Norvel R. Wright, Complainant,v.Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Contract Management Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 6, 2009
0120082746 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 2009)

0120082746

03-06-2009

Norvel R. Wright, Complainant, v. Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Contract Management Agency), Agency.


Norvel R. Wright,

Complainant,

v.

Robert M. Gates,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Contract Management Agency),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120082746

Hearing No. 550-2008-00031X

Agency No. YM070014

DECISION

On May 28, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's April

23, 2008 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), GS-1102-12 at the

Defense Contracting Management Agency ("DCMA"), Northern California.

On February 7, 2007 complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he

was discriminated against on the bases1 of race (African-American), color

(black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity [under Title VII],

when:

(1) he was not promoted to a GS-1101-13 ACO position based on

accretion of duties; and,

(2) he was denied the opportunity to compete for the two GS-1101-13

ACO positions.2

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to

the case granted the agency's January 17, 2008 motion for a decision

without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March

31, 2008.

The AJ addressed issue (1) and found that assuming complainant could

establish a prima facie case of discrimination/retaliation, the agency

has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Specifically, the Team Leader stated that the work that the ACOs who

received promotions were performing was at a higher grade than that

performed by complainant. The AJ found that in fact the record showed

that these two ACOs had been performing duties beyond their position

descriptions for three to four years prior to their positions being

accreted. The AJ found that the ACOs were also the only individuals

holding a GS-1102-12 position within their organizational units. The AJ

noted that complainant alleged he had in the past performed duties at

the GS-13 level prior to joining DCMA and during his tenure at DCMA, and

that the agency partially disputed this. Noting that all disputed facts

will be resolved in complainant's favor, the AJ found that complainant

still did not show that he was currently performing duties at the GS-13

level when the position descriptions were reviewed in the Spring of 2006.

The AJ found that no proof of pretext had been established.

The AJ addressed issue (2) noting that he had considered complainant's

argument that his name was left off the organizational chart so as to not

allow him to compete for the two positions of GS-13 ACO. The AJ found

that even considering complainant's argument in a light most favorable

to him, the evidence adduced is insufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact that the GS-1101-13 positions were intentionally not

announced for competition so as to exclude complainant from consideration

because of his race, color or prior EEO activity. The AJ found that

complainant did not prove discrimination. The agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove

that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

Complainant did not submit any new arguments in support of his appeal.

The agency asks the Commission to affirm its final order. In rendering

this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual

conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see

also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision

without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and

legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that

the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC

"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its

interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing). Here, the AJ

properly issued a decision without first holding a hearing in this case.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming complainant could establish a prima facie case of

discrimination on the alleged bases, the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions in issue (1). Specifically, the

Team Supervisor, Team Navy 2, was responsible for reviewing all GS-1102-12

position descriptions, including complainant's, to assess whether the

position should be accreted. She determined that two GS-1102-12 ACOs

(not in complainant's protected groups) were currently performing

duties beyond what was described in their position descriptions,

and recommended that these positions be accreted to a GS-1101-13. Two

Human Resources Specialists reviewed the accretion documentation to

insure that each position accreted met the stated criteria. The Team

Supervisor did not recommend accretion for complainant's position, or any

of the other GS-1102-12 ACOs. Management indicated that complainant's

position description was not forwarded on to Human Resources because

his position description accurately reflected his actual job duties.

Complainant has not presented persuasive evidence of discriminatory

or retaliatory animus. As to issue (2), complainant has not presented

evidence that the challenged actions were more likely than not, based on

his membership in a protected group. Accordingly, based on a thorough

review of the record, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, D.C. 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 6, 2009

__________________

Date

1 Complainant initially alleged sex and age discrimination as well,

but subsequently withdrew these bases. These bases are not addressed

herein.

2 Issues (1) and (2) are inextricably related as they refer to the same

two promotions to GS-1101-13 ACO positions.2

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0120082746

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013