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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 16, 2019

14428406 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/428,406 03/16/2015 Michael Meyer 4015-9131 / P38355-US1 1819
24112 7590 10/16/2019
COATS & BENNETT, PLLC
1400 Crescent Green, Suite 300
Cary, NC 27518
EXAMINER
SLOMS, NICHOLAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2476
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/16/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL MEYER, NADIA BRAHMI, and JOACHIM SACHS
Appeal 2019-000760
Application 14/428,406
Technology Center 2400
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24–26, 30–33, 37, and 41–54. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (publ). Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-000760
Application 14/428,406
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to vehicle-to-vehicle communication. See
Spec., Abstract. Claim 24, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
24. A method for controlling vehicle-to-vehicle
communication, the method comprising:
a vehicle-to-vehicle communication device receiving data
from a cellular network implementing a first radio technology,
the data indicating a risk of collisions of transmissions from the
vehicle-to-vehicle communication device and from other
vehicle-to-vehicle communication devices by a second radio
technology;
the vehicle-to-vehicle communication device setting at
least one control parameter of vehicle-to-vehicle
communication by the second radio technology based on the
data from the cellular network;
wherein the at least one control parameter relates to a rate
of periodically sending a vehicle-to-vehicle Cooperative
Awareness Message by the second radio technology.
REJECTIONS
Claims 24–26, 30–33, 37, 41–44, and 46–53 stand rejected under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nagai (US
2012/0314615 A1, Dec. 13, 2012), Papadimitratos (“Vehicular
Communication Systems: Enabling Technologies, Applications, and Future
Outlook on Intelligent Transportation,” IEEE Comm. Magazine, Nov. 2009),
and Kherani (US 2011/0238987 A1, Sept. 29, 2011). Final Act. 7.2
Claims 45 and 54 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Nagai, Papadimitratos, Kherani, and Farrag (US
2012/0182867 A1, July 19, 2012). Id. at 11.

2 Although not identified in the preamble of the rejection, the body of the
rejection addresses claims 46–53. Final Act. 9–10.
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Application 14/428,406
3
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
ANALYSIS
Appellant initially contends the cited references fail to teach or
suggest claim 24’s “vehicle-to-vehicle communication device receiving data
from a cellular network implementing a first radio technology, the data
indicating a risk of collisions of transmissions from the vehicle-to-vehicle
communication device and from other vehicle-to-vehicle communication
devices.” Appeal Br. 5–7 (emphasis added). Appellant focuses on Kherani,
arguing Kherani fails to teach or suggest this limitation because “the vehicle
10 of Kherani merely determines and implements an optimal inter-certificate
refresh period,” which is “not received at all, let alone from a cellular
network.” Id. at 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner newly finds that “Nagai highly implies
and/or teaches that [its] control information indicates a risk of data collisions
between terminal apparatuses.” Ans. 3. Specifically, the Examiner finds
that Nagai’s “base station adjusts the respective transmission periods
depending on the amount of traffic in order to account for the priority given
to communications between vehicles.” Id. Nagai teaches, “the base station
apparatus adjusts a length of the IP period according to a traffic amount in
the inter-vehicle transmission period” and that thereby, “the inter-vehicle
communication has priority over the IP communication.” Nagai ¶ 37. The
Examiner concludes,
[i]t likely would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention, that this congestion
indication, which is indicated by the respective transmission
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period control data, is an indication of a greater chance of [data]
collision. This is because such a judgement or analysis by one
of ordinary skill in the art is founded in common sense—when
there are more communications being transmitted, there is a
greater chance of collision.

Ans. 3–4.
Appellant does not address these new findings in the Reply Brief. See
Reply Br. 2–4. Arguments not made are waived. See Frye, 94 USPQ2d at
1075 (The Board “reviews . . . rejection[s] for error based upon the issues
identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon,” and treats arguments not made as waived.). Accordingly,
Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner erred with respect to this
disputed limitation.
Appellant next contends Nagai fails to teach or suggest claim 24’s “a
cellular network implementing a first radio technology” and “vehicle-to-
vehicle communication devices by a second radio technology.” See Appeal
Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant contends, “Nagai does not stipulate that the
base station utilizes any particular radio technology or that such a radio
technology is different than a radio technology utilized by a terminal device
for vehicle-to-vehicle signal transmissions.” Id.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, Nagai’s “communication between a vehicle and a base station
is a different technology than communication between a vehicle and another
moving vehicle.” Ans. 7. The Examiner also finds that “IP communication
as opposed to non-IP communication is a different technolog[y] as discussed
in Nagai (e.g. [0035] and [0036]).” Id. Further, the Examiner finds that
Appellant attacks the references individually because “Papadimitratos
teaches the utilization of multiple types of wireless transceivers within on-
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board units of cars.” Id. at 8; see Papadimitratos, 90. Appellant does not
address these findings and, therefore, does not persuade us the Examiner
erred.
Appellant further contends Nagai fails to teach or suggest claim 24’s
“the at least one control parameter relates to a rate of periodically sending a
vehicle-to-vehicle Cooperative Awareness Message by the second radio
technology.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant contends, “Nagai does not disclose or
suggest that the at least one control parameter set by the claimed vehicle-to-
vehicle communication device indicates (or is even related to) a rate of
periodically sending a vehicle-to-vehicle message by the second radio
technology.” Id. Appellant contends that “Nagai . . . describes aspects of
the one-to-one communication between the terminal apparatus and the base
station during the defined IP period of the superframe, which is a completely
different period of the defined superframe than the inter-vehicle transmission
period during which any inter-vehicle transmissions are confined.” Id.
(citing Nagai ¶ 37). “Nevertheless,” Appellant contends, “even if the
entirety of Nagai is considered, the reference is simply silent with respect to
periodically sending any vehicle-to-vehicle messages, let alone setting a
control parameter indicating a specific rate for periodically sending such
messages.” Id.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, “Nagai teaches wherein the
periodicity of communications is set based on the control information
received from the base station.” Ans. 8; Final Act. 6, 8 (citing Nagai ¶ 37).
Specifically, Nagai teaches that “[t]he control information includes
information about a period for the base station . . . to broadcast-transmit . . .
a ‘road-to-vehicle-transmission period[.]’” Nagai ¶ 29. Nagai also teaches,
“the base station apparatus adjusts a length of the IP period according to a
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traffic amount in the inter-vehicle transmission period,” and “[i]n this
manner, the inter-vehicle communication has priority over the IP
communication.” Id. ¶ 37. The Examiner also newly finds that Nagai’s
communication of “inter-vehicle transmission period timing . . . (see, e.g.,
figures 7A–C)” teaches or suggests the claimed “at least one control
parameter relate[d] to a rate of periodically sending a vehicle-to-vehicle
[message].” See Ans. 8. Figures 7A–C are reproduced below:

Figures 7A–C illustrate example superframe formats. Nagai ¶ 19. In Figure
7B, for example, the inter-vehicle transmission period in the second
subframe is longer than the inter-vehicle transmission period in Figure 7A’s
second subframe.
Appellant does not address the Examiner’s new finding with respect
to Figures 7A–C of Nagai. See Reply Br. 4–5. Arguments not made are
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waived. As Appellant does not address this finding, Appellant does not
persuasively distinguish Nagai.
Appellant next contends Papadimitratos “does not disclose that a
cellular network is used for transmitting data indicating a risk of collisions
between different vehicle-to-vehicle transmissions by different vehicles.”
Appeal Br. 8. But Appellant overlooks that the Examiner relies on
Papadimitratos for teaching or suggesting cellular networks and relies on
Nagai and Kherani for teaching or suggesting data indicating a risk of
collisions. Ans. 8–9. The Examiner correctly finds that Appellant attacks
the references individually, and thus, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive.
Id. at 9.
Finally, Appellant contends, “the Office Action appears to imply that
Papadimitratos teaches systems that utilize a first radio technology for
vehicle-cellular communication while utilizing a second radio technology
for vehicle-vehicle communication.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends,
“Papadimitratos fails to disclose or suggest a system or service that utilizes a
cellular network to relay control information to a vehicle where the control
information is used to define a parameter for vehicle-to-vehicle
communication utilizing a different radio technology than the cellular
network.” Id. at 8–9. But, as we explained above, the Examiner relies on
Nagai for the control information and relies on Papadimitratos for the
cellular network, and the Examiner also relies on Nagai for teaching or
suggesting different radio technologies. Final Act. 7–8. Appellant again
attacks the references individually.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24.
Appellant’s arguments regarding the rejection of independent claims 32, 43,
and 44 rely on the same arguments as for claim 24, and Appellant does not
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argue separate patentability for the dependent claims. See Appeal Br. 9. We
therefore also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25, 26, 30–33, 37
and 41–54. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
24–26, 30–
33, 37, 41–
44, 46–53
103 Nagai,
Papadimitratos,
Kherani
24–26, 30–33,
37, 41–44,
46–53

45, 54 103 Nagai,
Papadimitratos,
Kherani, Farrag
45, 54
Overall
Outcome
24–26, 30–33,
37, 41–54

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED