Nydia M. Riden, Appellant,v.Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 1, 1998
05970314 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 1, 1998)

05970314

10-01-1998

Nydia M. Riden, Appellant, v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.


Nydia M. Riden v. Department of the Treasury

05970314

October 1, 1998

Nydia M. Riden, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Request No. 05970314

) Appeal No. 01963141

Robert E. Rubin, ) Agency Nos. TD-96-2111

Secretary, )

Department of the Treasury, )

Agency. )

)

)

DECISION ON REQUEST TO RECONSIDER

On December 21, 1996, the Department of the Treasury,(hereinafter referred

to as the agency) timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (Commission) to reconsider the decision in Nydia

M. Riden v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, EEOC

Appeal No. 01963141 (December 5, 1996). EEOC regulations provide that

the Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider any previous decision.

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration must submit

written argument or evidence which tends to establish one or more of

the following three criteria: new and material evidence is available

that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved an erroneous

interpretation of law, regulation, or material fact, or a misapplication

of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); and the decision is of

such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). The agency requests reconsideration pursuant to

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the agency's

request is denied. We do, however, exercise our discretion to grant

reconsideration on our own motion for the reasons discussed herein.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the previous decision properly reversed the agency's final

decision finding that appellant's allegation of harassment failed to

state a claim.

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed a formal complaint alleging that, based on race

(Hispanic), color (White), sex (female), age (41), national origin

(Mexican), religion (Episcopal) and reprisal (for prior EEO activity)

she was harassed and subjected to a hostile work environment when

critical, humiliating and disparaging remarks were made by management

staff during a meeting on October 6, 1995. Appellant asserted that

the harassment was ongoing, occurred on various dates and created a

hostile work environment. Appellant also repeatedly asserted that she

was not permitted to utilize the assistance of her representative during

EEO counseling. The previous decision reversed the agency's dismissal

of appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that

appellant's allegation stated a claim because appellant alleged that

the incidents were part of a pattern of harassment. In reaching this

determination, the decision cited the Commission's decision in Osborne

v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960111 (July 19, 1996),

indicating, in pertinent part, that in Osborne, the Commission held that

"As long as [the appellant in Osborne] alleged that she was harassed

because of her sex, she states a claim under Title VII." Id. The decision

advised appellant to contact an EEO Counselor if she wished to pursue

her allegation, raised on appeal, that the harassment had caused her

"constructive discharge" from the assignment at issue.

In support of its request for reconsideration, the agency asserts that

appellant's reliance on the Osborne decision is misplaced and that the

meeting at issue fails to state a claim of harassment in that it is an

isolated incident without any demonstrated effect on appellant.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

After a review of the agency's request for reconsideration, the previous

decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that the agency's

request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and it

is the decision of the Commission to deny the request. We do, however,

exercise our discretion to reconsider on our own motion solely to

clarify the previous decision's discussion of the concept of an aggrieved

individual in the context of a harassment claim.

An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee

or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R.� 1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (Apr. 21, 1994).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that an agency shall

dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim under �1614.103.

In Cobb v. Dept. of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March

13, 1997), the Commission has recently reaffirmed what is required in

harassment cases in order to state a claim under the aforementioned

regulation. In conjunction with its discussion of existing precedent

in this area, the Commission advised that (1) the ultimate merit of the

allegations (whether they are true/whether discrimination has occurred)

may not be considered<1>; and (2) the complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the

complainant can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle the complainant to relief. The Commission further instructed that

claims of harassment should be accepted where the complainant has made

factual allegations which, when considered together<2> and treated as

true, are sufficient to state a claim either of (1) disparate treatment

regarding hiring, termination, compensation or any other specific term,

condition, or privilege of employment; or (2) a hostile or abusive

work environment. Cobb, at p. 7. The Commission held that "a claim of

harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment to which the

complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of the complainant's employment....[t]he trier of

fact should consider whether a reasonable person in the complainant's

circumstances would have found the alleged behavior to be hostile or

abusive." Cobb, at pp. 6-7.

While the Commission has held that "a few isolated incidents of alleged

harassment usually are not sufficient to state a harassment claim,"

[Cobb, at p.5], in this case, appellant checked off numerous forms of

adverse action in her informal EEO complaint and has alleged, without

elaboration, that the harassment was ongoing, occurred on various dates

and created a hostile work environment. Appellant further alleged that

the harassment and hostile work environment thereby created resulted in

her loss of a specific desirable assignment as a leader of the agency's

Trade Enforcement Team. Significantly, appellant also repeatedly asserted

that she was not permitted to utilize the assistance of her representative

during EEO counseling. Thus, additional language has been added to the

order of the previous decision to afford appellant the opportunity to

meet with an EEO Counselor in order to more closely define the substance

of her allegations of harassment. A footnote has been added to direct

the agency to consolidate, if practicable, any constructive discharge

allegation raised by appellant with her allegations of harassment.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the agency's request for reconsideration, the previous

decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that the agency's

request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and it

is the decision of the Commission to DENY this request. The Commission

exercises its discretion, however, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a)

to reconsider the decision on its own motion. The decision in EEOC Appeal

No. 01963141 (December 5, 1996) remains the Commission's final decision

as clarified herein. The agency is directed to comply with the order

set forth below. There is no further right of administrative appeal from

a decision of the Commission on this request for reconsideration.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegation in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. Initially, however, the agency shall afford

appellant the opportunity to meet with an EEO Counselor in order to

more closely define the substance of her allegations of harassment.<3>

The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant that it has received the

remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the

agency receives this decision. The agency shall issue to appellant a

copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant of the

appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days of the

date the agency receives this decision, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgement to appellant and a copy

of the correspondence that transmits the investigative file and notice

of rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report

shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the

appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29

C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil

action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or

following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the appellant has the

right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance

with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil

action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in

42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil

action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any

petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

OCT 1, 1998

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1In Osborne v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960111

(July 19, 1996), the Commission stated, in dicta, that as long as the

appellant in that case had alleged that she was harassed because of her

sex, she stated a claim. The Cobb decision clarified that, by this

statement in Osborne, the Commission did not intend to overrule, without

discussion, its longstanding policy and practice of determining whether a

complainant's harassment allegations were legally sufficient to state a

claim. The Commission explained that in Osborne, the agency's conclusion

as to whether appellant's complaint met the definition of sex-based

harassment went to the ultimate truth or merits of her allegation, rather

than to whether her allegations stated a claim and noted that the

Commission has repeatedly reversed such agency dismissals where they were

based on the agency's view of the merits of the case rather than on the

legal sufficiency of the claim.

2The Commission stated that, when considering whether a harassment

complaint states a hostile or abusive work environment claim, the decision

maker must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents and remarks.

3The agency is also directed to consolidate, if practicable, any

allegation raised by appellant concerning her resignation from her

assignment as the leader of the Trade Enforcement Team with her

allegations of harassment herein.