North American Rockwell Corp.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 28, 1972195 N.L.R.B. 1046 (N.L.R.B. 1972) Copy Citation 1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Whitcraft Houseboat Division , North American Rock- well Corporation and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 18-CA-3217 March 28, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER By, CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On October 29, 1971, Trial Examiner Bernard J. Seff issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. There- after, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions and the Respondent filed a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional. Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the ex- tent consistent herewith. 1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent dis- criminatorily promulgated and enforced a no-solicita- tion rule against union organizing in the plant in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We disagree for the reasons stated below. In February 1970 Respondent posted a set of general plant conduct rules on the employee bulletin boards at the Winona plant, the plant involved herein. It is ad- mitted that one of these rules was an invalid no-solicita- tion rule prohibiting the "Soliciting of subscriptions, memberships, pledges, circulating petitions or conduct- ing non-company business on Company time or prop- erty." This rule is not in issue herein. By registered letter dated April 23, 1971,1 which was received by the Company on Monday, April 26, the Union notified the Company that it was seeking to organize its employees. According to uncontradicted testimony, on the morning of April 26, Assistant Plant Manager Leo Carty began his regular morning tour through the plant at about 7:15 a.m. When Carty walked into plant no. 2, where assembly work is per- formed, he found a group of employees conversing with a fellow employee. This was about 15 minutes after starting time and Carty observed that none of the peo- ple had started to work. As Carty approached, some of the employees dispersed, and he told the others to go to work. Carty encountered similar situations in two other areas of the plant. In each instance, it was neces- sary for him to instruct the employees to go back to work. When he completed his tour of the plant, he All dates hereinafter are in 1971. reported the problem he had encountered to General Manager Fritz Weiss. It is undisputed that the employees continued to congregate in groups during working hours for the re- mainder of April 26, all day on April 27, and through- out the morning of April 28. As a result, there was a substantial adverse effect on production. During these 3 days, production in three departments was down by almost 50 percent. After Carty's report on the morning of April 26, Weiss got in touch with Harry Coll, Respondent's ma- rine divisions vice president, and advised him that Carty had reported that employees were congregating in various areas of the plant and that there was union solicitation going on during working hours which was slowing down production drastically. Coll instructed Weiss to get in touch with James Montgomery, the industrial relations manager for the marine divisions. Weiss did so, and Montgomery told him not to do anything until Montgomery could get to Winona on April 28. When Montgomery arrived at the Winona plant on April 28, Weiss discussed with him in detail the prob- lem of employees congregating during working hours and the resulting loss of production. Montgomery asked to see the plant rules, and after reviewing them, advised Weiss that the no-solicitation rule was illegal and unenforceable because it prohibited employees from soliciting during break or lunchtime and other nonworking hours. Montgomery suggested that the ex- isting rule be revised to permit solicitation during non- working hours. Based on Montgomery's advise, Weiss issued a "Statement of Unionism" which, inter alia, contained the following revision of the plant no-solici- tation rule and was posted on the bulletin boards by Carty at about 11 a.m. on April 28: As you well know working time is for work. No one will be allowed to solicit or distribute litera- ture during our working time, that is, when he or she should be working. Anyone doing so and ne- glecting his work or interfering (sic) with the work of another employee will be subject to discharge. Any other rule concerning solicitation is no longer effective. At the same time Carty removed the general plant conduct rules which contained the unlawfully broad no-solicitation rule. The Company also mailed to each of its employees a "Dear Whitcraft Employee" letter which contained the revised no-solicitation rule. The April 28 announcement of the no-solicitation rule was removed from the bulletin boards at about the time of the Board election, and, contrary to the Trial Examiner, at the same time, modified general plant conduct rules containing the revised no-solicitation rule were reposted on the bulletin boards. 195 NLRB No. 189 WHITCRAFT HOUSEBOAT DIVISION 1047 The Trial Examiner found that Respondent's an- nouncement and enforcement of its no-solicitation rule violated Section 8(a)(1) because of the timing of the rule's promulgation, and the fact that the "record is studded with evidence of many other solicitations being conducted in the plant before, during and after the union's organizational campaign" without any discipli- nary action being taken. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, the rule was not adopted on the same day that the Company was notified that the Union was going to conduct an organi- zational campaign. The record shows that the Com- pany received notification of the organizing drive on April 26 and that the revised rule was not posted until shortly before noon on April 28. More importantly, the Trial Examiner ignored the uncontradicted aforemen- tioned testimony that during this 2-day period there had been a marked decline in production due to union solicitation on company time and that this was the reason for adopting the revised rule. These circum- stances adequately explain on a nondiscriminatory ba- sis the timing of the rule's promulgation. Further, there is no evidence that any solicitations were knowingly permitted by Respondent after the re- vised no-solicitation rule was posted on April 28. Thus, while one employee testified that punch cards had cir- culated in the plant the week before the hearing, he did not specifically say that this was done during working time, nor could he say that Carty was aware of it. Another employee testified that a weekly check pool was in operation during working time the week before the hearing. However, he could not say whether Carty was aware that it was solicited during working time. Carty testified that the check pool is supposed to be handled after working hours and that he had never seen it done during working hours. The Trial Examiner also relied on Respondent's fail- ure to discharge Tom Clinger as showing disparate treatment. The record shows that Carty saw Clinger engage in solicitation during working time on April 26. At that time the original rule was in effect. When Carty posted the revised rule on April 28 he called Clinger and John Grable, another employee he had previously observed soliciting during working time, to the bulletin board and showed them the revised rule which he had just posted. Carty warned Grable and Clinger not to pass out union cards on company time as he would dislike losing two good men and told them that if there was any further solicitation he would have to discharge the person involved. He requested Clinger and Grable to spread the word among the other employees. Thus, it is clear that the Trial Examiner erred in finding that this incident represented disparate enforcement of the revised no-solicitation rule; for, at the time that Clinger and Grable engaged in the solicitation to which Carty was referring, the then operative no-solicitation rule was the pre-April 28 one which was illegal and unen- forceable. Finally, the Trial Examiner found that Respondent's failure to discharge employee Kuntz for circulating an antiunion petition established further disparate treat- ment in the application of the revised no-solicitation rule.' The facts show that Kuntz circulated an antiun- ion petition in the course of which he spoke to every employee in the plant. Kuntz testified that the petition was circulated on nonworking time and that manage- ment was unaware of such activity. Although uncon- tradicted, the Trial Examiner discredited Kuntz' state- ment that he circulated the petition without the knowledge of the Company. In addition, the Trial Ex- aminer inferred Respondent's knowledge of the antiun- ion petition upon finding that in general the employees' activities were apparently well known to management; Carty made at least 15 tours of inspection each day; the antiunion solicitation involved every employee in the plant; and Respondent did not affirmatively disclaim knowledge of the circulation of the antiunion petition. However, contrary to the Trial Examiner, the bur- den is on the General Counsel to show that Kuntz solicited on company time. Since Kuntz testified as a witness for the General Counsel that he circulated the petition on nonworking time and since no other witness contradicted his testimony in any respect, Respondent had no duty to disclaim knowledge of the circulation of the petition. There is no evidence whatever in the record indicating that Kuntz did solicit on company time. In these circumstances, we find that the facts do not establish that Respondent's announcement and en- forcement of the revised no-solicitation rule was in- tended as retaliation for the employees' union activity, or that it violated Section 8(a)(1). 2. The Trial Examiner further found that Respond- ent violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging employees Erwin Wolfram and Jerome Daniel. We find merit in Respondent's exception to this finding. Although Daniel and Wolfram engaged in oral union solicitation during working time with two other em- ployees for a period of about 20 minutes on April 30, the Trial Examiner nevertheless found that the men were in fact discharged because of their union activities and not for violating the revised no-solicitation rule, because he reasoned in this connection that the conver- sation was a single isolated instance and was "intermit- tent" and "rather brief"; Respondent's firing of the men was precipitate; the discharge was contemporane- ous with the beginning of the union campaign; and Respondent engaged in disparate treatment with re- gard to Kuntz and Clinger. ' The Trial Examiner erred in stating that Kuntz testified as a 43(b) witness. 1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD As we have found that the revised rule was not adopted for an illegal purpose and was not enforced in a disparate manner with regard to Kuntz, Clinger, and other employee solicitations, the Company had the right to enforce the rule against Daniel and Wolfram according to its terms. The conduct of these two men plainly violated the rule, which specified that anyone engaged in such prohibited activity "will be subject to discharge." Finally, the timing of the discharge must be viewed realistically. True, it occurred shortly after the Re- spondent became aware of the union campaign. But any discipline for violating a valid no-solicitation rule which is caused by an employee's prohibited solicita- tion of union support or membership is bound to occur during' a union campaign. In this context, therefore, our usual presumptions about timing have little appli- cability. Upon review of the record as a whole, we are per- suaded that Daniel and Wolfram were discharged for their misconduct in violating a valid rule. Accordingly, we shall dismiss this allegation of the complaint. 3. We disagree with the Trial Examiner that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by requesting in its "Statement of Unionism" and its "Dear Whitcraft Em- ployee" letter that "if anyone is causing you trouble on your job or trying to pressure you to sign a card or join a union, you should let the company know about it immediately and we will take steps to see that it is stopped."3 In our view requesting the reporting of in- stances of "pressure" or "trouble on your job" was not intended to nor did have the effect of inviting reports of any and all organizing efforts, and therefore we would not find this violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.4 THE REMEDY We have found, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Respondent did not engage in conduct violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) by its promulgation and implementation of a revised no-solicitation rule and the statements con- tained in its "Statement of Unionism" and "Dear Whit- craft Employee" letter. In addition we have found that Respondent did not engage in conduct violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) by its discharges of employees Wolfram and Daniel pursuant to the aforementioned rule. Ac- cordingly, we shall order that the complaint be dis- missed in its entirety. ' We reject Respondent's contention that this conduct was not litigated fully at the hearing as there is no question that the two documents contained the statement upon which this violation was based. ` Member Fanning would find this conduct to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) for the reasons set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be; and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BERNARD J. SEFF, Trial Examiner: This case was heard at Winona, Minnesota, on August 31, 1971,' based on a charge filed on May 6, 1971. The complaint alleges that Whitcraft Houseboat Division, North American Rockwell Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Company or Respondent), in- terfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. The unfair labor practices involve alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) because the Company posted a plant rule forbidding solicitation initially on company property. Subsequently this notice was changed to limit the ban on solicitation during working hours. Previously there was no such limitation in the notice. Respondent also allegedly discharged two employees whom the General Counsel claims were discharged because of activities on behalf of the labor union. Respondent, by its answer, admitted certain allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. At the hearing all parties were afforded an opportunity to adduce relevant testimony, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally on the record. Oral argument was waived. Briefs submitted by the' General Counsel and Respondent, respectively, have been received and duly con- sidered. Upon the entire record in the case, including my observa- tion of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a Delaware corporation, under the name Whitcraft Houseboat Division of North American Rockwell Corporation, is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of houseboats. During the past calendar year, Respondent purchased goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 from points directly outside the State of Minnesota for use in Winona and its Winona, Minnesota, operations.,During the same period of time Respondent, in the course and conduct of its opera- tions at Winona, Minnesota, sold and distributed goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 to points directly outside the State of Minnesota. Based on the facts of record and the admissions of Respondent I find that it is engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 5 of the Act. All dates in this case refer to 1971 unless otherwise indicated. WHITCRAFT HOUSEBOAT DIVISION 1049 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The No-solicitation Rule It is undisputed that prior to the Union' s organization campaign Respondent had posted and maintained a set of plant rules which included a no-solicitation rule which pro- vided , inter alia, that employees were prohibited from solicit- ing during break or lunch time and other nonworking hours. The Union notified the Company by registered mail that an organizational campaign had begun on April 26. Upon re- ceipt of this letter the Company 's general manager, Fritz Weiss, communicated with his home office and was advised by the Respondent 's director of labor relations that a new notice should be put up in place of the one which previously was in effect . This notice states "soliciting of subscriptions, memberships , pledges , circulating petitions for conducting non-company business on Company time or property" was an offense for which the penalty could result in immediate dis- charge . The Company also mailed to each of its employees a document entitled "Statement of Unionism" and such infor- mation was sent to each of its employees by mail. The General Counsel contends that the new rules estab- lished by the Respondent were clearly aimed at the union campaign . In support of his contention he points out that one of the sentences in the document mailed to each employee states "the company does not want or intend to have a union ." There is further information in the document sent by the Respondent to its employees encouraging any of them to report to the Company any pressure brought to bear on them to sign a card or to join the Union . Thus, the General Counsel contends the employees were in fact solicited to inform on their fellow employees if they engaged in any of the activities referred to above. The General Counsel 's brief recites the fact that the Board has recently held that soliciting employees to inform on one another constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Bank of St. Louis, 191 NLRB 119. General Counsel further argues that even if a no-solicitation or no-distribution rule is presumptively valid on its face such a presumption is rebutta- ble. Thus, if the rule is aimed at a union 's organizational campaign in an effort to discourage the employees ' concerted activities , the rule constitutes a violation of the Act and can- not be enforced . Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Miami, Inc., 155 NLRB 527; Wm. H. Block Co., 150 NLRB 341; Walton Manufacturing Co., 126 NLRB 697, enfd. 289 F. 2d 177 (C.A. 5). As a further indication of the Respondent 's purpose in changing its no-solicitation rule and sending copies of it to each of its employees the General Counsel points out that Assistant Plant Manager Leo Carty "admitted on cross ex- amination that the rules which Respondent posted on April 28 had been removed from the bulletin board shortly before or shortly after the NLRB election which had been con- ducted in the plant ." Thus, it would appear that the Respond- ent itself regarded these rules as being aimed directly at the organizational campaign. Furthermore, although the rules seemed designed to limit all forms of solicitation within the plant , the record is studded with evidence of many other solicitations being conducted in the plant both before, during , and after the Union's organiza- tional campaign. In this connection employee Ray Sultze, an employee of 9 years standing , testified that there had taken place continued solicitations for flower funds , Christmas gifts for supervisors , gifts for hospitalized supervisory personnel, baseball and football jackpots , the community chest , punch- cards for prizes , and other similar solicitations . There is also a check fund which it was not denied was in operation up to and including the period just prior to the hearing . This check fund involves the deposit of 50 cents by each employee who wants to participate in a cardboard box and if the number on the check corresponds to the one indicated by the player of the game he wins a certain prize in cash. Carty responded to these accusations by stating that so far as Respondent knew there had been no solicitations after the posting of the new nonsolicitation rule and that while the Company knew about the check fund collection no such ac- tivity took place during working hours. The record contains evidence that for the past approxi- mately 10 years no employee had ever been punished or discharged for distributing punchcards or engaging in solici- tation for community chest or any other solicitations that took place in the plant. B. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharges Ervin Wolfram began to work for the Company March 8 and was discharged on April 30. He testified that employee Donna Baker said in a teasing manner , "Jerry is mad and I'm glad and I don 't know how to please him ." She said it a number of times before the lunchbreak and continued after the lunchbreak . Wolfram said the remark was made at least approximately 5 times. Daniel did not respond at first and then he said "sign a card." She asked where she could get a card and she also asked who was handing them out in the fiberglass area. Wol- fram said he was operating a vibrator which made a lot of noise. Each time he stopped his sander to check the work he was doing the conversation started up again . The verbal ex- changes that took place between Daniel and Baker spanned a period of approximately 20 minutes . Employee Horman said that she could not afford whatever the union dues would be. Jerome Daniel began to work for the Company approxi- mately 10 years ago and discharged on April 30. He said he was a leadman who spent 95 percent of his time doing physi- cal work . Daniel admitted he called Baker a "liar" but did not say "god damn liar." At intervals Daniel discussed the fact that the vacation of the employees would be improved, that they would get additional holidays off and that they could bargain with their employer through the union for increases in wages at stated times and that the employees in his opinion would be better off if they were represented by a union. In the course of his remarks he also asked one of the two girls whether her husband was a member of a union . She said he was and Daniel then remarked that he probably got increases at certain intervals when the union was able to negotiate these improvements . It seems clear from the testimony of the two girls, Daniel , and Wolfram that the talk that took place among these four employees was intermittent and even though the machines they were working on were turned off briefly at various times the conversations were rather brief. At approximately 2:35 p.m. Supervisor Carty called both Wol- fram and Daniel into his office . Carty opened the conversa- tion and said to Daniel "Jerry , I'm surprised at you, I'm going to have to fire you two boys, the two girls come in here complaining that you were swearing at them and harassing them about the union." Daniel was asked whether he said anything in response to this accusation and the only word he uttered was "What?" Daniel also testified that Carty did not ask either Wolfram or him to give their side of the story. Carty told the two men to go out in the shop, pick up their tools, and go to the office and get their checks. After they had complied with this order and turned in their tools they were instructed to go to the office of one of the office girls where they found Leo Carty. Carty read the statement employee Baker had signed. After Carty started reading the two men asked him to read one sentence at a time and the men told him whether it was true 1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD or not and then he would go on to the next one . Both Daniel and Wolfram stated that most of the statements that were read to them were not completely accurate and they did not contain the actual words that were used by Daniel . There was agreement that Baker stated in her written complaint that Daniel asked her if her husband was a union member and she said yes . Both men denied the other contents of this state- ment. Both of the discharged employees stated that their checks were ready for them when they got to the office girl 's office. Wolfram testified that Carty said Jerry (Daniel) had been his best employee for the last year and a half and he hated to let him go . He turned to me and said , "I had only been there a short time but I was doing very good work and he didn't exactly like to let me go either." Wolfram said he never saw Daniel solicit any employee to sign an authorization card during working hours . He also stated that during the talk with Baker and Horman , Daniel did not stop working but kept right on with his job while he was having his conversation . Wolfram testified that among other comments made by Daniel he had stated to the two girls that "If we had a union contract here the jobs would be posted and the oldest person signing up would get the job. His purpose in making the remark was to indicate to the em- ployees that if they had a contract they might be able to better themselves. In large part the testimony of Wolfram was corroborated by Daniel . Daniel denied that he had called Baker a "god damn liar" but did admit that he called her a "liar." He also reiterated the fact that the conversation among the four em- ployees was begun by Baker 's taunting remarks which he took to be a form of teasing . He said he was not mad at her but he did ask her if she had signed a card. General Manager Weiss stated on the record that he was reluctant to discharge Daniel because he was a very good worker but that it would have been unfair to discharge one without the other . Furthermore, it was essential that both men be discharged because in order to maintain discipline in the plant it was necessary to mete out similar punishment for the same offense. General Manager Weiss was asked if he knew that fre- quently conversations took place among the employees dur- ing the workday . Weiss replied "there's always conversation, I would say ." He also conceded that the Company had never discharged any employee for talking on the job before the two men who are the subject of the case at bar . He further stated that he did not think talking as such is objectionable but that it is "the emotional element that was in here." Weiss said the men were discharged for violating a stated company rule and, "if you want to run a company , you have to enforce authority, and keep the whole place in order ." Carty for his part stated that the reason for the discharge was not the actual cursing but was due to the "fact of harassing the employees, to the fact that they came to me and complained they couldn't work under the conditions." There is direct unrefuted testimony from employee Thomas Clinger that on the day the revised no-solicitation notice was posted , April 28, he was asked by Assistant Manager Leo Carty if he had seen the notice. Clinger said that Carty admonished him by stating: John , I seen you talking about it yesterday when you were working on a boat , and I heard you telling about it then. Carty warned Clinger that if it was done any more he would have to discharge anybody found soliciting. Employee Frank Kuntz , who testified as a 43 (b) witness, stated that he was a leadman in the joining department. In this capacity he had authority over approximately 10 em- ployees. He said he did very little production work and he was promoted to the position of supervisor a short time ago. During the time that he still carried the title of leadman he made recommendations for employees to receive more than scheduled increases . These recommendations were granted. He further said that if a man wanted a day off he would come to Kuntz who had authority to grant the employees ' requests. Kuntz stated that he was aware of the Union 's campaign in April , May, and June . Kuntz circulated a petition in oppo- sition to the union campaign . He talked to every employee in the plant . The petition which he circulated stated something to the effect that the undersigned employees did not believe they needed to be represented by the Machinists ' Union. Kuntz said that no company representative asked him to discontinue his activities with respect to circulating the peti- tion . He claimed that it was circulated on nonworking time and that management was not aware that he was engaged in this activity. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that the Re- spondent affirmatively disclaimed knowledge of the circula- tion of the antiunion petition . It is difficult to believe that in a plant where the activities of the employees were apparently well known to management and where Carty stated that he made at least 15 tours of inspection each day that such ac- tivity , which involved the signing or the attempted solicita- tion of signatures of every single employee in the plant, could have gone on without the Company knowing what was in progress. In evaluating the testimony of Kuntz I was impressed more with his obvious attempt to curry favor with his boss than with his veracity. It should be noted that in the notice posted in February 1970 rule 3 explicitly states that the circulation of petitions on company time or property is an offense punishable by immediate discharge. After the rule was changed the prohibi- tion that circulating a petition on company time was con- tinued with the limitation that the reach of the rule was limited to the extent that there was no prohibition on em- ployees engaging in this activity on their own time. Concluding Findings and Analysis The Union held its first meeting on April 22 . A letter was sent to the Respondent by the Union notifying the Company that the Union was engaging in an organizing campaign among its employees . On February 1970 to August 28, 1971, Respondent had posted an invalid no-solicitation rule prohib- iting any solicitations at any time on company property. On the same day that the notice was received by the Respondent that the Union was attempting to organize its employees the Respondent posted a revised no-solicitation rule limiting its application to solicitation on company time. It was well known in the plant and Respondent did not deny that it knew Daniel was the sparkplug of the union campaign. Despite the long continued existence of the invalid no- solicitation rule, soliciting in the plant was rife covering a wide spectrum of activities : Christmas fund, gifts to company supervisors ; flower fund; community chest ; check pool; and baseball and football pools. In fact , it is undisputed that the check pool has flourished up to the time of the hearing. More to the point , it was not denied that Assistant Manager Carty admonished employee Clinger that he had seen him talking about it yesterday and warned Clinger that he would be discharged if found soliciting again. It is important to note at this juncture that Clinger was not discharged out of hand for engaging in similar soliciting which caused the immediate discharge of Daniel and Wol- fram . Note also that leadman Kuntz testified , without refuta- WHITCRAFT HOUSEBOAT DIVISION 1051 tion, that he circulated an antiunion petition in the course of which he spoke to everyone of Respondent's employees. Carty had stated that it was his practice to make 15 rounds of the plant on a daily basis. Under these circumstances and in view of the substantial information which Respondent seemed to have in its possession concerning the activities of its employees it is highly unlikely that Carty knew nothing about the thorough canvassing in the plant of each and every one of its employees. The only reasonable explanation of Respondent's lack of action against Kuntz can be found in the fact that Kuntz was actively campaigning against the Union and this suited the Respondent's purpose. It is established law that the promulgation and enforce- ment of a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours is presumptively valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.' The fact that Respondent requested the cooperation of its employees, in reporting to it immediately if there was any solicitation on company time is commented about in Bank of St. Louis, 191 NLRB 119. Respondent's request that employees report immedi- ately if they were subjected to constant badgering by union proponent was therefore tantamount to a request that they report persistent attempts to persuade. Ac- cordingly, the Respondent's letter would tend to restrain the union's proponent from attempting to persuade any employee through fear that his conduct would be re- ported to management. It is significant to note that the reason for the discharge of Daniel and Wolfram did not come about as a result of "con- stant badgering by the union proponent-persistent attempts to persuade-but in the instant case there was one single isolated instance of an attempt to solicit during working hours and this resulted in the immediate discharge of the alleged discriminatees. It is well settled that a no-solicitation rule which forbids union organizing activity on the job in such a way as to cause the union proponent to neglect his own work or interfere with the work of others is not an unreasonable limitation on the work of the others.' However, it is equally well settled that: . management can prevent employees from soliciting for a union during working hours, provided the ban is imposed on a nondiscriminatory basis. Further such a ban, otherwise reasonable, can become violative of