Oberthur Technologies

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 16, 2016

04-CA-128098 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 16, 2016)

JD–53–16
Exton, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES OF
AMERICA CORPORATION
and Case Nos. 4–CA–128098
4–CA–132055
LOCAL 14M, DISTRICT COUNCIL 9, 4–CA–134781
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS 4–CA–158860
CONFERENCE/INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
David G. Rodriguez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kevin C. McCormick, Esq., (Whiteford, Taylor and Preston. L.L.P.)
Baltimore, Maryland, for the Respondent.
Mark Kaltenbach, Esq., (Markowitz and Richman)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arthur J. Amchan, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania on April 6, 2016. Local 14M filed the charges giving rise to this matter on May 6,
July 2, August 14, 2014 and August 26, 2015. The General Counsel issued a consolidated
complaint on October 27, 2015.
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by discharging 4 bargaining unit employees without prior notice to the Union and without
affording the Union an opportunity to bargain with Respondent concerning the discipline of
these employees. The General Counsel also alleges that Respondent unlawfully delayed
providing the Union with information it had requested four months earlier, regarding one of
these discharges.1

1 The Union alleged in its charges that at least some of these employees were terminated in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). The General Counsel did not find merit to these allegations and did not issue
a complaint on this basis.
JD–53–16
2
The Union won a representation election on September 7, 2012, 2-3 years prior to the
discharge of the employees in question. In that election 108 eligible voters voted for union
representation by the Charging Party Union; 106 voted against representation. On February 20,
2013, Administrative Law Judge Raymond Green issued a decision in a combined unfair labor
practice/representation case. He sustained the Union’s challenge to the eligibility of 2 voters on 5
the grounds that they were professional employees. Judge Green found another employee whose
ballot was challenged to be an eligible voter. Following Judge Green’s decision the Union on
March 13, 2013, requested that Respondent commence bargaining. Respondent rejected the
demand and filed exceptions to Judge Green’s decision with the Board.
10
Between the time of Judge Green’s decision and the Board’s decision discussed below,
Respondent terminated 4 employees without giving the Union notice of their discharges and an
opportunity to bargain about these discharges.
Upon review of Judge Green’s decision, the Board certified the Union as bargaining 15
representative of a unit of Respondent’s employees described below on August 27, 2015, 362
NLRB No. 198.
All full-time employees in litho printing, finishing card and sheet, ink, facilities janitorial,
card auditing plastics, pre-press composition, QC [quality control], smart card embedding, 20
screen making, screen printing, production expeditor, quality systems analyst, warehouse
plastic, customer service manufacturing, and maintenance departments at 523 at James Hance
Court, Exton, Pennsylvania; but excluding all other employees, temporary and seasonal
employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
25
Respondent has continued its challenge to the certification of the Union.
The General Counsel relies on the rationale in Allen Ritchey, 359 NLRB No. 40 (2012), a
decision invalidated by the United States Supreme Court due to the composition of the Board at
the time of the decision.30
Respondent concedes that it did not give the Union prior notice of the discharges of its
employees or give it an opportunity to bargain over the discharges. It contests the validity of the
Union’s certification, the General Counsel’s reliance on the Alan Ritchey rationale and also
argues that the discharge of the four employees was not discretionary within the meaning of the 35
Alan Ritchey decision.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Respondent and Charging Party, I make
the following40
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
45
Respondent, a Delaware corporation, manufactures plastic credit and identification cards
at a facility in Exton, Pennsylvania. It also has facilities in Chantilly, Virginia and Los Angeles,
JD–53–16
3
California. In the year prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent sold and shipped
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside of Virginia, Pennsylvania and
California. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 5
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On March 11, 2013 the Union demanded bargaining concerning unit employees’ wages,
benefits and working conditions. The demand letter addressed disciplining of unit employees as 10
follows:
Should the Company file exceptions to the ALJ's decision, it is the position of the Union
that any unilateral changes by the Company pertaining to terms and conditions of
employment or with respect to the issuance of discipline without first providing the 15
Union with notice and the opportunity to bargain over those changes is an attempt to
unlawfully change, alter or eliminate those terms and conditions of employment and will
be met by the Union pursuing legal remedies available it for the violation of law.
On March 15, Respondent rejected this demand indicating that it intended to appeal the 20
administrative law judge’s decision of February 20, 2013. In that decision the Judge sustained
the Union’s challenge to the ballots of two employees, which in effect resulted in the Union
winning the 2012 representation election by a margin of 108 to 106.
On March 13, 2014, the Union requested that Respondent provide it with documentation 25
pertaining to the February 4, 2014 terminations of unit employees, Albert Anderson and Emery
Flowers. Respondent complied with this request on July 17, 2014. However, Respondent
reiterated its position that it had no obligation to bargain with the Union, including any
obligation to provide the documentation pertaining to the terminations.
30
After the Board affirmed the judge’s ruling and certified the Union on August 27, 2015,
the Union again demanded bargaining on September 1, 2015. Respondent rejected this demand
as well, indicating its intent to challenge the Board’s decision in the United States Courts of
Appeals.
35
The employee terminations at issue
Albert Anderson
On December 31, 2013, Albert Anderson and his leadman, Emery Flowers, were placing 40
stickers on company inventory at Respondent’s Exton facility. Anderson drove the forklift,
while Flowers stood on the elevated forks placing the stickers. The forklift moved horizontally
and vertically while Flowers stood on the forks. Flowers was not wearing a safety belt to prevent
him from falling off the forks. Respondent investigated the incident, which was captured on
video, and terminated both employees on or about February 4, 2014. Both Anderson and 45
JD–53–16
4
Flowers had been trained in the safe operating procedures for forklifts and were certified to
operate them.2
On March 13, the Union requested information regarding the discharge of Anderson and
Flowers. Respondent replied on March 18, indicating that it would provide the information the 5
following week. On July 17, Respondent provided to the Union the information that it requested
on March 13. However, Respondent’s counsel stated at the close of the letter than it should not
be construed to mean that Respondent had any duty to provide the information to the Union.
Dan Clay and Harvey Werstler10
Respondent terminated Dan Clay and Harvey Werstler on or about July 14, 2014 for
fighting on the production floor. The Union learned of these discharges from Werstler. It
requested information from Respondent about the discharges on July 24, which it received on
August 11. Respondent’s counsel reiterated his opinion that Respondent had no duty to provide 15
the information.
Lawrence Bennethum
In July 2015, a group of employees were meeting on the production floor of 20
Respondent’s Exton facility. A female employee did not have a hair bonnet that employees wear
to prevent hair from getting into the product. Somebody asked Bennethum to get a hair bonnet
for the female employee. Bennethum responded, “Did the color of my skin change?”
Respondent terminated Bennethum on or about July 27, 2015. The Union learned of the
termination from Bennethum.25
Respondent has terminated other employees for similar infractions
In an effort to defend against the General Counsel’s assertion that the terminations of
Anderson, Clay, Werstler and Bennethum were discretionary, Respondent introduced 30
uncontroverted evidence that it terminated other employees for the same or very similar
infractions.
Respondent’s disciplinary policies
35
Respondent’s employee handbook, G.C. Exh. 12 contains its Standards of Conduct and
Disciplinary Policy at pages 25-29:

2
The relevant OSHA regulation appears to be at 29 CF 1910.178 (m)(3):
Unauthorized personnel shall not be permitted to ride on powered industrial trucks. A safe place
to ride shall be provided where riding of trucks is authorized.
OSHA does not require employers to terminate employees to violate this rule. However, an employer,
who allows employees to violate this standard are subject to OSHA citations and penalties.
JD–53–16
5
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
RULES OF CONDUCT
All employees are expected to conduct themselves in a professional
business-like manner. Disregarding or failing to conform to these5
standards shall result in disciplinary action, as the Company may
determine, ranging from counseling to dismissal. This disciplinary policy
creates no contractual rights for continued employment and does not
modify the Company's policy of at-will employment. Because this policy
is intended only as a guideline, examples of conduct that will result in10
disciplinary action and/or dismissal include, but are not limited to, the
following:
20. Disorderly conduct, fighting or provoking a fight, horseplay or engaging in
acts of violence or threatening behavior, at Company or customer facilities or 15
work location, or interfering with others in the performance of their jobs.
31. Any action that results in, or could result in, property damage or personal
injury.
20
32. Any action that endangers the health or safety of others, including violating a
safety rule or practice.
34. Carrying unauthorized property or persons while operating Company
equipment.25
35. Failing to protect property or persons while operating Company equipment.
55. Engaging in any activity that is in conflict with the best interests of the
Company.30
It is impossible to define rules for every conceivable situation that might
arise. Activities that are not expressly covered in these rules will be
handled on a case-by-case basis. All employees are expected to act
with good common sense and in a totally professional manner. The35
Company reserves its right to demote, transfer, suspend, terminate or
otherwise discipline any employee without prior warning should the
Company, in its sole discretion, believe such action is warranted or
appropriate. The foregoing is not intended to and does not in any
manner alter the at-will relationship between the Company and its40
employees
At page 28, Respondent’s handbook addresses violence in the workplace. That
section specifically includes hitting or shoving an individual, or attempting to do so. As
with other violations of company policy, the handbook specifically states: 45
JD–53–16
6
Any violation of this policy will result in disciplinary action, as
the Company may determine in its sole discretion, ranging from verbal
counseling to immediate dismissal.
Bennethum’s conduct appears to violate Respondent’s Equal Employment 5
Opportunity and Unlawful Harassment policies set out at pages 11-15:
The Company prohibits unlawful harassment in any form,
including:
10
• VERBAL CONDUCT such as epithets, derogatory
comments, slurs or unwanted sexual advances,
invitations or comments, in violation of the Company's
Equal Employment Opportunity policy.
15
At page 15 the handbook states that:
Where the Company has determined that conduct in violation of this policy has
occurred, the Company will take appropriate disciplinary action.
20
In summary, nothing in the Respondent’s handbook mandates automatic
termination for the offenses committed by Anderson, Clay, Werstler or Bennethum.
There is no evidence in this record of any employees receiving less serious
discipline than Anderson, Clay and Werstler for substantially similar conduct. However, 25
with regard to the termination of Bennethum, there is such evidence. An employee who
asked another employee, “if he was the head N…..in charge?” received only a 3-day
suspension. Also, the degree of discipline for safety and violence infractions depends on
Respondent’s assessment of whether they were sufficiently egregious to warrant
termination, Tr. 94-95. 110.30
Analysis3
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to bargain
about the discharges after the fact35
I decline the General Counsel’s invitation to apply the rationale of the Alan Richey
decision. Until the Board adopts that rationale, I am bound by existing precedent. Moreover,
even if the Board were to reaffirm its holding in Alan Ritchey, it must decide whether it will
apply that rationale only prospectively, as it did in the 2012 decision, or retrospectively.440

3 I will not address Respondent’s contention that this case must be dismissed on the grounds that
Acting General Counsel Laife Solomon had no authority to nominate Regional Director Dennis Walsh,
who issued the complaint. The Board’s decision in American Baptist Homes of the West, 364 NLRB No.
13, slip opinion p. 7, n. 19 (2016) is dispositive on this issue.
4 For the same reason I will not address the General Counsel’s contention that Respondent is
obligated to pay for discriminatees’ expenses while searching for work.
JD–53–16
7
If the Board were to reaffirm the Alan Ritchey rationale and find that is applicable to this
case, I would find that Respondent violated the Act by failing to notify the Union in advance and
offering it the opportunity to bargain over the 4 discharges herein. “Discretionary” in this
context is the opposite of “Automatic.” For example, if an employer has a uniformly applied
rule that any violation of a particular safety requirement will automatically result in termination 5
regardless of the circumstances (e.g. failure to lock out/tag out a machine before doing
maintenance work) the decision to terminate an employee would not be discretionary. Here,
however, Respondent clearly reserved the right to impose lesser forms of discipline. The fact
that it usually or even always terminated employees for these types of misconduct does not
change the fact that in these circumstances termination was discretionary.10
Regardless of the fate of the Alan Ritchey rationale, Respondent violated the Act pursuant
to existing Board precedent. An employer has an obligation to bargain with the Union, upon
request, concerning disciplinary matters, even if it has no obligation to notify and bargain to
impasse with the Union before imposing discipline, Fresco Bee, 337 NLRB 1161, 1186-87 15
(2002); Ryder Distribution Resources, 302 NLRB 76, 90 (1991). This is certainly true when, as
in this case, its existing disciplinary policy did not require termination, Sygma Network Corp.,
317 NLRB 411, 417 (1995). An employer’s disciplinary system constitutes a term of
employment that is a mandatory subject of bargaining, Toledo Blade Co., 343 NLRB 385, 387
(2004). 20
An employer’s obligation to bargain with a Union begins on the date of a representation
election in which the Union prevails, regardless of when the Union is certified or when litigation
over that certification is concluded—at least to the extent that an employer makes unilateral
changes in wages, hours or working conditions. An employer which makes such changes does 25
so at its peril, Mike O'Connor Chevrolet Buick-GMC Co. 209 NLRB 701 (1974), enf. denied on
different grounds, 512 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1975).5
The imposition of discipline, particularly the termination of an employee is an obvious
change in that employee’s working conditions. In this regard the Board had held that a failure to 30
notify and bargain with a union over lay-offs between an election and certification violates
Section 8(a)(5) and (a)(1), Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671 (1989). Thus, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to the Union to bargain
over the terminations in this case-at any time.
35

