Oakland Press Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 6, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 476 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Oakland Press Co., a Subsidiary of Capital Cities
Communications, Inc. and Local 372, International
Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Of America. Case 7-CA-
13059
May 6, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER
On January 5, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefsI and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge 2 and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, The Oakland
Press Co., a subsidiary of Capital Cities Communica-
tions, Inc., Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in said recommended Order.
Respondent's request for oral argument is denied as the record,
exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the
parties.
2 The Administrative Law Judge properly found, inter alia, that the
Union's March 15, 1976, letters of notification to Respondent terminated
their collective-bargaining agreements for the two employee units herein as
of May 31, 1976. However, Respondent, in a subsequent motion to reopen
the record, opposed by the Charging Party, contends that a March 11. 1977.
letter from the Union to a new employee. which refers to the union-security
provision in "the existing contract," constitutes a clear admission by the
Union that it did not terminate the collective-bargaining agreements. As the
evidence adduced at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge is
sufficient to determine the contract termination issue, we find it unnecessary
to consider the proffered evidence and we therefore deny Respondent's
motion.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This matter
was heard before me on October 18 and 19, 1976, at
Detroit, Michigan, upon the General Counsel's complaint
which alleged that the Respondent, The Oakland Press Co.,
a Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,1 had
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §151, el seq., by refusing to bargain with the
Union for new contracts.
Involved in this case are two bargaining units of the
Respondent's employees, both of which are represented by
the Union. Collective-bargaining agreements covering both
units were effective from May 31, 1973, to June 1, 1976. In
each there was a termination clause the effect which was
that in the event neither party give notice to "terminate or
cancel" the respective contract 60 days prior to the May 31
expiration date, the contract would remain in full force in
effect for an additional year.
On March 15, 1976, the union business agent sent
identical letters to the Company by which it sought to "re-
open" each contract and to negotiate certain changes.
The Company takes the position that these letters did not
comply with the termination clause of the contracts and
accordingly, each contract was automatically renewed as of
June 1, 1976. Thus the Respondent states that it will
bargain with the Union concerning any matters not
covered by either contract, but it is not obligated to
bargain concerning modification of any term.
The General Counsel alleges that by refusing to bargain
with the Union concerning mandatory subjects, specifically
including proposed amendments to wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment, the Company has
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
An additional issue in this matter concerns the unit of
district managers, all of whom the Respondent claims are
supervisors, inasmuch as they are in charge of the paper
carriers. The General Counsel contends that the paper
carriers are independent contractors. Thus the district
managers do not supervise employees of the employer and
are therefore not supervisors within the meaning of Section
2(1 1) of the Act.
All parties were represented by counsel and were given
the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of
the witnesses, briefs, and arguments of counsel, I hereby
make the following:
I The name of the Respondent appears as amended pursuant to the
Respondent's posthearing motion, which is hereby granted.
229 NLRB No. 77
476
THE OAKLAND PRESS CO.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Michigan corporation, engaged in
the business of publishing and printing a newspaper of
general circulation. During the calendar year 1975, a
representative period, the Respondent had gross revenues
in excess of $1 million, advertised various nationally sold
products revenues from which exceeded $500,000, and
purchased goods, products, and materials valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
Michigan.
The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, it is
admitted by the Respondent to be, and I find, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE BARGAINING UNITS
Although the Respondent did not admit the appropriate-
ness of the unit description for the circulation department
truckdrivers and city truckdrivers, there is no evidence in
the record that this is not an appropriate bargaining unit.
Since at least 1972, the Respondent has in fact recog-
nized the Union as the bargaining representative for such a
unit. The Respondent and the Union have negotiated
collective-bargaining agreements covering the unit of
circulation department truckdrivers and so far as can be
determined from the record, the Respondent continues to
recognize the Union as the representative of these employ-
ees. Accordingly, I conclude that the following is a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All Circulation Department Truckdrivers and City
Dealer Drivers of the Respondent, excluding all other
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
As indicated above, the Respondent denies the appropri-
ateness of the unit of district managers on grounds that
these individuals are supervisors within the meaning of the
Act. Thus the Respondent argues that it may voluntarily
bargain with the representative of such employees, but it
need not do so and failure to do so is not violative of the
Act.
The question of whether the district managers constitute
an appropriate bargaining unit depends on the status of
some 1,250 individuals who deliver newspapers for the
Respondent.
The Respondent contends that these 1,250 individuals
are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) and since
the district managers have the authority to hire them, fire
them, direct them, and the like they are necessarily
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act.
The General Counsel, on the other hand, contends that the
paper carriers are independent contractors and therefore
the district managers are not supervisors of employees.
Without necessarily concluding that the carriers are
independent contractors, I do agree that they are not
employees. And whatever supervisory authority the district
managers may exercise, it is not supervision of employees.
Therefore they are not supervisors within the meaning of
the Act. Newsday, Inc., 171 NLRB 1456 (1968).
As to the status of the paper carriers, the evidence and
argument is directed principally to the question of whether
or not they are independent contractors. Of course if they
are, then they are not employees. But that is not the real
issue. The real issue is whether these individuals are
employees. I conclude they are not, without deciding
whether they are actually independent contractors.
The Respondent sought to show that it maintains control
over the manner and means by which the carriers deliver
the papers, and the Respondent presented evidence of a
number of indicators found by the Board to establish such
"right of control." On the other hand, the General Counsel
sought to establish that the Respondent controls only the
result-delivery of the newpapers to specified customers by
a certain time each day. And the General Counsel
presented evidence of some indicators found by the Board
to demonstrate lack of control over the manner and means.
In brief, the material facts show that most of the 1,250
paper carriers are children of approximately 12 years of age
who have rather small routes and who deliver the
newspaper on their skateboards, bicycles, by walking, or on
horseback. (There are about 35 motor routes handled by
adults.) They typically have about 50 subscribers on their
routes and typically make about $2 a day from this work-
4 cents per paper. (The motor carriers have 175-200
subscribers and are paid 6 cents per paper, 2 cents of which
is to cover automobile expenses. Thus the adults make $7
to $8 per day, plus expenses.) They do not own their routes
and indeed if they fail to deliver the papers or appropriate-
ly collect for them, they are summarily terminated.
The evidence also shows that typically these young
people maintain their routes for a period of 6 months to a
year. (The adults tend to keep their routes somewhat
longer.)
It is difficult to conceive that subteenage children who
carry newspapers for a period of 6 months to a year for
which they are paid in the range of $2 a day are
entrepreneurs in the traditional sense of an independent
contractor. This, however, does not necessarily mean that
they should be considered employees. Their employment, if
any, is very minimal, amounting to only a few hours a week
and lasts, as indicated, typically less than a year. The
question here is not so much whether a 12-year-old who
delivers newspapers I hour a day on a skateboard is an
entrepreneur, but whether, as a matter of policy, they (or
the adults) should be treated as employees.
Though the factors cited by the parties do have some
bearing on whether one is found to be an independent
contractor or not, there are additional, and important,
considerations here.
Specifically, the Respondent has always treated the
carriers as nonemployees, and still does. The Respondent
does not consider them employees for purposes of income
477
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tax withholdings, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act,
unemployment compensation, or workmen's compensa-
tion.
Unlike other employees, the carriers sign a "lease"
agreement and post a $10 bond. The Respondent has
clothed them with indicia of independent contractors, and
in 1970 agreed that they were nonemployees when the
district managers unit was organized.
From the record as a whole, it is clear that the
Respondent's contention that these carriers are employees
is taken for purposes of this case only.
Newsday, Inc., supra, was also a case involving whether
district managers who supervised carriers were employees
and, as here, this hinged on the status of the carriers. The
carriers' duties, their ages, pay, method of delivery were
essentially identical to the facts here. The employer, as
here, had always considered carriers to be "independent
contractors." The Board found that the carriers not to be
employees and hence the district managers were not
supervisors. The Board therefore found appropriate the
petitioned-for unit of district managers. As to the foot
carriers, Newsday is on all fours with the instant case. The
motor carriers' situation here is not sufficiently different to
change the result.
I therefore conclude that the district managers are
employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act
and are not supervisors in that they do not exercise
supervisory control over other employees of the employer.
The following is a unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act:
All Circulation Department District Managers of the
Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The 1973-76 contracts covering the two bargaining units
in question have identical "termination" articles which
read, in material part:
This Agreement shall be in full force and effect from
June 1, 1973, to and including May 31, 1976, and shall
continue in full force and effect from year to the year
thereafter, unless written notice of desire to cancel or to
terminate the Agreement is served by either party upon
the other at least sixty (60) days prior to the date of
expiration.
On March 15, 1976, Elton L. Schade, secretary-treasurer
of the Union, wrote identical letters to the Respondent
which stated, in material part:
You are hereby notified that Newspaper Drivers and
Handlers Local 372, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, desires to continue its current
collective bargaining agreement with your firm, but
2 The contract requires bargaining to commence at least 45 days before
the May 31 expiration date. Though mentioned in its brief, the Respondent
apparently does not contend that violation of this language excused its
also to negotiate certain changes or revisions in its
provisions, including those set forth in memorandum
agreements and other supplements thereto to take
affect during the contract period commencing June 1,
1976.
Local 372 offers to meet and confer with your
representatives for the purpose of negotiating said
changes or revisions at a mutually convenient date,
time and place.
The changes or revisions to be negotiated will be sent
to you at a later date.
The Respondent's new labor counsel, Robert Ballow,
received this letter sometime on or after April I. He
concluded that the Union had not followed the language of
the termination clauses of the contracts and therefore did
not, by sending this letter, appropriately terminate either
contract. Ballow concluded that the two contracts would
automatically be renewed for a period of I year.
Negotiation sessions were set up and the parties in fact
met on several occasions in April, May, and June.2 A fair
summary of Ballow's testimony, and that of Schade, is that
during these negotiation sessions Ballow undertook to
construct a record. In effect he stated that, even though the
contract was not appropriately terminated, he nevertheless
wanted to give the Union an opportunity to do so but that
Schade refused.
Thus Ballow argues that the Union's letter was an
attempt on the part of the Union to negotiate changes in
the contract but at the same time not have the contract
terminate, because were the contract to terminate, "con-
tractual provisions" (as opposed to those which covered
mandatory subjects of bargaining) would immediately
come to an end, particulary including dues checkoff.
Ballow's carefully constructed argument has a medieval
tone. Since Schade did not use the appropriate magic
words in the March 15 letter, it could not have terminated
the contract. This, however, does not take into consider-
ation the past history of bargaining between these parties
or other extrinsic evidence which clearly slows the Union's
position and which reasonably put the Respondent on
notice concerning it.
Having carefully considered Ballow's testimony, I am
persuaded that, following receipt of the Union's March 15
letter, he undertook to posture the Respondent in such a
way that by using a technicality, which Ballow admits, the
Respondent would not be required to bargain with the
Union over the subjects covered in the two contracts until
1977. I conclude that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid
the Respondent's obligation to bargain with the Union on
the full range of mandatory subjects. If the March 15 letter
was inartfully drafted, at best the defect was technical.
A mere technical deficiency in complying with the
termination of clause of a contract is not a sufficient reason
to excuse one's obligation to bargain in good faith.
In a substantially similar situation, the union did not give
the proper termination notice under the contract but it did
file with the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service
refusal to bargain. The first session of April 21 (less than 45 days from May
31 ) was arranged on April 6 to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.
478
THE OAKLAND PRESS CO.
Standard Form F-7, a copy of which was sent to the
employer within the appropriate time interval. In finding
that such a notice was legally effective to reopen the
contract for negotiations, the Board adopted Administra-
tive Law Judge Fitzpatrick's reasoning which concluded
that "So long as the essential message was conveyed, it is
not reasonable for Respondent to hold them to the
standards of a Philadelphia lawyer." Champaign County
Contractors Association, 210 NLRB 467, 470(1974).
Similarily, in South Texas Chapter, Associated General
Contractors, 190 NLRB 383 (1971), the union had failed to
use the word "termination" in its reopening letter.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the letter against the contract
clause, the Board concluded that the union had in fact
terminated the contract and the employer was therefore
required to bargain for a new one. The significance of this
case does not involve the particular words of the Union's
letter. Rather, the Board will interpret an ambiguous letter
to find the union's true intent.
I find that the essential message was in fact conveyed,
even if not in the precise, technical terms of the contract. It
is clear from the letter that the Union considered the
contract would expire on May 31 and it wished to negotiate
changes to take effect "during the contract period com-
mencing June 1, 1976." A collective-bargaining agreement
is a total document. Changes in one or more of its terms
necessarily implies termination of the agreement and
emergence of a new one. The Union's March 15 letter
necessarily implied termination.
In 1973, Schade sent the identical letter to the Respon-
dent concerning negotiating new contracts. At that time
there was no question concerning the effectiveness of the
letter and indeed the parties did negotiate new contracts.
Inasmuch as they were unable to reach these agreements
until after the May 31, 1973, expiration date, extension
agreements were entered into.
The point here is that the past practice was to treat the
Charging Parties' letter as a letter to reopen the contract for
negotiation of all substantive terms and absent agreement
prior to May 31 the contract would terminate as of that
date. However, the Union would consider entering into
extension agreements.
Further evidence of Schade's actual intent are his letters
of April II and 19 transmitting the Union's proposals. He
stated in each letter: "Enclosed please find two (2) copies
of the Union's proposal to amend the current District
Managers contract, which expires on May 31, 1976."
Schade would not have used the phrase "which expires
on May 31, 1976," had he in fact taken the position that the
contract would continue in full force in effect after that
date.
The Respondent contends that on every occasion from
April 6 on, when asked if he intended by his March 15
letter to have terminated the contracts, Schade responded
in the negative. Thus at the April 21 meeting, Ballow gave
Schade a letter which said, in material part, "It is the
understanding of The Oakland Press that any agreement-
written, oral, or implied-or any condition of employment
between the parties will terminate as of May 31, 1976."
Since Schade did not agree to the conclusions of this
letter, such means, according to the Respondent, that the
Union did not intend that the contracts would terminate as
of May 31. Such is a possible construction of Schade's
response. Equally possible, and in my view more probable,
Schade did not believe that all conditions of employment
should or would terminate.
At the April 21 meetings, and those which followed,
Ballow may very well had been talking about terminating
the collective-bargaining agreement but keeping such
matters as wages in effect, at least until impasse. However,
I believe Schade when he says that he thought Ballow was
talking about terminating the collective-bargaining rela-
tionship. Schade may be an experienced labor representa-
tive but that does not necessarily mean that he is totally
versed in the fine nuances of words of art in these matters.
At best there was confusion and no real meeting of the
minds concerning what the parties meant when they talked
about what the Union intended by its March 15 letter.
Ballow testified from extensive notes he took during the
negotiating sessions. As indicated, the thrust of his
testimony is that he asked the union spokesman (normally
Schade but on occasion Edgar Scribener, the Union's
president) whether the Union had intended to terminate
the contract. Every time he was told no. While I have no
doubt that Ballow's testimony is literally accurate, I am
also convinced that it is incomplete and does not present
the true picture.
For instance, Ballow testified concerning the May 26
meeting in part:
He [Scribener] said the union was going to operate
on the same basis that it has operated in the past. The
union felt it had a contract which expired on May the
31st, 1976. He understood the company's position, that
they had a one year extension. And I said, "Now, Mr.
Scribener, you've injected a new word into this. You
are now using the word 'expire' for the first time that I
have heard it."
It may be that this was the first time a union representa-
tive had actually spoken the word "expire" during their
meetings. But this was not the first usage of the word in this
matter. Schade's letters of April 11 and 19 transmitting his
proposals referred to the contract "which expires on May
31, 1976."
In any event, regardless of what occurred on and after
April 21, the question is whether or not the letter of March
15 was sufficient to terminate the contract such that the
Respondent would be required to negotiate with the Union
for a successor agreement and bargain in good faith on all
mandatory subjects.
I find that the Union substantially complied with the
termination clause of the contract. In addition to sending
the letter of March 15, Schade filled out the Federal
Mediation Conciliation Service Form F-7 which also went
to the Respondent. Reading the letter in light of the parties'
past practice, along with the FMCS Form F-7, there can
be no doubt concerning what the Union had in mind-to
reopen the collective-bargaining agreement for negotiation
on all matters involving wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment. In short, to terminate the 1973-
76 contracts and negotiate new ones at any time.
479
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent cites several cases where the Board
"strictly construed" the provisions of a contract which
foreclosed automatic renewal. These cases are substantive-
ly distinguishable in that they dealt with the time period
within which notice must be sent. Even so, "the Board will
consider mitigating circumstances, in determining the
timeliness of a notice," such as the postal service not
promptly delivering the letter. Mailing the letter was
considered to be compliance with the termination clause.
United Electronics Institute of Iowa, 222 NLRB 814 (1976).
This situation is in any event more analogous to
Champaign County Contractors Association, supra, and
South Texas Chapter, Associated General Contractors, supra,
where the Board looked through form to substance and
found sufficient compliance with the termination clause to
foreclose automatic renewal.
But the Respondent contends that the Union had a
reason for not actually terminating the contract during
these negotiations-namely, to be able to have the
production of the picket line clause should other unions
strike. The Respondent also argues that, upon termination,
the "noncontractual" checkoff provision would automati-
cally end, and this the Union did not want. There is no
evidence, however, that during their several meetings
Ballow ever explained this Byzantine reasoning when he
was attempting to "clarify" the Union's position. Further,
there is no evidence that other unions would strike during
the period following May 31 when the Union and the
Respondent might still be negotiating. Finally, there was
no picket line clause in the district managers' contract and
therefore Ballow's reasoning would not be applicable to
that situation in any event. Nor does it follow that the
checkoff clauses would automatically terminate.
In attempting to give credibility to its contention that it
believed the Union had not terminated the contract, the
Respondent attributes a strategy to the Union that I find it
did not have.
Each of these contracts has a no-strike probation. Thus
the Respondent's reasoning also implies that the Union set
out to negotiate changes knowing that the Respondent was
not required to bargain concerning those subjects covered
in the contracts and knowing that it was foreclosed from
using economic pressure. Such is so unreasonable that the
Respondent could not seriously have believed this to be the
Union's bargaining posture.
I am persuaded that the Respondent knew what the
Union had in mind when it sent the March 15 letter-to
renegotiate, as it had in the past, a new contract, which
implies termination of the old. Had Ballow accepted this
and undertaken to negotiate with the Union during April
and May, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
contract would have been executed by May 31 or at least
shortly thereafter. It is also reasonable to believe that the
parties would have entered into an extension agreements as
they had in the past. By raising this issue of whether the
Union's notice effectively "terminated" the contract, the
Respondent obstructed what had previously been an
amiable collective-bargaining relationship. By doing so and
by now refusing to renegotiate with the Union concerning
all mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Respondent has
violated its obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to decide
the additional issue of whether or not the Respondent
waived the alleged inadequacy of the notice.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Oakland Press Company, a Subsidiary of
Capital Cities Communications, Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. All circulation department truckdrivers, and city
dealer drivers of the Respondent, excluding all other
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act is
a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. All circulation department district managers of the
Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act is a unit appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. The above-named Union is, and at all times material
hereto has been, the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the units described in
paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
6. On or about March 15, 1976, the Union sent
appropriate notices to the Respondent pursuant to the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreements in
existence between it and the Respondent covering employ-
ees in the units above described to terminate or cancel the
respective contract and to renegotiate a new contract.
7. The Respondent, by failing and refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the above-described units concerning
mandatory subjects of bargaining since on or about April
21, 1976, has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in an unfair
labor practice, I will recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I will recommend that the Respondent be ordered, upon
request from the Union, to bargain with the Union as the
representative of the employees in the units herein found
appropriate concerning all mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing, and if an understanding is reached to embody the
same into a written signed agreement.
I further recommend that the Respondent post the notice
set forth in the appendix attached to this Decision.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
the entire record in this matter, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
480
THE OAKLAND PRESS CO.
ORDER 3
The Oakland Press Company, Detroit, Michigan, a
Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc., its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively upon
request with Local 372, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America as the exclusive representative of its employees in
the above-described appropriate units with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is
affected by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action deemed neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization as exclusive representative of all
employees in the above-described bargaining units with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment and if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) Post at its principal office copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
:' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall he
deemed waived for all purposes.
4 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we have violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice and to comply
therewith.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively,
upon request, with Local 372, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of
our employees in the appropriate units described below
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The bargaining units are:
All Circulation Department Truckdrivers, and
City Dealer Drivers, excluding all other employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
All Circulation Department District Manag-
ers, excluding all other employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
any labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the
extent that such right is affected by the proviso to
Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with
Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as
the exclusive representative of our employees in the
appropriate units described above with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
THE OAKLAND PRESS Co.,
A SUBSIDIARY OF CAPITAL
CITIES COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.
481