the Act if the times at which the ban was promulgated were restricted to times of union activity and no other times and other types of solicitation were and had been al- lowed. In the instant case the revised ban on union solicitation was promulgated a day or two after the commencement of union activities. Note also that a copy of this newly revised rule was mailed to every one of the Respondent's employees at a time when organizational activities were intense. This had never been done before. Thus the Respondent by discriminatorily promulgating and enforcing its no-solicitation rule violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and I so find. In the case of William H. Block Company, 150 NLRB 341; Walton Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 694, enfd. 289 F.2d 177 (C.A. 5) the Board concluded that: 1. Even if the employer's rule against union solicitation by employees during working time was presumptively valid, this presumption is rebuttable; 2. The elements present, including the fact that the Re- spondent took no action to prohibit other types of solici- tation ... showed that the rule was directed against Kerns Bakery, Inc., 154 NLRB 1582, 1986 Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Miami, Inc., 155 NLRB 527, 528, 529. union organization and not to the protection of the proper use of working time; 3. Because its adoption was motivated by antiunion con- siderations that presumption was rebutted and the rule was invalid. Using the yardstick set forth in the quotation supra it is apparent that however fair on its face the revised no-solicita- tion rule may appear, it was implemented in a way to discour- age union activities and therefore the presumption was rebut- ted and it became invalid. In any case the activities of Daniel and Wolfram were not part of a persistent campaign of badgering fellow employees. Their talk with Horman and Baker constituted a single iso- lated instance. In defense of its discharge of Wolfram and Daniel the Respondent in its brief states inter alia (a) the rules specify that the penalty for violation was discharge and not some lesser penalty." If Respondent's position of enforcing the rule with rigidity is to be believed how can it be explained that Carty, coming upon employee Clinger asked if he had seen the revised no- solicitation notice and then said, "John, I seen you talking about it yesterday when you was working on a boat and I heard you talking about it then." Carty warned Clinger that if it was done anymore he had to discharge anybody found soliciting. In this case Respondent sounded a clear warning but did not discharge Clinger on the spot. Such disparity of treatment perforates the Respondent's contention that the rule was mechanistically enforced and that it had no choice but to discharge both of the alleged 8(a)(3)'s. It is also significant that the timing of the discharge took place within a day or two after the Respondent learned of the union organizational campaign. In explaining that Daniel, when told he was discharged, did not ask permission to explain his side of the case, Daniel said that it was apparent when he arrived at Carty's office that he had already been discharged and was told together with Wolfram to go to the office and collect the final checks which had been prepared and were waiting to be picked up. Such precipitate action, occurring as it did within a day or two of the beginning of the union campaign and the posting of the revised antisolicitation rule, creates the strong inference that these two employees were discharged for their union activi- ties and not for violating the posted rule. In this connection it should also be recalled that employe Kuntz seemed to be allowed the run of the plant. He explained that he circulated an antiunion petition after working hours without the knowl- edge of the Company. I do not credit this statement. Under all of these circumstances, I find that the reason for the discharge was^a mere pretext but that the men were in fact discharged because of their activities on behalf of the labor union and thus Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company set forth in section III, above, and there found to constitute unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with the operations of the Company set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub- stantial relation on trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing such commerce and the free flow thereof. 1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. THE REMEDY In view of the findings above set forth to the effect that the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce, it will be recommended that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and take such affirmative action as appears necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the purview of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminatorily discharging Jerry Daniel and Ervin Wolfram Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By requiring that employees report to management any efforts at union organization, such requirement tends to re- strain the employees through fear that their conduct would be reported to management. By such conduct the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By promulgating and implementing a rule prohibiting or tending to inhibit employees from soliciting union member- ship on company property, during nonworking hours, the Company has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. By interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation