NORDSON CORPORATIONDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 1, 20212020006069 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/337,292 10/28/2016 Robert W. Springhorn 098974.022123 2311 75534 7590 10/01/2021 BakerHostetler Cira Centre, 12th Floor 2929 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19104 EXAMINER SOOHOO, TONY GLEN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1774 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/01/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT W. SPRINGHORN Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 Technology Center 1700 Before MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, DEBRA L. DENNETT, and SHELDON M. MCGEE, Administrative Patent Judges. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 1 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) of Application 15/337,292 filed Oct. 28, 2016 (“the ’292 App.”); the Final Office Action dated Sept. 23, 2019 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed Apr. 9, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer dated June 23, 2020 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed Aug. 21, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–15, 24, and 26. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to an integrated multicomponent dispensing system, which is configured for mixing and dispensing. Claim 1; Spec. ¶ 2. The Specification describes that the integrated multicomponent dispensing system combines various elements of a fluid dispenser. Spec. ¶ 2. Conventionally, the elements of fluid dispensers are manufactured as separate pieces, but assembling the elements together collectively is said to be complex, costly, and time consuming. Id. ¶ 4. A reduction in the number of pieces and operations to produce a fluid dispenser is desirable to reduce the cost of assembly, work in-process, and inventories. Id. Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claim Appendix of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A dispensing system configured to dispense a mixture of multiple fluid components, the dispensing system comprising: a static mixer including an elongate tubular body defining a fluid passageway configured to receive first and second fluid components and a plurality of mixing baffles located within the fluid passageway, the plurality of mixing baffles being configured to mix the first and second fluid components when received in the fluid passageway, 2 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Nordson Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 3 a cartridge including a first cylinder defining a first chamber for holding the first fluid component and a second cylinder defining a second chamber for holding the second fluid component, the first cylinder having a first fluid outlet in fluid communication with the first chamber, the second cylinder having a second fluid outlet in fluid communication with the second chamber, and the first and second fluid outlets being in fluid communication selectively with the fluid passageway of the static mixer, and an interior wall extending from the cartridge to the static mixer, the interior wall defining portions of the fluid passageway, the first chamber, and the second chamber, wherein the first and second cylinders of the cartridge, the elongate tubular body, and the plurality of mixing baffles of the static mixer are an integrated unitary single piece. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims on appeal: Name Reference Date Gronemeyer US 3,029,987 Apr. 17, 1962 Falco US 4,913,553 Apr. 3, 1990 Rovellini WO 2007/113627 A1 Oct. 11, 2007 REJECTIONS The Examiner maintains the following rejections: 1. Claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Falco. Final Act. 9–14. 2. Claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Falco in view of Rovellini. Final Act. 15–25. Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 4 3. Claims 5–11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Falco in view of Rovellini, and further in view of Gronemeyer. Final Act. 25–28. OPINION I. Rejection of claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 under § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Falco Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To serve as an anticipatory reference, “the reference must disclose each and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so explicitly or inherently.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Appellant argues the rejection of claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 as anticipated by Falco as a group, based on similar features in the two independent claims (claim 1 and clam 26). Appeal Br. 12–16. We select claim 1 as representative of the group. 37 C.F.R. § 42.37(c)(1)(iv). The Examiner finds that Falco discloses each component and limitation of the dispensing system recited in claim 1, with the exception that Falco does not explicitly describe “the first and second cylinders of the cartridge, the elongate tubular body, and the plurality of mixing baffles of the static mixer are an integrated unitary single piece.” Final Act. 10–11 (emphases omitted); see Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that the only structural difference between Falco’s known dispensing device and the dispensing system subject matter of claim 1 is “in the formation of the parts as ‘an integrated unitary single piece.’” Final Act. 11. Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 5 Despite this finding, the Examiner determines that the claim “term ‘integrated unitary single piece’ is read . . . to broadly include different method[s] of manufacture to produce a final single piece apparatus object.” Id. at 3. The Examiner concludes that because the Specification describes that multiple component 3-d printed layers elements may be joined together . . . , or [a] separately made static mixer component and [a] cartridge component may be formed into a (single) “integrated multicomponent dispensing system[,]”[] assembly of separate components into a unified single useable object is read to meet [an] “integrated unitary single piece.” Id. at 4. The Examiner finds that the claim term “an integrated unitary single piece” is anticipated by Falco’s assembly of separate components into a unified single useable dispensing system. Id. at 12. Appellant argues that the Specification provides support for construing the claim term “an integrated unitary single piece” recited in claim 1 as a structural limitation. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant relies on the Specification’s Figures 2–5 as depicting the disputed claim term. Id. at 5. Appellant notes the Specification’s paragraph 39 describes that the system 10, 110 may be constructed by laying down and/or modifying successive layers or dots of material under computer control, thereby integrally forming at least some of the cartridge 12, nozzle 14, static mixer 16 (including complex baffles), receptacle 186, and handle 188 as an integral, unitary single piece. Id. Appellant contends that claim 1 is not anticipated by Falco’s dispensing system because each of Falco’s individual components are assembled together. Id. at 11. Appellant argues that Falco’s device “can only perform its operations when its unit is capable of disassembly.” Id. at 12. Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 6 In response, the Examiner finds that the Specification’s paragraph 39 does not clearly point out that “a computer controlled dot/layer construction is meant as a structural definition” for the claim term “an integrated unitary single piece.” Ans. 5. The Examiner finds that the Specification’s paragraph 39 “teaches that techniques to manufacture the system include[] methods of a production assembly line (figure 9, left side of flow chart) and/or additive manufacturing techniques (figure 9, right side of flow chart).” Id. at 7. The Examiner argues that the Specification’s “description [o]f the final assembly is also inclusive of the structural product being made by other similar [known] additive manufacturing techniques, or by an assembly line.” Id. However, we agree with Appellant that the Specification clearly describes that the claim term “an integrated unitary single piece,” as recited in claim 1, “does not include separate multiple components connected and/or assembled together.” Reply Br. 2 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 8, 9, 28, 39–43; Figs. 2– 5). See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that, during examination, “the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.”). Although the Examiner points to the Specification’s paragraph 39 and Figure 9 as describing embodiments in which a dispensing system may be assembled from separate pieces, the Specification describes these embodiments as alternatives to a dispensing system that is an integrally formed unitary piece. Contrary to the Examiner’s construction of claim 1, we read the Specification as supporting the distinction between: (i) a component that is an integrated unitary single piece and (ii) separate components that require manufacture and assembly. See Spec. ¶ 28 Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 7 (disclosing that “the nozzle 14 can be a separate added piece to the static mixer 16 or can be integrally formed as a unitary piece with the static mixer 16”); Figs. 2–5 (distinguishing components that are not integrally formed as a unitary piece from components that are by including cross-sectional parallel lines in the latter components); Fig. 10 (depicting an alternative embodiment in which the static mixer is formed integrally as a unitary piece for subsequent connection to the cartridge). See also Reply Br. 5 (“Applicant’s Figure 10 is not representative of the claimed [integrated unitary single piece] subject matter” because dispenser system 210 is an assembly of a separate static mixer 216 and cartridge 212). Appellant persuasively shows the Examiner reversibly erred in finding claim 1 is anticipated by Falco. We do not sustain the rejection of claim 1. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the anticipation rejection of claims 4, 12–15, 24, and 26. II. Rejection of claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 under § 103 as unpatentable over Falco in view of Rovellini Appellant argues the rejection of claims 1, 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 for obviousness as a group. Appeal Br. 12–16. We select claim 1 as representative of the group. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Whether there is a reason to combine prior art references is a question of fact.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 8 The Examiner finds that claim 1 is unpatentable over Falco in view of Rovellini. Final Act. 15–20. The Examiner finds that Falco discloses each of the elements recited in claim 1, except that Falco does not describe “the manner in which the article product is made so that the device has elements[,]” which “are an integrated unitary single piece.” Id. at 16. The Examiner finds that Rovellini teaches that a static mixer may be assembled from separate parts, but the baffles (3) and elongated tube (2) “may be constructed using a single sintering process (SLS) to form a single integrated product ‘without discontinuities or mechanical joints.’” Id. at 16. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious at the time the invention was filed to have incorporated Rovellini’s method of integrally forming separate elements “to form any combination of” Falco’s assembled parts “so as to lower the number subcomponents of the device which must be put together to provide a[] fully functioning operable device and lower the amount of gaps and seams between elements.” Id. at 20. In doing so, the Examiner reasoned that one of ordinary skill in the art would have avoided “wast[ing] time to assemble the four parts together prior to using the device.” Id. In addition, and citing Howard v. Detroit Stove Works, 150 U.S. 164 (1893) and In re Larson, 340 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1965), the Examiner further concluded “that the use of a one piece construction instead of the structure disclosed in [the prior art] would be merely a matter of obvious engineering choice,” i.e., “a matter of mechanical expedience in construction and assembly techniques.” Final Act. 20. Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to identify any disclosure in either Falco or Rovellini that the proposed modification would have reduced the number of: (i) subcomponents requiring assembly or (ii) gaps and seams Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 9 between components connected to a static mixer. Appeal Br. 14. However, Rovellini teaches the advantage of avoiding gaps and seams. See Rovellini, 5 (“[T]he static mixer 1 thus formed is fully free from welding lines, brasing lines or other types of joints between different elements or components . . . [allowing a perfect connection between inner structure 3 and outer cylindrical portion 2 . . . free from any discontinuity which may cause the formation of critical areas in which the flow stagnates.”). In addition, “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Moreover, [A]n implicit motivation to combine exists not only when a suggestion may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but when the ‘improvement’ is technology-independent and the combination of references results in a product or process that is more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient. Because the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal – and even common- sensical – we have held that there exists in these situations a motivation to combine prior art references even absent any hint of suggestion in the references themselves. In such situations, the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art references.” Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Examiner’s reasoning is sufficient to provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 10 support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Appellant also asserts that “modifying Falco to include an integrated unitary single piece would clearly limit Falco from performing each of its intended operations, thereby rendering it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose.” Appeal Br. 15. For support, Appellant points to Falco’s system that “must be disassembled for cleaning, maintenance, and disposal of used and/or worn components.” Id.; see also id. at 11 (arguing that “[t]he specific operation of Falco includes not only the operation of mixing, but also the operations of removal, cleaning, maintenance, and disposal of individual components.” (citing Falco 9:5–10). This argument fails to persuade us of reversible error in the rejection. The portion of Falco’s disclosure relied on by Appellant makes no reference to cleaning or maintenance that would be required for the device to be operable. Falco 9:5–10. Rather, this disclosure relates to the disposability of shutoff valves. Id. Appellants have not explained how Falco’s disclosure evinces that the device would be inoperable if it were formed as one integrated unit. Here, we observe that Falco’s cartridges 80 and 82 are also made “to be inexpensive and disposable.” Id. at 4:60–63. On this record, Appellant has not explained with sufficient detail precisely how Falco’s device––which has at least two disposable parts––would not operate if formed as one integrated unit. For the reasons above, and those provided by the Examiner, we affirm the rejection of claim 1 as obvious over Falco in view of Rovellini. For the same reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 4, 12–15, 24, and 26 not separately argued. Appeal 2020-006069 Application 15/337,292 11 III. Rejection of claims 5–11 under § 103 as unpatentable over Falco in view of Rovellini and further in view of Gronemeyer Appellant does not argue for the nonobviousness of claims 5–11 separately from claim 1. Appeal Br. 16. Having affirmed the rejection of claim 1 over Falco in view of Rovellini, we affirm the rejection of claims 5– 11 over Falco in view of Rovellini and Groenmeyer. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. More specifically, DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4, 12– 15, 24, 26 102(a)(1) Falco 1, 4, 12– 15, 24, 26 1, 4, 12– 15, 24, 26 103 Falco, Rovellini 1, 4, 12– 15, 24, 26 5–11 103 Falco, Rovellini, Gronemeyer 5–11 Overall Outcome 1, 4–15, 24, 26 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation