News-Texan, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 6, 1969

174 N.L.R.B. 1035 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

NEWS-TEXAN 1035
News-Texan , Inc. and Dallas Typographical Union,
Local 173. Case 16-CA-3165
March 6, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA
On October 18, 1968, Trial Examiner Lloyd
Buchanan issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices, and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner, as elaborated below.
The Respondent operates a newspaper in
Arlington, Texas. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the A. H. Belo Corporation, which operates the
Dallas, Texas, Morning News. The Dallas
Typographical Union represents the Dallas
newspaper employees, while the Arlington
employees are unrepresented. Joy Lee Kropp, a
union member, was employed as a teletypesetter
operator at Arlington on September 10, 1967. She
soon advanced to more responsible tasks, and was
awarded a pay raise on November 7, 1967. Late in
October or early in November, foreman Amrein
told Kropp that the Company was installing a
dataphone machine at Arlington to take over some
work performed at Dallas. Kropp made this known
to union officials, who were engaged in negotiations
at Dallas. The Union speculated that the Company
might perhaps be made to pay union rates to
Arlington employees who would perform the
transferred work. About November 7, Kropp told
her friend and coworker Blakely about her
conversation with the union officials. On November
8 Blakely told plant superintendent Ozment about it.
On November 9, 2 days after her pay raise, Kropp
was discharged.
The Respondent admits that Kropp was
discharged because she told union officials about the
pending work transfer, but contends' that such
disclosure constituted a breach of trust, since every
newspaper employee stands in a confidential
relationship to his employer as to information
acquired in the course of employment. We find no
merit in this contention Kropp's activity was clearly
protected by the Act,' and we are not persuaded
that she should be silenced simply because her
employer is in the newspaper business. The
Respondent also admits that Kropp was discharged
because she told fellow employee Blakely that wages
might be raised after the transfer of work from
Dallas, but contends that such statement was a
spreading of false information disruptive of
employee discipline. We find no merit in this
contention. Kropp's statement related to wages, and
there is no evidence in the record to support a
finding that her remarks were either malicious or
manifestly destructive of employee discipline.3
The Respondent further contends that Kropp was
discharged pursuant to a plan to reduce the work
force in anticipation of transferring some work away
from the Arlington operation. Like the Trial
Examiner, we reject the testimony of the
Respondent's officials that Kropp was selected
about November 2 to be in a group of three
employees, one of whom would be discharged. In
addition to the facts that the Respondent hired a
new employee on November 6, and that little
reduction in work occurred for approximately 30
days, it is inherently incredible that Kropp would
have been selected for a wage increase 2 days before
her discharge, if the Respondent had previously
designated her for termination. Moreover, assuming
that such a designation of three employees did take
place, the Respondent has offered no explanation
why Kropp was selected for dismissal while two
employees with lesser seniority and skills were
retained.4 Nor does the record contain any
explanation as to why the Respondent's
implementation of its decision to reduce the work
force was accelerated and made applicable to Kropp
immediately after it had learned that she had
engaged in protected activities S We find,
accordingly, that Kropp was discharged because she
had engaged in protected union activities.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of' the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
'The Trial Examiner found no merit in the Respondent ' s contention at
the hearing that the information Kropp disclosed to the union officials was
confidential In its exceptions the Respondent seems to have abandoned its
original position that the specific information was confidential , and now
contends that "all employees, and in particular employees of a newspaper
are under a special obligation with respect to knowledge obtained by
them in the course of their employment "
'See Root-Carlin, Inc, 92 NLRB 1313, Salt River Valley Water Users'
Association , v N.L R B 206 F.2d 325 (C A 9), Pioneer Natural Gas
Company, 158 NLRB 1067, 1073-75
' Walls Manufacturing Company, Inc, 137 NLRB 1317.
'See Serv-Air, Inc, 161 NLRB 382, 418-420
'See Dunclick , Inc, 159 NLRB 10, 16.
174 NLRB No. 136
1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
modified below, and orders that the Respondent,
News-Texan, Inc., Arlington, Texas, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as herein modified.
1. Delete paragraph 2(c) of the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
2. Delete the fifth indented paragraph of the
notice.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
BUCHANAN, Trial Examiner The complaint herein
(issued January 31, 1968; charge filed November 24,
1967), as amended, alleges that the Company has violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 73 Stat 519, by discharging Joy Lee
Kropp because of her union and other protected concerted
activities, and by otherwise interfering with employees'
rights by a speech and letter noted below in connection
with the motion to reopen. The answer, as amended,
admits Kropp's discharge but alleges that it was due to a
reduction in force and further that Kropp engaged in
unprotected activity which warranted discharge
After opening of the trial at Fort Worth, Texas, on
March 26, 1968, the General Counsel and the Company
entered into a settlement agreement over the Union's
objection. Because of subsequent acts by the Company,
the agreement was thereafter set aside and the case
proceeded to trial on July 9 through 11, 1968, inclusive
Counsel were heard in oral argument at the close
Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, briefs have been
filed by the General Counsel, the Company, and the
Union, the time to do so having been extended The
Union's requested findings and conclusions are adopted to
the extent that they are necessary, consistent with, and
included in the findings and conclusions herein I regret
that seven intervening cases have delayed issuance of this
decision
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The facts concerning the Company's status as a Texas
corporation, the nature and extent of its business, and its
engagement in commerce within the meaning of the Act
are admitted, I find and conclude accordingly. I also find
and conclude that, as admitted, the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act
IL THE REOPENING OF THE TRIAL
Beyond posting the notice called for in the settlement
agreement of March 26, the Company's president on that
day made a speech to all company employees;' and on
April 2 he distributed to the employees a copy of that
speech I base no finding of violation of the settlement
agreement or of the Act on the "overall tenor or tone" of
the speech, or on the speech "in conjunction with"
violations otherwise found Nor do I find it necessary to
attach a copy of the speech, lengthy as it was But I do
find that the following portion of the speech breached and
violated the settlement agreement and certainly its
purpose and spirit
We would not have agreed to the Board's suggestion
for a settlement if the following had not occurred The
settlement calls for a posting by us for 60 days of a
notice which contains five paragraphs. One paragraph
reads, "We will offer Joy Lee Kropp immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job without prejudice
to any rights and privileges previously enjoyed" We
agreed to this only because it was stated to us by the
NLRB and Union officials that Joy Kropp does not
want her job back Otherwise we would not have agreed
to do this Another paragraph reads, "We will make
whole Joy Kropp for any loss of pay suffered as a
result of her discharge" We have learned through the
NLRB and the Union lawyer that Joy Lee Kropp did
not suffer any loss of pay as a result of her discharge
and that we therefore will not pay her anything.
Otherwise we would not have agreed to this provision
of the notice
More was said here than in the Brearley2 case, where the
company's letter to its employees "stated that it would
have no difficulty in complying with" the posted notice
Aside from the need for me to rely on the Board's
decision in Bangor Plastics,' and the question as there
posed whether the employer's "notice suggests to
employees that the Board's notice is being posted as a
mere formality" and was thus "a patent attempt to
minimize the effect of the Board's notice," the speech and
letter here argue that the settlement was quite meaningless
inasmuch as the stated requirements were known in
advance to be without meaning or effect Even if true,
such advice to employees minimizes not only the effect of
the notice but also the value and conceivable effect of the
Board's processes If, without the need for actual
reinstatement with backpay, a notice calling for those
remedies in general terms was made part of the settlement
agreement, the speech and its distribution violated the
spirit and was in derogation of and breached the
settlement agreement.
The terms with respect to reinstatement and backpay
were not here determined after trial They were agreed
upon in the settlement and, whatever the need to reinstate
or to pay, or the absence of it, the agreement was not to
be questioned, modified, or impaired °
The settlement agreement might have but did not
include reference to a waiver of reinstatement or to
absence of backpay because there was no loss of pay.
Such additions would have modified the agreement as
entered into But where these were not included, the
Company was without warrant to add them by a separate
speech and notice to each employee As the court noted in
Bangor Plastics, the settlement agreement did "not
amount to a finding or admission" of guilt It was neither
more nor less than what the General Counsel and the
Company had agreed. The agreement to post a notice
presupposes that nothing else will be added or otherwise
done to minimize it - and this is no less true when the
agreed-upon notice is limited and may therefore be the
more easily vitiated
'Unless otherwise noted, our attention throughout is directed to the
Arlington plant
'The Brearley Company, 163 NLRB No 84
'Bangor Plastics , Inc , 156 NLRB 1165, enforcement denied 392 F 2d
772 (C A 6)
'Poole Foundry and Machine Company v N L R B, 192 F 2d 740, 743
(C A 4), cert denied 342 U S 954
NEWS-TEXAN
The further communications by speech and letter were
not justified by the fact that they were true The point is
not whether the communication is a truthful or fair
report, but whether there is a right to communicate
beyond the express form of communication worked out,
agreed upon, and approved.
This is no matter of limitation on the right of free
speech or communication By agreement the parties may
limit or extend their right to communicate under given
circumstances, they may declare the extent of
communication The settlement agreement declared such
communication, and the notice agreed upon defined it
Aside from legal analysis, but viewed from the practical
standpoint of management and the working force, the
settlement was entered into to attain the desideratum of
industrial peace as I had noted in suggesting the
settlement Whatever the reasons, all were presumably
satisfied since Kropp was employed elsewhere at a higher
wage: she did not seek reinstatement and had not lost
wages.
But management did not rest on the practical solution
thus found and the expression of it agreed upon in the
settlement. The Company now sought to make capital of
the situation Not content with achieving or maintaining
good relations while it left behind this controversy which
had now presumably been or was being closed by the
settlement agreement, it continued the argument with
further words.
If it be asked whether one side is not as much as the
other entitled to a "last word" in a practical working out
of the settlement, the answer is that the agreement is the
last word for all: the settlement had been entered into and
the notice agreed to in haec verba The very discussion of
and importance attached by all parties to the language in
the notice (even to the Union's objection to the omission
of certain language, which I overruled in permitting the
settlement), reflects its finality. But this was disparaged by
the further notice issued by the Company in its speech and
letter
If the Company's assent to the settlement was reluctant
(there was no indication of this, and there could be none
in a voluntary settlement), that assent tottered and
vanished with the superimposition of the now unilateral
argument, which was different in both content and tone
from that which had been agreed upon
For these reasons, I granted the General Counsel's
motion to reopen the hearing I have elsewhere and more
than once deplored failure to effect a settlement in the
interest of industrial peace and to the apparent benefit of
all concerned It is quite as deplorable that an agreement
once entered into and reflecting an expressed meeting of
the minds is violated
I make no findings concerning the reference in the
speech and the letter of April 2 to the "other three
paragraphs of the notice' assuring against discharge or
interference with employees' rights and declaring those
rights with the statement that "that is the law. . The
company has always obeyed the law "
Beyond repetition of the references to no reinstatement
or backpay, the letter declares the Company's attitude and
opinion in a manner which is not itself violative and need
not be considered in the findings above that the settlement
agreement was breached, nor in the context of those
findings do these later declarations constitute violations of
the Act. The General Counsel's characterization in the
amended complaint that in the speech to the employees
the Company told them, "in effect, that testifying in an
unfair labor practice hearing would result in jeopardy to
1037
their job security, that the Union was powerless to help
them obtain better working conditions ." is incorrect
and unwarranted The Company was not here questioning
the employees' right to organize or otherwise restraining
them ' I thus find that these statements do not constitute
independent violation of Section 8(a)( 1)
The remedy for the statements which breached the
agreement lay in setting aside the settlement and in an
order directing rescission of the Company's letter and
speech, without an additional finding of violation thereby,
all as in Brearley, supra With the settlement set aside, we
come to consideration of the of iginal allegations
III THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(A)(3)
In contrast to the detailed explanation for reopening the
hearing, we can omit the harrowing (because unnecessary)
details submitted to show that the discharge, clearly so,
was violative This is quite apparent from the facts
(without the "inferences" so many times requested at the
trial), which can be largely taken from company witnesses
and concerning which there is little dispute despite the
markedly repetitive questioning We have belated
agreement by the General Counsel as he now promises but
does not quite succeed in touching upon "[o]nly the major
issues" in the hope that he will aid the Trial Examiner "in
sifting out the most relevant evidence "
It is undisputed that Kropp was hired on September 10,
1967, as a Teletypesetter operator and that during the 2
months of her employ was advanced to proofreading and
correction of final copy Aside from these assignments,
the quality of Kropp's performance can be judged in the
light of a notice of an inciease already effected, of which
her foreman, Amrein, informed her on November 7
The reasons now assigned by the Company for her
discharge on November 9 are (1) Kropp's unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information, (2) reduction in
force compelled by economic conditions, and (3)
unauthorized disclosure of false information to another
employee
About 2 days before her discharge, Kropp told Blakely,
a fellow employee and friend, to whom she had spoken
several times of her union sympathies, about a
conversation which she placed a week or a week and a
half before November 9, in which Amrein told Kropp that
the Company was setting up a Dataphone machine She
further told Blakely that the machine would be used to
run tape with material from the Dallas Morning News,
where employees are represented by the Union, that she
had told this to two union officials, who told her to report
further developments, and that they were excited about
this, not only because of its effect on Dallas employees,
but because of what they might accomplish here, they
would compel the Company to pay union wages to
employees who performed work previously done at Dallas.
Torn between dual loyalties but finally persuaded by
her sense of propriety and comparative right, Blakely on
November 86 informed her former supervisor and, at the
latter's instance, Ozment (misspelled as Azment in the
transcript), the plant superintendent.
In the meantime, concerned with costs and the expected
return to another plant of work which a few months
before had been transferred to this plant, Johnson, the
'Cf N L R B v M E Blatt Company, 143 F 2d 268, 273, 275 (C A 3),
where an organizing drive was in esse
'Various dates were not fixed with exactitude
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company's president, had about a week before November
9 discussed with Ozment the need to reduce the force
Three employees were named as possibilities in this
respect, Kropp, Cook, and Lock
Now with knowledge of Kropp's talk with Blakely and
her visit to the Union, Ozment selected her for discharge,
received Johnson's approval, and directed Amrein to effect
the discharge at once. This the latter did While Kropp
testified that Amrein said that he had been told to let her
go, but could not tell her why, Ozment told us that he had
instructed Amrem to say that she was being discharged
because of a reduction in force Not only were the other
reasons now offered, unauthorized disclosure of
confidential and of false information, not given to Kropp,
but the Company's personnel form lists as the sole reason
for her discharge- Reduction in work force. I deem it
unnecessary in this case to expand on the element of
shifting or addition of reasons . This has not been
emphasized by the General Counsel, who does refer to
"defense . raised for the first time" and a shift from
the original defense
Were reduction in force and selection of Kropp
otherwise warranted, any need to reduce was certainly not
the reason for discharging Kropp approximately a month
earlier than otherwise indicated. Work was returned to the
other plant a month or more later, the process having
begun earlier, and to that extent the reduction in force
was admittedly effected earlier than planned or than
allegedly required under the Company's plan.
If return of work to the other plant was in fact based
on economic considerations' and one employee had to be
terminated (aside from any question of transfer or
temporary layoff as others were soon thereafter hired),
there is no credible explanation for the allegedly tentative
selection of Kropp and two employees junior to her, one
of the three to be discharged, from among some half
dozen operators in the Teletype department on the night
shift No precedent for naming three was suggested. Nor
was any explanation offered, even when the question was
directly put, for not extending the group under
consideration to four since, as Johnson told us, efficiency
was considered in connection with the discharge, so as to
make comparison with at least one who was senior to
Kropp, or limiting it to two, Cook and Lock, who had
been hired on October 10 and November 6,8 respectively
Beyond this, the latter hiring only 3 days before Kropp
was discharged belies the alleged need and discussion'
about a week before for a reduction in force, and although
they testified that Lock was considered for discharge a
week or so before Kropp's termination, Johnson and
Ozment could hardly have contemplated Lock's discharge
before her employment commenced
Nor, even if it be unkind to dwell on this further, was
seniority the sole distinguishing l actor Admittedly Kropp
could do and had performed the jobs done by the other
two (several senior employees had not performed some of
her work), and during her last 3 weeks on the job she had
been given more overtime work than anyone else in the
group Conversely, neither Cook nor Lock could do some
of the work performed by Kropp The alleged and
unexplained naming of the three would be pretextual were
'The Company' s business judgment is not here questioned The issue is
of credibility and pretext
'In fact, a third employee , Davis , hired on October 31 , was also junior
to Kropp
'It was evidently after this discussion that it was decided to give Kropp a
wage increase
it not false, and I do not credit that testimony In fact, all
of this reflects on the Company's good faith and the
credibility of its witnesses in connection with the other
alleged reasons.
With respect to disclosure of confidential information,
it is true that an employer may prefer to make its own
disclosure of operational plans even if, as Johnson told us,
such plans are not confidential" and disclosure by an
employee is not harmful But such preference,
unsupported by necessity, cannot limit the rights of
employees to engage in concerted activities as Kropp did
here when she took to the Union information which could
affect the work and therefore the employees at
News-Texan or at the Dallas Morning News, another"
employer, which has a bargaining relationship with the
Union
As for the third reason alleged, Kropp's statement to
Blakely concerning transfer of work from Dallas Morning
News employees to employees of this Company with the
possibility of a marked increase in pay, even if erroneous,
also constituted protected concerted activity since at the
least it related to wages and encouraged support of the
Union Certainly there is no suggestion, much less
evidence, that Kropp was prompted by malice '= 1 find and
conclude that Kropp was discharged because of her union
support and activities An employee may engage in
protected concerted activities before a union has entered
the picture or begun an organizing campaign Unlike cases
cited by the Company, the activities which the Company
here found objectionable directly involved the Union The
Clearwater Finishing case ' 3 is distinguishable since Kropp
was under no special obligation or trust with respect to
the information which she submitted Were she limited in
that connection, she and other employees would be barred
from disclosing any information in the course of concerted
activities
It is unnecessary to detail here the negotiations and
problems facing the Union and the Company's parent
corporation. The latter is not before us even if it "[nlever
notified the charging union " of a change which it was
making
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I
recommend that the Company, News-Texan, Inc ,
Arlington, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Dallas Typographical
Union, Local 173, or in any other labor organization by
discriminatorily discharging any of its employees or
discriminating in any other manner in respect to their hire
or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
"We recall that one reason given was that Kropp had disclosed
confidential information Not only did Johnson deny any confidential
aspect , but his earlier testimony that the Dataphone was installed " toward
the end of October" and that employees were not told that it was
confidential suggests the pretextual nature , whatever its sufficiency under
any circumstances , of this reason for Kropp's discharge
"Pioneer Natural Gas Company. 158 NLRB 1067, 1068, 1073
"Cf Wails Manufacturing Company , Inc, 137 NLRB 1317, 1319
"Clearwater Finishing Company , 100 NLRB 1473
NEWS-TEXAN
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Offer to Joy Lee Kropp immediate and full
reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay
sustained by reason of the discrimination against her, with
interest to be computed in the customary manner, 14 and
notify her, if she is presently serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States, of her right to full reinstatement
upon proper application after discharge from the Armed
Forces
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommened Order.
(c) Distribute a letter to its employees which rescinds
the speech and letter of April 2, 1968
(d) Post at its place of business in Arlington, Texas,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "'
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 16, shall be posted by the Company,
after being duly signed by its representative, immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to its employees are
customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Company to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.16
"The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan , Puerto
Rico, Branch , 65 NLRB 827, Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440,
Republic Steel Corporation v N L R B . 311 US 7, F W Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294 , Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138
NLRB 716
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
1039
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Dallas
Typographical Union, Local 173, or any other labor
organization by discharging any of our employees or
discriminating in any other manner in respect to their
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition
of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the
right to self -organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist Dallas Typographical Union, Local
173, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities
WE WILL offer to Joy Lee Kropp immediate and full
reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss
of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against
her.
WE WILL notify the above-named employee if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of her right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
WE WILL distribute a letter to our employees which
rescinds the speech and letter of April 2, 1968
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any
labor organization
Dated By
NEWS TEXAN, INC
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 8A24,
Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth,
Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921