "lack of
confidence" they have thereby shown toward him, it
is a distinction without a difference to state that the
unlawful conduct is significantly mitigated because it
arose from personal pique rather than union animus.
Moreover, we regard the Administrative Law Judge's
inference that the existence of this alleged mitigating
factor makes the chances of future unlawful conduct
"virtually nil" as a non sequitur.
As to the Administrative Law Judge's citation of
the "penitence" assertedly shown by Galea, that
relates to his cooperation with OPEIU in assisting its
attainment of majority status, recognizing it as the
employees' representative, and negotiating a contract
which .provides for a sizeable wage increase which is
of direct benefit to employee Smith. Unlike the
Administrative Law Judge, however, we do not
regard Galea's cooperative attitude toward OPEIU
as significantly negating the impact of his coercive
actions against Respondent's employees. For, the
allegations at issue herein pertain not to alleged
animus by Respondent against that union, but to its
animus against employee Smith for exercising her
right to engage in union activity, and to its coercive
interrogations of both Smith and Veazey.
3 In his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge gave certain gratuitous
admonitions to the Charging Party and made gratuitous comments
pertaining to the asserted unlikeliness of a labor organization consciously
Further, while there is record evidence that Galea
took steps, starting in April, to restore to Smith some,
but not all, of her prior duties, that occurred only
after Smith filed unfair labor practice charges against
Respondent and the OPEIU brought pressures to
bear against Galea to secure such a result. We also
note that the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween Respondent and OPEIU, specifically cited by
the Administrative Law Judge asevidence of Galea's
penitence, was not executed until 2 days prior to the
hearing herein.
Finally, respecting the Administrative Law Judge's
partial justification for Galea's diminution of Smith's
work duties, there is simply no record evidence to
support his assertions that Smith either supported
Galea's opponents or was "used" by them in any
infighting against Galea which may have existed. The
Administrative Law Judge's assumption that this
case involves an intraunion "private vendetta" is
pure surmise and is not based on any credited
testimony that such was the fact.
Accordingly, having rejected the Administrative
Law Judge's recommendation that a remedial order
is not warranted in this case, we shall provide an
order remedying the Respondent's violations of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.3
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, we shall order that it cease
and desist therefrom, take certain affirmative action,
and post the appropriate notice.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We hereby affirm the Administrative Law Judge's
Conclusions of Law, as modified below.
1. Delete the words "one of' from Conclusion of
Law 3.
2. Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law
4:
"4. By discriminatorily modifying the working
conditions of employee Maureen Smith, the Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (aX3) of the
Act "
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent,
permitting invasions of the rights of its own employees under the Act. We
disavow those gratuitous admonitions and comments.
788 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, Cincinnati, Ohio, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees concern-
ing their union affiliations and sentiments.
(b) Threatening employees with a reduction in
wages because of their activity in behalf of a union.
(c) Modifying the working conditions of employees
in order to discourage their membership in a union.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing their employees in the
exercise of any rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) To the extent not previously accomplished,
restore to Maureen Smith her former job duties.
(b) Post at its office in Cincinnati, Ohio, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by it, immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR ,RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act gives employ-
ees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain as a group through a repre-
sentative of their own choosing
To `act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all these things.
We assure all of our employees that:
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with
these rights.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union affiliations and
sentiments.
WE WILL NOT threaten, harass, or intimidate
our employees because of their activities on
behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with a
reduction in wages because of activity on behalf
of the Union.
WE WILL NOT alter the terms and conditions of
employment of employee Maureen J. Smith, or of
any other employee, because she has engaged in
activities on behalf of the Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local 388, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization.
To the extent we have not done so, WE WILL
restore Maureen J. Smith to her former duties.
OHIO VALLEY
CARPENTERS DISTRICT
COUNCIL, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAURICE S. BusH, Administrative Law Judge: The
Respondent, hereafter sometimes called the District
Council or Council, is an association of a number of
affiliated local craft unions, chiefly carpenter unions. The
District Council is the central governing body of its
affiliated unions. The Council and most of its affiliated
locals occupy a suite of offices in downtown Cincinnati,
Ohio.
The Council's full time administrative head is Arthur H.
Galea who holds the title of district secretary, an elective
office to which he succeeded in July 1973. He is responsible
for the supervision and direction of all the business
representatives of the locals affiliated with the District
Council.
The Charging Party, Maureen Smith, and Sharon Veazey
are the Respondent's only office employees. Both work as
secretaries under Galea's direction and supervision. Smith
began her employment with Respondent some 4-1/2 years
ago, long before Galea became Respondent's district
secretary. Veazey, on the other hand, was hired by Galea
some 9 months ago upon Smith's recommendation after
she had screened a number of applicants. She was hired to
look after the overflow of secretarial work.
On February 8, 1974, Smith gave the Office and
Professional Employees International Union, Local 388,
AFL-CIO, a union authorization card.
01110 VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 789
On February 12, 1974, Robert A. Pierce, business
representative of Local 388, sent Galea a letter requesting
recognition of Local 388 as the collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent's office employees, claiming
that Local 388 represented a majority of such office
employees.
The letter reached Galea on February 13. By his own
admission, it momentarily greatly upset him. With the
letter in his hand, Galea angrily confronted Miss Smith
and sharply questioned her on why she joined Local 388
without first confiding in him beforehand. He also asked
Veazey if she had signed a union authorization card.
Nevertheless, on the same day, February 13, Galea
contacted and met with Pierce, Local 388's business agent.
At the meeting Pierce asserted that the Respondent had
three office workers in its employment and stated that he
had authorization cards from two of such employees,
namely, the Charging Party Smith and a Mary Edwards,
and accordingly claimed majority representation. Galea
told Pierce that Respondent had only two office employees
and that Mary Edwards was not one of them as she was an
employee of one of Respondent's affiliated locals. He
therefore told Pierce that he did not have majority
representation. (The truthfulness of Galea's above-stated
representations to Pierce at their meeting of February 13
was established at the hearing herein.)
However, shortly after his meeting with Pierce, Galea got
Veazey to go over to Pierce's office to sign an authorization
card in order to give Pierce's Union the required majority
representation and thus establish a legal basis for the start
of contract negotiations.
On February 28, 1974, Respondent, under Galea's
signature as district secretary, sent Pierce a letter of formal
recognition of his Union "as the collective-bargaining
representative for our office employees."
The subsequent ensuing contract negotiations were
briefly suspended in early April 1974 by Pierce when he
had accusations from the Charging Party Smith that Galea
was curbing her job responsibilities in an attempt to cause
her to resign her job because of her union interests. Upon
the restoration of these duties, the parties reached an
agreement on a collective-bargaining agreement which was
executed on July 8, 1974, effective until March 31, 1975.
The agreement gave both Smith and Veazey a $12.37
weekly wage increase retroactive to April 1, 1974. This was
a second raise for Smith within 12 months. In September
1973, Galea increased Smith's salary by $10 per week.
Under the above skeletonized but undisputed facts, the
issues herein' are: (a) whether Respondent through Galea
coercively interrogated its two office employees, Smith and
Veazey, about their union interests, (b) whether Respon-
dent through Galea threatened Charging Party Smith with
a reduction in wages because of her union activities, and
(d) whether Respondent through Galea has discriminatori-
ly modified Smith's working conditions because of her
union activities and in order to discourage membership in
the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
The complaint herein was issued on May 29, 1974,
pursuant to a charge filed on April 2, 1974, and duly served
upon Respondent. The answer denies the alleged unfair
labor practices.
The case was heard on July 11, 1974, at Cincinnati, Ohio,
on July 11, 1974. The briefs of the parties, received on or
about August 9, 1974, have been carefully reviewed and
considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION FINDINGS ON RESPONDENT UNION AS
AN EMPLOYER
The Respondent is an unincorporated association which
maintains its offices at Cincinnati, Ohio, and has been
organized for the purpose, among others, of bargaining
collectively on behalf of its members in matters of wages,
hours, and other conditions of work. It is a chartered
affiliate of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the
International Union, which maintains its headquarters at
Washington, D.C. In the 12-month period preceding the
issuance of the complaint herein, Respondent transmitted
per capita dues and pension fund fees in excess of $70,000
from its offices in Cincinnati, Ohio, directly to the
International Union's offices at Washington, D.C. The
International Union, during the same 12-month period
prior to the issuance of the complaint, received per capita
dues and pension fund fees in excess of $1 million at its
Washington, D.C., offices from its various local unions
located in the several States of the United States.
Respondent at all times here material has been an
"employer" as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act engaged
in "commerce" and in operations "affecting commerce" as
defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, respectively.'
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION HERE INVOLVED
Office and Professional Employees International Union,
Local 388, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization as defined in
Section 2(5) of the Act.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Interrogations
Galea's interrogation of Maureen Smith, his secretary,
on February 13, 1974, upon his receipt of Local 388's
recognition demand letter, is virtually undisputed. The
letter came to Galea's attention at about 4 o'clock in the
afternoon when he was opening his mail . Without opening
the envelope, he guessed its contents from its return
address. He rushed with the unopened letter to Smith and
asked, "What the - is this?" When she replied that it
looked like a letter, he went back to his office and after
reading the letter, he again rushed to Smith and loudly
demanded, "Did you join this blankety blank union?"
Smith replied that she had signed a union authorization
card for Local 388. Galea then went over to Veazey's desk
and asked her, "Did you join the union also?" When
1 The above findings are based on the complaint and answer as
amended.
790 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Veazey expressed ignorance, Galea, after talking to an
International representative about the letter, again ap-
proached Smith and asked her why she had joined Local
388. She replied that she was interested in the fringe
benefits and the extras that a union might be able to get for
her. Galea told her in effect that if, for example, she had
come to him and asked for 2 extra weeks of vacation, he
would have granted her request.
The above findings are based on the undisputed
testimony of Charging Party Smith. Veazey did not testify.
Galea admits that for a moment or so after he got Local
388's certified return receipt demand letter, he lost his
temper and "wasn't myself." He admits that his conduct
towards Smith in the first minutes after the receipt of the
letter "is probably a violation of the law." However, he
flatly denies that his conduct to Smith was due to any
union hostility on his part.2 He testified that the hostility
he showed to Smith upon receipt of the demand letter was
brought on by the psychological "hurt" he felt that Smith
as his private secretary had not first taken him into her
confidence and told him about her interest in being
represented by a union before she signed a union
authorization card. Galea more graphically describes his
mental state at the time he received Local 388's demand
letter as follows:
And I'd say for about a minute or about a minute and a
half I, you know, I wasn't myself. It sort of shocked me
that my secretary would without [my] knowledge -
well, I would say maybe that's not the right words to
use, but it hurt me somewhat, that they had joined a
union, or wanted to participate in a union, without, you
know, first coming to me; which I would say is
probably a violation of the law. Because I've been an
organizer and a representative for a long time. And I'm
not opposed to organized labor. I don't want anybody
to get me wrong about girls having a shop.
Discussion and Conclusions
The undisputed record as set forth in the above findings
compels the conclusion, as alleged in the complaint, that
Respondent through its agent, Galea, upon receipt of Local
388's demand letter, "coercively interrogated, harassed and
intimidated" one of Respondent's office employees, his
secretary, Maureen J. Smith, because of her interest in
being represented by Local 388 in collective bargaining
with the Respondent. I find and conclude that this conduct
by Galea was an unfair labor practice in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
It is noted, however, that Galea's misconduct was wholly
momentary and was brought on, not by any union animus
per se, but by a quick flash of understandable anger that
Smith, in her close relationship to Galea as his private
secretary, had not seen fit to take him into her confidence
beforehand by telling him that she was thinking of signing
up with an office employee union. The record shows Galea
to be a dedicated veteran career union representative,
organizer, and leader, and that he is a man totally
unopposed to organized labor. I fully credit Galea's
testimony that he has not at any time had any animus
towards having his (Respondent's) office employees organ-
ized. The record shows that after his initial emotional
shock and outburst over the failure of his private secretary
to confide in him, beforehand, of her union interest, Galea
did everything in his power to get an organized shop for his
two office employees, even to the point of getting the then
uncommitted Miss Veazey, the other office employee, to
give the Office Employees Union her union authorization
card so that that Union could then have the required
majority representation necessary to establish a legal basis
for contract negotiations. Thereafter, the two-employee
bargaining unit not only received a contract but also got a
sizeable pay increase, retroactive to April 1, 1974. But all
this cannot change the fact that Galea in his fit of anger
engaged in an open violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by his plain overt coercive interrogation of Smith about her
union interests and activities.
Although the record shows that Galea at the time he was
interrogating Smith also asked Veazey, the only other
secretary in his office, whether she had signed a union
authorization card, there is no evidence that this interroga-
tion was coercive in nature. As shown above, Veazey did
not testify in this proceeding. It is also noted that counsel
for the General Counsel in her brief does not request a
finding that Veazey was coercively interrogated about any
union activities she may have engaged in . Accordingly,
insofar as the complaint alleges that more than one of
Respondent's office employees were unlawfully interrogat-
ed, that portion of the complaint will be dismissed for
failure of proof.
B. The Threat
At the time and in the matrix of his unlawful interroga-
tion of his secretary, Maureen Smith, Galea, in his same fit
of anger over her failure to confide in him about her union
interest, told her, "I will negotiate a contract for you, baby.
I will negotiate a contract for you for $2.00 per hour." 3
Smith's salary at the time of Galea's above remark to her
was $165 per week or slightly more, than $4 an hour for a
40-hour week.
2 Although I credit Smith's testimony that Gates asked her at the time
here under discussion, "Didn't you know that everybody has been trying to
keep that blankety blank Union out of hereT' I find that that does not
reflect Galea's personal attitude about having Respondent's office employ-
ees under a union . Galea's testimony shows that at the time he took office as
Respondent's District Secretary he was cognizant about the feeling of many
of the business agents of Respondent's affiliated locals that office employee
unions for union secretaries were not necessary, but that Galea himself
favored such a union for union office employees (Tr. 143). Nonetheless I
find without further discussion that the question put to Smith by Galea,
"Didn't you know that everybody has been trying to keep that blankety
blank Union out of here?" constituted an unlawful interrogation of Smith
for its obvious coercive effect on her, despite his own personal feelings that
he favored a union for his office employees.
3 The quotation in the above findings is based on the credited testimony
of Charging Party Smith and Dorothy Clark, a secretary for one of
Respondent 's affiliated locals, who overheard Galea make the remark to
Smith. Galea did not directly deny that he made the remark . I do not credit
his indirect denial that he merely told Smith, "Well, I guess we'll have to
start paying you union wages."
OHIO VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 791
Discussion and Conclusions
I find that Galea's statement to Smith that he would
"negotiate a contract for you for $2.00 per hour" was
merely an angry, emotional reaction to Smith's failure to
confide in him about her union interests and was obviously
not meant to be taken literally. I find that Smith, likewise,
never seriously believed that Galea would attempt to
negotiate a $2 per hour wage for her in place of the slightly
more than the $4 per hour she was receiving if the Office
Employees Union came to represent the unit of which she
was part.
Nevertheless, I find that Galea's angry retort to Smith
did convey on its face the threat that he would attempt to
get her existing wages reduced in the anticipated contract
negotiations because of her part in bringing the Union in,
although I am convinced that as a professional business
representative committed to getting the highest wages
possible for union labor, Galea never at any time meant to
carry through with his verbal threat as evidenced by the
fact that in the actual ensuing bargaining negotiations he
agreed to give Smith, as well as Veazey, a handsome wage
increase of $12.37 per week retroactive to April 1, 1974.
But all Smith had to, go on were Galea's actual words and
they clearly spelled out a threat. Accordingly, I find that
Galea's worded threat that he would seek to reduce her
existing wages in contract negotiations because of her
union activities constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
C. Modification of the Charging Party's Job Duties
Prior to Galea's receipt on February 13, 1974, of Local
388's demand letter, Charging Party Maureen Smith had a
pleasant business relationship with Galea as his private
secretary. The relationship is best described in her own
words, "Businesswise, he was very friendly to me. He joked
around with me. He took me out to lunch. He took me
Christmas shopping. You know, just shopping. And it was
just a general good atmosphere."
Smith testified that this good relationship between
herself and Galea began to deteriorate from and immedi-
ately after February 13, 1974, when Galea received the
demand letter. She further testified that commencing after
February 14, 1974, Galea started to take some of her job
duties away from her and transfer them to Veazey, the
other secretary in Respondent's office. Under cross-exami-
nation, she was asked, "But you're saying, commencing
after the 14th, that's when everything started about the
change of these job duties?" Smith replied, "Yes, sir."
However, Smith in an affidavit dated April 9, 1974, some
3 months prior to the trial herein, swore that Galea was
"very nice" to her in the next few days after the receipt of
the demand letter and that he "did not say a word about
the Union."
Her affidavit shows that the deterioration of her
relationship with Galea began on February 23, 1974, and
not earlier as she had testified. On that day, a Saturday, she
was working overtime, typing up the minutes of a meeting
of the Respondent District Council. Galea called her into
his office to check the typed minutes with her. While at his
office, Galea voiced bitter criticism or "bad-mouthing" as
put by Smith, of two business representatives in the office
because they were trying to get a certain union organizer
off the payroll. Smith's affidavit further shows that Galea
told her that these same representatives were "no good"
and that they were also "trying to use, Smith. In her
affidavit Smith states, "I told Galea that the people he was
talking about were my friends. And that until they proved
otherwise to me, they would continue to be my friends."
Galea replied, according to her affidavit, "Well, well see
about that."
That ended the conversation. But Smith's affidavit states,
"From this point forward the relationship between Galea
and I began to deteriorate. Galea very rarely speaks to me,
and in general ignores me."
From the above, I find that Smith's troubles with Galea
began on February 23 as stated in her affidavit, and not
right after February 14, as she testified to herein.
I further find that Smith incurred Galea's wrath and
hostility on February 23, 1974, by her fervid defense as
"my friends" of the two business representatives that Galea
regarded as "rotten" because they were trying to get
another business agent fired.
On March 4 and 5, 1974, Galea also expressed,
separately, to two other union business representatives
under his jurisdiction, resentment against Smith for her
failure to help support efforts, presumably by volunteering
her clerical services, to elect a candidate favored by Galea
and other business agents for election to the United States
House of Representatives which their favored candidate
won, much to their elation. One of these two union
business agents, Joseph Rayburn, said to Galea, "It's good
to be on the winning side for a change." Galea replied,
"Well, I'm going to win again, because I am going to get
rid of her." Although Galea did not expressly identify by
name the "her" he had reference to, Business Agent
Rayburn was pretty certain that Galea was referring to
Maureen Smith. From Rayburn's testimony both under
direct and cross-examination, I find that the "her" Galea
had reference to when he spoke to Rayburn was Charging
Party Smith.
In the same conversation, Galea told Rayburn, "They
think they got me buffaloed with this union bit But we'll
work it out yet." From the record as a whole I find that the
"they" refers to union business agents in Respondent's
headquarters hostile to Galea who had put Maureen Smith
up to seeking out union representation in order to
embarrass Galea.
In his conversation' with the other business representa-
tive, Joseph Bremke, Galea told him, "This little bitch -
little blonde bitch, will not work for Luken [candidate for
U.S. Congressman], but that will be taken'care of in the
future" Although Bremke did not identify by name the
"little blonde bitch" he had reference to, there was no
doubt in Btemke's mind, and I so find, that Galea was
referring to Maureen Smith and that Galea had in mind
discharging her from her job as his secretary.4
Even prior to these early March 1974 statements by
Galea to Business Agents Rayburn and Bremke that he
4 1 base the findings in the above three paragraphs on the credited testimony and sworn statements of the aforementioned Joseph Rayburn
(Continued)
792 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
intended to get rid of Maureen Smith, Galea had embarked
on a course of whittling down her office duties. But this
began, not on February 14, 1974; the day after he received
Local 388's demand letter, but right after February, 23,
1974,- as aforeshown when Galea told Smith that he
thought certain of the business agents under his jurisdic-
tion were "rotten" because they were trying to get another
agent fired and Smith heatedly replied that the business
agents he was "bad-mouthing" were her friends and she
intended to stick by them. The bulk of Smith's job duties
consisted of correspondence, the volume of which was such
that in October 1973 Galea hired Sharon Veazey to'assist
her in overloaded work. But starting the Monday after
February 23, 1974, a Saturday, Galea transferred the bulk
of the correspondence Smith had been doing to Veazey.
Smith's duties were reduced to cutting stencils 'and
voluntarily performing "odd jobs that she hadn't done in
the past" in an effort to keep busy: Coupled with the
reduction of her job duties, Galea began to "ignore"
Smith .5
At or about the same time Galea transferred much of
Smith's correspondence to Veazey, he ordered "Smith to
show Veazey how to do all the payrollitaxes and tax forms,
a job that took about 3 'days a month' to perform. This so
upset Smith that she saw her family, doctor the next day
who told her that' she was suffering from nervous
exhaustion and recommended that 'she take a week off to
recuperate. In early April 1974 Smith complained to
Business Agent- Pierce of Local 388 that Galea had
changed her job duties. Pierce took the matter up with
Galea, telling him that there was no use having any further
contract negotiation meetings unless Galea agreed to
refrain from reducing Smith's job duties. Galea agreed to
do so.
Discussion and Conclusions
I fmd and conclude from the above evidentiary findings
and the record as a whole that Galea as Respondent's
agent intentionally reduced Charging Party Maureen
Smith's work responsibilities and changed his attitude
towards her from one of friendliness to coldness for the
deliberate purpose of causing her to resign her job.
However, such acts of conduct by an employer towards an
employee do not constitute unfair labor practices under the
Act unless motivated by an intent to discourage union
activity or to punish an employee for engagipg in union
activity.
There is no evidence of such an unlawful motivation or
intent in the present case. The record is clear from Smith's
own affidavit that after Galea's initial outburst of February
13, 1974, over Local 388's demand letter, he treated Smith
from February 14 to February 23, 1974, with the same
courtesy and friendliness he had always treated her,
notwithstanding the fact that she had signed a union
authorization without first confiding in him as his private
secretary her union interests. -
Moreover, Smith's affidavit further shows that it was not
until after her quarrel with Galea on February 23, 1974,
over' his 'bad-mouthing" two union business representa-
tives whom she regarded as her true friends and he
regarded as enemies that her relationship with Galea
"began to deteriorate rapidly:' The record further shows
that it was not until after this quarrel by Smith with Galea
that he began to transfer much of the correspondence she
had been doing to Sharon Veazey.
The evidence thus shows that Charging Party Smith ran
into trouble with Galea, not immediately after Galea's
receipt of Local 388's demand letter February 13, 1974, as
she testified, but after February 23, 1974, as shown in her
affidavit, when she committed, for a private secretary, the
cardinal transgression of siding with Galea's intraoffice
dissidents against her boss. Prior to her taking sides with
Galea's political enemies, Galea had been"very pleasant to
Smith, notwithstanding her union activities according to
her own pretrial affidavit when the events were much
clearer in her mind than at the time of the trial herein. In
that interval between February 13 and 23, Galea had gone
out of his way to help Local 388, the -office employees
union, to get majority representation status by inducing his
secretary, Sharon Veazey, to ' give Local 388 her union
authorization card.
From the record as a whole I fmd and conclude that
Galea after February 23, 1974, began to modify and
transfer some of her job duties solely because of her
display of lack of personal loyalty to him as his private
secretary by siding with his in`traoffice enemies against him
and also because she had refused to assist efforts to elect a
Congressional candidate favored by Galea and many of his
associates.
Accordingly I fmd and conclude that Respondent is not
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by reason of its
modification of Charging Party Smith's working conditions
because the reasons for the modification'' were totally
unrelated, to Smith's union activities aid interests. I,
therefore, recommend that the allegations in the complaint
of an 8(aX3) violation by reason of an alleged discrimina-
tory modification of Smith's working conditions be
dismissed for failure of proof.
Upon ; the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I Brake the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Ohio Valley Carpenters District Coun-
cil, affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America , AFL!-CI0; is an Employer within
the meaning of Section 2(2); vn$8 .ged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6), and activities affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (7), of the Act.
2. The above-named Respondent and the Office and
Professional Employees International Union , Local 388,
AFL-CIQ, are labor organizations within the meaning of
Sectiop 2(5) of the Act.
and Joseph Bremke, business representatives of locals affiliated with to the two union representatives is not credited.
Respondent who worked under Galea's direction . Galea did not elegy the 5 Gales. denies that he transferred most of Smith's correspondence to
statements attributed to him as shown above by the two business agents. Veazey and denies that he began to ignore Smith . I do not credit these
Galea's testimony that he did not recall malpng the statements in question denials. I
OHIO VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COL CIS, 793
3. By interfering with ,) restraining , and coercing one of
its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Respondent is not in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act as alleged in the complaint.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It was found above that the Respondent through its
agent Galea has engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by his unlawful
interrogation of Charging Party Maureen Smith and by his
threat to seek to reduce her existing wages in the
anticipated forthcoming contract negotiations with the
Union representing the Charging Party. While I would
normally recommend an order requiring Respondent to
cease and desist from such conduct and to require
Respondent to take certain affirmative action and to post
appropriate notices , I am convinced that under the
peculiar circumstances of this case no such order is
warranted or necessary.
I have come to this conclusion for a number of reasons.
Primary among these is that the chances for a repetition of
the unlawful conduct found above is virtually nil. It is
wholly unlikely that Respondent, a highly respected labor
organization dedicated to the interests of organized labor,
would consciously permit any invasions of the rights of its
own employees under the Act. The unlawful interrogation
and threat here found were isolated events that occurred
within the span of no more than 5 minutes of a single day.
As shown in the findings above, the overt unlawful
conduct did not stem from any antipathy to having
Respondent's office employees represented by a union, but
arose from a momentary flash of anger by Respondent's
agent Galea that his private secretary, the Charging Party,
with whom he had pleasant relationships had not taken
him in her confidence beforehand about her interest in
being represented by a union. Galea has shown penitence
for his unlawful conduct and has done everything in his
power to undo his momentary misconduct. He made it
possible for the Office Employees Union to attain majority
representation status by getting his other secretary , Sharon
Veazey, to give her union authorization card to that Union.
He effected a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Office Employees Union in behalf of the Respondent. In
that contract he agreed to a sizeable wage increase of
$12.37 per week for both Charging Party Smith and Sharon
Veazey . Moreover, he agreed to make that wage increase
retroactive to April 1, 1974, which was scarcely a month
after contract negotiations started . During the course of his
contract negotiations with the Office Employees Union
Galea revoked the modification of Charging Party Smith's
working conditions and restored to her her former working
conditions and job responsibilities although the modifica-
tion had not been without some justification as it had been
caused by the lack of confidence Smith had brought on
herself by taking sides with his intraoffice political
opponents against him. Charging Party Smith, now fully
protected by the collective-bargaining agreement, has no
need for an order herein and such an order under these
circumstances would be redundant. Moreover, the record
supports the inference that Galea's political opponents in
the offices shared by Respondent and its affiliated locals
have used Charging Party Smith in their infighting against
Galea. It is not the purpose of The Act to serve private
vendettas.
With the termination of this proceeding, I anticipate that
Charging Party Maureen Smith , an intelligent woman, will
reciprocate the efforts Galea has been making for many
months to restore the atmosphere of friendship that once
existed between the two.
For the above reasons I believe that a remedial order
herein is unwarranted and unnecessary. Cf. The Dow
Chemical Company, 212 NLRB 333 (1974).
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]