Octove Livaudais, Complainant,v.Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 19, 2003
07A20073 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 19, 2003)

07A20073

03-19-2003

Octove Livaudais, Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Octove Livaudais v. Department of Agriculture

07A20073

March 19, 2003

.

Octove Livaudais,

Complainant,

v.

Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 07A20073

Agency No. 000030

Hearing No. 270-A0-9224X

DECISION

Following its March 15, 2002 final order, the agency filed a timely appeal

which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. On appeal,

the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC

Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding that the agency discriminated against

complainant on the bases of age (over 40 years old) and sex (male).

The agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of

the AJ's order to retroactively promote complainant to the position of

Paralegal Specialist, GS-9, award back pay to complainant, and take

curative and preventative actions to ensure that discrimination does

not recur. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the

agency's final order.

Complainant, a Contact Representative in the Thrift Savings Plan Service

Office of the Thrift Savings Plan Division at the National Finance Center

in New Orleans, filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on August

26, 1999, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the

bases of sex and age when on May 14, 1999, it failed to select him for

a Paralegal Specialist position, GS-9, at the National Finance Center.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ.

Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision on January 25, 2002.

The AJ found that complainant established a prima facie case of sex and

age discrimination because he established that he was a male over 40

years of age who applied and was qualified for the position in question,

but was not selected in favor of five females candidates who were all

significantly younger.

Further, the AJ rejected the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

offered by the agency for its actions. The agency stated that it did

not select complainant because he failed to respond in writing to the

Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) portion of the announcement, that

he failed to articulate any relevant legal experience in the interview,

and because he had no �hands on� experience processing court orders.

However, the AJ concluded that although the application stated that KSA

responses were required, the application allowed applicants to elect to

either address the criteria separately or within their application.

The AJ found that complainant addressed the criteria within his

application package by providing a resum�, his law school transcript,

and his license to practice law. The AJ then concluded that the agency's

purported emphasis on experience and court orders was �highly suspect,�

since two of the selectees had no experience drafting or processing

court orders. The AJ determined that two of the selectees had some legal

training and at least three had significant legal work experience. The AJ

found that the educational qualifications specified in the announcement

and possessed by complainant, coupled with the two selectees' lack of

legal education and minimum legal experience made suspect the agency's

reasoning for not selecting complainant. The AJ noted that during the

hearing, the agency failed to rebut the fact that one selectee (S1)

had neither any legal education nor substantial experience drafting,

analyzing, or reviewing court orders beyond clerical responsibilities.

Further explaining her disbelief of the agency's explanation and her

belief that discrimination motivated complainant's non-selection,

the AJ noted that the vacancy announcement stated that education may

be substituted for experience, and that in order to qualify for a

GS-9 appointment, an applicant must possess a year of experience at

the GS-7 level or equivalent in the private industry or must possess

a Juris Doctor degree. The AJ concluded that because he possessed a

law degree, complainant not only exceeded the educational requirement,

but his experience as a Vice-President at a private corporation gave

him private sector experience which exceeded the GS-7 level requirement

for equivalent private industry experience. The AJ found that the agency

subjected complainant to unlawful discrimination on the bases of sex and

age and ordered the agency to retroactively place him in the position

of Paralegal Specialist and award him back pay.

The agency's final order declined to implement the AJ's decision finding

discrimination and order of relief.

On appeal, the agency contends that the AJ misapplied Supreme Court

authority because no evidence of discriminatory animus toward

complainant's protected groups was presented. The agency further

maintains that the record is devoid of any evidence that could lead one to

conclude that the reasons proferred by the agency for the non-selection

were false or inaccurate. Further, the agency contends that complainant

failed to provide sufficient information about his knowledge, skills,

and ability to perform the job of a paralegal in his resum�. The agency

pointed out that one of the selectees (S1) cited by the AJ as less

qualified than complainant possessed a college degree and worked in

the Legal Review Evaluation Unit for approximately five years and

the other selectee (S2) had worked as a paralegal in a law office for

approximately two years, had a college degree, and attended law school

for one year. The agency contends that by finding that two selectees

were less qualified than complainant, the AJ impermissibly substituted

her judgment for that of the agency's selecting officials. Finally,

the agency also maintains that complainant did not qualify for the GS-9

level Paralegal Specialist position under the Merit Promotion Plan because

he was only a GS-6 employee. In response, complainant contends that the

AJ's decision correctly summarized the facts and reached the appropriate

conclusions of law.

Analysis and Findings

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's finding of discrimination. The findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence, and the AJ correctly applied the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws.

Regarding the agency's argument that complainant failed to provide

sufficient information about his knowledge, skills, and ability to

perform the job of a paralegal in his resum� and application package,

we note that complainant submitted a very detailed resum� that stated

that he received a Juris Doctor, was proficient in legal research,

and had work experience as a Contact Representative with the National

Finance Center, which included writing interpretations of court orders

pertaining to the Thrift Savings Plan. Complainant also submitted his

law school transcript as part of his application package. Upon review

of the record, we determine that this was sufficient information for the

agency to determine complainant's ability to perform in the position of

Paralegal Specialist.

Also, we note that the agency contends that complainant was not eligible

for a GS-9 paralegal position because he was only a GS-6 employee.

However, the record contains a copy of an Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) notice dated December 7, 1998, that stated that complainant

was eligible for a GS-9 Paralegal Specialist position. Further, the

Vacancy Announcement for the position states that a Juris Doctor degree

is sufficient to qualify an applicant for a GS-9 Paralegal Specialist

position. Consequently, we conclude that the AJ properly concluded that

complainant was eligible for a GS-9 Paralegal Specialist position.<1>

Further, we determine that the AJ's finding that complainant possessed

superior qualifications to at least two of the selectees is supported

by testimonial and documentary evidence. Specifically, we note that

while one of the selectees (S2) attended law school for one year,

she was not accredited with any hours and lacked any other form of

legal education. Moreover, we note that the agency challenges the AJ's

conclusion that complainant was more qualified than another selectee

(S1) because that particular selectee's application revealed that she

�previewed and composed letters pertaining to court orders� in the Legal

Review Evaluation Unit. However, we agree with the AJ's conclusion

that previewing and composing letters pertaining to court orders is an

attendant clerical duty to processing court orders and is very distinct

from the analytical skills required to evaluate court orders, as stated

in the position description for a Paralegal Specialist. In contrast,

complainant's resum� reveals that he possessed a Juris Doctor and

law license, as well as had experience as a Contact Representative

interpreting and writing on all aspects of the Thrift Savings Plan,

including court orders. Therefore, we conclude that complainant possessed

superior qualifications to at least two selectees for the position of

Paralegal Specialist.

In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000),

a unanimous Supreme Court held that evidence showing that the employer

presented a false reason for a challenged action is sufficient in most

cases to support a finding of discrimination. The Court acknowledged

that in some cases disproving the employer's explanation may not

be sufficient to permit a finding of discrimination. As an example,

the Court stated that a complainant might have "created only a weak

issue of fact as to whether the employer's asserted reason was untrue

and there was abundant, uncontroverted independent evidence that no

discrimination had occurred." Id. at 2109. In this case, we find that

complainant created a strong issue of fact concerning the falsity of

the agency's explanation because the record reveals that complainant

provided sufficient KSA information and had superior qualifications

than two selectees. We therefore find that there is not abundant,

uncontroverted evidence that no sex or age discrimination occurred. We

also determine that the agency's argument that it has broad discretion

in making selection decisions and should not be second-guessed has no

relevance in the case at hand because this broad discretion is granted

only when candidates are equally qualified and when there is no evidence

of unlawful motivation. See Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981); Fodale v. Department of Health and

Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05960344 (October 16, 1998). Here,

the AJ properly found that complainant has superior qualifications

than at least two of the selectees. The agency contends that the AJ

misinterpreted Supreme Court authority because she failed to prove that

the non-selection was motivated by discriminatory animus. Having found

that the agency's proffered nondiscriminatory explanation was false,

we find that the AJ properly concluded that the agency's failure to

select complainant was motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly,

we discern no basis to disturb the Administrative Judge's finding of

discrimination and order of relief.<2>

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

REVERSES the agency's final order. The agency is liable for violating

both Title VII and the ADEA. The Commission directs the agency to take

corrective action in accordance with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER

The agency is ordered to undertake the following remedial action:

Within thirty (30) calendar days from the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall promote complainant to the position of Paralegal

Specialist, GS-950-09;

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501 and no later than sixty (60) calendar

days after the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall

determine the appropriate amount of back pay, interest, and other

benefits due complainant from May 23, 1999 through the date complainant

is promoted to the position of Paralegal Specialist, GS-950-09.

Complainant shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the

amount of back pay and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant

information requested by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding

the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a

check to complainant for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar

days of the date the agency determines the amount it believes to be due.

Complainant may petition the Commission for clarification or enforcement

of the amount he believes to be due. Complainant must file the petition

for clarification or enforcement with the Compliance Officer, at the

address referenced in the statement entitled �Implementation of the

Commission's Decision.�

The agency shall take corrective, curative, and preventative action to

ensure that sex-based and age-based discrimination does not recur,

including but not limited to providing training to all management

officials at the National Finance Center in New Orleans, Louisiana in

their duties and obligations under Title VII and the ADEA.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its New Orleans, Louisiana facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.<3>

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__March 19, 2003________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that

a violation of the ADEA and Title VII has occurred at the agency's New

Orleans, Louisiana facility (hereinafter this facility).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

This facility was found to have discriminated against an employee when he

was not selected for the position of Paralegal Specialist. The facility

was ordered to place the employee into the Paralegal Specialist position

with back pay, interest, and other benefits due. This facility will

ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions and terms and

conditions of employment will abide by the requirements of all federal

equal employment opportunity laws and will not retaliate against employees

who file EEO complaints.

This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment

opportunity law.

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 16141We note that on appeal, the agency submits a copy of

revisions of the OPM Time-in-Grade Restrictions made effective January 1,

2001 in support of its claim that complainant was ineligible for a GS-9

position. However, we determine that the relevant OPM restrictions were

those in place during the time of the selection in May 1999.

2The record reveals that complainant requested placement into the

Paralegal Specialist position as a the only remedy desired for

his discrimination claim and did not request compensatory damages.

Nevertheless, we note that while compensatory damages are part of �make

whole relief� for violations of Title VII, compensatory damages are

unavailable under the ADEA.

3Under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, a successful complainant

may recover attorney fees in the administrative process from the agency.

There is no similar provision for attorney fees under the ADEA.