North Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 1, 1976

225 N.L.R.B. 1114 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

1114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
North Electric Company and Catherine Price and
Communications Workers of America
North Electric Company and Communications Work-
ers of America, Petitioner . Cases 10-CA-10940,
10-CA-11017, and 10-RC-10126
September 1, 1976
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO
On September 11, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Max Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Pe-
titioner-Charging Party Communications Workers of
America filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
On August 14, 1975, the Respondent, distributed
to all employees its annual review of "employee ben-
efit programs and rates of pay." This announcement
indicated, inter aha, that all employees would receive,
effective January 27, 1975, a general wage increase of
31.3 cents an hour. The petition in this case was filed
6 days after this announcement. As more fully de-
tailed in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
the subsequent election campaign was earmarked by
a significant concern with the possibility that if the
Petitioner won the election the employees in the vot-
ing unit might lose the announced wage increase. In
this regard, the fundamental issue presented by the
case is whether the Respondent, through its cam-
paign literature and subsequent explanations of the
meaning of that literature, overstepped the bounds of
legitimate electioneering and impliedly threatened
employees with loss of the increase if they voted for
the Petitioner. We disagree with the Administrative
Law Judge' s assessment of Respondent's tactics and
their potential effect on the outcome of this election
and conclude that Respondent overstepped permissi-
ble boundaries and a new election is required.
While it is true, as the Administrative Law Judge
points out, that Respondent's campaign took place
against a backdrop of the Union's contentions that a
vote for the Union would, necessarily, result in an
improvement of working conditions, including wag-
es, that fact alone does not overcome what we view
as the clear implication in Respondent's "response"
to the union position. The relevant campaign materi-
al distributed by Respondent, reproduced in greater
extent in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
stated:
Bargaining a union contract does not start with
the wages and benefits you now have. All of
your present benefits and wages are open for
negotiations.
[This letter] is about what actually happens if the
union wins the election . . . . If the union wins
the election, it only means . . . one thing . . . .
We do not have to agree to anything. We do not
have to give in to anything. . . . Bargaining
starts with a blank sheet of paper . . . . I can
tell you for a fact that Company representatives
would bargain legally with the union. They
would bargain in good faith, but they would bar-
gain hard. . . .
The Company would bargain in good faith with
the union, but you should know that it frequent-
ly takes a long time to bargain. This is especially
true when you are bargaining with the union for
the first time, for a brand new contract, where
you have not had one before. No one knows
how long those negotiations would last. Some-
times these negotiations go on for months.
Sometimes bargaining for a new contract goes
on for over a year. All the time this bargaining
was going on, your wages and your benefits
would be frozen! . . . Unless there was an
agreement between the union and the Company,
your wages and benefits would be frozen during
negotiations and no one can say how long this
wage freeze would last.
In some instances, unions and companies have
bargained and negotiated for a year or even
more. This is especially true in a first contract.
Unless there is agreement, your wages and bene-
fits are frozen by law during this period.
The theme of this literature was reiterated
throughout the campaign in a considerable number
of employee interviews called by Respondent,'
1 Respondent's contention, with which the Administrative Law Judge ap-
parently agreed , that the supervisory dissemination of Respondent's cam-
paign theme was accomplished in "the normal kind of atmosphere" other-
wise prevailing at Respondent's plant, does not withstand careful scrutiny
The record does demonstrate that Respondent has had an ongoing policy of
225 NLRB No. 153
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1115
through its supervisors, and a brief account of several
of these interviews underscores the nature of the
choice these employees were forced to confront by
virtue of Respondent's campaign stance.
Employee Churchwell was led into a conference
room by his supervisor, Cooper. In the conference
room there was a table with a blank sheet of paper
on it. Cooper told Churchwell, "This [the blank
sheet] is what the union started with . . . . They
could trade you vacations and all their [sic] benefits
if they wanted." Churchwell asked if Respondent
could close down the plant if the Union won. Cooper
responded that he had lost his job because of a strike
in another plant which closed down and that Re-
spondent could do the same. Cooper also told
Churchwell that "if the Union come [sic] in it would
more than likely start out with the minimum wage."
According to employee Murray's testimony, Su-
pervisor Hammett called a conference of some 7-10
employees to comment on a union leaflet which stat-
ed, in part, that a vote for the Union would "stop
many of the activities that you have to put up with
such as a supervisor belittling you, swearing at you,
making you nervous . . . ." etc. Hammett asked the
employees if they had these kinds of problems. He
then indicated that "if the union came in they would
start out with a blank sheet of paper and we wouldn't
be for sure if we would get the benefits that we have
now. We might have less or we might have more."
In response to a question from employee Temple-
ton concerning whether, if the Union won, the em-
ployees would lose their 31-cent increase, Supervisor
Beck told Templeton he did not know but would
check on it. Later Beck told Templeton "that by law
they could take our wages and benefits away from us
but how probable he [Beck] didn't know." Temple-
ton asked him if that meant the employees "would
start from scratch and that we might end up with less
than what we had" at the time. Beck responded,
again , "by law they could." 2
conducting employee interviews on a regular (apparently 6-month) basis
However , our examination of the record reveals that the interviews in this
case were not that kind of interview Witness Pendley testified that the
traditional interviews involved "picking out so many people , they haven't
recently, but ordinarily so many people a week But his time they started by
clock number He [her supervisor ] said they were going to talk to all of the
employees before the union election " And, indeed, the conclusion is inesca-
pable that a significant number of these interviews would not have been
called but for the union campaign Witness McCarthy testified that her su-
pervisor "kept bringing up the union " even though she did not wish to talk
about the matter It was , nevertheless , "all he talked about " No discussion
other than of the campaign appears to have been undertaken in the case of
employee Hickman 's interview In numerous other instances , the interviews
involved little discussion , if any, of noncampaign matters The interview of
employee Dale lasted over 2 hours, more than twice the time , according to
him, normally spent at the traditional interviews The interviews conducted
by Respondent constituted , in our view , a vehicle by which Respondent
implemented its campaign strategy and were not called as a regular course
of events at Respondent's plant
Employee Music was called to her supervisor's
desk and asked what the Union could do for her. "I
said the first thing would be a raise and he asked me
what if the union asked for a nickel and the Compa-
ny said we are not going to give you a penny, what
would happen then." When Music replied that the
Company and Union were to get together and nego-
tiate, the supervisor reiterated "Well, what if the
union asks for a nickel and the Company says they
are not going to give you a penny?"
Supervisor Chapman summoned employee Hick-
man to an interview to determine if Hickman had
any questions about the Respondent's literature. Af-
ter discussing Hickman's questions with regard to in-
centive rates, Chapman asked her if she had any fur-
ther questions. When Hickman responded that she
did not, Chapman stated:
. . . you know that the Company has promised
you a good raise and I [Hickman] said yes and
she [Chapman] said, you know the company
doesn't lie and that all I would get from the
union was lies. And I didn't make any comment
on that. And she said that when they come to
compromise that we would lose everything, I
would lose my raise and we would probably go
back to the minimum wage. And she said, you
know that we aren't going to start with anything
but a blank sheet of paper. We are not going to
start with the benefits you have now and go up
but we'll probably start with a blank sheet of
paper. Then she asked me if I could keep an
open mind about the company and about the
union and I said yes I would. And she asked me
if I remembered the Kingsport Press strike and
Leon Ferenbach strike and I said yes, I remem-
bered them. And she asked me again to think
about it.'
' That Templeton raised the question whether the employees "could get
less" if the Union won, emphasized by the Administrative Law Judge in
discounting the impact of this particular event , is not so much evidence of a
lack of impact as it is of the successful dissemination by Respondent, by the
time of the incident, of what the " issue" in the campaign really was-wheth-
er the employees should risk the established increase by voting for represen-
tation or assure it by voting against representation
3 Chapman's testimony , in relevant part, was confined to the following
colloquy with Respondent 's counsel
Q Did you tell Brenda Hickman that she would lose everything if
the Union came m7
A No, I did not
Q Did you tell Brenda Hickman she would lose all benefits if the
Union came in'
A No
Q Did you tell Brenda Hickman that she would probably go back to
the minimum wage if the Union came m7
A No
Q What did you tell Brenda Hickman?
