OCAW, Local 1-591

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 10, 1974

208 N.L.R.B. 296 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO and Snelson,
Incorporated . Case 19-CB-2036
January 10, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On September 10, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
James T. Rasbury issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent Union
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
property of the employees of Snelson, Incorporat-
ed.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
OIL, CHEMICAL AND
ATOMIC WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 1-591, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, 10th Floor, Republic Building, 1511
Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Tele-
phone 206-442-4532.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Reiations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and, as
modified below, hereby orders that Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union, Local
1-591, AFL-CIO, Anacortes, Washington, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except that
the attached notice is substituted for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which we were given an opportunity
to present evidence, examine witnesses, and submit
written briefs, we have been found guilty of violating
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Accordingly, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce the employees
of Snelson, Incorporated, by physical assault
upon employees, supervisors, or their property, by
preventing the ingress and egress of their employ-
ees or equipment to an from the Shell Oil
Company refinery at Anacortes, Washington, or
by following and threatening the life or personal
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES T. RASBURY, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried at Anacortes, Washington, on June 28, 1973.1
The charge herein was dated April 20, and was served on
Respondent on the same date. Complaint and notice of
hearing was issued on May 4. Respondent's answer denied
the agency relationship of two of the three individuals
alleged to be agents of the Respondent and denied the
specific allegations of the complaint alleged to be violative
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act; however, by way of an
affirmative defense, Respondent further pleaded: "Res-
pondent has acknowledged that the facts show individuals,
both within and without the collective-bargaining unit
engaged in individual conduct which could be designated
as restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act." Respondent's answer then sets forth
that it has offered to settle this dispute by means of the
usual informal settlement agreement , Respondent asking
only that a nonadmission clause appear in the settlement
agreement. Respondent further pleads: "The Regional
Director has refused to settle this case and thereby
effectuate the purposes of the Act, and has thereby refused
to comply with the official declared policy of the NLRB."
Accordingly, the Respondent pleads, the complaint should
be dismissed.
A similar motion to dismiss was filed by Respondent on
May 17 with the Regional Director of Region 19 which
I All dates hereinafter will be in the year 1973, unless otherwise
indicated.
208 NLRB No. 30
OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 297
motion was referred to the Division of Judges for ruling.
On June 8, Administrative Law Judge James R. Webster
denied the Respondent's motion, stating: "Although
settlements are encouraged, an Administrative Law Judge
may not require any of the parties to accept any significant
term or provision of a settlement of an unfair labor
practice case. A nonadmission clause is deemed to be a
significant term or provision."
At the hearing in this matter, but prior to the receipt of
testimony, Respondent presented its motion for order
directing settlement of the case, or in the alternative for
dismissal of the complaint (see Resp. Exh. 1). The motion
was denied. The primary issues then are (1) whether the
Respondent Union is responsible for the actions of its
members, which conduct is not denied, and whether or not
said conduct did unlawfully restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A); and (2) did the refusal and failure of
the Regional Director to settle this case violate the policies
and procedures of the National Labor Relations Board
and/or the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses and after due consideration of
the brief filed by the General Counsel and the Union, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Snelson, Incorporated, is a Washington corporation with
its principal offices located at Sedro Wooley, Washington.
At all times material, it has been engaged in the
construction industry in Washington and other States. In
the course and conduct of its Washington operation,
Snelson annually purchased for importation into the State
of Washington goods and supplies valued in excess of
$50,000. The Shell Oil Company (herein Shell) is a
Delaware corporation engaged, inter aka, in refining oil at
its Anacortes oil refinery. In the course and conduct of its
State of Washington operation, Shell annually purchases
for importation into the State of Washington goods and
supplies valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent's
answer admits, and I herewith find, that at all times
Snelson and Shell are, and have been, employers within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,
Local 1-591, AFL-CIO (herein Respondent or Union), is,
and at all'times material has been, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Events
The production and maintenance employees of Shell at
its Anacortes, Washington, refinery, who are represented
by the Respondent, went on strike January 24. Respon-
dent's contract differences with Shell were concluded and
on June 1 the employees terminated their strike and
returned to work. The relevent events of this dispute
occurred during the period of Respondent's strike and
picketing of the Shell refinery at Anacortes.
Snelson, the Charging Party in this dispute, is a general
contractor involved, among other duties, in maintenance
and new construction work in the petroleum-chemical
industry. Snelson, at the time of the relevant events herein,
had a blanket purchase order contract for new construc-
tion and maintenance work at the Shell refinery to be
effective for a 1-year period. Snelson was to have entered
the refinery on April 16 with his crew to begin the
performance of a 6-or 8-day job consisting of cleaning and
repairing a furnace utilized in refinery processing.
B. The Critical Events
At approximately 7 a.m. on April 16, Wesley Gilfry, an
employee relations representative who has been employed
by Shell in various capacities for the past 17-1/2 years at
Anacortes, proceeded to a separate entrance gate, designat-
ed as Gate No. 3, which had been set aside for the
exclusive use of the Snelson employees. Gilfry intended to
open the gate for the admittance of Snelson's employees as
well as two trailers which were to be used for office
facilities and change rooms during the time Snelson would
be working on the Shell property. Gilfry found that the
lock had been jammed and noted that there were two cars
placed front end to front end just outside the gate which
were obstructing entrance. Gilfry returned to the mainte-
nance shop to obtain a bolt cutter to enable him to open
the gate. A sizable and very legible sign had been placed at
Gate No. 3 indicating "CONTRACTOR'S GATE SNEL-
SON, INC. SNELSON ELECTRIC" (see G.C. Exh. 3).
The two vehicles which had been parked immediately in
front of the gate were removed without serious incident
and the entrance to the gate was opened.
At approximately 7:30 a.m. Iwo pickup trucks pulling
small trailers were observed by Gilfry to be approaching
Gate No. 3. At this time there were at least 15 or 20
pickets2 in the area, some of whom were carrying clubs
resembling baseball bats or axe handles. They milled
around the Snelson vehicles constantly and a rock was
thrown which broke a window in one of the trailers. At this
time Donald Yates, who is chairman of the Shell group of
employees that belong to the Respondent Union and who
testified that he- was in direct charge of the strike, was
observed to be in the immediate area . Virgil Coragliotti, an
international representative of the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union assigned to service
local unions in the States of Washington and Oregon,
testified that he arrived at Gate No. 3 about 7 a.m. and
remained until 8:30 a.m. The pickets converged at the gate
entrance making entry impossible, while at the same time
displaying their clubs and yelling uncomplimentary epi-
thets that made it rather plain that it would not be safe to
enter. Without too much delay and without any serious
confrontation, the drivers of the Snelson vehicles moved on
past the gate set aside for their exclusive use.
2 Respondent's counsel objected to characterizing all of the Shell
employees or union members who were in the immediate vicinity of Gate
No 3 as pickets, but see the discussion of pickets and picketing in Stoltze
Land & Lumber Company, 156 NLRB 388
298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
William Earl Rapp , the field construction manager for
the petrochemical work performed by Snelson, was in
charge of the early arrivals and he determined that it would
be best not to attempt an entry at this particular time. He
instructed the drivers to move on past the gates down the
highway and he would consult with William Snelson
concerning the problems of entering the refinery and the
attitude of the Shell strikers . Rapp contacted William
Snelson and, after surveying the general situation, another
attempt to enter the gate was made at approximately 11:30
a.m. William Snelson led the procession in an unmarked
automobile followed by two pickup trucks, each with
Snelson signs and each towing a trailer bearing Snelson
signs, together with another unmarked vehicle driven by
Rapp . They were met at Gate No. 3 by a number of pickets
some of whom were carrying strike signs indicating
"O.C.A.W. ON STRIKE." Testimony indicated that at this
time there were some 35 or 40 pickets in the immediate
vicinity of Gate No. 3, most of whom were recognized by
Gilfry and Davoho as being Shell employees . A number of
these individuals were carrying clubs, others were juggling
stones or rocks, and many were shouting threats and
blocking the entrance to Gate No. 3. At this time Don
Yates approached William Snelson , who had stopped his
car approximately 6 feet from the gate because the
picketers were blocking his ingress, and informed Snelson:
"We would never get through the gate, that we might as
well go on back to Sedro Wooley and forget about working
there." Yates then departed from Snelson's vehicle after
their brief conversation and the real violence began. The
front windshield of the car driven by William Snelson was
shattered , his rear window was shattered , the trailers and
the pickup trucks were both tipped' over and a large piece
of metal resembling a crowbar was thrown at the rear
window of Snelson's car bouncing off the car and falling at
the feet of Davolio , who was standing inside the Gate on
Shell property . (See G.C. Exhs. 5, 6, 7, and 8.) Fortunately,
the drivers of the pickup trucks were able to get out of their
vehicles and into the car driven by Rapp and escaped
without serious injury to themselves or the automobile
driven by Rapp. Snelson succeeded in getting through the
gate, but his car suffered a great deal of damage and he
was in considerable fear of his life. All of the Snelson
employees took a great deal of verbal abuse. The tipped
over trucks and trailers, which never succeeded in entering
the gates , were only removed at a later date when the local
sheriff was present.
C. Misconduct Away From the Refinery Site
On April 17, at approximately 3 p.m., Snelson was
delayed in his efforts to enter the refinery at Gate No. 3 for
approximately 5 minutes by the pickets then on duty, in
spite of the fact that the sheriff was parked directly across
the road from the gate. As Snelson attempted to leave at
approximately 6 p.m. on the same day, he was again
delayed some 5 minutes in exiting the plant although the
sheriff was still present at the site. After finally exiting the
refinery by way of Gate No. 3, Snelson, who was then
driving a pickup truck with Snelson identification symbols,
turned to the right on Mountain Road and proceeded past
the Mount Baker Gate of the refinery. Just before passing
the Mount Baker Gate, a green Pontiac LeMans automo-
bile pulled out in front of him and moved slowly up the
road. At a point some distance from the refinery, the green
Pontiac LeMans attempted to stop and block Snelson's
efforts to continue on down the road. There were other
cars with individuals wearing typical refinery-type hard-
hats alongside the road at the point where the Pontiac had
stopped. At this puncture Snelson realized what was
happening and became concerned about his own safety.
He shifted the truck down to the second gear and stepped
on the gas , succeeding in pushing the Pontiac on past the
other cars and individuals that had been stopped alongside
the road. While pushing the car out of the way and
continuing on up the road, a yellow and black General
Motors type of truck, referred to as a blazer, came
alongside Snelson's pickup truck and threw a large rock
toward the side window which fortunately missed its mark.
Shortly thereafter, the driver of the car which was being
pushed by Snelson lost control of it, enabling Snelson to
get around the Pontiac and ahead of the yellow and black
blazer and successfully elude his pursuers. At a later date,
Mr. Snelson identified the individual driving the Pontiac
LeMans as a Shell employee whom he had seen at Gate
No. 3 during the violence that occurred on April 16. Mr.
Snelson testified that he had never seen the black and
yellow blazer prior to the incident just related. However, he
did see the same black and yellow blazer at the refinery
gates after the incident and on the following morning he
saw the Pontiac LeMans at the main entrance gate to the
Shell refinery.
D. Analysis
The occurrence of the incidents heretofore related stand
in the record undenied, although there are differences as to
whether or not all of the people participating in the
violence on April 16 and 17 were members of the
Respondent Union, as well as whether or not clubs and
rocks were being carried b} any of the picketers. In this
regard, I fully credit the testimony of William Snelson,
Gilfry, and Davolio. It would have been impossible to
inflict the damage to Snelson's car shown in General
Counsel's Exhibit 7, unless some type of club or large
stones were used . The pictorial evidence in the record
leaves no doubt that violence did occur on April 16 and
substantial damage sustained to Mr . Snelson 's personal
automobile, as well as the two pickup trucks and trailers.
The incident that occurred to Mr. Snelson on April 17
stands in the record undenied. During cross -examination,
Snelson testified that he saw individuals run out of the Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers trailer house parked near
the Mount Baker gate and get into the vehicle that pulled
out in front of him. This credited testimony by William
Snelson is sufficient to directly link this incident to the
Respondent.
Respondent 's defense was in the area of the Respon-
dent's lack of responsibility for the misconduct that
occurred. Virgil Coraghotti acknowledged that he had been
at the refinery on the early morning of April 16 and
acknowledged having had some conversation with the
boilermakers who were to have worked for Snelson on
April 16. He testified that he left at approximately 8:30
OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 299
a.m. and did not return to the Shell refinery that day.
Donald Yates testified that he left the area of Gate No. 3
immediately after talking with Snelson about 11 : 30 on the
morning of April 16, going to the picket shack at the main
gate where he attempted to reach Coragliotti by telephone
at the local union hall. Yates contended that he was there
for some 10 or 15 minutes talking and as he was leaving to
go back to Gate No. 3 he was advised that the trailers had
been turned over . Bob Melton , who is alleged by General
Counsel to have been a picket major with responsibility for
the Respondent 's Shell employee pickets, had no authority
on the picket line according to Donald James Burgess, the
financial secretary and chief executive officer of Respon-
dent. This testimony is supported by Donald Yates,
chairman of the Shell group . Respondent 's testimony
indicated that Bob Melton was a picket major in charge
only of the boycotting activities conducted against Shell
and that he had no authority on the picket line. However,
General Counsel's Exhibit 2, a three-page mimeographed
pamphlet addressed to the membership of Local 1-591,
clearly shows that Bob Melton and Cline Herrin were
picket majors for the Shell unit. This corresponds to the
two picket majors that were indicated in the same
pamphlet who would be in charge of the Texaco unit. In
view of this written directive to the membership of the
Respondent Union and in the absence of some evidence
that the general membership was informed that Melton's
responsibilities were limited exclusively to the area of
boycott activities , I find Melton to be an agent of the
Respondent with picket line authority for the Shell unit.
The other picket major, Herrin , is identified on General
Counsel's Exhibit 6 which depicts the overturned trucks
and trailer immediately in front of Gate No . 3. Melton has
been identified on General Counsel 's Exhibit 5 as one of
those individuals who is in the process of overturning one
of the trailers. There can be little doubt, and I herewith
find , that Virgil Coragliotti , Donald Yates , Robert Melton,
and Cline Herrin, and each of them, were agents of the
Respondent Union.
The international representative, Virgil Coragliotti,
acknowledges having been present at Gate No. 3 from 7
a.m. until approximately 8:30 on April 16 at a time when
the pickets prevented Snelson's employees and equipment
from entering Gate No. 3. This was not only a violation of
the Act, but was in violation of an outstanding state court
injunction and temporary restraining order limiting the
number of pickets to two people at any gate other than the
main gate, and restraining Respondent from preventing
any person from ingress or egress to and from the refinery.
(G.C. Exh. 9.) There is no evidence in the record to
indicate that the Respondent at any time took measures to
disavow the misconduct that occurred at Gate No. 3 on
April 16 or corrective measures to avoid similar miscon-
duct in the future . Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7. I find that agents of the
Respondent not only allowed the membership of Respon-
dent to engage in restraining and coercive conduct directed
against William Snelson and Snelson 's employees , who had
a right to enter the Shell refinery , but agents of Respondent
actually participated in the violence and misconduct in the
11:30 a.m. incident of April 16 which restrained and
coerced employees in violation of the Act. Clearly, the
flagrant misconduct and violence engaged in by the
Respondent and its agents both at 7:30 a.m. and again at
11:30 a.m . on April 16 was precisely the kind of outrageous
misconduct which Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act was
intended to prevent.
The Board has also held that a union which calls a strike
and authorizes picketing must retain control over the
pickets in whatever manner it deems necessary in order to
insure that they do not act improperly.3 It is not necessary
for an authorized union agent to be present at the time of
each violent incident in order to hold a respondent
responsible for the misconduct . If a union is unwilling, or
unable, to take the necessary steps to control its pickets, it
must then bear the responsibility for their misconduct.'
Snelson testified that he saw the occupants of the Pontiac
LeMans, which precipitated the acts of misconduct and
violence on April 17 to his person and automobile, come
from the Respondent's picket house located near the
Mount Baker gate entrance to the refinery and this
testimony stands in the record undemed . Additionally, the
yellow and black blazer and the driver of the Pontiac
LeMans were linked to the picketing activities on behalf of
Respondent against Shell . On the basis of prior Board
holdings that if a union is unwilling, or unable, to take the
necessary steps to control its pickets , it must then bear the
responsibility for their misconduct , I herewith find the
misconduct directed toward William Snelson as occurred
on April 17 to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
and the responsibility of the Respondent Union.
There remains for disposition the Respondent 's argu-
ments that the refusal by the Regional Director to settle
this case on terms offered by the Respondent violated not
only the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, but
also the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
and thus the complaint should have been dismissed, or the
Regional Director directed to settle the case . At first blush,
Respondent 's arguments appear to have some degree of
merit and when considered in light of the Board 's rather
strong language relating to screening out de miminis or
isolated violations, as set forth in American Federation of
Musicians, Local 76, AFL-CIO, 202 NLRB 620, it causes
one to wonder why the Regional Director refused to accept
Respondent 's settlement offer. Respondent was willing to ac -
cept a complete informal settlement , asking only that a non -
admissions clause be placed in the settlement agreement,
but not the notice to be posted. Respondent argues, and
cites Board and court cases , that settlement agreements are
not admissions of past liability,5 thus inclusion of a
nonadmissions clause in the settlement agreement is not a
significant term or provision but is merely an accurate
3 Drivers Local 695, et at (Tony Tellitteri Trucking Service, Inc), 174 Helpers, Local 696 (The Kargard Company), 196 NLRB 645
NLRB 753 5 See N L R B v Bangor Plastics , nc, 156 NLRB 1165. enforcement
4 See General Drivers and Dairy Employees Local Union Local 563 denied 392 F 2d 772 (C A 6, 1968), and Southwest Chevrolet Corporation,
(Northern Contractors Supply, Inc), 183 NLRB 1023 , and International 194 NLRB 975
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers &
300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reflection of its legal effect. While this argument has some
appeal, neither the Board nor the Administrative Law
Judge has the authority to direct a settlement, absent a
most obvious abuse of discretion by the General Counsel.
Although not totally analagous, a somewhat similar
affirmative defense was raised by the respondent in Gimbel
Brothers attacking the General Counsel's settlement
procedure. There the Trial Exammer7 said at page 886:
Under the Act the General Counsel has final
autho-ity in respect to the investigation of charges, the
issuance of complaints, and the prosecution of those
complaints before the Board. (Section 3(d)). The
Board, itself, has no power to enter into settlement
negotiations of unfair labor practice charges, although
it can and does review the terms of a proposed
settlement once a complaint has been issued and
hearing held. However, neither the Board nor any of its
Trial Examiners has any power or right to inquire into
the course of settlement negotiations held off the
record to decide whether they were fair. This would be
a gross violation of law. The General Counsel,
appearing as a litigant before the Board, has full
freedom to enter into such negotiations. The General
Counsel must weigh all relevant factors in deciding
whether and on what terms he shall offer to settle a
case. Since many charges are filed during a year (5,809
in the fiscal year 1950), he undoubtedly has formulated
broad settlement policies of general application and
does make distinctions according to different types of
violations and the prior history of other litigants in the
case. He must determine in the first instance whether a
settlement would effectuate the policies of the Act. The
General Counsel has the power to make distinctions
which the Union has charged he had made, if he in his
discretion feels that he should make them. It is no
vi elation of law for him to do so. These settlement
policies are not "substantive rules adopted as author-
ized by law and statements of general policy or
interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency
for the guidance of the public . .." which are required
to be published by the terms of Section 3(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
The Board has only limited power of review of the
actions of the General Counsel in settlement negotia-
tions in unfair labor practice cases. It cannot originate
settlement negotiations or dictate what terms he shall
offer It can only review a settlement agreement once a
case has gone to hearing. . . . [Footnotes omitted.]
It seems perfectly clear that the Administrative Law
Judge does not have the authority to substitute his best
judgment for that of the General Counsel insofar as
settlement terms are concerned and I so find .8
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices , it shall be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices
committed, it shall be recommended that the Respondent
cease and desist from restraining or coercing in any
manner employees in the exercise of their rights as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Shell and Snelson are employers within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation-
al Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation-
al Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act through the commission of acts of
restraint, coercion, and violence which interfered with the
exercise of rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,
Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and represent-
atives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining or coercing employees of Snelson,
Incorporated, by physical assaults upon the property of
Snelson, Incorporated, its employees, and supervisors; by
throwing rocks toward employees and equipment; by
preventing ingress to or egress from the Shell refinery; by
6 Gimbel Brothers , Inc, 100 NLRB 870, recently cited with approval by
the Board in Smith Company of California, Inc, 200 NLRB No 106
r August 19, 1972, the title "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Adminis-
trative Law Judge "
s All the circumstances of this case , including the reckless disregard for
property and person displayed by Respondent while under a state court
restraining order , would seem to havejustified requiring a formal settlement
with court decree
9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 301
causing great damage to the automobiles, trucks, and
trailers driven by Snelson employees; by following from
the refinery Snelson supervisors; and by Respondent's
course and conduct placing in great danger the life and
property of William Snelson and/or Snelson, Incorporated,
employees.
(b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its offices and meeting hall, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being duly signed by its representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Sign , as aforesaid, and mail sufficient copies of the
said attached notice to the Regional Director for Region
19, for posting, the Shell Oil Company and Snelson,
Incorporated , being willing, at places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Such copies of the
notice shall be furnished the Respondent by the said
Regional Director.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
10 In the event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "