nullDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 29, 201913973277 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/973,277 08/22/2013 Yugo HAYASHI RYM-723-3821 2668 27562 7590 11/29/2019 NIXON & VANDERHYE, P.C. 901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR ARLINGTON, VA 22203 EXAMINER WHITAKER, ANDREW B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3629 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/29/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com pair_nixon@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YUGO HAYASHI ____________ Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4 and 6–21, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Nintendo Co., Ltd. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention relates generally to “sharing information between users.” Spec. 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system, comprising: a stationary sensor device configured to sense an activity of a user of the system; and an information processing device, including a computer processor, the information processing device at least being configured to: automatically send data dependent on an application as shared information triggered by occurrence of a predetermined event, the predetermined event being sensing an end of the user’s activity by the stationary sensor device, and the shared information being representation of the activity of the user of the system and identifying a community to which the user of the system belongs from among one or more communities relevant to the application, the identified community including a group of users having a common interest; receive shared information sent from another user, who belongs to the identified community to which the user of the system belongs, the shared information sent from the another user being representative of activity of the another user; and output information generated based on the shared information received by the receiving unit. REJECTIONS Claims 1–4 and 6–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5. Claims 1–4 and 6–13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Ross et al. (US 2013/0339111 A1; published Dec. 19, Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 3 2013) (“Ross”) and Gilley et al. (US 2008/0086318 A1; published Apr. 10, 2008) (“Gilley”). Final Act. 8. Claims 14–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Ross, Gilley, and Dugan (US 5,947,868; issued Sep. 7, 1999). Final Act. 17. ANALYSIS Section 101 Rejection An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 4 economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019 PEG Update”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 5 (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018)). See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See id. at 56. 2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1 Under the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner concludes that the claims are directed to “the concept of organizing human activities, which corresponds to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts,” reciting steps of “gathering information from different data sources (i.e., ‘sensing an end of at least one of the user’s activity’ i.e. activity data of users), analyzing said gathered data and displaying certain information/results of the gathered and analyzed data.” Final Act. 5 (citing Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 6 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Specifically, the Examiner determines that the “claims are similar to the electronic record keeping of human behavior (activities) which are able to be shared within an identified community (data recognized in a memory),” which “pertain to managing relationships or transactions between people, social activities, and human behavior.” Final Act. 5. Appellant contends that claim 1 “is not directed to an abstract idea,” and rather “recites specific, non-abstract, tangible structure.” Appeal Br. 9; see Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing Thales Visionix, Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); Reply Br. 2–3. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner that the claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity. See Final Act. 5–6; 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant’s invention is titled “Information Sharing System.” Spec. 1. In the Specification, Appellant describes allowing a user to “ascertain attributes and specific activities of other users whose shared information has been received.” Id. at 20. Specifically, “shared information is selectively shared between users belonging to a community” to make it “easier to share information between users having a similar purpose,” which promotes “communication between users” and makes it “easy to have an opportunity to interact with a user actively using the information sharing service.” Id. at 21. For example, claim 1 recites a system performing a method comprising: automatically send data . . . as shared information triggered by occurrence of a predetermined event, the predetermined event being sensing an end of the user’s activity . . ., and the shared information being representation of the activity of the user of the system and identifying a community to which the user of Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 7 the system belongs from among one or more communities relevant to the application, the identified community including a group of users having a common interest; receive shared information sent from another user, who belongs to the identified community to which the user of the system belongs, the shared information sent from the another user being representative of activity of the another user; and output information generated based on the shared information received . . . . Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Claim 11 recites similar limitations in a “non-transitory storage medium storing a program for causing a computer to execute the steps of . . . .” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). Claim 12, likewise, recites an “information sharing system” comprising “a plurality of information-processing devices” which include “stationary sensor devices” and a “processing system, including a computer processor,” as well as a “server device” performing similar limitations. Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.). Claim 13 also recites a “method” claim performing similar limitations. Appeal Br. 20–21 (Claims App.). Appellant has not persuasively argued why the claim limitations above are not directed to organizing human activity—specifically, “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. As stated in the Specification, Appellant seeks to provide an “information sharing service” that is “a social network service (SNS) provided to users using a same application,” where a “user is able not only to browse shared information sent from another user, but also to establish a relationship with another user by following him/her or registering him/her as a friend.” Spec. 14. Appellant further seeks to allow a “community [to be] formed according to a user’s preference or purpose.” Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 8 Id. at 15. As supported by the Specification, each of the above claim limitations are directed to managing relationships and interaction between people, including social activities (i.e., sending shared information representing the activity of a user and identifying a community to which the user of the system belongs, receiving shared information from another user belonging to the same identified community, outputting information based on the shared information). Accordingly, we conclude claims 1, 11, 12, and 13 recite a certain method of organizing human activity (managing personal relationships or interactions between people, including social activities) as identified in the 2019 Guidance, and thus an abstract idea. Furthermore, the claims also recite mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the “sending or sharing of physical activity to users of a community is not unique to the internet and could be performed by pen and paper by a human being.” Ans. 4–5. For example, claim 1 recites “send[ing] data dependent on an application as shared information triggered by occurrence of a predetermined event . . . the shared information being representation of the activity of the user of the system and identifying a community to which the user of the system belongs.” Independent claims 11, 12, and 13 recite similar limitations. As determined by the Examiner, a person could manually “post[] on a company bulletin board that a user ran 3 miles for a companywide weight loss or exercise challenge as well as writ[e] in their weight loss as observed from an analog scale.” Ans. 5. Appellant has not persuasively argued why the claim limitations italicized above cannot be Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 9 practically performed by a human, either mentally, manually, or with the use of pen and paper. See, e.g. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The recitation of certain computer components in the claims (e.g. “information- processing devices,” “stationary sensor devices,” “computer processor,” “server device”) does not impose sufficiently meaningful limitations on claim scope beyond these mental steps. Intellectual Ventures, 838 F.3d at 1318; Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278–79. Accordingly, we conclude claims 1, 11, 12, and 13 recite certain methods of organizing activity and mental processes as identified in the 2019 Guidance, and thus an abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2 In determining whether the claims are “directed to” the identified abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of elements) recited the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Appellant argues that the claims “use a stationary sensor device in a nonconventional manner to provide the technical improvement of sharing of information which is triggered by sensing an end of user’s activity by the stationary sensor device.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant also argues that “[a]utomatically sending data dependent on an application as shared information triggered by occurrence of the predetermined event of sensing Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 10 an end of the user’s activity as required by claim 1 provides the technical improvement of sending the data without a user’s explicit instructions.” Id.; see Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 6. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Ans. 3–6; Final Act. 5–6. The claims recite additional limitations including a “stationary sensor device,” “information processing device, including a computer processor,” “receiving unit,” and “server device.” Appellant does not direct our attention to any disclosure in the Specification that indicates these claimed computer components are anything other than generic computer components. See, e.g., Spec. 6–9; Figs. 2–4. For example, the Specification describes that the main device is “a computer device that . . . executes a program for measuring an amount of a physical activity, in response to an input operation by a user” that also “sends shared information to server device 700 according to an input operation by a user or based on a result of execution of a program, and performs image display control of terminal device 300 and display device 500.” Spec. 7. The “server device” is a “computer device that receives shared information from each user, and sends it to other users,” by “connect[ing] to plural main devices” over a “network . . . to exchange shared information with the devices.” Spec. 9. Simply implementing an abstract idea using conventional machines or devices “add[s] nothing of substance.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226–27; see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84– 85 (explaining that “simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine” does not suffice for patent eligibility (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64–65, 71 (1972))). Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 11 Moreover, Appellant has not sufficiently shown that the claims are directed to an improvement to the computer system or technological process. For example, Appellant characterizes the claims as “providing a solution in which ‘shared information sent from a user belonging to a community to which the user belongs is selectively sent’ to thereby make it ‘easier to obtain information from users having a preference or purpose similar to that of the user.’” Appeal Br. 12–13 (quoting Spec. 20–21); see Reply Br. 6. However, Appellant has not shown that sharing information between users in a community changes the manner in which the sensor device (that senses an activity of the user) or information processing device (that shares information) operates or changes the functionality of the sensor device or information processing device itself. Instead, Appellant’s Specification describes “send[ing] shared information at a time that a user indicates by an input operation” or “automatically . . . send[ing] shared information at a predetermined time such as when an indoor training exercise is finished.” Spec. 13. Therefore, the claims are meant to make it easier to obtain information from the users, which can be done through user input or at a predetermined time without user input. As the Examiner properly reasons, the sharing of information between users “could be performed by pen and paper by a human being (i.e. posting on a company bulletin board that a user ran 3 miles for a companywide weight loss or exercise challenge as well as writing in their weight loss as observed from an analog scale . . . ).” Ans. 4–5. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself” or “effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.” Ans. 6. Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 12 Appellant also argues that the claimed stationary sensor device is similar to the sensors in Thales. See Appeal Br. 10–12; Reply Br. 4–5. Specifically, Appellant argues that the “stationary sensor device is configured to sense an activity of a user of the system” which “require[s] specific, non-abstract, tangible structure rather than the insignificant extra solution activity of data gathering.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Appeal Br. 10– 11. According to Appellant, the claimed sensor device is not merely involved with data gathering because it “provides output used in significant configuration to ultimately improve sharing of information which is triggered by sensing an end of user’s activity by the stationary sensor device.” Appeal Br. 11; see Appeal Br. 13–14. We are not persuaded. In Thales, the patent at issue disclosed “an inertial tracking system for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving reference frame.” 850 F.3d at 1344. The Federal Circuit determined that the claims satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one because they were directed to using “inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors in measuring the relative position and orientation of a moving object on a moving reference frame.” Id. at 1348–49. Unlike the claims in Thales, the claims here do not utilize sensors in a non-conventional manner. Nor do they specify a non-conventional manner for arranging the sensors. For example, the Specification describes that an “activity meter” is a “portable measuring instrument that measures an amount of physical activity of a user” that “includes an acceleration sensor and an altitude sensor.” Spec. 3–4. The Specification also describes a “load input device” as “an input device for inputting a load” that “measures a load applied to the planar part using a load sensor.” Spec. 5. The Specification, therefore, Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 13 describes the sensors (i.e., activity meter with acceleration sensor and altitude sensor, load input device) as conventional sensors that collect data. We agree with the Examiner that the claimed sensor, unlike in Thales, “is simply used to collect data” and “there is no significant calculation or algorithm used to more accurately calculate something such as a position and orientation of an object on a moving platform.” Ans. 3–4. As the Examiner properly reasons, the claimed “‘stationary sensor’ is the sensor of the originally filed disclosure that is only capable of sending measured data i.e. extrasolution data gathering activities.” Ans. 4. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the claims fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. 2019 Guidance, Step 2B Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Mayo framework, we look to whether the claims (a) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner determines that the claimed additional elements (e.g., a “stationary sensor device,” an “information processing device” including a “computer processor,” “server device”) “are recited at a high level of generality and are recited as performing generic computer functions routinely used in computer applications . . . that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities [that] amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.” Final Act. 6. Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 14 Appellant argues that there is “insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s allegation that the . . . claim limitations ‘are well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Reply Br. 5–6 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We are not persuaded. As discussed above, the Specification describes the claimed computer-system components generically and evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g., Spec. 3–9; Figs. 2–4. Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the claimed computer components perform anything other than the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of monitoring, communicating, manipulating, and displaying data. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355 (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept). Given the claimed generic computer-system components performing generic computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each independent claim does not supply an “inventive concept” that Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 15 renders the claim “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Thus, the claims do not satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two. For at least the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, as well as independent claims 11, 12, and 13, with commensurate limitations, and dependent claims 2–4, 6–10, and 14–21, which were not separately argued. Section 103 Rejections Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Ross and Gilley teaches or suggests “automatically send[ing] data dependent on an application as shared information triggered by occurrence of a predetermined event, the predetermined event being sensing an end of the user’s activity by the stationary sensor device,” as recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claims 11, 12, and 13? Appellant argues Gilley “says nothing about transmitting data to a server automatically as specifically triggered by the occurrence of sensing an end of the user’s activity by the stationary sensor device.” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Gilley ¶¶ 14, 79, 147). Specifically, Appellant argues Gilley’s “updating the performance metric . . . when the sensor data indicates that the user has completed a set of the prescribed activity . . . does not disclose automatically sending data depending on an application as shared information triggered when ‘the sensor data indicates that the user has completed a set of the prescribed activity.’” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Gilley ¶ 147). According to Appellant, Gilley “says nothing about sending data automatically as specifically triggered by the occurrence of sensing an end of the user’s activity by the stationary sensor device” or that “the partner’s Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 16 electronic device sends the partner’s performance metrics to the user’s electronic device automatically.” Reply Br. 8. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Rather, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Gilley’s sensors in devices such as a treadmill teach the claimed stationary sensor device, and Gilley’s activities and feeds being “automatically updated when user has completed prescribed activity” teaches the claimed automatically sending data triggered by occurrence of the sensing of the end of the user’s activity. Final Act. 9 (citing Gilley ¶¶ 14, 79, 82, 147, 156, 164–65, and 167–69; Fig. 22); see Ans. 7. For example, Gilley discloses that “electronic device 1400 can automatically update performance metric 1906 based on data collected by sensors 208,” and “if performance metric 1906 tracks the number of sets completed by the user, electronic device 106 can update the performance metric when the sensor data indicates that the user has completed a set of the prescribed activity.” Gilley ¶ 147. Gilley further discloses that the “user’s electronic device and the partner’s electronic device can each log the performance metrics of each person,” the “partner’s electronic device can send the partner’s performance metrics to the user’s electronic device,” and the “user’s electronic device then can compare the user’s performance metrics to those of the partner.” Gilley ¶ 168. In other words, Gilley teaches updating performance metrics when a set is completed and communicating the updated performance metrics between users. The claimed automatically sending data triggered by sensing the end of the user’s activity (“without a user’s explicit instruction”) does not preclude Gilley’s updating the performance metrics when a set is completed (without user intervention). See Spec. 13. Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 17 Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Gilley’s updating performance metrics when a set is completed and communicating the updated performance metrics between users teaches “automatically send[ing] data dependent on an application as shared information triggered by occurrence of a predetermined event, the predetermined event being sensing an end of the user’s activity by the stationary sensor device,” as recited by claim 1. For at least the above reasons we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent claims 1, 11, 12, and 13. For the same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of dependent claims 2–4, 6–10, and 14–21, not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 7. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–4 and 6–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 6–21 101 Eligibility 1–4, 6–21 1–4, 6–13 103 Ross, Gilley 1–4, 6–13 14–21 103 Ross, Gilley, Dugan 14–21 Overall Outcome 1–4, 6–21 Appeal 2019-000375 Application 13/973,277 18 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation