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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 25, 2019

14689339 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/689,339 04/17/2015 Francisco Javier VILLANUEVA 83512127 1036
28395 7590 10/25/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
NAVAS JR, EDEMIO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2483
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FRANCISCO JAVIER VILLANUEVA,
JAVIER SANCHEZ, and JUAN ESTEBAN RIIVERA
____________________

Appeal 2019-001031
Application 14/689,339
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, BETH Z. SHAW, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.

YAP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final rejection of claims 1, 3, 6–9, 11–17, and 19–20.1 (Final Act. 1 (Final
Office Action, mailed February 15, 2018, “Final Act.”).) We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Ford Global Technologies, LLC. as the
real party in interest. (Appeal Br. 2.)
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Application 14/689,339

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to the Specification, Appellant’s invention “relates to a
vehicle camera enclosure, and in particular embodiments, relates to an
enclosure for a translatable vehicle camera.” (Spec., ¶ 1 (Specification filed
April 17, 2015, “Spec.”).) Claims 1, 8, and 15 are illustrative, and are
reproduced below (with minor reformatting):
1. A vehicle camera system comprising:
a housing defining an opening;
a camera lens disposed within the opening;
a cover rotatable from a closed position in which the
cover extends across the opening to an open
position; and
a processor programmed to cycle the camera lens
between inward and outward positions and the
cover between the closed and open positions such
that the cover repeatedly brushes against the lens to
clean the lens.
8. An enclosure for a vehicle camera including a lens
comprising:
a housing defining an opening: and
a cover extending across the opening and including
inner and outer layers of different opaque materials,
wherein the vehicle camera is translatable between
inward and outward positions, and some of the
materials contact the lens while the vehicle camera
translates from the inward position to the outward
position through the cover to clean the cover.
15. A vehicle camera system comprising:
a camera translatable between inward and outward
positions; and
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an enclosure partially enclosing the camera and
having an opening and a cover including flaps
extending across the opening, the flaps having
closed and open positions; and
a processor programmed to cycle the camera
between the inward and outward positions through
the cover as the flaps move between the closed and
open positions to repeatedly brush the flaps against
the camera.

Prior Art and Rejections on Appeal
The following table lists the prior art relied upon by the Examiner in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Name Reference Date
Freeland US 3,715,149 April 16, 1971
Major US 4,415,242 Nov. 15, 1983
Kamps et al. (“Kamps”) US 2011/0211062 Al Sept. 1, 2011
White et al. (“White”) US 2012/0302834 Al Nov. 29, 2012
Dowell US 2013/0129338 Al May 23, 2013
Neff US 8,818,187 B1 Aug. 26, 2014
Laroia et al. (“Laroia”) US 2016/0004144 Al Jan. 7, 2016

Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 15, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being unpatentable over Freeland, Laroia, and Kamps. (See
Final Act. 2–6.)
Claims 8, 9, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Freeland, Dowell, Laroia, and Kamps. (See Final
Act. 6–9.)
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Claim 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Freeland, Dowell, Laroia, Kamps, and Neff. (See Final
Act. 9.)
Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Freeland, Dowell, Laroia, Kamps, and White. (See Final
Act. 9–10.)
Claim 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Freeland, Laroia, Kamps, and Major. (See Final
Act. 10–11.)

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are not persuaded the Examiner
erred in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

“to cycle the camera lens between inward and outward positions and the
cover between the closed and open positions such that the cover repeatedly
brushes against the lens to clean the lens”
With respect to independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that the
combination of Freeman, Laroia, and Kamps teaches the limitations of this
claim. (Final Act. 2–4.) Specifically, according to the Examiner, even
though Freeman “fails to teach a processor programmed to cycle . . . ,”
Laroia and Kamps teach this limitation. (Final Act. 5–6.) The Examiner
cites to paragraph 93 of Laroia and paragraph 15 of Kamps and explains that
“[i]t is obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that Laroia’s teaching of
comprising a computerized system[,] which identifies a dirty lens and
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attempts to clean or minimize contamination on the lens[,] would be
combinable with Kamps’ teaching of a lens with an inner-cleaning portion[,]
which may clean the lens during opening and closing.” (Id. at 6.)
Appellant contends that “these references lack [] the concept of
repeatedly cycling a camera lens between inward and outward positions2 and
a cover between closed and open positions such that the cover repeatedly
brushes against the lens to clean the lens.” (App. Br. 3.) Specifically,
Appellant contends that there is neither any mention of cycling or
“repeatedly brushing” in these references. (Id.; Reply Br. 2.)
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. In particular, we agree with
the Examiner’s finding that as “seen between FIG. 3 and 4 of Freeland, a
lens cover may be placed between an open and closed position, respectively,
and as such may be placed between inward and outward positions.” (Ans. 3;
Final Act. 3 (explaining rotation between an open and closed position).)
Therefore, we agree that Freeman teaches “cycle the camera between the
inward and outward positions.”
With regard to Appellant’s arguments regarding “repeatedly brushes,”
we first note that this term only appears in independent claims 1 and 15 (and
their dependent claims); independent claim 8 does not contain this
limitation. Appellant contends that in Kamps, “opening a cover for camera
use does not suggest repeatedly opening and closing the cover.” (App. Br.
3.) We are not persuaded by this argument because we agree with the
Examiner that “Kamps indeed teaches enabling the lens cover to clean the

2 We note that claims 1, 8, and 15 recite cycle/translatable “between inward
and outward positions” and do not recite “repeatedly cycling a camera lens
between inward and outward position.”
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lens upon opening and closing of the lens cover [and] in view of Laroia’s
teachings [that] when a dirty lens is determined, an operation may be [used]
for the lens cover to clean the lens.” (Ans. 3–4; Kamps ¶ 15 (“a cleaning
element in the form of a cleaning lip, a micro-nonwoven or the like can be
provided on the inside of the protective element so that the protective
element cleans the lens of a camera unit during opening or closing”); Laroia
¶ 93 (“upon the identification of a dirty lens a camera cleaning module
translates or causes to move the identified lens or an associated lens cover to
clean or move to a different area on the lens, the dirt or other contamination
on the identified dirty lens.”).)
As the Examiner explains, and we agree, “the claim language does not
specify a time limit of ‘repeated cycling’ [sic],” therefore, “it is understood
by one of ordinary skill in the art that as long as a dirty lens is determined,
the lens may be repeatedly cleaned by the system through the use of the lens
cover.” (Ans. 3.) Appellant contends that “translating or moving the lens or
cover[, in Laroia] does not suggest repeatedly closing and opening the cover
and repeatedly moving the lens inward and outward as such would likely
smear the dirt rather than move the dirt . . . .” (App. Br. 3.) However,
Laroia states that the lens cover can be used to clean the lens: “upon the
identification of a dirty lens a camera cleaning module translates or causes to
move the identified lens or an associated lens cover to clean or move to a
different area on the lens . . . .” (Laroia ¶ 93.) Therefore, Appellant’s
attorney argument is not supported by evidence in the record. Moreover, as
discussed above, the Examiner uses the combination of Laroia and Kamps to
show that the lens may be repeatedly cleaned by the system through the use
of the lens cover. (Ans. 3.) Kamps teaches “a cleaning element in the form
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of a cleaning lip, a micro-nonwoven or the like can be provided on the inside
of the protective element so that the protective element cleans the lens of a
camera unit during opening or closing” while Laroia teaches that “upon the
identification of a dirty lens a camera cleaning module translates or causes to
move . . . an associated lens cover to clean . . . the dirt or other
contamination on the identified dirty lens.” (Kamps ¶ 15; Laroia ¶ 93.)
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 and independent claims 8 and 15, which are not argued
separately. (App. Br. 3.) We also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
dependent claims 3, 6, 7, 9, 11–14, 16, 17, and 19–20, which depend from
either claim 1, 8, or 15 and are not argued separately. (Id. at 4.)

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basic Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 6, 7, 15, 16,
19, and 20 103(a)
Freeland,
Laroia,
and
Kamps
1, 3, 6, 7, 15,
16, 19, and 20
8, 9, and 11 103(a)
Freeland,
Dowell,
Laroia,
and
Kamps
8, 9, and 11
12 103(a)
Freeland,
Dowell,
Laroia,
Kamps
and Neff
12
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Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basic Affirmed Reversed
13 and 14 103(a)
Freeland,
Dowell,
Laroia,
Kamps
and
White
13 and 14
17 103(a)
Freeland,
Laroia,
Kamps,
and
Major
1, 3, 6, 7, 15,
16, 19, and 20
Overall
Outcome
1, 3, 6–9, 11–
17, and 19–20

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3, 6–9, 11–17, and
19–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED