NYSE Group, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 2, 2021

2021000337 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/574,930 12/18/2014 Amy Joy Farnstrom NGI-14-1080R 1999
35811 7590 06/02/2021
IP GROUP OF DLA PIPER LLP (US)
ONE LIBERTY PLACE
1650 MARKET ST, SUITE 5000
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
EXAMINER
WARDEN, MICHAEL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto.phil@us.dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte AMY JOY FARNSTROM,
STEVEN G. CRUTCHFIELD, and JAMES HYDE
____________

Appeal 2021-000337
Application1 14/574,930
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI,
NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection2 of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, and 28. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies NYSE Group, Inc. as the real party
in interest.
2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on March 5, 2020 (“Final Act.”).
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We affirm.
THE INVENTION
Appellant states the invention relates to: “the field of electronic
trading systems, and in particular, systems for handling limit and market
orders.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A system comprising:
one or more specialized computers, in communication
with one or more external electronic exchanges through a
network, comprising computer-readable instructions stored on a
non-transitory computer-readable storage medium and executed
by at least one processor, said one or more specialized computers
further comprising:
at least one monitoring component;
an order manager subsystem; and
an execution manager subsystem,
the order manager subsystem configured to:
monitor, over the network, via the at least one monitoring
component, one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at the
one or more external electronic exchanges;
determine, in response to said monitor, that an away BBO
price among the one or more away BBO prices is a better price
than a display price for an initiating order for at least one external
electronic exchange of the one or more external electronic
exchanges, wherein the better price comprises a higher price if
the initiating order has a sell side and a lower price if the
initiating order has a buy side;
activate a specifically designed BBO router module when
the order manager subsystem determines the better price, the
BBO router module configured to perform the specific function
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of dispatching full or partial orders to the one or more external
electronic exchanges, said orders having been received by said
system, and the execution manager subsystem configured to:
identify, via the at least one monitoring component, at
least one irregular transaction from among the received orders
based on one or more predetermined conditions; and
temporarily halt a trading operation, thereby preventing
execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction.
THE REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, and 28 are rejected under 35 USC § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–10 in the
Final Office Action and on pages 3–11 in the Examiner’s Answer,
concerning the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28 as a group. (Appeal
Br. 3). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so
the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;4 see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior
to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should
not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent
those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance.
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05.
The Specification states:
The advent of certain types of trading has narrowed the spread
between available best bids and best offers (defined below),
which may decrease profits available to market participants.
Additionally, the prices of markets may change significantly
relative to bid-offer spreads, which could lead to unexpected
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losses for market participants. These (and other) factors may
decrease available liquidity at the best bid and offer prices. As a
result, orders (particularly large orders) may expect to receive
prices differing from the best bid or best offer prices. Due to the
lack of price predictability, market participants making certain
types of orders must price these orders by manually contacting
other market participants. This manual pricing process is
inherently slow and error-prone. Additionally, orders priced
outside of an exchange may not fetch an efficient price because
some market participants are not consulted.
Spec. ¶ 2.
In one embodiment, the exchange includes risk management
functionality to identify irregular trades. Irregular trades may be
identified based on a trade quantity and/or percentage above
thresholds set by the exchange and/or market participants.
Irregular trades may also be identified based on a series of trades
having too many trades having a trade quantity or percentage
above thresholds.
Spec. ¶ 8.
In one embodiment, the exchange monitors best bid and best
offer prices at away exchanges and the NBBO (defined below).
Based on availability of better prices at an away exchange, the
exchange may route all or part of an order. The exchange may
include execution instructions that determine how an order
interacts with prices at away exchanges. Other execution
instructions may cancel an order that is not filled immediately or
after a price improvement auction.
Spec. ¶ 9.
Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:
monitor, . . . one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at the
one or more external electronic exchanges; determine, in
response to said monitor, that an away BBO price among the one
or more away BBO prices is a better price than a display price
for an initiating order for at least one external electronic
exchange of the one or more external electronic exchanges,
wherein the better price comprises a higher price if the initiating
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order has a sell side and a lower price if the initiating order has a
buy side; . . . when the order manager . . . determines the better
price, . . . perform the specific function of dispatching full or
partial orders to the one or more external . . . exchanges, said
orders having been received by said system, and the execution
manager . . . identif[ing], . . . at least one irregular transaction
from among the received orders based on one or more
predetermined conditions; and temporarily halt[ing] a trading
operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one
identified irregular transaction.
Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a
way of monitoring one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at one or
more external exchanges to identify at least one irregular transaction from
among received orders and temporarily halting a trading operation of the at
least one identified irregular transaction. This is consistent with the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is “related to a concept related to the
economy or commerce.” Final Act. 3. Preventing irregular trades on
commercial exchanges is a fundamental economic principle because
conducting trades within thresholds promotes fairness and an even playing
field on which transactions take place and, thus, maintains true market
equilibrium. Fundamental economic principles are ones of certain methods
of organizing human activity that are abstract ideas. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
The limitation of “temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby
preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction” is
deemed a post-solution activity. See, Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (“The notion
that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself,
can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
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solution activity to almost any mathematical formula.”)
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “computers,” “a network,” “a non-transitory computer-
readable storage medium,” “at least one processor,” and a “BBO router
module.” These components are described in the Specification at a high
level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34, 50–53, Figs. 1 and 2. We fail to see
how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or
of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53. This is consistent with the Examiner’s findings which we adopt
as our own herein:
This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical
application because the claims only recites system components
for implementing the abstract idea. The claims recite the
additional limitations of one or more specialized computers, one
or more external electronic exchanges, a network, computer-
readable instructions, a non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium, at least one processor, at least one monitoring
component; an order manager subsystem; and an execution
manager subsystem, and are recited at a high level of generality
and amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the
exception using a generic computer.
(Final Act. 7–8).
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a certain
method of organizing human activity absent computer components and/or of
a system so integrated into the judicial exception as to impose a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to financial instruments, does not make them any less abstract. See
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OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:

The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because, when considered separately and as an ordered
combination, they do not add significantly more (also known as
an “inventive concept”) to the judicial exception.
Final Act. 8. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer. They do not.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 225.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify
the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of
the most basic functions of a computer. Limitations such as “wherein the
better price comprises a higher price if the initiating order has a sell side and
a lower price if the initiating order has a buy side,” are not steps, but a
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recitation of data characterization. In short, each step does no more than
require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The
claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the
computer itself. The Specification spells out different generic equipment
and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular
steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34, 50–
53, Figs. 1 and 2. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly
more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified,
generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis
(monitor/determine/activate/identify/halt operation) and storing is equally
generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of
receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and
receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of
processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering
of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
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We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Appeal Br. 3–20; Reply Br. 1–5). We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues: “Thus, the distinctiveness of the claimed operations
and functions is evidenced by the lack of any prior art rejections in the Final
Action. Indeed, the lack of any prior art rejections in the Final Action is,
instead, more indicative that the Appellant's claims are indeed
unconventional.” (Appeal Br. 5).
We disagree with Appellant. Although the second step in the
Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the
analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a
search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–18
(citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery
does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
Appellant asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that “the very purpose of electronic transaction systems is to maximize
throughput by automatically executing huge volumes of inbound electronic
orders.” (Appeal Br. 6). And Appellant argues that “[b]y introducing an
intentional delay into this automatic execution (as in Appellant's invention),
the claimed invention is necessarily causing the system to operate in a
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manner that is completely contrary to its very purpose.” (id. (emphasis
omitted)).
We are not persuaded by Appellant because first, as found above, the
limitation of “temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby preventing
execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction” is a post-
solution activity. See, Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
Second, the act of temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby
preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction is the
product of the mental step of evaluating, which is an abstraction.
Although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a
whole (Appeal Br. 13–14), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is
directed to the abstraction of a way of monitoring one or more away best
bid-offer (BBO) to identify at least one irregular transaction. As found
supra, claim 1 only includes generically recited device limitations. What
remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations, are
abstractions, i.e.;
determine, in response to said monitor, that an away BBO price
among the one or more away BBO prices is a better price than a
display price for an initiating order for at least one external
electronic exchange of the one or more external electronic
exchanges, wherein the better price comprises a higher price if
the initiating order has a sell side and a lower price if the
initiating order has a buy side; . . . determine[] . . . : identify[ing],
. . . at least one irregular transaction from among the received
orders based on one or more predetermined conditions.
(Appeal Br. 9–10). “A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90) (emphasis omitted); see also BSG Tech.
LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been
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clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
Appellant argues,
At a minimum, the elements above certainly amount to
significantly more than any abstract idea, and none can possibly
be construed as well-understood, routine, and conventional in
this art. As such, Claim 1 indeed provides an inventive concept.
Any attempted rebuttal by the Office of said inventive concept
would necessarily require factual evidence under Step 2B and the
Berkheimer standard.
(Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis omitted)).
We disagree with Appellant because an “inventive concept” is
furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the
claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim
as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception
itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). On
page 17 of Appellant’s Brief, Appellant cites to three claim elements which
it asserts cannot “possibly be construed as well-understood, routine, and
conventional in this art.” (Appeal Br. 17). But, the functions attached to
these devices are all items for which a computer is designed, namely,
identifying an order, routing dispatches and stopping execution of a
command, respectively. Further, the purported solution requires the use of a
server, device, and network operating in their ordinary and conventional
capacities. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26.
The Appellant does not, and cannot, claim to have invented the use of
the required “computers,” “network,” “non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium,” “at least one processor,” and a “BBO router module.” The
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“focus” of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335) or on the network itself
(see Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d
1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), but rather on using the server, device, and
network as tools to implement the abstract idea in the particular field of
monitoring away trades. See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court and [the Federal
Circuit] have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of
the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not
render the claims any less abstract.”)
Finally we disagree with Appellant that the claimed “monitor[ing],
. . . one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices” (Appeal Br. 8) does not
constitute “data gathering and storing,” and hence is an abstraction.
Gathering information of a particular content and analyzing this information
in particular ways falls squarely under the abstract idea umbrella. Elec.
Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no
deficiencies in the Examiner’s determination of patent ineligibility of the
rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection
of claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–9,
and 11–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–9,
11–28
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–9,
11–28

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED