Ohio Power Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 12, 1975

216 N.L.R.B. 987 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

OHIO POWER COMPANY 987
Ohio Power Company and Utility Workers Union of
America AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-8333
March 12, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On September 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Charles W. Schneider issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging
Party filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Ohio Power Company, Canton,
Ohio, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in said recommended
Order.
Act. Service of the charges, the complaint, and the notice
of hearing were duly made on the Respondent. On June 13,
1974, the Respondent duly filed its answer in which it
admitted certain allegations of the complaint, but denied
the allegations of unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held before me in
Canton, Ohio, on July 23, 1974. All parties were represent-
ed, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
introduce and to meet material evidence , to present oral
argument, and to file briefs. A brief was filed by the Union
on August 26, 1974, and by the Respondent on August 27,
1974.
Upon consideration of the record and the briefs, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is now, and has been at all tunes
material herein, an Ohio corporation, with its principal
office and place of business located in Canton, Ohio, where
it is engaged in the business of producing, generating,
transmitting, and furnishing electric power to residential
and commercial consumers . Annually, in the course and
conduct of its business, Respondent receives goods and
services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
located outside the State of Ohio. Respondent receives
gross revenues in excess of $500,000 per annum.
The Respondent maintains administrative units known
as Division 2 (Canton and Coshocton Area), Division 4
(Zanesville), Division 7 (Tiffin), Division 9 (Lima), which
administrative units are the only facilities of the Respon-
dent involved herein.
The Respondent is now, and has been at all times
material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
, Member Jenkins does not subscribe to, or find it necessary to rely on
that part of the Administrative Law Judge 's discussion related to , Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971), or its progeny , in affirming the
decision by the Administrative Law Judge.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHARLES W. SCHNEIDER , Administrative Law Judge: On
April 25, 1974, Utility Workers • Union of America,
AFL-CIO, the Charging Party, filed a charge, and on June
4, 1974, an amended charge , against Ohio Power Compa-
ny, the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151,
et. seq., by refusing to provide Locals 111 and 116 of the
Charging Party with information relevant to their perform-
ance as bargaining agents of the Respondent 's employees.
On June 6, 1974, the Acting Regional Director of the
Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing upon the
charges, asserting that the Respondent's action constituted
unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the
I The specific composition of the units, which is stated in the complaint
and admitted in the answer , need not be detailed here.
IT. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Utility Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, and its
Local Unions 111 and 116 are, and at all times material
herein have been, labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent is a public utility. At all material times
Local Ill of the Utility Workers Union has been the
collective-bargaining representative, pursuant to certifica-
tion by the Board and by contract, of employees of the
Respondent in Division 7 (Tiffin) and Division 9 (Lima),
an appropriate bargaining unit. At all material times Local
116 of the Utility Workers Union has similarly been the
collective-bargaining representative of employees of the
Respondent in Division 2 (Canton and Coshocton Area)
and Division 4 (Zanesville), also an appropriate bargaining
unit.'
Commencing on July 1, 1973, economic strikes occurred
216 NLRB No. 177
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the two bargaining units over contract negotiations.
Local 111 ended its strike on December 9, 1973, and signed
a new labor contract, effective January 28, 1974, through
June 30, 1975. Local 116 ended its strike on December 14,
1973, and signed a new labor contract effective December
14, 1973, to June 30, 1975.
During the strike a number of striking employees in the
appropriate units were replaced by the Respondent.
At the end of the strike the unions asked that all strikers
be reinstated to their positions. The Respondent replied
that it could not do that as to strikers whose positions were
occupied by replacements, but said that it would offer
them other vacancies for which they were qualified. As to
those for whom there were no such positions, the
Respondent said that it would put them on a preferential
hiring list. This was in accordance with the Respondent's
understanding of its obligations under the, law to replaced
strikers. (See N.LR.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389
U.S. 375 (1967)). Those replaced strikers who accepted
other positions with the Respondent were known as
displaced employees. Those for whom there were no
positions were known as replaced employees.
The preferential hiring lists were then established. The
lists were explained to and discussed with the unions prior
to their promulgation and prior to signing the contracts,
and presumably had the understanding, acquiescence, and
agreement of the unions. However, the provisions were not
included in the contracts or reduced to writing as an
agreement or understanding between the Respondent and
the Unions.
For a number of years, with the apparent acquiescence
of the locals, the Respondent has, in accordance with the
exigencies of operating requirements, subcontracted to
private contractors from time to time the performance of
work normally performed by line or maintenance workers
within the appropriate units - without prejudice to the
employment of employees then within the units.
Each of the bargaining contracts contains a provision to
the effect that the Respondent will neither lay off nor
discharge any employee covered by the contract due to
work being contracted for with outside parties.2 This
provision, in the same or substantially similar form, has
been in the contracts for many years.
The Respondent's uncontested and accepted evidence is
that it has never laid off or discharged any employee in the
appropriate units, in the sense of removing him from the
job, due to contracting.
As more specifically set out hereinafter, beginning in
February 1974 grievances were filed by employees on the
preferential hiring lists asserting that the Respondent's
failure to reinstate them constituted a violation of the
subcontracting provisions of the contracts. The locals then
made separate written requests to the Respondent to
provide them with information as to the extent of
subcontracting in their units. The Respondent denied the
requests as irrelevant, for the stated reason that no
2 Art. 5.5 of the Local 116 contract; art. 16.1 of the Local I 1 I contract.
The text of art. 16.1 is: "The Company agrees that during the life of this
contract it will neither lay off nor discharge any employee covered by this
agreement due to work being contracted for with outside parties." The
language of art. 5.5 is substantially the same.
3 1 find no authorizations for two employees on the Tiffin Division hiring
employees had been "placed on layoff or discharged
because of work being done by contractors."
The issue here is the legality of the Respondent's action
in denying those requests for information. Concurrently
the Respondent declined to consider the grievances filed
on behalf of employees on the preferential hiring lists
based on the subcontracting provisions of the contracts,
contending that they were not proper subjects of grievance
procedure. Union attempts to submit the issue to arbitra-
tion, provided by the contracts as the terminal point in the
grievance procedure, were rejected by the Respondent, as
not involving "a grievance under the contract" and thus
not an "arbitrable matter."
The events, beginning with the establishment of the
hiring lists, is best stated in chronological fashion, as
summarized below.
B. Chronology
December 10, 1973: The list of preferential hirees in the
Local 111 unit is established. It contained 15 names. By
July 17, 1974, shortly before the hearing, the Local Ill list
had been reduced by reinstatement, acceptance of other
employment, or other reason, to seven names.
December 24, 1973: The list of preferential hirees in the
Local 116 unit is established. It contained 21 names. By
July 22, 1974, the list had been reduced to nine names.
February 6, 13, 1974: Thirteen of the employees in Local
Ill's unit (nine from the Tiffin Division and four from the
Lima Division), who were on the December 10, 1973,
preferential hiring list, signed and authorized a grievance
stating as follows:
We the (attached) employees state that the Company
has violated Article 16 page 34, and any other related
Articles by the Company's unfair action of not
returning us to our original Positions with all rights and
privileges.
In settlement of this grievance we request that the
Company return us to our original Positions with all
rights and privileges and backpay to December 10,
1973.3
February 10, 1974: Gene A. Potter, national representa-
tive of the Utility Workers Union, sent a letter to the
Respondent requesting information as to subcontracting in
the Tiffin and Lima Divisions. Insofar as pertinent this
letter stated the following:
In order to properly perform and police our
Agreement between Ohio Power Company, Division 7
Tiffin, Division 8,4 and Division 9 Lima - and
particularly its Article 16, we will need disclosure on
the various contractors which the Company employs.
1. We will need the name of each individual
contractor engaged in Physical, Operating or
Trades work, or work, which in the absence of
list: B . M. Fouts and L. J. Stanton . In the Lima Division one of the
grievants was Kent Zimmerly . I do not find Zimmerly 's name on the
December 10, 1973, pteferential hiring list in the Lima Division.
+ Division 8 has been absorbed into the other divisions (art. 1.1 of the
current Local I I 1 agreement).
OHIO POWER COMPANY
such contractor , the bargaining unit employees
would perform.
2. We will need to know the nature and
location of work , the expected length of the stay
or tenure of the contractor and his expected date
of completion.
3. We have to know the contractor's work
week , i.e. the amount of hours which his men
work.
4. We need to know whether it is a "bid" or
"time and material plus" job and if it is a bid, the
nature of the bid , e.g. "out-and-out flat money"
or "unit bid" or "footage."
5. We could discuss with you overall costs.
February 15-20, 1974: The Respondent , in a series of
letters to Local 111 , refused to consider the February 6
grievance . Each letter, so far as pertinent , stated:
Please be advised we do not consider that this
request involves a proper grievance under the contract
dated January 28, 1974, and therefore is not subject to
the provisions of that contract.
The question over the placement of the returning
employees was discussed before the contract was
signed and you were informed this was the procedure
that would be followed . With your agreement on this
issue, the contract was signed and the Company
returned the employees in accordance with the outlined
procedure.
February 23 and 27, 1974: The bargaining committee of
Local 111 wrote letters to Lima Division Manager Springer
and Tiffin Division Manager Eley, stating that the
responses to the February 6 grievances did not meet with
their approval , and requesting a conference to adjust the
grievances.
February 28 and March 6, 1974: Division Managers
Springer and Eley, in letters to Local 111, rejected the
requests for conference . Springer's letter, and Eley's in
language to the same effect, said in part:
... we do not consider that this request involves a
proper grievance under the contract dated Jan. 28,
1974, and therefore not subject to provisions of that
contract.
March 7, 1974: L. P. Scales, the Respondent's personnel
director, in reply to National Representative Potter's letter
of February 10, 1974 , requesting information as to
contractors , declined Potter 's request . Scales' letter said in
pertinent part:
Though Article 16 has many sections, the only
section that refers to contractors is 16.1, so we presume
you refer to that section.
5 Presumably referring to art. 5.5 of that contract, quoted supra. The
phrase "laid off" refers to two employees from the Coshocton area on the
preferential hiring list.
6 The Respondent's brief states that there is no dispute that these
989
In Local 111, there has been no employee placed on
layoff or discharged because of work being done by
contractors. That being the case, your request has no
relevancy to 16.1. We know of no other section of the
contract which concerns contracting out.
In view of the above, we choose not to comply with
your request.
March 6 and 9, 1974: The bargaining committee of Local
111 wrote to M. E. Rice, the Respondent's labor relations
supervisor, stating that it was not satisfied with the answers
of Division Managers Springer and Eley, and that it wished
to meet with Rice concerning the grievances.
March 11, 1974: Richard L. Borden, shop committeeman
in the Local 116 unit filed a grievance on behalf of two
employees "laid off" in the Coshocton area. In the
grievance Borden alleged that the presence of Hoosier
Construction Company employees on company property
in the area was in violation of article 5 of Local 116's
contract .5
March 15, 1974: Rice, in written reply to Local 111's
bargaining committee's letters of March 6 and 9, rejected
the request for a meeting. To the extent pertinent, Rice's
reply was identical in language with the Respondent's
letters of February 15-20, quoted above.
March 20, 1974: Local 111 by letter advised Labor
Relations Supervisor Rice that it was submitting the Local
111 grievances for arbitration under the contract. In
pertinent part the letter stated the following:
This letter is to inform you that Grievances L 74-1,
L 74-2, T 74-1, and T 74-2 concerning the replaced and
displaced people is being submitted for arbitration
under Article 17.2.1 of the bargaining agreement.
March 25, 1974: Labor Relations Supervisor Rice by
letter replied to Local 111's March 20 letter as follows:
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of
March 20, 1974. As we informed you by letter dated
March 15 , 1974, we do not consider this matter a
grievance under the contract dated January 18, [sic]
1974. Since this is not a grievance under the Grievance
Procedure, we do not consider it an arbitrable matter.
April 9, 1974: Sixteen members of Local 116 employed in
the Canton Division signed a grievance stating the
following:
The above men were grieved under Articles 2 (sec.
2.1 & 2.3), 3, and 5 (sec . 5.5) and any other article or
law pertaining to this grievance. This grievance pertains
to contractors performing work at the East Wooster
substation while there are substation and other employ-
ees laid off. We want this stopped and all work by
contractors until all employees are back to work.6
grievants were replaced sinkers on the preferential hiring list . However, I do
not find any of their names on that list. Labor Relations Supervisor Rice
and Carl Householder, president of Local 116 , testified that the signatories
to this grievance (with one exception) were unreplaced sinkers who were
(Continued)
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 2.1 of the Local 116 contract is the recognition
clause in which the Respondent recognized the union as
the bargaining agent in the appropriate unit . In Section 2.3
the Respondent agreed not to discriminate against , coerce
or intimidate union members . The Union , in turn, agreed
not to solicit membership or collect dues among employees
on duty or to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
to influence them to be members of the Union . Article 3 is
a management rights clause subject to the grievance
procedure . It contains a proviso against use of manage-
ment rights for the purpose of discriminating against union
members.
April 16, 1974: Union National Representative Potter
sent a letter to the Respondent asking for information with
respect to contracting in the Local 116 unit . Insofar as
pertinent, the April 16 letter is identical in language with
Potter's letter of February 10, 1974 , to the Respondent
(quoted above) requesting contracting information as to
the Local 111 unit and contract.
May 2, 1974: Labor Relations Supervisor Rice replied by
letter to Potter 's April 16 request for information. Rice
rejected the request . To the extent pertinent , the language
of Rice 's letter is identical with that in Personnel Director
Scales' March 7 letter, quoted above, refusing Potter's
request of February 10.
At some undisclosed date after the filing of the March 11
Borden grievance and the April 9 grievance in the Local
116 unit, and in some undisclosed manner, the Respondent
refused to accept both those grievances , as it had those of
Local 111 , and on the same grounds.?
C. Contentions
The General Counsel contends that the Union had a
good-faith belief that the Respondent was expanding the
use of subcontracting within the appropriate unit and that
this belief is supported by observations of union agents.
Both Unions , the General Counsel says , have filed
grievances which the Respondent refuses to recognize.
Thus, the General Counsel states, contract procedures have
been exhausted , the Unions need the information in order
to determine the merit of the grievances, and the Unions
cannot secure the information themselves for geographical
reinstated to their former classifications at the end of the strike . I conclude
that the statement in the Respondent's brief is inadvertent.
However, I do not regard the fact as of significant bearing on the issues.
r The record also contains evidence of a grievance filed by one James
Linthicum on April 22, 1974.
Lin cum, a replaced striker from the Canton area who had accepted
employment at Wooster, filed a grievance stating that he was being
discriminated against by being kept in Wooster , after the person who had
displaced him at his home area had allegedly left the Respondent 's employ.
In May and June 1974 Linthicum 's grievance was processed through the
second and third stage of the grievance procedure provided by the Local
116 contract, and rejected by the Respondent at each step on the ground
that the Respondent had "not seen fit to open any job in the Canton area"
since Linthicum's employment in Wooster . L nthicum was assured that if
such a job opened up he would have "every right to bid on it."
Under date of June 12, 1974, Local 116 requested a meeting with the
Respondent's executive vice president , as provided in step 4 of the
contractual grievance procedure (art. 17 . 1.4) concerning Linthicum's
grievance . The record contains no evidence as to the disposition of that
request.
The relevance of the Lmthicum incident to the issues here is not apparent
or explained . Unlike the other grievances , the Respondent accepted
Linthicum's and processed it through the first several steps of the grievance
reasons and because of the nature of the work. The
connection of the requested information to the contract is
as to whether the unit is being eroded and the effect on
promotions. Thus, the General Counsel states, the informa-
tion is relevant to the Unions' obligation to police the
contract and relevant to grievances which are on file. The
merit of the grievances are not in issue here, the General
Counsel says: the Unions' position is not patently frivolous
and involves substantial questions of law related to the
production of information as to employment conditions
and relationships vis-a-vis the appropriate units, and of
interpretation of the collective-bargaining contracts.
The Charging Party's position is essentially the same as
the General Counsel's, with the exception that the
Charging Party states that the final item in the requests for
information, No. 5, relating to overall costs, was not "a
demand," or "an imperative," but was merely "mentioned
as a 'discussion' " (Charging Party brief). I infer from this
statement that the Charging Party's requests for informa-
tion are not to be interpreted as including information as
to the costs of subcontracting. There is therefore no
occasion to determine the relevance or securability of such
information here. Cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 173
NLRB 172 (1968).8
The Charging Party specifically asserts that the term
"layoff" in the clauses of the collective-bargaining con-
tracts relating to contracting is synonymous with "perma-
nently replaced," insofar as job recall and protection are
concerned.
The Respondent's contentions: The Respondent denies
that it is obligated to furnish the requested material. Its
stated reasons are that (1) neither the requests nor any
related communications from the Unions prior to the
hearing tied in the information requested to any pending
grievance or dispute, (2) no relevance has been shown to
any provision of the contract, (3) the information is not
related to the contracting clauses of the contracts, because
no employees had been laid off or discharged due to
contracting, and (4) finally, that the Respondent could not
reasonably be expected to connect the requests and the
grievances.9
procedure . The record contains no indication that during the processing of
Linducu m's grievance the Union specifically asked for contracting
information bearing on his complaint . Indeed, there is no suggestion in the
record that the Union made any reference to the contracting problem
during the processing of Linthicum 's grievance . The record will thus not
support a finding that the Respondent either refused to process Linthicum's
grievance or refused a specific request for information respecting it.
In these circumstances I find nothing in the Linthicum incident of
significant bearing on the issues here.
Linthicum also signed the April 9 grievance.
a In view of this position of the Charging Party, it is unnecessary to
consider the testimony of William A. Black, vice president of the
Respondent involved in subcontracting determinations , to the effect that in
deciding whether to subcontract , the Respondent does not consider the
relative cost of subcontracting as compared to the cost of having projects
done by unit employees.
9 At the hearing the Respondent unsuccessfully objected to the
introduction of testimony by union officials relating to their reasons for the
requests for information , namely, relating the requests to the grievances
previously filed. The Respondent's ground, in substance , is that the
sufficiency of the requests must be determined from the communications
themselves . This objection was overruled . The adequacy of the requests to
apprise the Respondent of the relevancy of the information must be judged
OHIO POWER COMPANY 991
Conclusions
There is a general obligation on an employer to provide
information needed by the bargaining representative for
the proper performance of its duties . This duty extends
beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to
labor-management relations during the term of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement . N.LR.B. v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432, (1967). As the Court there said at
435-436:
duty for provide it. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
173 NLRB 172 (1968).11
It is not required that there be grievances or that the
information be such as would clearly dispose of them. The
union is entitled to the information in order to determine
whether it should exercise its representative function in the
pending matter, that is, whether the information will
warrant further processing of the grievance or bargaining
about the disputed matter. As the Supreme Court said in
Acme Industrial at 438:
There can be no question of the general obligation of
an employer to provide information that is needed by
the bargaining representative for the proper perform-
ance of its duties . N.LR.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149. Similarly, the duty to bargain unquestionably
extends beyond the period of contract negotiations and
applies to labor-management relations during the term
of an agreement . N. L R. B: v. C. & C. Plywood Corp.,
ante, p. 421; N.LR.B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S.
938.
The obligation is one created by the National Labor
Relations Act, and not by agreement between employer
and- union.10 However , its exercise may be affected by the
provisions of collective-bargaining agreements . The test of
relevancy is similar to that in discovery: "the probability
that the desired information [is] relevant , and that it would
be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties
and responsibilities ." Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437.
Where the information sought covers the terms and
conditions of employment within the bargaining unit, thus
involving the core of the employer-employee relationship,
the standard of relevance is very broad, and no specific
showing is normally required ; but where the request is for
information with respect to matters occurring outside the
unit, the standard is somewhat narrower (as where the
precipitating issue or conduct is the subcontracting of work
performable by employees within the appropriate unit) and
relevance is required to be somewhat more precise. See
Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. N.LR.B., 347 F.2d 61 (C.A.
3, 1965). The obligation is not unlimited . Thus where the
information is plainly irrelevant to any dispute there is no
in the light of the entire pattern of facts available to the Respondent. In
addition , the Unions' purposes in seeking the information are relevant to a
determination of the legitimacy of the requests . Finally, the Respondent was
apprised at the hearing of those purposes . The requests for information are
still outstanding . The Respondent's continuing failure to accede to them can
thus no longer be attributed to inadequacy of the communications.
10 As the court of appeals said in the case of The Timken Roller Bearing
Co. V. N.LR.B., 325 F.2d 746,751 (C.A. 6, 1963):
We agree with the Board that the Union's right to wage information it
needed to administer the bargaining agreement was a right which it had
under Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, Section 158(d),
Title 29 United States Code , and the existence of this right was not
dependent upon it being included in the bargaining agreement. It was
not a right obtained by contract . . . . The failure to have the right
recognized by the Company in the bargaining agreement, which would
probably eliminate the necessity of possible litigation over it later, does
not mean that it does not exist by virtue of the statute.
Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance
procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious
claims . For if all claims originally initiated as griev-
ances had to be processed through to arbitration, the
system would be woefully overburdened. Yet, that is
precisely what the respondent's restrictive view would
require . It would force the union to take a grievance all
the way through to arbitration without providing the
opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim... .
nothing in Federal Labor Law requires such a result.
In that case the Court further said, quoting Fafnir Bearing
Co., 362 F.2d 716, 721 (C.A. 2, 1968):
By preventing the Union from conducting these studies
[for an intelligent appraisal of its right to grieve], the
Company was, in essence , requiring it to play a game of
blind man's bluff.
In summary, as the Respondent suggests in its brief, the
results of the decided cases have been mixed, but the basic
principle remained quite consistent: a bargaining repre-
sentative is entitled to information relevant to the perform-
ance of its obligations as such representative. The
differences in results in the decided cases reflect, not
difference over the applicable principle, but rather judg-
ment as to the relevancy of the requested information to
the performance of the representative obligation in the
specific situation.12
As will be seen, the bargaining representative has a
correlative obligation to exert reasonable effort to secure
information relevant to and necessary for the performance
of its function.
The issues here are thus (1) whether the information
... we find no error in characterizing it as a statutory right.
11 In the Southwestern Bell Telephone case the union made a demand for
a variety of information concerning subcontracting of unit work, including
a request for information as to the costs of the contracting. The employer
voluntarily supplied the bulk of the material, but declined to provide
information as to costs , accompanying his declination with the statement
that costs were not a factor in the subcontracting. The Board consequently
held that since the information had no relevance to the dispute, there was no
obligation to supply it.
12 For illustrative cases, in addition to those cited above , see: Northwest
Publications Inc., 211 NLRB 464 (1974); Trustees of Boston University, 210
NLRB 330 (1974); Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 NLRB 964(1973); General
Electric Company, 199 NLRB 286 (1972); Herk Elevator Maintenance, Inc.,
197 NLRB 96 (1972); Ohio Medical Products, 194 NLRB 1 (1971); United
Aircraft Corporation, 192 NLRB 382, 423 (1971); Vertol Division, Boeing
Company, 182 NLRB 421 (1970); Gulf States Asphalt Company, 178 NLRB
405 (1969); Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 173 NLRB 172 (1968);
King Radio Corporation, Inc., 172 NLRB 1051 (1968); The American Oil
Company, 164 NLRB 29 (1967); Hughes Tool Company, 100 NLRB 208
(1952).
992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
requested is relevant to the performance of the unions'
representative obligations , and (2) if so, whether the
relationship between the two was sufficiently clear as to
impose a duty on the Respondent to comply with the
requests.
The Relevance of the Information
The unions' obligations to the employees as bargaining
representatives stem directly from two independent
sources : the first from the statute and the second from the
collective-bargaining contracts . The direct statutory obli-
gation flows from the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court
in Fleetwood Trailer Co. In that case the Supreme Court
held, in sum, that an employee who is on strike retains his
status as an employee until he has obtained other regular
and substantially equivalent employment , even though his
position has been validly and permanently filled by a
replacement hired during the strike . Once the striker
terminates the strike and offers to return to work he is
entitled to employment whenever a job becomes available
for which he is qualified , unless the employer can show
legitimate and substantial business justifications for not
offering him the position. That there may be no such jobs
available at the time of the request for reinstatement is not
controlling . The striker is entitled to an offer of reinstate-
ment when such a vacancy occurs . See also The Laidlaw
Corporation, 414 F.2d 99 (C.A. 7, 1969). In the instant case
the Respondent has recognized this obligation. The
preferential hiring lists here were established by the
Respondent in order to comply with the Fleetwood Trailer
decision . As the bargaining representative of the employees
on the preferential lists, the unions are obligated to police
the performance of the Respondent in that regard and to
protect the rights of the strikers to reemployment in
accordance with the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court. The unions are therefore entitled to information in
the possession of the Respondent as to practices by the
Respondent concerning work performable in the appropri-
ate units, where the practices might conceivably affect the
strikers' possibilities of employment within the appropriate
unit.
In addition, as the employees ' surrogate, the unions are
obliged to police the Respondent 's actions to assure that
employment opportunities, including promotional oppor-
tunities , within the appropriate units are not foreshortened
or curtailed by actions of the Respondent. Thus, however
legitimate the Respondent 's motives, it is conceivable that
the subcontracting of work performable within the unit
might constrict the possibilities of employment within the
unit, including the possibilities of promotion of unit
employees . As the Board said in Northwest Publications,
supra: "All possible ways in which the information may
become important cannot be foreseen in advance of
negotiations . A real probability feared by the Union is
encroachment on bargaining unit work ." The unions'
obligations in this regard , also, are thus duties flowing
directly from the statute and not initially founded in the
contract.
The third manner in which the unions are obligated is to
police and administer the contract . Unlike the others, this
obligation flows directly from agreement . The scope of the
obligation therefore is measured by the language of the
contract . Here there is disagreement between the parties as
to the extent of the Respondent's commitments under the
contract.
Insofar as the unions ' performance of their obligations in
the first two instances are concerned , namely, to police the
enforcement of employee rights under the principle of
Fleetwood Trailer, and their general obligations as bargain-
ing representatives to preserve employment standards and
opportunities within the collective -bargaining units are
concerned, I find that the information requested by the
Charging Party was relevant and essential to the discharge
of those duties. Whether specific notice of that intent or
purpose was required to constitute an adequate request by
the unions , and if so to what extent , and whether the
requirements were met here , are questions discussed at a
later point . Suffice to say now that the information
requested was relevant and essential to the performance of
the unions' representative obligations and was thus
securable upon proper request.
The next question is whether the requested information
was relevant for purposes of administration of the
bargaining contracts.
A representative union has legal obligations to the
employees it represents to do so fairly and with due
diligence and care.
For breach of its obligations in that regard a bargaining
representative may be guilty of unfair labor practices
(Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181, enforcement denied
326 F.2d 172 (C.A. 2, 1963)), liable in a suit for damages
(Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)), subject to injunction
(Steele v . LAN RR, 323 U .S. 192 (1944)), or have its
certification as representative revoked (Hughes Tool Com-
pany, 104 NLRB 318 (1953)).
As the Supreme Court said in Vaca v. Sipes:
In administering the grievance and arbitration
machinery as statutory agent of the employees , a union
must, in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner,
make decisions as to the merits of particular grievances.
[Citing .cases] In a case such as this, when Owens [the
grievant] supplied the Union with medical evidence
supporting his position , the Union might well have
breached its duty had it ignored Owens' complaint or
had it processed the grievance in a perfunctory manner.
While the representative is invested with a substantial
amount of discretion in seeking in good faith to accommo-
date conflicting interests within the appropriate unit and to
determine whether particular grievances warrant attention
(Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)),
that discretion is not unbridled . A union must therefore, as
the quoted language from Vaca suggests , exercise a
reasonable amount of due care in determining its position
with respect to particular grievances . As a minimum that
standard of care would seem to include reasonable effort
to secure information relevant to the grievance.
The Respondent's position, as we have seen, is that
neither the grievances nor the request for information
relate to any relevant and applicable portion of the
contract. Thus the Respondent points out that the
Charging Party's letters requesting the information stated
OHIO POWER COMPANY
that the information was needed "to properly perform and
police our agreement," in the application of the contract
clauses binding the Respondent not to lay off or discharge
employees covered by the agreement due to contracting
with outside parties. (Art. 16.1 of the contract with Local
111 and art. 5.5 of the contract with Local 116.)
The Respondent's position is thus that, there being no
employees in a laid-off or discharged category, and the
employees on the preferential lists not being so classifiable,
there is no showing of relevance. The Charging Party,
however, asserts that the contract term "lay off" is
synonymous with "permanently replaced" insofar as job
recall and protection are concerned.
This difference of view plainly poses a problem of
construction of the contract language. The contract
provides a procedure whereby such differences in interpre-
tation may be resolved, ultimately through final and
binding arbitration.
The Board, in the case of Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837 (1971), established the principle that where
parties to an unfair labor practice proceeding before the
Board have established a contractual procedure for final
and binding resolution of controversies by arbitration, the
parties shall first attempt disposition through those
procedures - reserving jurisdiction to the Board to review
the result of the arbitration for its consonance with the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, in accord-
ance with principles established in the case of Spielberg
Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
The Board has further held that a dispute between the
parties to a contract as to the arbitrability of an issue under
the contract should itself be submitted to the contract
procedures in accordance with Collyer. Norfolk, Portsmouth
Wholesale Beer Distributors Association, 196 NLRB 1150
(1972). In that case a collective-bargaining contract
between the respondent employer association and the
charging party union contained a clause for the checkoff of
union dues pursuant to proper individual authorization by
employees. In addition there was a provision for grievance
procedure terminating in arbitration . The Association,
questioning the validity of the authorizations submitted by
the union, refused to deduct dues . When the union sought
to institute grievances under the contract the Association
declined to accept them, on the ground that the matter was
not arbitrable. A hearing was held before a Trial Examiner
upon a complaint asserting that the Association's refusal
constituted a violation of Section 8(aX5) of the Act. In the
hearing upon the complaint the Trial Examiner considered
the question of the validity of the authorizations, found
them to be invalid, and recommended dismissal of the
complaint . With respect to the contention that the matter
should have been submitted to the grievance procedure
and arbitration in accordance with Collyer, the Trial
Examiner found Collyer not controlling for the reason that
the question of the validity of the authorizations was
"essentially a legal question and not one best resolved by
an arbitrator." The Board reversed the Trial Examiner and
found Collyer controlling. In so doing the Board said:
... the [contract ] clause requires deductions only if
pursuant to individual authorizations , and whether the
authorizations were valid will determine in this case the
993
ultimate question of whether Respondents did or did
not violate the agreement by refusing to make the
deductions. That is clearly a contract issue fully
capable of resolution under the contractual procedures
for resolving such disputes. Although Respondent
Association has asserted that the validity of the cards is
not arbitrable, this issue of arbitrability should itself be
submitted to the arbitrator, as has become the near
universal practice under collective bargaining agree-
ments.
In Radioear Corporation, 199 NLRB 1161 (1972), the
union and the respondent employer were in disagreement
as to whether a "zipper" or "wrap-up" clause in their
collective-bargaining agreement indicated an intent to
continue a "turkey money" bonus. The contract provided
an arbitration procedure for the determination of contrac-
tual disputes. After hearing upon a complaint alleging that
unilateral discontinuance of the turkey money bonus by
the employer was a violation of Section 8(a)(5), the Trial
Examiner construed the contract and found that it did not
authorize discontinuance of the bonus. The Board,
reversing the Trial Examiner, found that the interpretation
of the contract was a matter to be first considered by the
arbitrator. The Board said:
Since the collective-bargaining agreement, and the
events surrounding its execution, are at the heart of the
disagreement, we would, as we did in Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 NLRB 837, defer our decision to the parties'
contractual settlement procedures.
In the case of Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196 NLRB 871
(1972), the respondent employer unilaterally revoked
certain parking privileges of employees. The contract
contained an arbitration clause, along with a provision to
the effect that working conditions should be maintained at
not less than the highest standards in effect at the time of
signing the agreement, and further that any disagreements
between the union and the employer with respect to the
clause should be subject to the grievance procedure. On the
authority of Collyer, the Board found it appropriate that
,.an arbitrator interpret the contractual Maintenance of
Standards section and decide whether employee parking
privileges are within the meaning of conditions of
employment" under the contract.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 197 NLRB 837 (1972),
involved the validity of unilateral subcontracting by the
employer. The collective-bargaining contract, which con-
tained a provision for arbitration of disputes, was silent on
the subject of subcontracting. The Trial Examiner held
that the matter was initially one of interpretation of the
collective-bargaining contract and that that issue should be
resolved through the contractual grievance and arbitration
procedures of the contract. The Trial Examiner stated at
841:
It is the substance of Respondent's motion to dismiss
that this case is more properly an interpretation of the
terms of an outstanding contract .... The provisions
of the contract set forth herein (supra), clearly outline
the agreed-upon method of settling such disputes ... .
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
... Nothing in the contract itself precluded the
Respondent from subcontracting its work , hence we
would reach the consideration of such act . . . in the
posture of an unfair labor practice . . . only after we
have explored what the contract did or did not provide,
and had examined what Respondent 's working capabil-
ities were in its day-to-day application of the terms of
the contract.
Such an interpretation of the contract, it would
seem, is the first order of business. . . . It would
appear to be a determination properly to be submitted
to arbitration ... .
The Board, on the authority of Collyer, affirmed.
The issue here , of course, is not whether the Respon-
dent's subcontracting was lawful or unlawful , permitted by
the contracts or forbidden by them, but only whether the
unions were entitled to information pertaining to the
subject. However the Board's declaration of broad policy
in the Collyer and subsequent cases, to the effect that issues
resolvable under a collective -bargaining contract and its
arbitration procedures should be first resolved there,
before resort to the Board , is of relevance in the disposition
of the present matter.
Article 17.1 of both collective-bargaining agreements
here provide that "any dispute or disagreement" between
an employee and the Company "as to the meaning or
application of the terms of this Agreement . . . shall
constitute a grievance," and be disposed of in accordance
with the grievance procedure outlined . Article 17.2 of the
agreements provide that if the grievance is not satisfactori-
ly adjusted and settled in the various steps of the grievance
procedure , the matter shall , upon notice by either party to
the agreement, be submitted to an arbitrator, whose
findings shall be binding on both parties.
There is dispute between employees and the Respondent
as to the interpretation of the contract , as reflected in the
grievances filed by the employees and the refusal of the
Respondent to consider the grievances . Such disagreement
is resolvable under the grievance and arbitration proce-
dures of the contracts . The information requested by the
Charging Party appears to be relevant to a determination
of that issue . In the light of these facts , contrary to the
contention of the Respondent , the information would
appear to be related to a contractual provision, necessary
for an informed interpretation of the contract, and
essential to a decision as to whether to process the
grievances further.
In any event, as Collyer and its analogs demonstrate,
Board policy is that in circumstances of this nature the
Administrative Law Judge should not , at this point in the
proceedings , interpret the contract and decide the substan-
tive rights of the parties thereunder.
In summary , in accordance with Board policy the unions
here have consistently , but unsuccessfully , sought determi-
nation under the grievance procedure of the question as to
whether the grievances are subject to, and consonant with,
the contracting provisions of the agreements. The Respon-
dent's resistance has prevented such a determination.
It is true , of course, that the Respondent is not charged
here with refusal to process the grievances, but with
refusing to provide information concerning them. That,
however, is not a dispositive distinction. The significant
factors are that Board policy is to encourage the parties to
utilize their own mechanisms for resolving controversies,
and that the information requested is essential here for
resolution of the controversy in that mechanism. It is
therefore necessary for performance of the locals' contrac-
tual responsibilities.
It is consequently concluded that the information
requested by the Charging Party in its letters to the
Respondent of February 10 and April 16, 1974, is relevant
and essential to the locals' performance of their obligations
as bargaining representatives in three respects : (1) Protec-
tion of and effectuation of the rights of employees on the
preferential hiring list in accordance with the principles of
Fleetwood Trailer, (2) protection and maintenance of work
opportunities and promotion possibilities within the
appropriate unit, (3) determination as to the merit, under
the contract, of the grievances filed by employees in
February, March, and April relating to employees replaced
or displaced as a consequence of the strike.
The grievances and the requests for information, of
course, adverted only to the contracts as the basis for their
claim, and not to factors (1) and (2). That fact, however,
does not affect the question of relevance. It is material only
to the question as to whether, and to what extent, a
statement of purpose is required . That question is deter-
mined in the following discussion.
Whether the Requests Were Adequately Stated
The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party's written
requests were deficient in that they failed to allege their
relevance to the pending grievances , and that there was no
reasonable way that the Respondent could be expected to
make such connection from the mere filing of the
grievances . There is, however, no testimony supporting
that contention ; that is to say, no witness on behalf of the
Respondent has testified that the Respondent 's responsible
officials were not aware that the requests were related to
the grievances . If the Respondent's contention is support-
ed, the support must be inferred from the circumstances of
the events . We turn then to the occurrences and to their
chronology.
All the material events occurred over a period of 4
months. On December 10, 1973, the preferential hiring list
in the Local 111 unit was established , and on December 24,
1973, that of Local 116 . Approximately 8 weeks later, on
February 6, 1974, employees on the preferential hiring list
in the Local 111 unit filed the grievance stating that the
Company had violated article 16 , page 34 and other related
articles by not returning them to their original positions,
and requesting restoration of rights, privileges, and
backpay retroactive to December 10. Two weeks later the
grievance was rejected on the ground that it was "not
subject to the provisions" of the contract, that the
procedure for the placement of returning employees had
been agreed upon before the signing of the new contract.
On February 10, 1974, 4 days after the date of the
grievance , the Charging Party sent its letter requesting
information as to contracting in the Local 111 unit in order
OHIO POWER COMPANY
to "perform" and "police" the Local Ill agreement "and
particularly its Article 16." From that date until March 25,
1974, there was a series of communications between the
Unions and the Respondent in which the Unions sought to
pursue the grievance through the various stages of the
grievance procedure and to arbitration, each of which
attempts was successively denied by the Respondent.
In the meantime on March 11 , 1974, a grievance was
filed in the Local 116 unit concerning the presence of
Hoosier Construction Company employees on the Respon-
dent's property , and alleging that this action , occurring
while employees were in layoff status , was in violation of
article 5 of the Local 116 contract and other articles, and
on April 9, 1974, other employees in the Local 116 unit
filed a grievance concerning "contractors performing work
at the East Wooster substation while there are substation
and other employees laid off." Specifically the grievance
requested that all work by contractors be stopped until all
employees were back to work. "Layoff" referred to
employees on the preferential list.
On April 16, 1974, the Charging Party wrote to the
Respondent requesting the same information concerning
contracting within Local 116's area as had been requested
with respect to Local I11. Again the reason given for the
request was in order that the union could "perform" and
"police" the contract. The letter further stated that the
information was required in the application of article 5 of
the contract.
Though neither letter of the Charging Party specifically
stated the subsection of the article of the contract referred
to, the Respondent in its reply in each case indicated that it
understood the reference to be the contracting clause. In
each instance the Respondent's reply was that no employee
had been placed on layoff or discharged because of work
by contractors, that the request had therefore no relevance
to the contract , and that the Respondent therefore chose
not to comply with the requests.
In the light of the content and continuity of the
communications between the Respondent and the unions
during the period of time involved, I am of the opinion that
the relationship between the grievances and the requests
for information is quite clear.
Thus the first grievance was filed on February 6, 1974. It
was signed by employees on the Local 111 preferential
hiring list , and stated inter alia that the Respondent had
violated article 16 of the Local 111 contract in not
returning the employees to their original positions. Four
days later National Representative Potter asked the
Respondent for information as to contracting, particularly
in connection with article 16 of the Local 111 contract.
This request for information as to article 16, following
immediately on the filing of the grievance alleging
violation of article 16, could scarcely have left the
Respondent in doubt as to the relationship between the
grievance and the request . I think it of significance that
there is no testimony that the Respondent was in doubt,
and no indication that the Respondent inquired as to the
reason for the request. I infer that the Respondent knew
the reason.
In any event , I believe that the communications between
the Respondent and the Unions in connection with the
995
grievances would have apprised reasonably perceptive
persons as to the relationship between the grievances and
the requests for information . From my observation of the
Respondent's official personnel who testified , I deem them
above average in perceptive capacity.
I therefore find , contrary to the contentions of the
Respondent, that the circumstances were such as to inform
the Respondent fully as to the relevance of the requested
information to the grievances.
As a further reason for not being required to produce the
information requested , the Respondent says that the
information would not be useful or helpful in processing
the grievances . That proposition however , is one for
presentation in the grievance procedure . But even if not
helpful in prosecuting the grievances , the Union deems the
information useful in determining whether to prosecute
them . That view, not patently unreasonable , contributes to
the relevancy of the information . As the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit said of a similar contention by an
employer in Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 347 F.2d 61, 70:
Be this as it may , it does not detract from the potential
value of such material as pertinent data with which the
Union should be supplied in order to assist it in its task
of deciding whether to institute grievance proceedings
or use other policing tools under the existing bargaining
agreement ... .
The Respondent introduced evidence to establish that
the work performed by the contractors, though of the same
kind as that performed by members of the appropriate
units, is not of such nature, because of its duration, and
staffing and supervision problems, that it can as a practical
matter be assigned to employees in the units. That
contention is also one to be advanced and established in
the grievance procedure. I make no finding on that
evidence.
In view of the disposition reached here it is unnecessary
to consider other contentions advanced by the parties.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact I conclude
that the information requested by the Charging Party of
the Respondent in the Charging Party's letters of February
10, 1974, and of April 16, 1974, is relevant and essential to
the performance of the obligations of Local 111 ahd Local
116 as bargaining representatives of employees of the
Respondent, and to enable them to administer their
collective-bargaining contracts with the Respondent. It is
further found that by failing and refusing to provide such
information the Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, and refused to bargain collectively
with representatives of its employees, and that by such
conduct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It will be recommended that the Respondent supply
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 111 and Local 116 with the information requested in
the Charging Party's letters of February 10, 1974, and
April 16, 1974, set out above, with the exception of
paragraph 5 thereof.
It will also be recommended that the Respondent cease
and desist from failing and refusing to supply Locals 111
and 116 with information relevant and necessary to the
performance of the obligations of a collective-bargaining
representative , including information affecting employees
on the preferential hiring lists.
The posting of an appropriate notice will also be
recommended.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER 13
Respondent , Ohio Power Company, Canton, Ohio, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing to supply Local 111 and Local 116
of the Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, with
information relevant and necessary to the performance by
such Locals of their obligations as bargaining representa-
tives of employees of the Respondent.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
bargaining rights through the above-named unions.
2. Take the following affirmative action found neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request by them, furnish to the above-named
unions the following information:
1. The name of each individual contractor engaged
in Physical , Operating or Trades work, or work, which
in the absence of such contractor , the bargaining unit
employees would perform ; the nature and location of
work, the expected length of the stay or tenure of the
contractor , and his expected date of completion; the
contractor 's work week , i.e., the amount of hours which
his men work ; and whether it is a "bid" or "time and
material plus" job and if it is a bid, the nature of the
bid, e.g. "out-and-out flat money" or "unit bid" or
"footage."
2. All information concerning or affecting employ-
ees on the preferential hiring lists which is relevant and
reasonably necessary to the performance of the locals'
obligations as bargaining representatives of those
employees.
3. All other information relevant and reasonably
necessary to the performance of their obligations as
bargaining representatives.
(b) Post at its places of business copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative , shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
14 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request by Local Union 111 and
Local Union 116, of the Utility Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, provide each of those Locals with
the following information previously requested by them
related to the bargaining unit in which the respective
Locals are the bargaining representatives . (Divisions 7
and 9 in the case of Local 111 , and Divisions 2 and 4 in
the case of Local 116.)
1. The name of each individual contractor
engaged in Physical, Operating or Trades work,
or work, which in the absence of such contractor,
the bargaining unit employees would perform;
the nature and location of work , the expected
length of the stay or tenure of the contractor, and
his expected date of completion ; the contractor's
work week, i.e., the amount of hours which his
men work ; and whether it is a "bid " or "time and
material plus" job and if it is a bid , the nature of
the bid, e.g. "out-and-out flat money" or "unit
bid" or "footage."
2. All information concerning or affecting
employees on the preferential hiring lists which is
relevant and reasonably necessary to the, per-
formance of the Locals ' obligations as bargaining
representatives of those employees.
3. All other information relevant and reason-
ably necessary to perform their obligations as
bargaining representatives.
OHIO POWER COMPANY