A I told Brenda that her wages and benefits would be open for
negotiations and until agreement was reached and that her wages
would be frozen during negotiations
Continued
1116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
When such interviews, as well as the significant
number of others described in the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision, most of which, the record re-
veals, would not have been held but for the cam-
paign, are viewed as a total course of calculated con-
duct a and when proper weight is accorded the fact
that the wage increase was already determined, an-
nounced, and scheduled,' the implication of
Respondent's message to its employees becomes
clear. The "facts" that all existing benefits become
negotiable, that the Respondent did not have to
agree to anything and would start bargaining with a
blank sheet of paper, that negotiations, especially
first-time negotiations, take a long time, sometimes
over a year, and that during such time all wages
would be frozen, that no one could say how long
such a "freeze" would last, that the law required such
a freeze,' that the Union could trade all employee
benefits if they wanted, that it was conceivable that
The Administrative Law Judge "accepted" Chapman's version, on the
ground , apparently , that such a version would be consistent with "exactly
what the Respondent had been conveying to the employees throughout the
campaign " The Administrative Law Judge 's approach , then, reflected his
previous findings that the Respondent did not overstep the bounds of legiti-
mate electioneering through its literature and subsequent dissemination of
the substance of that literature We note , however , that Chapman 's testimo-
ny was limited , for the most part , to straightforward denials in response to
counsel ' s questions , that the only narrative of the conversation she supplied
did not dispute Hickman 's statement that Chapman 's remarks were made
after Hickman indicated that she had no further questions (and, therefore,
strikes us as a less plausible and certainly less complete narrative ), and did
not dispute Hickman's testimony concerning Chapman's references to two
prior strikes about which , it was suggested , Hickman should " think " Final-
ly, the record does not support the Administrative Law Judge 's statement
that on cross -examination Hickman "stated that 'the Company was saying
you could gain or you could lose"' or that Hickman "told Chapman that
the former [Hickman ) did not personally feel that the employees would `lose
in negotiations "' Hickman merely testified , in response to Respondent
counsel 's question whether she was aware of the fact that the Company was
saying employees could gain or could lose, "that 's true " Hickman further
testified that she may have indicated by tone of voice to Chapman a person-
al feeling that negotiations would result in gains but she "did not say it " To
the extent , then , that the Administrative Law Judge implied that Hickman
made such statements to Chapman and that such statements tended to sup-
port Chapman 's version , the record does not support those specific findings
"It is not the effect of any one of the objectionable acts standing alone,
however , but the combined effect of all of them , which must be considered "
Home Town Foods, Inc d/b/a Foremost Dairies of the South v N L R B, 379
F 2d 241, 244 (C A 5, 1967)
5 In this sense , the scheduled wage increase , subject to effectuation by the
mere passage of time , is more properly characterized as an "existing" bene-
fit. "[S]tating that `Under the law , an employer is not required even to
continue in effect its existing benefits if a union wins ' carries with it
the coercive implication that the employees may wind up with less than
what they already have , in the event they exercise their lawful right to
bargain collectively , and, accordingly , violates the Act " Astronautics Corpo-
ration of America, 164 NLRB 623, In 2 (1967) The cases cited by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge are, in the context of the announcement of the
increase , therefore , inapposite
6 As a "matter of law" it does not See Russell Stover Candies, Inc, 221
NLRB 441 (1975), Gerbes Super Market, Inc, 213 NLRB 803 (1974) See
also The Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB 95 (1970) "It is well settled
that the employer 's legal duty is to proceed as he would have done had the
union not been on the scene " If the announced wage increase was to take
effect during the pendency of the question concerning representation, the
employer could not withhold it because of the pending question Russell
employees could wind up receiving the minimum
wage, that the only union resort to a hard company
stance was to strike, that strikes at other nearby
plants had resulted in either protracted layoffs, job
loss, or shutdowns, that employees should "think
about" such strikes, and that all employees would get
from a union was lies, even if stated with a "fine
sense of Victorian delicacy,"' and to, at times, but a
few employees, cannot be said to be merely pre-
dictions "carefully phrased on the basis of objective
fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstra-
bly probable consequences beyond his control." 8 In
viewing Respondent's campaign strategy as a contin-
uum, the employees in this case were confronted, by
virtue of that campaign, with a dilemma not unlike
that faced by the employees in Peterson Builders,
Inc, 9 to elect the Union and forego the announced
wage increase pending lengthy negotiations or, in the
alternative, vote against the Union and be guaran-
teed it. We find that Respondent, during the course
of the campaign, engaged in a course of conduct vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by impliedly
threatening the employees herein with loss of their
scheduled wage increase, which, of necessity, inter-
fered with their exercise of free choice in the ensuing
election.10
2. On October 3, 1974, approximately a week be-
fore the election, Respondent distributed to its em-
ployees a leaflet entitled, "What did Leon-Ferenbach
Employees have to say about the Strike?" At the bot-
tom of this leaflet, Respondent inserted the following
parenthetical statement:
(These are exerpts [sic] taken from employee af-
fidavits on file with the NLRB-To protect the
employees who gave the affidavits and the rights
Stover Candies, supra If the question became resolved in favor of representa-
tion, and the union 's economic proposals were limited to acquiescence in
the employer's previously announced plan, the failure of the employer to
agree on the wage level would amount to a refusal to bargain in good faith
N L R B v Benne Katz, etc, d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co, 369
U S 736 745 (1962) Thus whether the employees would "lose" the already
announced wage increase is a question singularly within the bargaining
representative 's province and not subject to the "hard bargaining" in which
the employer might choose to engage
i N L R B v Trojan Powder Company, 135 F 2d 337, 339 (C A 3, 1943)
8 N L R B v Gissel Packing Co, 395 U S 575, 618 (1969)
9215 NLRB 161 (1974) ( Member Penello dissenting ) Member Penello
adheres to his dissent in Peterson but views that case as distinguishable from
the instant one inasmuch as in Peterson no specific wage increase was al-
ready determined, announced , and scheduled In Peterson, the election was
held some 2 weeks prior to the date on which the employer therein custom-
arily announced the results of its wage survey As Member Penello indicated
in Peterson, discretionary increases not previously announced must be negoti-
ated with the collective-bargaining representative and, since the Peterson
employer did not "threaten to take away existing benefits" (emphasis sup-
plied), the employer' s statements with regard to the wage survey involved in
that case were not objectionable Compare Textron, Inc (Talon Division),
199 NLRB 131, 134 (1972), et seq
10 See Gary Aircraft Corporation, 193 NLRB 108 (1971), Ohn Conductors,
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 185 NLRB 467, 479 (1970)
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY
of those referred to in the affidavits, many of
whom will soon be coming to trial, all names
have been deleted.)
The Administrative Law Judge found no merit in
General Counsel's contention that the statement was
unlawful because it created the impression the Re-
spondent had access to confidential files of the
Board. He reasoned "[I]t is not uncommon for Board
agents . . . to take affidavits from employees . . .
and to provide the affiants with copies of their state-
ments. For aught that appears, Respondent may law-
fully have procured the contents of statements by
Leon-Ferenbach's employees . . . ."
While it may not be uncommon for a Board agent
to provide affiants with copies of their statements, it
is not common for affiants to provide employers with
whom they have no connection copies of such state-
ments. In any event, whether Respondent may have
procured the statements lawfully is not as germane as
whether Respondent left, without elaboration, the
impression that it had access to Board files. In our
judgment, the burden is on Respondent to insure
that employees are not led to believe such access
exists. That belief, whether or not correctly held, can
only have an inhibitory effect, not only on the open-
ness of employees providing affidavits, but, more im-
portantly, on their very willingness to provide those
affidavits. The unqualified statement reasonably
tends, in our judgment, to create the impression that
employee affidavits are, as a matter of course, avail-
able to the Respondent. We find the statement viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1).
3. For about the last 10 years, Respondent has dis-
tributed to its employees a booklet entitled, "Your
Guide to the Future." An appendix thereto states, in
pertinent part, a "Rule of Conduct" that "counseling
others to engage in a work stoppage" is a discharge-
able offense.
On November 11, 1974, after being served with the
complaint in Case 10-CA-10940, which alleged the
rule was violative of Section 8(a)(1), Respondent, on
December 5, 1974, amended the rule to clarify its
intent. The Administrative Law Judge, in view of
Respondent's voluntary revision of the rule and the
absence of evidence it was unlawfully enforced, con-
cluded that maintenance of the rule was too minimal
to form a basis for finding a violation or issuing a
remedial order.
The rule is patently invalid on its face." "The Gen-
eral Counsel was not required to show either that the
rule was illegally motivated, discriminatorily en-
forced, or, indeed, enforced at all." Congoleum Indus-
tries, Inc., 197 NLRB 534, 539 (1972). That the rule
11 N L R B v Erie Resistor Corp, 373 U S 221, 233 (1963)
1117
was promulgated throughout and was not modified
until after the disputed election persuades us its
maintenance was not so minimal as to warrant not
finding a violation.12
THE OBJECTIONS
Based upon our findings herein, we shall sustain
Petitioner's Objections 3, 5, and 10 and set aside the
election conducted in Case 10-RC-10126 on October
10 and 11, 1974. We shall remand the case to the
Regional Director for Region 10 to conduct a new
election when he deems the circumstances permit a
free choice of a bargaining representative.
THE REMEDY
We have found, contrary to the Administrative
Law Judge , that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. It is necessary , in order to effectuate the purpos-
es of the Act, that Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from engaging in such unlawful activity.
We shall order the Respondent to post appropriate
notices designed to inform its employees of their
rights, to remove the effects of the unfair labor prac-
tices, and to effectuate our decision and the overall
policies of the Act . We shall further order that the
election of October 10 and 11, 1974 , be set aside.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization, all within the meaning
of the Act.
2. By telling its employees that collective bargain-
ing starts from scratch, or a blank sheet of paper, or
the minimum wage, in a context emphasized the pro-
tracted length of first-time negotiations, and that
during those negotiations wages were "frozen" by the
law, all of which jeopardized a determined, an-
nounced, and scheduled wage increase, in the event
its employees voted in favor of union representation,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By stating in its literature that various state-
ments contained therein were taken from employee
affidavits on file with the National Labor Relations
Board, thereby creating the impression among its
employees that it had access to such confidential
12 Detroit Plastic Molding Co, 209 NLRB 763 (1974), relied on by the
Administrative Law Judge, is clearly distinguishable That case involved the
sole question of whether the promulgation of two rules, one inadvertently
posted for a brief period of time, through clerical error, the other a substi-
tute which at one time was found acceptable by a Board compliance officer,
was violative of Sec 8(a)(1) In the instant case , there is no dispute that the
rule was not "inadvertently" posted and was effective throughout an elec-
tion campaign
1118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
statements, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By maintaining, during the course of the elec-
tion, a rule which prohibited, under penalty of dis-
charge, the counseling of others to engage in work
stoppages, a protected activity under the Act, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are those
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
North Electric Company, Gray, Tennessee, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Conveying to employees the impression that
collective bargaining, by law, requires all existing
benefits including announced and scheduled wage
increases to be frozen and that a vote for a union
jeopardizes such wage increases.
(b) Making statements which leave the impression
that Respondent has access to confidential employee
affidavits on file with the Board.
(c) Maintaining a rule which prohibits employees
from counseling others to engage in work stoppages.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights granted them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Johnson City, Tennessee, plant cop-
ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 10, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be post-
ed by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that those additional portions
of the complaint found to be without merit are here-
by dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case
1974, be, and it hereby is, set aside and that said case
be, and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 10 to conduct a new election when he
deems circumstances permit a free choice of bargain-
ing representative.
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
13 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act gives all employ-
ees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a represen-
tative of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT give you the impression that col-
lective bargaining, by law, requires all existing
benefits, including announced and scheduled
wage increases, to be "frozen."
WE WILL NOT give you the impression that a
vote for a union jeopardizes such wage increas-
es.
WE WILL NOT make statements which give you
the impression that we have access to the confi-
dential affidavits of employees that are on file
with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain any rule which prohib-
its employees from counseling others to engage
in work stoppages.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the ex-
ercise of rights granted you by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
You are free to become members of the Communi-
cations Workers of America, or any other labor orga-
nization.
lO-RC-10126, conducted on October 10 and 11, NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1119
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAx ROSENBERG, Administrative Law Judge: With all
parties represented, this consolidated proceeding was tried
before me in Johnson City, Tennessee, on February 4 and
5, 1975, on a complaint filed by the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board and an answer interposed
thereto by North Electric Company, herein called the Re-
spondent.' Joined with the complaint are objections to an
election conducted by the Board in Case 10-RC-10126
among an appropriate unit of Respondent's employees on
October 10 and 11, 1974, which were lodged by the Com-
munications Workers of America, herein called the Union,
and which the Regional Director for Region 10 consolidat-
ed for hearing with Cases 10-CA-10940 and 10-CA-
11017. At issue is whether Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by certain conduct to be detailed hereinafter,
and whether the foregoing alleged acts of misconduct by
Respondent which antedated the election, and which find
their parallel in the Union's objections to the aforemen-
tioned election, so interfered with the employees' freedom
of choice as to require a second balloting. All parties were
afforded full opportunity to present evidence, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally at the close of
the hearing, and to file briefs. Briefs which have been re-
ceived from the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the
Union have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record made in this proceeding, includ-
ing the briefs filed with me, and upon my observation of
the demeanor of each witness while testifying, I hereby
make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Respondent, an Ohio corporation, with an office and
place of business in Gray, Tennessee, is engaged in the
manufacture of telephone switching equipment. During the
annual period material to this proceeding, Respondent sold
and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the State of Tennes-
see. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is undisputed and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The original complaint alleges that Respondent, by its
supervisors, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the fol-
1 The consolidated complaint, which issued on December 20, 1974, is
based upon charges and amended charges filed and served on September
30, October 4, and November 7 and 22, 1974
lowing misconduct: (a) In a letter to its employees signed
by Plant Manager Harry Smith, on or about September 26,
1974, and by a leaflet distributed to its employees on or
about September 10, 1974, in and about the vicinity of the
plant, Respondent threatened its employees with loss of all
existing benefits if the Union was successful in its organiza-
tional campaign; (b) in a letter to its employees signed by
Plant Manager Harry Smith, on or about September 26,
1974, and by a leaflet distributed to its employees in the
vicinity of the plant on September 27, 1974, Respondent
threatened its employees with loss of a scheduled wage in-
crease if the Union attained exclusive representative status
at its plant; (c) on September 20 and 30, 1974, General
Foreman Donald Latimer and Foreman James Watkins,
respectively, threatened employees with loss of an an-
nounced wage increase and other existing benefits if they
joined or supported the Union; (d) on September 24, 1974,
Foreman James Watkins interrogated employees concern-
ing their union membership, activities, and desires, and
threatened that they would be discharged for joining or
aiding the Union; and (e) since April 1, 1974, Respondent
maintained and distributed among its employees a booklet
entitled "Your Guide to the Future," which provided, inter
alia, for the discharge of employees for "instigating or
counselling others to engage in a work stoppage or slow-
down."
In his consolidated complaint, the General Counsel fur-
ther alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
statute when certain supervisors on various dates prior to
the conduct of the election in Case 10-RC-10126 on Octo-
ber 10 and 11, 1974, (a) interrogated employees concerning
their union membership, activities, and desires; (b) threat-
ened its employees with loss of an announced wage in-
crease and other existing benefits if the Union became
their bargaining agent; (c) threatened employees with clo-
sure of the plant if the Union was successful in the elec-
tion; (d) threatened employees that they would be given
written warnings if they engaged in union activities; (e)
threatened employees that it was futile to support the
Union by informing them that Respondent would not give
a penny when the Union requested a wage increase during
negotiations; (f) prohibited discussions concerning the
Union during employees' worktime while permitting dis-
cussions on other nonwork related subjects during employ-
ees' worktime; (g) prohibited employees from indulging in
activities on behalf of the Union during worktime while
permitting other employees to engage in antiunion activi-
ties during the same time , and (h) distributed leaflets to
employees which contained the statement that "These are
excerpts taken from employee affidavits on file with the
NLRB," thereby creating the impression that Respondent
had access to the confidential files of the Board. Finally,
the complaint charges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act by issuing disciplinary warnings to em-
ployee Randall Phillips because of his activities on behalf
of the Union, and because he had engaged in concerted
activities with other employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. Both the
General Counsel and the Union urge that, because of the
foregoing alleged violations of the Act, the election should
be set aside and a new one ordered. For its part, Respon-
1120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent generally denies the commission of any labor practic-
es banned by the statute, and prays that the election results
be permitted to stand.
In 1966, Respondent opened the Tennessee plant here
involved and during 1974 2 it had an employee comple-
ment of approximately 2,600 workers who were supervised
by approximately 120 supervisors and managers.3 In Feb-
ruary, the Union embarked upon a massive organizational
campaign to enlist the collective support of approximately
2,300 employees in an appropriate unit. Literally hundreds
of prounion employees openly wore union buttons, T-
shirts, and packets in the plant, distributed union literature
at the plant gates, and made home visitations to solicit the
membership of fellow employees. A barrage of union com-
munications representing its organizational goals were
passed out, not only to employees, but to supervisors as
well. With the acquisition of new in-plant organizers, the
Union periodically sent letters to the Respondent during
the campaign apprising it of the identity of these individu-
als. In addition, the Union utilized such mass media as
radio stations and the newspapers to announce its organi-
zational drive and aims. In short, for a period of 8 months,
the Union launched and maintained an aggressive effort to
install itself as the exclusive representative of Respondent's
employees, and the union adherents in the plant made no
secret of their representational sympathies or desires.
On August 20, the Union filed a petition for an election
with the Board in Case 10-RC-10126, and a consent elec-
tion by secret ballot was conducted on October 10 and I I
in a stipulated appropriate unit to determine the existing
question concerning representation. Upon the conclusion
of the balloting, the parties were furnished with a tally of
ballots which showed that, of approximately 2,244 eligible
voters, 762 cast valid votes for, and 1,441 cast valid votes
against , the Union. There were 4 challenged and II void
ballots, a number insufficient to affect the results of the
election . Thereafter, on October 18, the Union filed objec-
tions to the election which find their parallel in the charges
of unfair labor practices filed against Respondent. I turn
now to a consideration of these charges and objections.
The original complaint alleges that, by a letter signed by
Respondent's plant manager, Harry Smith, dated Septem-
ber 26, and distributed to employees at the plant, and by
leaflets distributed to employees on September 10 and 27,
Respondent threatened its employees with loss of all ex-
isting benefits if the Union was successful in its organiza-
tional campaign, and threatened them with loss of a sched-
uled wage increase if the Union became their bargaining
representative, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
Resolution of the foregoing issues requires a brief scan
of the backdrop against which Respondent's written com-
munications were developed. According to the uncontra-
dicted testimony of Respondent's industrial relations man-
ager, Fred Duncan, which was corroborated by General
Counsel's witness, Brenda Hickman, the Union, through-
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter fall in 1974
3 Respondent also operates two other plants, not involved herein, which
are located in Galion and Kenton, Ohio The Galion installation has been
represented by the IAM since 1963, while the Kenton facility has been
under contract with the AIW since 1967
out the course of its drive, persistently advised the employ-
ees that "if they would vote the union in they [the Union]
would get them more and kept suggesting that they could
not lose any of their wages and benefits they could only
gain. . .." In addition, the union leaflets which were dis-
tributed to the employees proclaimed that an election vic-
tory by that labor organization would insure the employees
substantial wage increases with cost-of-living adjustments,
a change in Respondent's rules, incentive pay systems, a
seniority system, and a restructuring of its progression sys-
tem.
In response to these union promises, Respondent first
countered with a notice which it posted on September 10.
Addressed to all employees, the document recited in signif-
icant part:
QUESTION
The union tells us that if we vote for them , we'll get
everything that we now have plus more. Is this true?
ANSWER
No. Bargaining a union contract does not start with
the wages and benefits you now have . All of your pre-
sent benefits and wages are open for negotiations.
Bargaining a union contract starts with a blank sheet
of paper. Until an item is agreed upon by the parties
and put down on that sheet of paper , you do not have
it. Sometimes employees wind up with more, some-
times they wind up with less, and sometimes they wind
up having no more than they had to start with, plus
having to pay union dues.
On September 17, in a leaflet passed out to the employ-
ees, the Union made the following claim-
CAN NORTH TAKE AWAY WAGES, PROMISED WAGES, OR PRE-
SENT BENEFITS9
NO' The NLRB will not allow North to take away
any benefits you presently enjoy. Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer
from making threats of loss of jobs or benefits. The
Bargaining Committee starts with wages and benefits
you presently have or have been promised and im-
proves them If this were not true, there would be no
Union. The Company will continue to try to confuse
you-just as they have tried to put the blame on the
Government for not giving you a decent raise. You
need to realize that they are playing on fear and hoping
you won't find out the truth.
According to Industrial Relations Manager Duncan,
"Confusion continued to be quite extensive throughout the
plant and we continuously were getting questions as to who
was telling the truth. Was the Union telling the truth9 Was
the company telling the truth? Would wages be guaranteed
or not? Would we lose in negotiations or not?" In conse-
quence thereof, the Union's September 17 leaflet prompted
Respondent to issue its letter of Sepember 26, over the
signature of Plant Manager Harry Smith, to all employees.
This letter stated that:
If the Union wins the election, it only means the Com-
pany has to do one thing. All this Company, or any
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1121
company, has to do is to bargain in good faith with
that union. We do not have to agree to anything. We do
not have to give in to anything. We do not even have to
like the union. All we are legally required to do is sit
down with the union and bargain with them
Now here's how that works- As we have told you, you
do not start out with the wages and benefits you have
now. Bargaining starts with the union representatives
sitting on one side of the table and Company repre-
sentatives sitting on the other side of the table. Bar-
gaining starts with a blank sheet of paper. We would
take up each one of our benefits, one at a time, place
it on the bargaining table for discussion and argu-
ment, and it would not go into the contract until each
one had been agreed to. The union will make a request
for things they would like to have, and the Company
will respond by either agreeing or disagreeing with, or
modifying the proposal. There will be some things the
Company can agree to, but there will be many things
the Company cannot agree to. Not one thing goes
down on that piece of paper until it has been agreed to
The only thing employees would get from that bar-
gaining is what was agreed to and put down on that
sheet of paper, not one thing more.
What it amounts to is this: It is just plain old horse
trading. "I'll give you this, if you give me that." I can
tell you for a fact that Company representatives would
bargain legally with the Union. They would bargain in
good faith, but they would bargain hard. The Compa-
ny would do what is legally required, but just like any
other negotiations, we would do our very best in a
cold, calculating and business-like way to out-bargain
the union. We would do what was fair, but we would
not go one step beyond that. There have been a few
incidents where unions have not believed North Elec-
tric when the Company told them that. In every case,
the union has found out this Company means what it
says
Sometimes people also have another complete misun-
derstanding about what it means when the union gets
in. They think, or they assume , or they are told by the
union organizers that the Company automatically will
have to give more wages, more benefits, more of ev-
erything . That is not true, and if you don't remember
anything else in this entire union campaign, remember
that. If the union asks for something and we refuse to
give it to them , or if they want more money than the
Company is willing to pay, the union can only do one
of two things: ( 1) accept the Company's answer, or (2)
call you out on strike . Those are the only two choices
the union has. If they ask and we say no, they can pull
you out on strike . In bargaining , the union may get
you more, or they may get you less. But one thing I
can guarantee you, they will not get you one thing that
is uneconomical or unreasonable or prevents the Com-
pany from running its business
Let me tell you one more important thing that hap-
pens if a union wins an election. The Company would
bargain in good faith with the union, but you should
know that it frequently takes a long time to bargain.
This is especially true when you are bargaining with
the union for the first time, for a brand new contract,
where you have not had one before. No one knows
how long those negotiations would last. Sometimes
these negoations go on for months. Sometimes bar-
gaining for a new contract goes on for over a year. All
the time this bargaining was going on, your wages and
your benefits would be frozen? It is against the law for
the Company to unilaterally change wages or benefits
while negotiations were going on without an agreement
between the Company and the union. Unless there
was an agreement between the union and the Compa-
ny, your wages and benefits would be frozen during
negotiations and no one can say how long this wage
freeze would last.
This letter was followed by a leaflet from Respondent dat-
ed September 27, which recited.
QUESTION
If the union gets in, are our wages frozen during bar-
gaining?
ANSWER
YES, until agreement is reached.
When a union wins an election, the Company and the
union sit down at the bargaining table. The parties
then negotiate back and forth. This can go on for
months. In some instances, unions and companies
have bargained and negotiated for a year or even
more. This is especially true in the first contract.
Unless there is agreement, your wages and benefits are
frozen by law during this period.
In my opinion, the letter of September 26 and the leaflets
of September 10 and 27 constitute nothing more than privi-
leged partisan electioneering by Respondent when viewed
against the background in which they were distributed.
The Union had consistently claimed during its campaign
that it would extract higher wages and benefits from the
Company for the employees if it became their bargaining
agent, without yielding on any of the current assertions
created a confusion in the minds of the employees which
Respondent sought to undo. That Respondent accom-
plished this goal in a lawful manner is patently exemplified
by the decisions of the Board in this area.
In Universal Producing Company, a the Board addressed
itself to the question in an election proceeding as to wheth-
er the following statement, delivered by an employer in a
preelection speech, constituted an objectionable threat to
discontinue existing benefits.
Should a contract be negotiated, present wages, bene-
fits, etc. are first thrown out the window. When nego-
tiating we would start from scratch. Nothing would be
carried over. . . .
4 123 NLRB 548 (1959)
1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board there ruled that-
. . we . . do not believe that they [these remarks]
constitute an unlawful threat to discontinue existing
benefits prior to negotiations. We find, rather, that the
Employer was merely expressing its legal position that
it did not have to start bargaining from the level of
existing benefits, and informing the employees what
they might expect as the result of any negotiations
which might take place. These are statements which,
as the Board has held, the Employer is privileged to
make, and we find therefore that they do not warrant
setting the election aside.5 [Footnotes omitted.]
Moreover, in Trent Tube Company, Subsidiary of Crucible
Steel Company of America, 6 the Board was faced with the
task of determining the legal propriety of two letters which
an employer had sent to its employees prior to the conduct
of a representation election. In the first, the employer
wrote:
Take a few minutes to reflect and carefully weigh the
advantages you now enjoy at this plant against what
you think you might gain under Union conditions. Re-
member , the Union cannot guarantee that present
benefits will continue under a Union contract. Bar-
gaining starts from scratch
In the second letter, the employer announced:
Many employees voting in a National Labor Relations
Board election mistakenly [assume] that if they vote in
a union they are bound to get a wage increase and
other improvements . Nothing could be further from
the truth . Under the law, an employer is not obligated
to continue in effect its existing benefits if a union
becomes bargaining agent. What the wages and condi-
tions thereafter will be depend upon the results of the
negotiations between the union and the employer. The
law does not require the employer to agree to increase
wages or improve benefits . The union can obtain in
negotiations only what an employer is willing to agree
to give.
In sanctioning the contents of these letters, the Board com-
mented
The pertinent issues of existing benefits , future bene-
fits . . . and the requirement of good faith bargaining
were fully brought to the attention of the employees
by the respective electioneering of the Employer and
the counter-electioneering of the Petitioner. In our
opinion, the Employer' s letters could clearly be evalu-
ated by the employees as partisan electioneering.
[Footnote omitted.]
The Board has held that it will not restrict the right
of any party to inform employees of "the advantages
and disadvantages of unions and of j oining them" as
long as such information is imparted to employees in a
noncoercive manner... . we see no basis for conclud-
ing on the facts of this case that the employees could
reasonably construe the Employer 's statements as
Id at 550
e 147 NLRB 538
constituting threats of reprisals by the Employer in the
event the Petitioner won the election.7
Furthermore , in C & K Coal Company,8 the Board held an
employer harmless when , in a preelection address, he in-
formed his employees that:
Some people have the idea that when a union gets
in, that automatically means higher pay and better
benefits . Nothing could be further from the truth. Re-
member, if a union gets in, the company and the
union must bargain . All bets are off and they start
from scratch . None of the present benefits would be
guaranteed you. And if the company and union
couldn't get together it might mean a long strike.
Overruling the union 's objection to this speech , the Board
observed that.
In these circumstances, no unlawful meaning attaches
to the Employer's "bargaining from scratch" state-
ment . . That statement can reasonably be inter-
preted as the Employer's legitimate contention that
the selection of the union would not automatically
bring increased benefits. We find that the Employer's
speech contains no veiled threat of a withdrawal of
benefits should the employees choose a union as their
bargaining representative §
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent did
not offend the provisions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
the letter which it addressed to its employees on September
26 or by the leaflets which were distributed to them on
September 10 and 27. I overrule the companion objections
to election.
The original complaint also charges that Respondent,
through General Foreman Donald Latimer and Foreman
James Watkins, violated Section 8(a)(1) on September 20
and 30, respectively, by threatening its employees with loss
of an announced wage increase and other existing benefits
if they joined or supported the Union. The testimony relat-
ing to these issues came from the lips of Denver Hughes
and Phyllis Hughes.
As background, it is undisputed and I find that since
1969 Respondent has maintained an interview program
whereby supervisors personally interview employees on a
regular basis In the words of Fred Duncan, Respondent's
manager of industrial relations, the program "is designed
for the employees to meet individually with their supervi-
sor to ask any questions they may have on anything con-
cerning theirjob, the company, the progress of the compa-
ny, anything concerning their personal problems that may
be affecting them and their job and just otherwise making
suggestions." 10
Denver Hughes' testimony recounted that he had a
meeting in the conference room sometime in September
with Supervisor Don Latimer along with six other employ-
ees. The topic of discussion initially centered around work-
Id at 540-541
195 NLRB 1038 (1972)
91d at 1039
10 It should be noted that neither of the complaints filed herein alleges
that Respondent's conduct of employee interviews constitutes a violation of
the Act
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1123
ing conditions, work areas, and, scheduled lunchbreaks.
One of the female employees in the group asked about a
wage raise of 31 cents which was scheduled for payment in
January 1975.1' According to Hughes, "She said she want-
ed to ask him a question about the union if she could and
he said he would answer it if he could to the best of his
knowledge." The employee inquired "if we still had our 31
cent raise," to which Latimer responded, "That he did not
think so, no, not at this time." She then asked Latimer "if it
was possible, what kind of changes could be made if the
company had to bargain with the union," and Latimer re-
plied, "That they could be different job classifications
therefore requiring different wages and different-Like
paid holidays could be changed around or different stuff
like that." In connection with wages, Hughes stated that
Latimer "mentioned anywhere from minimum wage on up.
He said it could change." Finally, Hughes testified that the
discussion respecting wages and other benefits occurred in
a context of negotiations; namely, that if the Union won
the election every issue would be negotiable. When queried
as to whether Latimer stated that the employees would au-
tomatically lose benefits in the event of a union victory,
Hughes emphatically answered, "No, no, sir."
On the basis of Denver Hughes' testimony, I am not
persuaded that the General Counsel has proved that La-
timer threatened Hughes and the other employees that they
would lose their announced wage increase and other bene-
fits if the Union succeeded at the polls. Hughes flatly
averred that Latimer did not state that the employees
would forfeit benefits automatically, inclusive of wages, if
the employees selected the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative. I shall therefore dismiss this allegation from the
complaint and overrule the companion objection to the
election.
Phyllis Hughes testified that, while she was at her work
station in either the third or fourth week in September, she
was summoned to the plant conference room for an inter-
view with her foreman, James Watkins. During an ensuing
conversation, the only reference which Watkins made to
wages or benefits, as Phyllis Hughes testimonially remem-
bered, was that "He said that when we got our 31 cent raise
in January [1975] that we would be making more than the
people in Galion plus our incentive would be more." This
observation by Watkins hardly portrays a threat by him
that Hughes would lose any announced wage increase if
she embraced the Union. I shall therefore dismiss this alle-
gation from the complaint and I shall overrule the parallel
objection to the election.
In the consolidated complaint, the General Counsel
maintains that, on September 27, Respondent engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) by certain statements
made by Supervisor Ruth Chapman to employee Brenda
Hickman which threatened that employee with loss of an
announced wage increase and other existing benefits if the
Union won the election
Hickman testified that, in a meeting with Chapman on
September 20, the latter stated that, "The company has
promised you a good raise and I said yes and she said,
11 Respondent made a practice of announcing annual wage increases in
October and awarding them in the following January
`You know that the company doesn't lie and that all I
would get from the union was lies.' And I didn't make any
comment on that. And she said that when they come to
compromise that we would lose everything, I would lose
my raise and we would probably go back to the minimum
wage. And she said, `You know that we aren't going to
start with anything but a blank sheet of paper. We are not
going to start with the benefits you have now and go up but
we'll probably start with a blank sheet of paper."' Howev-
er, on cross-examination, Hickman acknowledged that she
had read the union bulletin in which that labor organiza-
tion claimed that the employees could not lose any benefits
in negotiations with Respondent, and she stated that "the
company was saying you could gain or you could lose."
Hickman also told Chapman that the former did not per-
sonally feel that the employees would "lose in negotia-
tions."
In her testimony, Chapman categorically denied that she
told Hickman either that she would lose everything if the
Union was successful, or would lose all benefits, or that she
would receive the minimum wage in the event of a union
victory. According to Chapman's testimony, "I told Bren-
da that her wages and benefits would be open for negotia-
tions and until agreement was reached and that her wages
would be frozen during negotiations."
I accept Chapman's version of this episode As chroni-
cled above, the Union conducted a spirited campaign in
which it held out to the employees that it would bring vari-
ous economic benefits from Respondent in negotiations. In
response to this thrust, Respondent countered with leaflets
which explained the bargaining process and the potential
ultimate consequence of labor negotiations. In these leaf-
lets, which I have heretofore found to have contained con-
tents which are lawfully privileged, Respondent related
that wages and benefits would be frozen until a consensus
had been reached by both parties regarding their accepta-
bility, and that the Union and the employees could either
gain or lose in the course of negotiations. In my opinion,
Chapman simply repeated to Hickman exactly what Re-
spondent had been conveying to the employees throughout
the campaign-that benefits would be "frozen" during ne-
gotiations unless changes were agreed upon by the Union
and Respondent
I therefore find and conclude that the General Counsel
has failed to make out a case that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by virtue of Chapman's conversation with
Hickman, and I shall dismiss this allegation and overrule
the companion objection to election
In his consolidated complaint, the General Counsel
avers that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when, on
October 3, Supervisor Gene Nichols threatened employee
John Delaney that the Respondent would withhold an an-
nounced wage increase and other benefits if the Union
won the election.
Delaney testified that, about a week before the election
which was held on October 10 and 11, his supervisor, Gene
Nichols, visited his work station and announced to Dela-
ney and two other employees that "if the union wanted the
election there would be a strike and that our wages would
be, we wouldn't receive wages for January `75 and we
would lose other benefits." Delaney went on to recount
1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that "We are supposed to have got a 31 cent raise and he
was saying that we would lose it if the union won the elec-
tion and if there was a strike." Delaney further testified
that, during the same week, Nichols again paid a visit and,
holding some union leaflets in his hand, remarked that
"they were a bunch of phonies and he said that if the union
won the election he said that our wages and benefits would
be frozen until the company and the union negotiated for a
contract."
On cross-examination, however, Delaney admitted that
Nichols' statements were premised upon the assumption
that the Union would engage in a work stoppage at the
plant. Delaney further admitted that Nichols stated in their
conversation that wages and other benefits would remain
constant until Respondent and the Union had reached an
agreement, that these items would be negotiable, and that
the employees would not lose them during the progress of
negotiations.
In light of Delaney's admissions, I am unwilling to find
that Respondent, through Nichols, threatened that Dela-
ney would suffer a loss of wages or benefits if the Union
entered the plant. I shall consequently dismiss this allega-
tion from the complaint, and I shall overrule the objection
to election relating thereto.
It is the General Counsel's contention that, on Septem-
ber 27, Respondent's supervisor, Jack Beck, threatened
employee James Templeton with loss of an announced
wage increase and other benefits in violation of Section
8(a)(1).
Templeton testified that, late in September, he had a
conversation with Beck in which the latter asked Temple-
ton "if I had any problems to start with and I asked him a
question about if the union came in whether we would lose
our wage and benefits that we now had including our 31
cent raise coming up in February and he said that he didn't
know, that he would have to find out for me." Later that
afternoon, Beck returned and advised that "by law they
could take our wage and benefits away from us but how
probable he didn't know." In turn, Templeton stated that
"this meant that we would start from scratch and that we
might end up with less than what we had at the time and he
quoted what he had said to start with, that by law they
could . . . by law they could but how probable he didn't
know."
During cross-examination, Templeton acknowledged
that he had seen communications emanating from both the
Union and Respondent which recited that both factions
agreed that "all wages and benefits would be negotiable if
the union got in." Templeton also admitted that he had
read a leaflet distributed by the Union on September 17
which stated that "the NLRB will not allow North to take
away any benefits you presently enjoy. Section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer
from making threats of loss of job or benefits. Bargaining
committee starts with wages and benefits you presently
have or have been promised and approved them." Temple-
ton testified that following receipt of the Union communi-
cation the Respondent distributed a document that "pres-
ent wages and benefits are guaranteed, that you could get
more as the union has promised or you could get less."
Finally, Templeton made it clear that in their conversation
it was he, Templeton, rather than Supervisor Beck who said
that Templeton might get less wages and benefits in negoti-
ations, and that Beck commented that he "did not know
how probable that was."
On the basis of Templeton's testimony, I am not con-
vinced that the General Counsel has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that Beck threatened Tem-
pleton with loss of a wage increase and other benefits. As
Templeton's own testimony reveals, it was he who suggest-
ed that this might eventuate following a union victory.
Moreover, Templeton displayed his awareness that the Re-
spondent had intended to bargain with the Union in good
faith and that in negotiations he "could get more as the
union promised or [he] could get less."
Accordingly, I shall dismiss this allegation from the
complaint and overrule the companion objection to elec-
tion.
The consolidated complaint charges that Respondent,
through Supervisors James Bray and Dick Lyons, threat-
ened employee Randall Phillips and other employees with
loss of an announced wage increase and other benefits in a
conversation which occurred on October 1, in violation of
Section 8 (a)(1).
Phillips testified that he had received a letter from Re-
spondent dated September 26, which is set forth above,
relating to collective bargaining with the Union, and he
had a meeting with Bray and Lyons about the matter. Phil-
lips testified that Lyons said that "he had heard that there
was some question about some of the literature and wanted
to know then if there was anything he could answer and I
asked the question concerning the union, the letter that the
union won the election would the company take away or
would we lose any of our present wages and benefits. And
Mr. Bray spoke first and said, yes, that the present wages
and benefits would be frozen. And then Mr. [Lyons] said
that it was kind of a trading situation. He said that we
could lose some or we could gain something in return."
In conformity with the teachings of Universal Producing
Company, 12 Trent Tube Co., Subsidiary of Crucible Steel
Co., f3 and C & K Coal Company, 14 I find and conclude that
neither Bray nor Lyons violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by their statements to Phillips and other employees. I shall
dismiss this allegation and overrule the Objection to Elec-
tion relating thereto.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by the conduct of Supervisor Glea White
which occurred during a conversation with employee Hel-
en McCarty on October 4.
McCarty, by her own admission, openly backed the
Union by wearing a T-shirt and badge. Dressed in this
garb, McCarty was called into the conference room on Oc-
tober 4 for an interview with White. She testified that,
upon her arrival, White "asked if I had any questions . . .
about the union or the Company." McCarty queried the
supervisor "about the blank sheet of paper and he said he
did not know, he would have to check it out." She then
inquired "about the efficiency, how we would get a written
12 See fn 4, supra
13 See fn 6, supra
14 See fn 8, supra
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1125
warning about that and what written warnings would mean
and I just kept changing the subject , because White kept
returning to the subject of whether she "had any questions
about the union or the company ." When questioned on
further direct examination as to what she had made refer-
ence when she asked White about the "blank sheet of pa-
per," McCarty responded , "How would the blank sheet of
paper work? We heard that if the blank sheet of paper
come in we would lose everything and start all over again."
However, McCarty admitted that , in an affidavit given to a
Board agent regarding this meeting, "I asked him about the
literature about the blank sheet of paper and starting all
over again at $2.00 an hour and he said he didn't know
anything about that . That if the union got in that would be
between the union and the company ." Finally, she con-
fessed that at no time during their conversation did White
ever state that she would lose present wages and benefits.
On the basis of the foregoing , I am unable to either find
or conclude that White illegally interrogated McCarty dur-
ing the interview on October 4, or that he otherwise inter-
fered with the rights guaranteed to her under Section 7 of
the Act. I shall therefore dismiss the allegation in the com-
plaint relating to Glea White on this date , and I shall over-
rule the objections to election pertinent thereto.
The consolidated complaint also avers that Respondent,
through Supervisor John Hammett , illegally interrogated
Betty Murray on June 4 and otherwise infringed upon her
statutory rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Murray testified that during the first week in June she
and approximately 10 other employees were summoned to
an office in the plant where they met with Hammett. Ham-
mett opened the discussion by stating that "The reason
that we were in this conference when we sat down . . . he
said there was a letter that was sent to the ones [in the
department] and he was wanting to find out if anyone of us
knew anything about it. He said it was union literature and
he said the union was behind it and they were the only
ones that could get by with trash like this." Murray added
that Hammett "wanted to go around the table to each per-
son and ask them if they knew anything of the literature or
if we knew anything , if we had any questions about the
union." Finally , Hammett asked Murray "if I knew any-
thing about the literature and I just told him that , I didn't
make any comment on that question ." Murray, who was a
hyperactive supporter of the Union 's cause , 15 acknowl-
edged that in his queries about union "literature " Hammett
had reference to a letter dated May 24 which the Union
addressed to the employees in her department and which
read:
CWA can stop many of the activities that you have to
put up with such as a supervisor belittling you, swear-
ing at you, making you nervous or watching over you,
15 It is undisputed and I find that , by letter of May 30, Murray notified
Respondent that she was laboring on the Union's behalf in the election
campaign Murray also stated that she was a signatory to a communication
dated June 4 which informed the Respondent that "we need a union" and
"have chosen to work openly for it " This letter also contained the statement
that "On Wednesday , May 29 , the company informed us that they had
received our letter and would honor our rights They told us they had no
objection to our working for the union during our breaks and lunch hours "
Murray testified that Respondent fulfilled its promise in this connection
just waiting for you to make a mistake. With a CWA
contract supervisors will have to respect you as a per-
son and honor the contract
According to Murray , the supervisor asked the assembled
employees "if you all had the kind of problems that were
mentioned in that letter ," and Murray candidly remarked
that "that's what the conference was about ." Murray fur-
ther stated that Hammett was "quite disturbed about the
accusations in the letter" and admitted " If I [Murray] had
done something like that I would have wanted to have
known about it."
On the basis of the foregoing testimony , I am hard-
pressed to understand how the General Counsel can con-
tend that, by his comments , Supervisor Hammett coercive-
ly interrogated Murray and the other employees in atten-
dance at the interview concerning their "union
membership , activities and desires ." By Murray's own ad-
mission , the meeting was called because Hammett was
riled by the Union 's accusations concerning his treatment
of the employees under his wing, and he sought to learn
from them whether he had been guilty of the transgressions
of which he had been accused . Under the circumstances, I
find and conclude that Hammett did not violate the Act by
his statements to Murray and other employees at this inter-
view, and I shall dismiss the allegation from the complaint.
I shall furthermore overrule the objection to election perti-
nent thereto.
Murray further testified that , when she returned from
sick leave on October 1, Supervisor Jack Beck came up to
her and "wanted to know if I had any questions concerning
what was going on outside the gate concerning the union
organizers and I told him no. And he said , you signed the
letter , didn 't you?"-an apparent reference to the letter
dated May 30. Murray stated that she engaged in this con-
versation with Beck because "I knew him and he was a
person . . that you could talk to " Beck concluded the
discussion by remarking that "he felt that the reason I was
for the union was because I had been in John Hammett's
department."
The General Counsel alleges in his consolidated com-
plaint that Beck 's inquiries put to Murray on October 1
constituted illegal interrogation in violation of Section
8(a)(1). I do not agree. By her own account , Murray was an
active union adherent and her activities in this respect were
clearly apparent to Respondent 's officials , including Beck,
by virtue of her signing the letter of May 30 in which she
proclaimed herself as a union activist , and the leaflet of
June 4. I deem it implausible that Murray would have felt
coerced by the statement of Beck , "a person . . that you
could talk to ." I therefore find and conclude that Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by Beck's conduct, and
I shall dismiss this aspect of the complaint . I shall also
overrule the parallel objection to election.
Employee Barbara Pendley testified that, on September
24, Foreman James Watkins summoned her to a confer-
ence room for an interview In his original complaint, the
General Counsel asserts that , during the course of their
meeting, Watkins coercively interrogated Pendley concern-
ing her union activities and threatened her with discharge
for engaging in those activities. According to Pendley, the
1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
practice of interviewing employees was not of recent inno-
vation, for she testified that the program had been in exis-
tence "ever since I can remember" and she had been em-
ployed by Respondent for 9 years. At the outset of their
meeting, Watkins announced that "we are calling the em-
ployees in to see if they have any questions about the com-
pany literature passed out," and then Watkins solicited
questions from her. In response to Watkins, Pendley
"asked about my insurance. I had dropped my insurance
through my own fault and I was not able to pick it back up
so he got an interview for me to see about getting it."
At this juncture, Watkins inquired whether Pendley had
ever worked for a unionized employer and, when she re-
plied in the affirmative, he asked about the manner in
which the rate was computed. Watkins then related his ex-
periences regarding his employment with another company
which was represented by a labor organization, stating that
he had lost his job there, adding that "he wasn't for the
union. That he was innocent. But they laid off so many
people before they got to the ones that were for the union."
As the interview progressed, Pendley asked Watkins if he
thought that the Union would achieve exclusive represen-
tative status at the plant, and the supervisor answered that
"I have no idea. He said somedays there looks like there's
a lot of people for it. Other days it doesn't look like too
many is for it."
In her testimony Pendley flatly denied that during her
discussion with Watkins he ever told her that she would be
laid off or discharged by Respondent for engaging in union
activities. Rather, both Watkins and Pendley reveiwed the
names of employees who had been promoted to superviso-
ry positions despite the fact that they had actively cam-
paigned for a labor organization in a prior election at the
plant, and Watkins stated that these promotions demon-
strated proof that Respondent "did not hold it against you
if you are for the union."
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, I am not con-
vinced that the General Counsel has proved the practice of
illegal coercive interrogation by Watkins against Pendley.
Nor, in view of Pendley's explicit denials that she had in
any way been threatened with discharge by Watkins, am I
persuaded that Respondent unlawfully threatened her with
termination if she engaged in union activities . I shall, con-
sequently, expunge these allegations from the complaint,
and overrule the companion objection to the election.16
16 The Union's Objection 6 alleges that Respondent threatened "employ-
ees with discharge for distributing union literature in working areas of the
plant while freely encouraging and permitting supporters of the company to
distribute 'vote no ' literature in the same area " At the hearing , the General
Counsel and the Union sought to adduce testimony from Pendley in sup-
port of this objection by claiming that Respondent permitted employee
Edna Fleanor to fabricate and distribute antiunion insignia on company
time while denying the privilege of making and distributing countervailing
insignia to Union adherents Pendley testified that she observed Fleanor
constructing the insignia after the morning break , but avowed that Fleanor
distributed them only during breaks and not on company time However,
when queried as to whether the union followers also engaged in union activ-
ities during working hours , Pendley replied that "We didn't do a lot during
working time " (Emphasis supplied ) Pendley also admitted that she pos-
sessed union badges in her toolbox at her work station and that employees
came and obtained them "usually during break " (Emphasis supplied) In
light of Pendley 's equivocal testimony , I am unwilling to find that Respon-
dent accorded disparate treatment in this regard to union supporters I shall
The consolidated complaint further alleges that on Sep-
tember 26 Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Supervi-
sor Hammett's coercive questioning of employees Evelyn
Dale.
Dale testimonially recounted that about 2 weeks prior to
the election held on October 10 and II Hammett invited
her into a small office at the plant for an interview . It is her
testimony that when the discourse commenced Hammett
stated, "As you know we have received a lot of literature.
He said, `Do you have any questions on this.' And I said,
`No, sir.' And then he said, `How do you feel?' And I said,
`About what?' And he said, `Well, about the union coming
into North.' And I said, `I haven't given it any thought
even though I had. And I don't remember exactly how
everything fell into place. This was a two hour conversa-
tion. But after this he had began to tell me why we didn't
need a union in North Electric. That no other plant in
Johnson City paid as well as North and we would be fool-
ish to bring one in ." Hammett then asked Dale "if I felt the
union had a chance of coming into North several times
throughout this conversation. And I said no, that I didn't.
At one point I said I really didn't think that North Electric
needed a union."
On cross-examination , Dale related that it was the
Company's policy to hold employee interviews every 6
months and that she had attended others. At the confer-
ence held before the election, she acknowledged that a vast
variety of subjects were discussed which had no relation-
ship to the union campaign Rounding out her testimony,
Dale stated that following the interview she wore a union
T-shirt in the presence of Hammett Observing the gar-
ment, Hammett commented that "I like your outfit there
and I said, `I'm glad you like it. I'm proud of it.' And he
said, `I'm glad to see everybody stand up for what they
believe in.' "
During his examination , Hammett denied that he had
asked Dale how she felt about a union or if she felt the
Union would succeed at Respondent 's plant. I deem it un-
necessary to resolve this conflict in testimony for, in my
opinion , Hammett's questions , even if posed , could hardly
have had a coercive effect upon Dale in the forthcoming
election in view of the facts that she thereafter wore union
T-shirts and buttons for the first time, and was assured by
Hammett shortly before the balloting that he was happy
"to see everybody stand up for what they believe in." Ac-
cordingly , I shall dismiss this allegation from the complaint
and overrule the coextensive objection to election.
Employee Brenda Hickman testified that, on September
20, she was called to the plant conference room for a ses-
sion with Supervisor Ruth Chapman. At the outset of their
meeting, Chapman "asked me if I had been reading the
company literature , the letters that had been coming
around and I said yes. And she asked me if I had any
questions and I questioned her about one paper on the
incentive rates and she explained that to me. And I think
she asked me if I had any more questions and so forth and
I said no." At the conclusion of the colloquy Chapman
"asked me if I could keep an open mind about the compa-
ny and about the union and I said yes I would."
therefore overrule Objection 6, and any companion allegation in the com-
plaint is hereby dismissed
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1127
Hickman actively supported the union campaign, wore
union T-shirts, and had her name appended to a letter
which found its way into Respondent's hands on August 22
which announced that Hickman had thrown her lot in with
the Union. On this state of the record, and after consider-
ation of Chapman's comments, I am not satisified that the
General Counsel has sustained his allegation in the consoli-
dated complaint that on September 20 Respondent,
through Chapman, interrogated Hickman in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act I shall dismiss this allegation
from the complaint and the companion objection to elec-
tion.
The General Counsel contends that on or about October
8 Supervisor John Quillen unlawfully interrogated Jamie
Edwards about her union propensities. Edwards testified
that on the above date she met Quillen in Respondent's
conference room and "we talked about several different
things and finally the subject of the union came up and he
said , well, I know how you are going to vote but he said
why do you think North [Respondent] needs a union and I
told him because of incentive rates and favoritism. And he
agreed that the incentive was too high on some of the units
and so he then started to explain that to me, the incentive
rates." Edwards confessed that at all times prior to this
conversation she had actively embraced the Union by
wearing union badges and T-shirts, and that her name ap-
peared on a letter dated August 22 which the Union sent to
Respondent and which proclaimed that she was openly
working for the Union's success at the polls. During her
discussion with Quillen, Edwards sported a union T-shirt.
Following their conversation she continued openly to sup-
port the Union.
In light of the fact that Edwards' colloquy with Quillen
occurred in the context of an open and notorious campaign
by the Union in which the former's active adherence to
that labor organization was made manifest by the wearing
of union insignia of various types, and by the appearance
of her name on a list of prounion employees which was
conveyed to Respondent, I find and conclude that Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by Quillen's attempt to
elicit from Edwards her reasons for casting her lot with the
Union i7 I shall dismiss this allegation from the affirmative
pleadings, and the companion objection to election.
The consolidated complaint charges that Respondent of-
fended the provisions of Section 8(a)(1) by the conduct of
Assistant Plant Manager Gene Nichols in coercively ques-
tioning employees Pearl Coggins and Reba Pipkin on Oc-
tober 7 concerning their union membership, activities, and
desires.
Coggins testified that, a few days before the election,
Nichols approached Coggins' work station where she was
performing her duties along with employee Reba Pipkin.
According to Coggins, Nichols "walked over to us and he
said, `How's it going? And I said, `It looks good.' And he
says, `Well, we don't know because people here are pretty
unpredictable.' And he says, `Well, do you want my opin-
ion.' And we said, `Yes,' and he said, `Now, if you say I
said this I'll say it was a lie' and we just laughed. And he
said that he thought that the union would lose by a large
percentage. I think it was about 3 to 1." Coggins added
that the discussion with Nichols was in a jocular vein, stat-
ing that "We weren't at each other throats or anything.
We're on a friendly basis. It was just a conversation " In
her testimony, Pipkin generally corroborated Coggins' re-
count of the conversation with Nichols.
Both Coggins and Pipkin admitted on the stand that
during the entire organizational campaign conducted by
the Union, which spanned from February until the Octo-
ber election, they were open and active supporters of the
Union's cause. Thus, they wore jackets, T-shirts, and
badges which clearly bore the Union' s insignia while at
work, and distributed union literature at the plant gates.
Moreover, the names of Coggins and Pipkin appear on a
union letter dated May 30 which was sent to Respondent
to inform the latter that these employees were ardent advo-
cates of the Union, as well as on a leaflet to the same effect
which the Union distributed at the plant on June 4. Indeed,
Pipkin acknowledged that she and Coggins were clothed in
union T-shirts at the time of their conversation with Ni-
chols.
As the two employees alleged to have been unlawfully
interrogated were openly and actively partisan on behalf of
the Union, a fact well known to Respondent, and as no
illegal conduct by Respondent with respect to either of
them was proved to have occurred other than Nichols'
query as to "how's it going," I find and conclude that Ni-
chols did not coercively interrogate either Coggins or Pip-
kin in violation of Section 8(a)(l). I shall accordingly dis-
miss this allegation,18 and the parallel objection to election.
The General Counsel contends in his complaints that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when, on September
13, Supervisor Frank Crutchfield threatened Teresa Music
that it would be futile for her to engage in union activities
by telling her that Respondent would not "give a penny
when the Union requests a wage increase during negotia-
tions," and by questioning her coercively concerning her
union endeavors.
The evidence on this score in its totality is that, on June
10, Music enlisted in the Union's ranks, distributed hand-
bills at the plant gate, and appended her name to a letter
which announced to Respondent that she was an ardent
supporter of the Union. On either September 12 or 13, she
was summoned to the plant conference room by Supervisor
Frank Crutchfield where, according to her testimony, "he
asked me, he said he knew that I was supporting, working
for the union and asked me what I thought the union could
do for me " Music replied, "The first thing would be a raise
and he asked me what if the union asked for a nickel and
the company said we are not going to give you a penny,
what would happen then? And I said, well, the company
and the union was supposed to get together and negotiate
together " Music conceded that, at the time of this conver-
sation, she had observed leaflets which stated that, if the
Union and Respondent were unable to agree in negotia-
tions, the union would be in a position of either accepting
Respondent's last proposal or calling the employees out on
strike.
17 Federal Paper Board Company, Inc, 206 NLRB 681 (1973) 18 B F Goodrich Footwear Company, 201 NLRB 353 (1973)
1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
With respect to the allegation'of illegal interrogation of
Music by Crutchfield, I find it difficult to believe that Mu-
sic, an active union supporter and known as such to
Crutchfield, could have felt coerced by his inquiry about
"what I [Music] thought the union could do for me." As
the Board observed in Federal Paper Board Company,
Inc.,'9 absent widespread unfair labor practices or other
coercive conditions, it is not unlawful for an employer to
query openly prounion employees as to why they support a
labor organization. Accordingly, I find and conclude that
Respondent did not offend the provisions of Section
8(a)(1) by Crutchfield's questioning of Music.
Regarding the allegation of "futility" in engaging in
union activities, there is absolutely no evidence in Music's
testimony to support the General Counsel's claim that Re-
spondent "would not give a penny when the Union re-
quests a wage increase during negotiations." Crutchfield's
comments, made in the context of future negotiations be-
tween the Union and Respondent, simply posed a hypo-
thetical question which might have arisen in those negotia-
tions, and Music correctly answered that "the company
and the union was supposed to get together and negotiate
together." In my view, Crutchfield's comments hardly car-
ry a threat that Respondent would not offer "a penny" to
the Union in negotiations on wages. I shall therefore dis-
miss this allegation, and overrule the coextensive objection
to the election.
The consolidated complaint charges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by certain conduct of Supervisor
James Campbell.
Employee Herbert Worley testified that he first became
involved in the organizational campaign around June 1
when he commenced to wear a union button Thereafter,
he adorned himself with a T-shirt signifying his allegiance
to the Union, passed out literature at the plant gates, and,
on June 4, his name appeared on a union letter designating
him as an active supporter of that labor organization.
About a week following his enlistment in the Union's
ranks, and while he was sporting a union badge, he was
approached by Supervisor Campbell at his work station.
According to Worley, Campbell "took his finger and flip-
ped my button and asked me where I got the button and I
told him a friend gave it to me."
Worley further testified that on October 3 he was beck-
oned to the conference room for a periodic interview with
Campbell. When Worley arrive, Campbell asked, "What's
going on and I said, `What do you mean what's going on?'
And he said, `You know, what's going on in the plant' And
I told him `Well, you know how I feel about what's going
on' and he said, `Well, I just wanted to call you in here and
talk to you about it.' And I told him, `Well, you know how
I feel because I've been wearing the T-shirts and the but-
tons and things.' And he said yes, and I told him that I
knew how he felt because he was a supervisor And he said,
yes, I guess you do. And he told me not to make any hasty
decisions. He said think-He said think about this and do
the right thing and I told him I had already made my deci-
sion and I asked him if he had ever worked for a union and
19206 NLRB 681 (1973)
he said no. And I asked him if he's ever been in a plant that
had a union and he said yes." The conversation concluded
with Campbell assuring Worley that "no matter how this
goes we will continue to do our job and get along, won't we
and I said yes."
In his testimony, Campbell recalled that he looked at the
union button which Worley was wearing on or about June
3, but emphatically denied that he questioned Worley as to
his source of supply. I credit Campbell's denial in this re-
gard because I deem it implausible that he would have
posed such a question to Worley in light of the fact that
Worley was a known union activist who openly stored
union insignia in his toolbox while at work.
In sum , I am not convinced that Respondent, through
Supervisor Campbell, offended the provisions of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by his statements to Worley on either
June 3 or October 3. I shall dismiss this allegation and
overrule the companion objection to the election.
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, on or about May 29,
Material Manager James P. Caruthers "prohibited employ-
ees from engaging in activity on behalf of the Union during
work time while permitting other employees to engage in
anti-Union activity during work time " The only evidence
elicited by the General Counsel which in any manner per-
tains to this allegation came from the testimony of Carl
Miller. Miller testified that on May 28, in company with six
or seven other employees, he visited Caruther's office
where the latter spoke to the assemblage about a letter
which Plant Manager Harry Smith received from the
Union bearing a date of May 24. This letter recited that
"We, the undersigned employees of North Electric, are
working to bring a union into North Electric, and trust you
will honor our rights as protected by law." After reading
the letter to the employees, Caruthers thereupon read, ver-
batim, the Respondent's response to the Union's message,
which was as follows:
The company has received the letter from the union
designating you as in-plant organizers in the union
campaign. To be absolutely sure you understand what
I am about to say and to make sure there is no ques-
tion exactly what I do say, I am going to read this
word for word.
First of all, the letter asked us to respect your legal
rights in this area. The company will do this absolute-
ly. All of your legal rights will be protected just as the
legal rights of all other employees and the company
will be protected without discrimination to anyone.
One thing I do want to counsel with you about, how-
ever, sometimes employees who have been designated
as union organizers get the impression that work rules
and company rules of conduct no longer apply to
them. This is not the case. You, along with every other
employee of the company are expected to abide by
company rules, policies and practices just as you have
in the past, and this is true for the future also. I want
to especially remind you that work time is for work
You are absolutely free to discuss your opinion about
the union with your fellow employees but this must be
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1129
done in such a way that it does not interfere with
either your work time or the work time of your fellow
employees. Union organizers sometimes get careless
about this rule and that is why we wanted to remind
you of it, in fairness to you. In conclusion, let me say
again that all of your legal rights will be protected in
this area along with every other employee and the
rights of the company, and this includes you abiding
by plant rules just like any other employee.
I fail to perceive anything in Caruthers' foregoing con-
duct which even remotely suggests that Respondent ac-
corded disparate treatment to prounion employees in their
engagement in union activities on company time. I shall
therefore dismiss this allegation from the complaint, and
overrule the coextensive objection to election.
The General Counsel's consolidated complaint contains
the allegation that, on June 12, Supervisors Frank Crutch-
field and James Whitman "prohibited discussions about
the Union during employees' work time while permitting
discussions on other non-work related subjects during em-
ployees' work time." This allegation has reference to an
incident involving Teresa Music.
Whitman testified that he had occasion to speak to em-
ployee Teresa Music on June 12 about interfering with
other employees' work during working time. Whitman re-
lated that he had been informed by a foreman that the
latter had been receiving complaints from some of his em-
ployees that Music "was bothering at their work station
and using some foul language and that they wanted it
stopped." Whitman thereupon summoned the complain-
ants to his office and questioned them about Music's be-
havior, in response to which "they said that they were
being bothered by Teresa Music and that she had called
them chicken shit because they wouldn't sign a union
card," and that this had occurred on working time which
interfered with their productivity. One of the employees
complained that Music threatened that "your home will
come nearer getting dynamited if you don't belong to the
union than it will if you do." Following this meeting, Whit-
man ordered that a written warning be prepared for Music
and he called her to his office. When she arrived, Whitman
advised her that "I'm getting some complaints from some
of the employees in the department that you are bothering
them during their working hours trying to get them to join
a union and sign a union card." Music replied that "I know
what you are talking about and she said, I'll stop it."
Whereupon Whitman handed Music the written warning,
commenting that "there's a time for work and a time for
play.... while you are at your work station during work-
ing hours that you must stay busy and on the job."
Music's version of her encounter with Whitman on June
12 runs as follows. She was summoned to a meeting with
Supervisors Whitman, Crutchfield, and Meadows. When
she entered the office, she asked why the conference had
been scheduled and was told that "they were just asking
about if they had any problems on the work and things of
that sort." At first, Music denied that any mention was
made to her about other employees' complaints that she
was interfering with their work. When questioned as to
whether the supervisors cautioned her about bothering an
employee at work by calling the employee "chicken shit for
not signing a union card," Music initially stated that "I
don't recall," but then admitted that "Maybe in joking I
would have." Music also conceded that she had spoken to
three employees about signing a union authorization card,
but denied that this took place during work hours. Music
further acknowledged that she had solicited an employee
to join the Union, and when the individual refused Music
made the comment about dynamiting, stating that "I said
that but it was, I was not threatening her. We were both
lust joking ...." Rounding out her testimony, Music re-
counted that as she left the meeting Whitman said "if I was
talking to be sure I was talking about fishing or work."
I credit the testimony of Whitman and find that, after
receiving complaints from employees that Music was both-
ering them by asking them to sign union cards on company
time, he issued a warning notice to her regarding this con-
duct. I further find that by so doing Whitman in no way
precluded Music from engaging in discussions with em-
ployees during working hours while at the same time he
permitted nonwork related discussions on company time. I
shall therefore dismiss this allegation from the complaint
and I overrule the pertinent objection to the election.
The General Counsel contends that on September 18
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the con-
duct of Supervisor Bill Cooper in threatening employee
Johnny Churchwell with closure of the plant and with the
receipt of written warnings if he engaged in activities on
behalf of the Union.
Churchwell testified that, in mid-September, Cooper
called him into the conference room for a periodic inter-
view. Resting on a table in front of Cooper was a blank
sheet of paper. According to Churchwell, Cooper, pointing
to the sheet, remarked that "this is what the union started
with." Cooper added that "They said they could trade you
vacations and all their benefits if they wanted." At this
juncture, Churchwell inquired whether "the plant in Gal-
ion (an apparent reference to Respondent's facility in that
city) was condemned and he said no." Churchwell then
asked "if they could close the plant down if the union got
in." Cooper replied that "he worked at Monroe and he lost
his job because of the strike and that Monroe closed down
and that North Electric could do the same." Turning to
wages, Cooper stated that "if the union come in it would
more than likely start out with the minimum wage," al-
though Cooper noted that Respondent was among the four
highest paying plants in the area. Cooper thereupon stated
that "we all wasn't doing our job, that we could all get
written warning and he had seen some literature passing
around. He could get rid of that, of us for that," although
Cooper noted that he had seen the literature at work sta-
tions.
On cross-examination, Churchwell was shown an affida-
vit which he tendered to the Board. In that document,
which Churchwell acknowledged as containing his true
recollection, he averred that Cooper was speaking about
negotiations between the Union and Respondent when he
mentioned that the Union could take vacation and benefits
and "could swap it to something else they wanted." Cooper
also told the employee that he was going to receive a 31-
cent wage increase. With respect to the plant closure,
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Churchwell stated that Cooper merely expressed his opin-
ion when he said that the union at Monroe was no good
because he lost his job due to a strike at the location. When
asked if Cooper said that Respondent would close the
plant if the Union won the election, Churchwell replied
that "He said it could."
Regarding the topic of written warnings, Churchwell ac-
knowledged that Cooper's threat of their possible issuance
was predicated solely upon the failure of employees to per-
form their work tasks satisfactorily. Lastly, Cooper's refer-
ence to minimum wage arose in the context of negotiations
between the parties, with Cooper stating that "The union
come in we would have nothing to start with but the mini-
mum wage."
In his testimony, Cooper denied that he told Churchwell
that Respondent would close down the plant if the Union
became entrenched in the plant. I need not resolve this
conflict in testimony for, even were I to find that Cooper
uttered this remark to Churchwell, I deem that any such
threat, made to but 1 employee out of a voting work com-
plement of over 2,000, is too isolated and innocuous to
warrant either an affimative finding of a statutory violation
or a remedial order. Regarding the General Counsel's as-
sertion that Churchwell was threatened by Cooper with
written warnings for aiding and abetting the Union,
Churchwell's testimony makes it crystal clear that such
warnings would be forthcoming only for derelictions of
duty rather than for engagement in union activities.
In sum , I shall dismiss the foregoing allegations in the
complaint, as well as overrule the concomitant objections
to election.
Over the years, Respondent had circulated to its employ-
ees a handbook entitled "Your Guide to the Future" which
contains rules of conduct regarding their employment rela-
tionship. Rule 26 in that brochure provided, inter aka, for
certain penalties to employees, including discharge, for
"Instigating or counselling others to engage in a work stop-
page or slowdown." In his original complaint, the General
Counsel alleged that this rule was violative of Section
8(a)(1) because it was susceptible to an interpretation that
it would debar employees from engaging in statutorily
guaranteed, protected, and concerted activities.
It is uncontroverted and I find that, upon service of the
complaint in Case 10-CA-10940, Respondent became
aware of the potential purport of the rule and, according to
Industrial Relations Manager Fred Duncan, "We revised
the rule to better clarify the intent of the rule and to pre-
vent any misunderstanding concerning the rule. The revi-
sion or the revised page containing this rule was distributed
to all employees for insertion in their employee hand-
book." The record establishes that such revision became
effective on December 5.
In view of Respondent's immediate and voluntary revi-
sion of rule 26 when its scope was brought to its attention,
and in the absence of any evidence that the rule was un-
lawfully enforced against its employees, I find and con-
clude that its maintenance until December 5 was too mini-
mal and isolated to form a basis for a finding of a violation
of the Act, or the issuance of a remedial order.20 I shall
20 Detroit Plastic Molding Co, 209 NLRB 763 (1974)
dismiss this allegation from the complaint and overrule the
pertinent objection to election.
In the consolidated complaint, the General Counsel
claims that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by the dis-
tribution to employees on October 3 of a leaflet entitled
"What did Leon-Ferenbach Employees have to say about
the Strike?" This leaflet, which dealt with incidents of vio-
lence during a strike at a Leon-Ferenbach plant, contained
a parenthetical sentence at the bottom of the page which
read:
(These are exerpts [sic] taken from employee affidavits
on file with the NLRB-To protect the employees
who gave the affidavits and the rights of those referred
to in the affidavits, many of whom will soon be com-
ing to trial, all names have been deleted.)
The General Counsel contends that the foregoing sentence
created the impression that Respondent had access to con-
fidential files of the Board and therefore was unlawful.
Apart from the leaflet, the General Counsel offered no in-
dependent evidence that Respondent was privy to the
Board's files
I am not convinced that the General Counsel has proved
Respondent violated the Act by the distribution of the
foregoing leaflet. As a matter of practice, it is not uncom-
mon for Board agents who investigate unfair labor practice
charges to take affidavits from employees concerning
events giving rise to the charges, and to provide the affiants
with copies of their statements. For aught that appears,
Respondent may lawfully have procured the contents of
statements by Leon-Ferenbach employees which formed
the basis for the statements set forth in the leaflet. I there-
fore find and conclude that the General Counsel has failed
to sustain his allegation that the leaflet was violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall dismiss it from the
complaint. I shall also overrule the pertinent objection to
election.
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) of the statute by issuing two written,
disciplinary warnings to employee Randall Phillips on July
8 and August 23 because of his active engagement in union
endeavors Respondent asserts that Phillips was repri-
manded solely because he violated certain established rules
of employee conduct and work performance which are ap-
plicable to the entire work force.
Phillips, who was hired by Respondent in 1970, became
interested in the Union's organizational drive when he
commenced to wear a union button during the first week in
May. Thereafter, he distributed union leaflets at the plant
gate, wore union T-shirts and jackets, and solicited the
membership of employees at their homes. Under date of
July 9, Phillips received a written warning for violating
Respondent's rule of conduct no. 3 which prohibits em-
ployees from leaving their regular working place during
working hours without proper authorization from their su-
pervisors. On August 23, he was given another written
warning for his violation of rule of conduct no. 31 which
pertains to inefficiency or lack of application of effort on
the job.
NORTH ELECTRIC COMPANY 1131
With respect to the first warning issued on July 9, Phil-
lips testified that after the lunchbreak on July 8 he received
a telephone call from his home on a phone located in his
department which was answered by Phillips' supervisor,
James Bray, who in turn summoned Phillips. According to
Phillips, "because of the noise in the shipping department I
couldn't hear anything over the telephone so I left the area
and went to the pay phone closest to the department and
they were busy so I had to go to the front of the plant to
use the pay phone at the front of the plant. And when I
finished my telephone conversation I started back to the
department and stopped by the credit union just-I wasn't
in there over a minute and a half to two minutes at the
most and started back to the department and I got [be-
tween two other departments] . . . And I met Mr. Bray on
the way up the aisle and he stopped me there in the main
aisleway and wanted to know where the hell I had been
and I told him that I had to go use the telephone and stop
at the credit union for a minute and we got in kind of a
heated discussion right there in the main aisleway and he
told me that bunch of shit is going to have to stop or he's
going to have to tie a cow bell around my neck " Phillips
retorted that "I didn't think that was the correct place to be
chewing me out. That I didn't have to listen to that bunch
of bull shit and just turned and walked off." Later that day,
Phillips was invited to the office of George Grillot, the
department head, and was given a written warning "for
being out of my work area " On cross-examination Phillips
admitted that when he received the first written warning he
acknowledged that he had violated Respondent's rule 3,
stating "Yes, I was out of my work area." Phillips also
acknowledged that he signed the warning voluntarily and
did not perfect an appeal of the disciplinary action to high-
er authorities in the plant as he was entitled to do.
Regarding the second warning which was issued to Phil-
lips on August 23 for inefficiency and lack of application in
completing an installation kit order, Phillips was assigned
by Bray on the preceding day to prepare the device. The
particular kit required 4 rolls of 26 different types of wire,
with each roll consisting of 50 feet of wire. Instead of using
a required wire counter machine to accomplish his work
task, Phillips proceeded to perform the operation by hand,
commencing , according to his testimony, at noon on Au-
gust 22 and finishing some 5 hours later. He then testified
that he was taken off the job prior to its completion on
August 23 Finally, when shown an affidavit which he gave
to the Board, which recited that "I finished this project at
approximately 8.30 a.m. on August 23, 1974," Phillips stat-
ed that "I was finished with everything except putting the
material in a box." Phillips then sought to excuse any laxity
on his part by pointing to the performance of a fellow
employee, Dot Bacon, who he claimed was working on the
same project during the times material and had not com-
pleted her assignment when Phillips was pulled off the im-
complete job by Bray. Phillips did not impress me with his
candor as a witness and I credit Bray's testimony and find
that Bacon toiled on the modification of installation kits
which takes a greater length of time to accomplish.
In short, I find that Phillips received a written warning
on July 9 for leaving his place of work during productive
time without prior authorization from Bray which, by his
own admission, was warranted. I also find that Phillips was
issued a second warning on August 23 for failing ade-
quately to complete a work assignment in a timely fashion.
Although Phillips had been an active proponent of the
Union since May, I am not convinced that the General
Counsel has shown by preponderant proof, as shown he
must , that Phillips had received the disciplinary notations
for his personnel file in order to punish him for assisting
the Union and to discourage any further efforts on its be-
half.21 I shall therefore dismiss this allegation from the
complaint as well as the objection which pertains thereto.
As in the case of employee Barbara Pendley chronicled
in a marginal reference above,22 the General Counsel
sought to introduce testimony through Phillips in support
of the Union's Objection 6 which, as previously noted, al-
leges that Respondent threatened employees with dis-
charge for distributing union literature in working areas of
the plant while freely encouraging and permitting support-
ers of the Company to distribute "vote no" literature in the
same areas. Phillips testified that on or about October 1 he
observed employees Roy McGrew and Clyde Gentry who
worked in an adjoining department take some of the union
buttons on company time-"they were a blue button
around an inch and a half or two inches in diameter that
said I'm for CWA and they were covering them with mask-
ing tape and we have a stencil cutter in the department and
they went back and wrote no, vote no with the stencil cut-
ter and were stenciling it on these buttons " According to
Phillips, Supervisor Marvin Bunker "came up to where
they were working on the buttons and looked over their
shoulder to see what they were doing and he kind of just
smiled and walked off and went back and sat down in his
chair " Phillips further testimonially reported that later in
the evening McGrew and Gentry approached employee
Lewis Kingsley during working hours and pinned "one of
these vote no buttons on him and they were standing just
right across from Marvin Bunker's desk and he was sitting
there in his chair and watched the whole incident and he
didn't say anything to them at all."
Supervisor Bunker, when called to the stand, flatly de-
nied that he had seen either McGrew or Gentry make
"vote no" buttons on company premises at any time.
Bunker stated that he had discussed the subject of these
buttons with McGrew and Gentry due to the following
circumstances. In his words, "They asked me if the compa-
ny was passing out vote no badges or how they could ob-
tain them to wear them and I told them that I would have
to check with the personnel department to see if the com-
pany was issuing these or if they were allowed to. And I
called Mr. Duncan's office [the industrial relations manag-
er] and he advised me that the Company could not make
these and pass them out. So, I told these two fellow that if
they wanted them they would have to make them on their
own time and they could wear them. The company would
not make them take them off if they wanted to wear them."
Bunker further noted that, at the time these employees
21 See Boaz Spinning Company, 206 NLRB 518 ( 1973) "It is well settled
that union adherence or activity does not insulate an employee from repri-
mand or discharge where valid cause therefor exists
22 See fn 16, supra
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
queried him about the "vote no " buttons, five or six em-
ployees in the shipping area sported union badges.
Bunker testified that as a result of the inquiry made by
McGrew and Gentry on October 1, and his consultation
with Industrial Relations Manager Fred Duncan, Respon-
dent placed a notice on the plant bulletin board on Octo-
ber 3 which read:
We have had many requests from employees for the
Company to make available "VOTE NO" buttons to
those employees desiring to wear them Unfortunate-
ly, the Company is prohibited by law from supplying
material of this type to employees. All employees,
whether they are against the union or for the union,
have a legal right to express themselves as they see fit
however, including the wearing of buttons , shirts, etc.
All employees also have the legal right not to express
themselves with respect to this. The right of every em-
ployee will be protected.
All employees should remember Company rules pro-
hibiting any such activity which interferes with work.
Bunker finally testified that after his conversation with Mc-
Grew and Gentry he noticed that they, as well as other
employees , wore "vote no" buttons in the plant
As heretofore noted , Phillips did not impress me as a
trustworthy witness and I credit Bunker's denial that he
had ever seen either McGrew or Gentry fabricate "vote
no" buttons on company time. I shall therefore overrule
objection 6, based on Phillips ' testimonial utterances, and
also dismiss any companion allegation in the complaint
which relates thereto.2 3
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I Respondent is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not interfered with, restrained,
or coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4 The Respondent has not engaged in preelection con-
duct which warrants setting aside the election conducted in
Case 10-RC-10126.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
23 At the hearing , the General Counsel elicited testimony from Phillips
concerning a conversation with Supervisor Bray which allegedly occurred in
late August or early September The General Counsel main tains that the
conversation demonstrated that Bray illegally interrogated this employee
However , no such allegation is contained either in the original or the consol-
idated complaint, and therefore was not put in issue in these proceedings
Moreover , the evidence fails to establish Phillips was coercively questioned
by Bray