5 In Howard Plating Industries, Inc., 230 NLRB 178 (1977), the Board held that an employer
does not violate the Act in refusing to engage in negotiations for a collective bargaining
agreement with a union, which has won a representation election, during the period in which the
union has not been certified. This holding is limited to an employer’s refusal to engage in
contract negotiations (“plenary bargaining”), Alta Vista Regional Hospital, 357 NLRB 326, 327
n. 5 (2011)[Also cited as San Miguel Hospital Corp.]. It has no bearing on an employer’s
obligation to refrain from unilateral changes, such as the imposition of discipline.
JD–53–16
8
The Union did not waive its bargaining rights by not specifically requesting bargaining over the
terminations of Anderson, Clay, Werstler and Bennethum
The Union requested that the Respondent bargain with it on March 11, 2013. 4 days later
Respondent informed the Union that it would not recognize the Union or bargain with it. 5
Consistent with this position, Respondent never notified the Union that it discharged Anderson,
Clay, Werstler and Bennethum. Moreover, when providing information to the Union in response
to the Union’s requests for information about the terminations of Anderson, Clay and Werstler,
Respondent explicitly stated that it was under no obligation to provide the information. Thus,
the Union could reasonably conclude that Respondent’s position that it had no obligation to 10
notify and bargain with the Union about anything had not changed. Thus, the Union was fully
justified in believing that Respondent had presented it with a “fail accompli” and that specifically
requesting bargaining about the discharges would have been a useless endeavor, Sunnyland
Refining Company, 250 NLRB 1180, 1181, n.4 (1980).
15
Furthermore, I conclude that if Respondent was willing to negotiate with the Union about
the discharges, it was Respondent’s obligation to so inform the Union in light of its previous
refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union. Had Respondent been willing to bargain with
the Union, it should have notified the Union that it was willing to bargain about the discharges of
Anderson, Clay and Werstler when it complied with the Union’s information requests. The fact 20
that Respondent failed to give any notice to the Union that it discharged Clay, Werstler and
Bennethum, even after receiving and complying with the Union’s information request
concerning Anderson, also indicates that a specific request to bargain over these discharges
would have been futile.
25
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by waiting four months to comply with the
Union’s information request regarding Anderson’s termination
A four-month delay, or less, in providing information may violate Section 8(a)(5) and
(1)—particularly when an employer fails to offer a legitimate explanation for the delay, e.g., 30
Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671 (1989). The circumstances in this case warrant such a conclusion
particularly since Respondent terminated Anderson on February 4, 2014 and never notified the
Union that it had done so. Further, the size of the production that satisfied the information
request, G.C. Exh.7, provides no basis for concluding that Respondent had any legitimate reason
for dragging its feet in providing this information.35
Finally, for a collective bargaining representative to have a meaningful opportunity to
bargain over a discharge, it must be promptly notified and its information requests regarding the
reasons for the discharge must be complied with promptly. In this case, Respondent failed to
notify the Union of the discharge, took four months to provide the Union with the requested 40
information, and then implicitly, in its response to the Union’s information request, indicated that
it had no intention of bargaining with the Union about anything. I have considered all these
factors in finding that the 4 month delay in providing the information violates the Act.
JD–53–16
9
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.5
A threshold issue is whether a make whole remedy, i.e. reinstatement and backpay is
precluded in this case by virtue of the language of Section 10(c) of the Act, “no order of the
Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended
or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or 10
discharged for cause.”
As a general proposition, an employee who has not engaged in protected activity and is
discharged for misconduct is not entitled to a make whole remedy. This is so even in cases in
which the employee was not afforded his or her rights under Weingarten v. NLRB, 420 U.S. 251 15
(1975),6 or the employer discovers the misconduct through unlawful means, such as with an
unlawfully hidden surveillance camera, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 NLRB 644 (2007). In this
case there is no evidence that the discharged employees terminations were related in any way to
conduct protected by the Act.7
20
As the Charging Party points out, Section 10(c) also does not prevent a make-whole
remedy in a limited number of other situations in which an employee was discharged for
misconduct unrelated to protected activity. One such situation is when an employer unilaterally
changes a disciplinary rule and it is not clear that the employee would have been discharged
under the employer’s rules that existed prior to the illegal unilateral change, Uniserve, 351 25
NLRB 1361, n.1 (2007).8
In the instant case employees Anderson, Werstler, Clay and Bennethum were discharged
for misconduct unrelated to any protected activity. There is also no evidence that there was any
unlawful unilateral change in Respondent’s disciplinary policies that was related to their 30
discharges. Therefore, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, these employees are entitled to
neither backpay nor reinstatement. The consequences of failing to bargain over these discharges
is limited by Section 10(c) to the posting of a notice.9

6 An employer violates the Act pursuant to Weingarten if it conducts an investigatory interview after
denying the employee the assistance of a union representative.
7 I have issued 2 decisions in which I found that employees were entitled to a make-whole remedy
under similar circumstances to the instant case, Total Security Management Illinois 1, 13-CA-108215
(May 9, 2014) and Security Walls, LLC, 16-CA-152423, January 21, 2016). In neither case was the
language of Section 10(c) raised by the employer. I was not aware that this was an issue. Depending on
the ultimate outcome of the instant case, it could be that I was mistaken in ordering a make-whole
remedy in those cases.
8 In this situation, however, the employer may be able to avoid a make-whole remedy in the
compliance stage by showing that it would have discharged the employee under the policies that existed
prior to the unlawful unilateral change.
9 Pressman Cleaners, 361 NLRB No. 57 (2014) cited by the Charging Party did not involve the
discipline of employees. Thus that decision has no bearing on this case.
JD–53–16
10
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in failing to notify the Union of
the discharges of employees Anderson, Werstler, Clay and Bennethum.
5
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in failing to provide the Union an
opportunity to bargain over the discharges of employees Anderson, Werstler, Clay and
Bennethum.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in unreasonably delaying its response to the 10
Union’s March 13, 2014 information request.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended10
15
Order
The Respondent, Oberthur Technologies of America, its officers, agents, shall
1. Cease and desist from20
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Local 14M,
District Council 9, Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters
as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all full-time employees in litho printing,
finishing card and sheet, ink, facilities janitorial, card auditing plastics, pre-press composition, QC 25
[quality control], smart card embedding, screen making, screen printing, production expeditor,
quality systems analyst, warehouse plastic, customer service manufacturing, and maintenance
departments at 523 at James Hance Court, Exton, Pennsylvania; but excluding all other employees,
temporary and seasonal employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.30
(b) Unreasonably delaying its response to the Union’s information requests.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.35
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
40

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–53–16
11
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Exton, Pennsylvania
facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily 5
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these 10
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
February 4, 2014.
15
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., June 16, 201620
______________________________
Arthur J. Amchan
Administrative Law Judge25

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to notify and offer to bargain in good faith with Local 14M,
District Council 9, Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters
over the discipline or discharge of any bargaining unit employee.
WE WILL NOT unreasonably delay responding to information requests from Local 14M,
District Council 9, Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
OBERTHUR TECHNOLGIES OF
AMERICA CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-128098 or
by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354.