NICE-SYSTEMS LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 12, 202014267638 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 12, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/267,638 05/01/2014 Omer EREL P-77957-US 6102 49443 7590 05/12/2020 Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP 1500 Broadway 12th Floor New York, NY 10036 EXAMINER HOANG, HAU HAI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2167 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/12/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Arch-USPTO@PearlCohen.com USPTO@PearlCohen.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte OMER EREL, TAMIR LEVY, and OFIR ROTH ________________ Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 Technology Center 2100 ________________ Before JASON V. MORGAN, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–8, 10, 12–18, and 20–22. Claims 2, 9, 11, and 19 are canceled. Corrected Appeal Br. 3–5 and 7 (July 3, 2018). An oral hearing was held April 21, 2020. A transcript was entered into the record April 30, 2020. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as NICE LTD. Appeal Br. 1 (June 18, 2018) (“Appeal Br.”) Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 2 Summary of the disclosure Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to reporting invalid recordings of interactions where records from an interaction exchange list are matched with records from a recorded interaction list to determine whether all listed interactions have operational recorded interactions. Abstract. Representative claim2 1. A method for identifying and reporting invalid recordings of interactions, performed on a computer having a processor, memory, and one or more code sets stored in the memory and executing in the processor, the method comprising: receiving, by the processor, from an interaction exchange an interaction exchange list of interactions, transferred as interaction metadata from the interaction exchange; generating, by the processor, a recorded interaction list of recorded interactions, wherein the recorded interactions were recorded by a recording device and stored in a memory; during a record matching process, matching, by the processor, records from the interaction exchange list with records from the recorded interaction list, wherein each record in the interaction exchange list is matched to a record in the recorded interaction list having the same record parameters selected from a group consisting of: interaction identification, user device identification, number of segments in the interaction, interaction duration, interaction start time, interaction stop time, and interaction date; and for each record in the interaction exchange list: if a matching record from the recorded interaction list is found: 2 All quotes from the claims are based on the Corrected Appeal Brief filed July 3, 2018. Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 3 determining, by the processor, if the associated recorded interaction is operational; wherein, determining if the associated recorded interaction is operational comprises at least one of (1) analyzing one or more predefined exceptions fields to determine whether or not an exception applies which renders the associated recorded interaction operational or non-operational; and (2) attempting to play the recording and testing for any system errors; and if no matching record from the recorded interaction list is found or if the associated recorded interaction is determined to be non-operational: reporting, by the processor, that the associated recorded interaction is invalid; wherein reporting by the processor that the associated recorded interaction is invalid comprises displaying the invalid associated recorded interaction on a display for a user; automatically sending, by the processor, a request to initiate a new interaction with a user device interacting in the invalid recorded interaction; recording, by the processor, the new interaction with the user device; and verifying, by the processor, that the contact center stores a record and an operational recorded interaction for the new interaction. The Examiner’s rejection The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–8, 10, 12–18, and 20–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without significantly more. Non-Final Act. 2–20. Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 4 PRINCIPLES OF LAW To constitute patent-eligible subject matter, an invention must be a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or [a] new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. There are implicit exceptions to the categories of patentable subject matter identified in 35 U.S.C. § 101, including: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena; and (3) abstract ideas. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a framework for distinguishing patents with claims directed to these implicit exceptions “from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Id. at 217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). The evaluation follows a two-part analysis: (1) determine whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea; and (2) if so, then determine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the patent-ineligible concept itself. See id. at 217–18. Last year the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published guidance on the application of the two-part analysis. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Oct. 2019 Update”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 5 practice, or mental processes) (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (step 2A, prong one)); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see id. at 54–55 (step 2A, prong two); MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. ANALYSIS Step 2A, prong one The Examiner determines that claim 1 “recites comparing and matching an interaction exchange list with a recorded interaction list based on record parameters to detect discrepancies in the records.” Non-Final Act. 2–3. Thus, the Examiner determines the recitations of claim 1 “are similar to the concept identified as abstract ideas by the court[s], such as Obtaining and comparing intangible data.” Id. at 3 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also, e.g., Ans. 10. That is, although Appellant argues “the Examiner does not allege that the Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 6 claims fall into one of the three categories identified in the Jan. 2019 Revised Guidance” (Supp. Appeal Br. 2 (Apr. 15, 2020)), the Examiner’s determinations are reasonably characterized as determining claim 1 recites mental processes (i.e., concepts performed in the human mind, including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion), and thus an abstract idea (see CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1376–77; 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52). Appellant contends the Examiner “impermissibly simplified [claim 1] by pointing to the preamble of the claim and arguing that ‘it is clearly in the claim.’” Reply Br. 6. Appellant contends that the “Examiner’s reliance on the preamble of the claim in identifying an alleged abstract idea literally ignores every limitation in the body of the claim and specific requirements of the claims.” Id. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner’s characterization of claim 1 accords with recitations throughout the claim, not just in its preamble. In particular, claim 1 recites steps that include “‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,’ where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the human mind.” Oct. 2019 Update at *7 (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Specifically, claim 1 recites the information collecting steps of “receiving . . . an interaction exchange list” and “generating . . . a recorded interaction list of recorded interactions.” Claim 1 recites the analysis steps of “matching . . . records from the interaction exchange list with records from the recorded interaction list” and “determining . . . if the associated recorded Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 7 interaction is operational.” And claim 1 recites displaying certain results by “reporting . . . that the associated recorded interaction is invalid” and “sending . . . a request to initiate a new interaction.” The information collection recitations of receiving an interaction exchange list and generating a recorded interaction list recite insignificant extra-solution activities. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by limiting the use of the idea to a particular technological environment or adding insignificant extra-solution activity”); see also, e.g., Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1351–52 (patent-ineligible claim recited “receiving a plurality of data streams” and data from power system and non-grid data sources); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (patent-ineligible claim recited receiving output from “an automated digitizing unit”). The displaying recitations of claim 1—along with additional recitations that include “recording . . . the new interaction” and “verifying . . . that the contact center stores a record and an operational recorded interaction for the new interaction”—represent conditional steps that need only be performed “if no matching record from the recorded interaction list is found or if the associated recorded interaction is determined to be non- operational.” See Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792, at *5 (PTAB 2016) (precedential) (the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim to a method excludes conditional steps that need not be performed). That is, if a matching record is found and the associated recorded interaction is operational, the display steps and other conditional Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 8 steps are not performed. Thus, we need only consider whether the embodiment that performs only information collection and analysis steps recites an abstract idea. Cf. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing MPEP § 2106 (9th ed. Mar. 2014)) (“a claim [that] covers ‘both statutory and non-statutory embodiments,’ . . . is not eligible for patenting”). Because the collection and conditional display recitations are insignificant extra-solution activities, we focus on the analysis recitations. Our reviewing court has “treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. That is, steps that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” are unpatentable mental processes. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372. Here, the analytical step of “matching . . . records from the interaction exchange list with records from the recorded interaction list” can be performed in the human mind. Cf. Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics, 774 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“comparing BRCA sequences and determining the existence of alterations” is an abstract idea). Matching records as claimed entails matching records in the interaction exchange list with records in the recorded interaction list “having the same record parameters selected from a group consisting of: interaction identification, user device identification, number of segments in the interaction, interaction duration, interaction start time, interaction stop time, and interaction date.” See also Spec. ¶¶ 9, 34, 48, 69–70. Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 9 Appellant argues that “[c]omplex technology has been developed to record, track, and organize this data,” but “the data may not be stored, initially, in an ideal manner, requiring complex processing of past data.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Declaration of Omer Erel ¶ 6 (filed Feb. 1, 2018) (“Erel Decl.”)). This assertion is not only uncorroborated by the Specification, as the Examiner correctly notes (Ans. 7), it is uncorroborated by any evidence of record identified by Appellant. Moreover, it is not enough that a technical solution exists to perform operations that can be performed in the human mind. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (claim reciting “mathematical procedures [that could] be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary [or] without a computer” claimed an unpatentable abstract method). Furthermore, claim 1 fails to preclude processing data that has been recorded in an ideal, organized manner (e.g., sorted and cross-indexed based on values used for matching). See Ans. 7; see also Appeal Br. 9 (citing Erel Dec. ¶ 9) (Appellant acknowledges that only in “some embodiments” would the claimed matching process match records “quickly and efficiently . . . without requiring additional processing power or time to identify and review each record individually”). The analytical step of “determining . . . if the associated recorded interaction is operational” can also be performed in the human mind. Such determination comprises “at least one of (1) analyzing one or more predefined exceptions fields to determine whether or not an exception applies which renders the associated recorded interaction operational or non- operational; and (2) attempting to play the recording and testing for any system errors.” That is, a recording can be deemed non-operational if it is Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 10 “lost, damaged, incomplete, or transferred away” or if a recording has “no audio, no channel found, [the recording is] damaged [or] will not play.” Spec. ¶ 28. We agree with the Examiner that a human can perform this determination “by attempting to play the recording and testing for errors.” Ans. 8–9. Appellant argues that the method of claim 1 “could not as a practical matter be performed in the human mind, at least because the claimed invention solves the problem in a manner that is different than how the human mind would solve it.” Supp. Appeal Br. 4; see also Reply Br. 4–5; Appeal Br. 11. A human can, however, look at record parameters in multiple lists to ascertain whether records match. And a human can attempt to play a recording and test for errors. Despite Appellant’s arguments—including assertions made in the Erel Declaration (e.g., in paragraph 12)—nothing in the claim limitations makes it impractical for these steps to be performed in a human mind. Because claim 1, given its broadest reasonable interpretation, recites steps that include collecting information and analyzing in a manner that could be performed in a human mind (and optionally displaying information), claim 1 recites mental processes (observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) and thus an abstract idea. Step 2A, prong two Appellant further argues that even if claim 1 recites an abstract idea (e.g., mental processes), it is nonetheless patent-eligible because it integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. See Supp. Appeal Br. 5–6. Appellant argues, for example, that claim 1 “improve[s] the technology of recording compliance systems and equipment.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing McRO, Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 11 Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (“[a]n additional element [that] reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field” may indicate “that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application”). In particular, Appellant argues that “[t]ypical prior art recording compliance systems require that each recording be checked and confirmed separately in order to confirm that each individual record has been recorded and saved properly, and is operational.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Erel Decl. ¶ 8). That is, Appellant contends that [i]n prior art technology performing processes to achieve the result the presently pending claims achieve, and should people attempt to perform such a process manually, a system or person would be required to begin with a first record from the interaction exchange list, compare it with each and every record from the recorded interaction list . . . and then repeat the process for each and every record from the interaction exchange list. Id. at 10 (citing Erel Decl. ¶ 10). Thus, Appellant argues “prior technology systems when attempting to perform this task cause tremendous amounts of computer database memory to be wasted, as there may be many records which have not been recorded and saved properly, and/or are non- operational.” Id. at 11 (citing Erel Decl. ¶ 13). Appellant acknowledges these arguments are based on the declaration of a named inventor, but Appellant argues “the Examiner has offered no contrary evidence as to why the improvements to the technology of recording compliance systems and equipment Declarant Erel describes are not true.” Reply Br. 1. Appellant thus contends that these “statements Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 12 regarding the improvements to the technology . . . should be interpreted as fact.” Id. at 1–2. Appellant’s arguments and the Erel Declaration are unpersuasive. An inventor declaration is less persuasive than that of a disinterested person, although “it is not to be disregarded for that reason alone and may be relied on when sufficiently convincing.” In re McKenna, 203 F.2d 717, 720 (CCPA 1953) (emphasis added). Moreover, the “Board has broad discretion as to the weight to give to declarations offered in the course of prosecution.” In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That is, the “Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.” Id. Here, the inventor declarant assertions regarding prior approaches to matching records are uncorroborated and speculative. See, e.g., Ans. 7 (“the original specification never discuss the prior art recording compliance system”). Not only is claim 1 not limited to applying the method to matching sufficiently numerous records that an inefficient approach provides any meaningful benefit, claim 1 does not preclude the use of purportedly inefficient matching techniques. See id. (“[t]he specification and the claim do not include [a] limitation” to avoid “requiring additional processing power or time to identify and review each record individually”). That is, claim 1 recites matching records without reciting any particular algorithm or class of algorithms to use to perform the matching. Appellant also argues that claim 1 allows “a computer, which thinks and operates differently from how a human thinks and operates, to achieve a result which a human might achieve.” Appeal Br. 11. That is, “[t]he Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 13 computer must be told to use specific operations different from those a human would use.” Id. (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314); see also id. at 13; Supp. Appeal Br. 4. Claim 1, however, does not have limited rules structured to reflect a specific implementation that differs from what a human would have used in detecting record discrepancies. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316 (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 595–96 (2013)). Even a claimed invention designed for use on a computer that varies the ordinary steps a human would use can be patent- ineligible. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). As previously discussed, claim 1 broadly recites steps such as matching records without reciting any particular algorithm or class of algorithms to use to perform such steps. For these reasons, claim 1 does not integrate the recited mental processes (observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion), the underlying abstract idea, into a patent-eligible practical idea. Step 2B The Examiner determines that the additional limitations of claim 1 do “not provide additional elements to be considered ‘significantly more’” than the patent-ineligible idea to which claim 1 is directed. Non-Final Act. 6; see also, e.g., Ans. 23, 32–33, 36. Appellant argues the invention of claim 1 “is not in the prior art, and thus has not been previously performable by a computer.” Appeal Br. 15. Thus, Appellant contends claim 1 includes “an ‘inventive concept’ which transforms the alleged abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention, as the additional limitations provide ‘significantly more’ than the alleged abstract Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 14 idea itself.” Id. (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). That is, Appellant argues claim 1 recites “a combination of elements [that add] a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field [indicating] that an inventive concept may be present meaning [claim 1 is] patent-eligible.” Supp. Appeal Br. 6; see also Appeal Br. 18–19; Reply Br. 7–8. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because merely applying a mental processes (i.e., an abstract idea) on a computer is not only insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a patent-eligible practical application (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55), it is insufficient to show that claim 1 recites additional elements provide significantly more than the underlying abstract idea (id. at 56). Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM is particularly unpersuasive because the patent-eligible claims in BASCOM did more than “merely recite the abstract idea of filtering content along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet, or to perform it on a set of generic computer components. Such claims would not contain an inventive concept.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (citing CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370). Rather, the patent-eligible claim in BASCOM recited a “particular arrangement of elements [representing] a technical improvement over prior art ways” of performing the underlying abstract idea of filtering content on the internet. Id. (emphasis added). No such technical improvement is evident in the additional recitations of claim 1. Rather, claim 1 recites well-understood, routine, and conventional generic components such as a “processor,” “recording device,” “memory,” and “user device.” See Spec. ¶¶ 30, 34, 37, Fig. 1. Even read as Appeal 2019-000672 Application 14/267,638 15 an ordered combination, the additional recitations fail to add significantly more to the underlying abstract idea (i.e., the mental processes) of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claim 1, and claims 3–8, 10, 12–18, and 20–22, which Appellant argues together with claim 1. Appeal Br. 21. CONCLUSION Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–8, 10, 12–18, 20–22 101 Eligibility 1, 3–8, 10, 12–18, 20–22 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation