New York Times Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1984

270 N.L.R.B. 1267 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

NEW YORK TIMES CO.
The New York Times Company and Newspaper
Guild of New York, Local 3, The Newspaper
Guild, AFL-CIO. Cases 2-CA-18303, 2-CA-
18800, 2-CA-19251, arid 2-CA-19559
19 June 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 13 December 1983 Administrative Law
Judge Howard Edelman issued the attached deci-
sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in
reply to the exceptions.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, The New
York Times Company, New York, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Order.
I The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the
position of the parties.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products. 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
The Respondent has excepted to the judge's characterization of the
date employee Stephen Benis received his appraisal when he was told by
his supervisor that he spent too much time on union activities. Bens testi-
fied it was in 1978 or 1979. Union representative Dan Bacheller testified
it was in 1979 or 1980. The judge's findings are inconsistent as to this
fact. We find the exact date immaterial as the information request was for
all performance evaluations for Benis.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD EDELMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me on April 26 through 29 and on
September 6 and 7, 1983.
On August 31, 1981, and May 13, 1982, the Newspa-
per Guild of New York, Local 3, The Newspaper Guild,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, filed charges in
Cases 2-CA-18303 and 2-CA-18800, respectively, alleg-
ing that the New York Times Company, herein called
Respondent, had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by refusing to provide the Union with certain infor-
mation requested by the Union. Thereafter, a complaint
issued and the cases were consolidated for hearing on
270 NLRB No. 194
July 19, 1982, before Administrative Law Judge William
A. Gershuny. During the course of this hearing Judge
Gershuny severed the cases and postponed Case 2-CA-
18800 indefinitely, with instructions to the Union and
Respondent to meet and negotiate further. On August 3,
1982, he issued a decision wherein he dismissed Case 2-
CA-18303. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the
Union filed exceptions to this decision. On November 10,
1982, the Board issued a decision in which it reversed
Judge Gershuny and remanded the case for a hearing de
novo. On November 18, 1982, the Union filed a charge
in Case 2-CA-19251 against Respondent alleging that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
by refusing to provide information requested by the
Union. Thereafter a complaint issued. Pursuant to a
motion filed by the General Counsel, Cases 2-CA-18303,
2-CA-18800, and 2-CA-19251 were consolidated. On
April 26 through 29, 1983, a hearing was held in connec-
tion with these cases. On April 8, 1983, the Union filed
an additional charge against Respondent alleging a fur-
ther refusal to supply the Union with information re-
quested in violation of Section 8(aXI) and (5). On May
23, 1983, subsequent to the close of the hearing, but prior
to the issuance of a decision, a complaint issued on the
above charges. In view of the substantive similarity of
the issues presented by this complaint and the issues al-
ready litigated, Respondent moved that the hearing be
reopened and the cases consolidated. Such motion was
granted and on September 6 the hearing reopened. The
hearing on the additional issues presented concluded on
September 7, 1983.
Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and counsel
for Respondent.' On consideration of the entire record,
the briefs, and my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondent is a New York corporation with an office
and place of business in New York, New York, where it
is engaged in the publication, circulation, 'and distribution
of a daily newspaper, The New York Times, throughout
the States of the United States and in various countries
abroad. In the course and conduct of this operation Re-
spondent derives annual gross revenues in excess of
$200,000, holds membership in, or subscribes to various
interstate news services, including the Associated Press,
and advertises various nationally sold products. Respond-
ent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
Collective-Bargaining History
Since 1940, the Union has represented all employees
employed by Respondent in its news and editorial de-
' I found both briefs to be extremely well written and well researched.
They were most helpful to me in analyzing the issues presented in this
case.
1267
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
partments, including all editors and reporters and various
other classifications, not relevant in this proceeding, to-
taling about 40 separate classifications. In 1943, pursuant
to a consent election agreement, this unit was expanded
to include "watchmen." Over the next 20 years the unit
has been substantially expanded to include various other
departments, and to cover a multitude of employee clas-
sifications. These additions to the unit were memorialized
by various written memorandum of agreement and let-
ters which were incorporated in successive collective-
bargaining agreements since 1940 by reference. At the
present time the bargaining unit covers approximately
1500 employees of which approximately 30 are alleged
by Respondent to be "guards" within the meaning of
Section 9(b)(3) of the Act.
In 1978 Respondent filed unit clarification petitions in
Cases 2-UC-131 and 2-UC-135. One of the issues pre-
sented by these petitions was whether the classification
of "watchmen," added to the unit in 1943 were guards
within the meaning of Section 9(b)(3) and should be ex-
cluded from the unit.2
At present, Respondent and the Union are parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement effective as of March 31,
1981, and expiring on March 30, 1984. The unit in the
current agreement, as in the past agreements, incorpo-
rates the various memorandum of agreements and letters
described above.
With the limited exception of the guard classification,
which is in issue in the pending UC petitions, Respond-
ent conceded during the hearing that the Union current-
ly represents, as the collective-bargaining representative,
all the classifications set forth and described in the cur-
rent collective-bargaining agreement.
Moreover, in its answer filed on July 16, 1982, prior to
the hearing before Judge Gershuny, Respondent admit-
ted the unit was appropriate except for certain superviso-
ry, managerial, and confidential classifications pending in
the UC petitions described above.
Request for Benis' Performance Appraisal
Stephen Benis is employed by Respondent in its gener-
al accounting department as a payroll checker. He has
held various positions in this department since 1966.
Benis became a member of the Union shortly after his
employment in 1966. In 1971 he served the Union in the
capacity of shop steward and continued to act in that ca-
pacity through 1979.
Respondent has an established procedure since 1977 of
evaluating the performance of its employees annually.
Such evaluation is documented in a "written perform-
ance appraisal." The employee's supervisor prepares the
appraisal and orally reviews it with the employee in-
volved. Following this interview the employee is provid-
ed with a copy of his appraisal.
In the beginning of 1981 Benis received his appraisal
for his 1980 work performance. During the appraisal
meeting his supervisor told him in connection with his
I Other issues were raised concerning the inclusion of alleged supervi-
sory, managerial, and confidential employees which are not relevant to
this case.
work performance that he spent too much time on union
activities.
Benis testified that between 1978 and 1981 he applied
for various posted positions which would have resulted
in a promotion and a raise in pay but that he had failed
to receive such promotion. Benis further testified that as
a result of his last appraisal and the statement made by
his supervisor concerning his union activities he believed
his activities as a union shop steward might have had
something to do with his failure to receive a promotion.
About March 1981, and as a result of his supervisor's
comment, Benis contacted Dan Bacheller, union griev-
ance chairperson, and told him that during a meeting
with his supervisor concerning his 1981 performance ap-
praisal his supervisor had made an unfavorable reference
to his union activities as they related to his work. He
told Bacheller that he believed Respondent had probably
been discriminating against him in the past by denying
his promotions because of his activities in the capacity of
shop steward.
Benis had received a copy of his 1981 appraisal but
had discarded it by the time he met with Bacheller. He
did not have copies of his prior appraisals.
Bacheller discussed Benis' complaint with Union Rep-
resentative William Montes. On June 19, 1981, Montes
wrote a letter to Joseph Eisenberg, Respondent's labor
relations manager, wherein he set forth as follows:
The Guild requests copies of all performance eval-
uations contained in The Times files for Steven
Benis of Payroll Accounting.
This information is necessary for the Guild's admin-
istration of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment with respect to promotions and non-discrimi-
nation.
On June 24, 1981, Eisenberg responded by letter to the
Union's request as follows:
I am in receipt of your June 19, 1981 letter re-
questing copies of all Performance Evaluations of
Steven Benis. Our records reflect no grievance or
complaint by either Mr. Benis or the Guild con-
cerning a promotion or some alleged form of dis-
crimination. However, the information you request
is available to you from Mr. Benis, who should
have a copy of all his Performance Evaluations and
we would assume he would share them with you.
Bacheller testified that there is an agreement between
the Union and Respondent that performance appraisals
may not be introduced as evidence in an arbitration con-
cerning the performance of an employee. However, such
appraisals were useful to the Union in an investigation of
an employee complaint and in aiding the Union in deter-
mining whether to file a grievance. Bacheller testified
that it was for this purpose that the Union needed the in-
formation requested.
Thereafter on August 31, 1981, the Union filed an
unfair labor practice charge concerning Respondent's re-
fusal to supply the Benis appraisals.
1268
NEW YORK TIMES CO.
On July 19, 1982, during the hearing on these cases
Judge Gershuny requested that Respondent provide
Benis with copies of all his performance appraisals and
that Benis provide them to the Union. On July 20, Re-
spondent turned over such appraisals to Benis who in
turn turned them over to the Union.
On August 3, 1982, Judge Gershuny issued his deci-
sion in connection with this matter.3 Judge Gershuny's
decision 4 concluded that since the Union was in posses-
sion of the performance appraisals (solely as the result of
Judge Gershuny's request described above) the Union
had "equal access to the information" sought and "its
subsequent demand under Section 8(a)(5) lacks the essen-
tial element of good faith."
On November 10, 1982, the Board issued a decision re-
versing Judge Gershuny and ordering a hearing de
novo.5 The Board in its decision held:
To the extent that dismissal of the complaint is
grounded on the alleged availability of the request-
ed information from other sources, the Administra-
tive Law Judge erred as a matter of law. The
Kroger Company, 226 NLRB 512 (1976). The fact
that employees may have the information and may
be or are willing to give it to the union does not
relieve an employer of its obligations under Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. See Bel-Air Bowl, Inc., 247
NLRB 6 (1980). Cf. The Proctor & Gamble Manu-
facturing Company, 603 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979),
enfg. 237 NLRB 747 (1978).
The Compu Serve, On Line, and Videotex Requests
The remaining issue in this case concerns the Union's
request for information relating to Compu Serve, On
Line, and Videotex services.
All three services are private, computerized news serv-
ices which distribute news to their subscribers by means
of a video display terminal (VDT). News stories are
written by the writer entering the story into a computer
through a computer keyboard. The story or news report
is then edited in an abbreviated manner suitable for dis-
play over a VDT. Subscribers to the service can then re-
ceive the condensed news reports over their VDT's by
making appropriate requests into their computer key-
boards.
Gordon Thompson employed by Respondent as assist-
ant to the metropolitan editor, and the union chairman of
the electronic journalism committee testified that he read
an article in the May 22, 1981, issue of the Guild Report-
er (the Union's newspaper) entitled "Technology Seek-
ing a Market." That article described the Compu Serve
system and stated that The New York Times and five
other newspapers were presently available to its subscrib-
ers. Thompson additionally read advertisements in The
New York Times which said: "Stories for the Times,
specially edited and transmitted to Compu Serve are
3 As previously noted he had severed Case 2-CA-18800 from this
case.
4 JD-12-82.
s 265 NLRB 353.
available by telephone each evening to your home termi-
nal . . . ."
Thompson testified that as a result of reading the
above article in the Guild Reporter and the advertise-
ment in the Times he became concerned that writing
and/or editing work, which was unit work, was being
performed by nonunit personnel. Thompson discussed
the matter with union representatives and on August 20,
1981, Edwin R. Egan, union executive, sent a letter to
John H. Martinez, Respondent senior vice president. The
letter in pertinent part set forth as follows:
As you know, during the recent bargaining we
agreed to put over discussion of issues relating to
electronic journalism until after agreement was
reached on the contract. We are now ready to resume
these discussions. [Emphasis added.]
In order to be better prepared for same, we need in-
formation about The Times' involvement in Compu
Serve, the electronic news-dissemination project.
The information being requested is:
The names, job titles, departments and salary
groups of all Times' employees currently in-
volved performing work related to The Times'
involvement in Compu Serve. Please identify sep-
arately those employees, if any, who have been
hired by the Times specifically because of the
Compu Serve project.
A description of the work functions attributable to
the Compu Serve project that are being performed
by such employees.
The reference in the above letter to "the recent bar-
gaining" referred to the 1981 contract negotiations which
resulted in the current collective-bargaining agreement.
During the 1981 negotiations the parties were unable to
reach agreement concerning jurisdiction over "Electron-
ic" or computerized journalism and so they agreed to in
effect table the issue. As a result a memorandum of
agreement was entered into dated May 7, 1981, which
provided inter alia:
2. Electronic Journalism
. . .(T)he following issues (other than health and
safety) will be referred for discussion to a joint
Times/News/Guild sub-committee at the conclu-
sion of negotiations; 1. Reprint Rights, 2. Exempts'
use of VDT's, 3. Tracing.
During the negotiations, and at all times thereafter, the
Union took the position that all writing and editing,
whether for the newspaper or computerized news serv-
ices which Respondent was engaged in, was unit work.
On October 2, 1981, in response to the Union's May 7
letter, Joseph Eisenberg, Respondent labor relations man-
ager replied by letter as follows:
Please be advised that we have carefully investigat-
ed and reviewed your requests with respect to em-
ployees in the bargaining unit represented by the
1269
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Guild. The New York Times Company at a corpo-
rate level is engaged in a preliminary experiment
with Compu Serve and other companies in the com-
munication field.
There are no Times employees in the bargaining
unit represented by the Guild involved in or effect-
ed by the preliminary experiment nor do we con-
template they will be involved or effected in the
future. In view of the nature of the situation as we
have outlined it to you and particularly noting the
absence of any effect on, or involvement by bargaining
unit personnel in this preliminary experiment, there is
no relevant information to be provided as to your re-
quest.
If there are any questions concerning this matter
please do not hesitate to contact me. [G.C. Exh. 6,
Tr. 76.]
On December 8, 1981, Union Representative Harry
Fisdell wrote to John Mortimer, Respondent's vice presi-
dent. He took exceptions to Respondent's contention that
there was "no relevant information to be provided." Fis-
dell, referring to the Compu Serve article appearing in
the Guild Reporter, stated that:
All of the work functions described in this process
are Guild bargaining-unit work functions as defined
by the Preamble to the Guild-Times contract. If
The Times' involvement in Compu Serve is even
roughly similar to that of The Examiner, then ac-
cording to your October 2 letter, contract violations
are now taking place in that non-bargaining-unit
employees are performing bargaining unit functions.
In addition Fisdell quoted from the July 1981 issue of
"Inforum," the newsletter of the Times Information
Service, a wholly owned subsidiary of Respondent and
stated in pertinent part:
Information Service mentions on page 2 that "The
New York Times Information Service (referring to
On-Line) has established a special staff of editors
and indexers who devote their time exclusively to
the task of gathering and processing New York
Times stories for on-line retrieval." Again, editing
and indexing are bargaining-unit work functions as
defined in the Preamble to the Guild-Times con-
tract.
Accordingly, we are renewing and updating our re-
quest for information. For purposes of negotiating
the issue of Guild representation in Times electronic
journalism endeavors, we ask the following:
The names, job titles, departments and salary
groups of all Times employees currently involved
in performing work related to both Compu Serve
and the New York Times On-Line.
A description of the work functions attributable
to both CompuServe and The New York Times
On-Line being performed by such employees.
A description of the procedure by which The
Times receives revenue for its participation in
CompuServe and for The New York Times On-
Line.
If either CompuServe or The New York Times
On-Line are experimental in that it is not generat-
ing revenue for The Times at present, a descrip-
tion of those procedures now under consideration
for attributing and collecting revenues in the
future.
By letters on January 26 and February 24, 1982, Fis-
dell repeated his request for the information described in
his December 8, 1981 letter.
On March 19, 1982, Eisenberg by letter responded to
the Union's requests of December 8, January 26, and
February 24, in pertinent part as follows:
As you are well aware our 1981 negotiations with
the Guild were concluded after the Guild strike
with an agreement on May 7, 1981, later reduced to
a Memorandum of Agreement of that date and rati-
fied by the Guild on June 5, 1981. The agreement
contains no provision to negotiate the question you
now base this request for information on and further
both parties agreed to reincorporate in the contract
Article XVI, Section 2.
In any event since you have now clarified or
amended to reflect the true purpose in requesting
this information and such purpose as you now ex-
press it is clearly one which we did not agree to,
we must respectfully decline to furnish the informa-
tion requested.
Eisenberg testified that Respondent interpreted the ref-
erence in the May 7 memorandum which provided that
the issue of "electronic journalism will be referred for
discussion" (emphasis added), as an agreement to permit
the Union to express their views rather than an agree-
ment to negotiate. He emphasized such distinction was
made because of the use of the word "discussion" rather
than "negotiation," in the agreement.
On July 7, 1982, Union Representative Fisdell sent Ei-
senberg another letter requesting the information request-
ed in the Union's August 20 and December 8, 1981 let-
ters but broadening the scope of the request to include
Respondent's affiliates or subsidiaries. The letter set forth
in pertinent part as follows:
Please be advised that the Guild requests the infor-
mation itemized in the letters of August 20, 1981
and December 8, 1981, whether or not the persons
performing the work on the Compu Serve and On-
Line operations are employees of The New York
Times Company, an affiliate or subsidiary of The
New York Times Company, or of a company with
some other relationship to The New York Times
Company.
On August 23, 1982, Union Representative Fisdell sent
a letter to Eisenberg requesting the financial information
relating to the reprint clause in the collective-bargaining
1270
NEW YORK TIMES CO.
agreement which requires Respondent to pay its writers
a percentage of revenues received for stories reprinted
elsewhere. The letter set forth in pertinent part as fol-
lows:
A description by headline, date, page, and author
of all stories written by Times-Guild unit employees
which were disseminated through the CompuServe
Network.
The amount of revenue, if any, received by The
Times for each story disseminated.
Total revenues received by The Times for stories
disseminated.
Copies of all contracts between The New York
Times Company and CompuServe.
Purpose: The parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment, Article III, Section 11 requires that fees re-
ceived through reprints of editorial material request-
ed by other publishers will be shared evely [sic]
with the employees involved. The Guild maintains
that this provision covers electronically-disseminat-
ed editorial material. The Guild requires the above-
cited information to administer this provision in the
agreement.
In addition, the parties agreed in the May 7, 1981
Memorandum of Agreement, page 7, "Other Mat-
ters" (Section 2, Electronic Journalism) to discuss
the issue of "reprint rights" in the context of the
electronic dissemination of editorial material. For
the purpose of preparing for discussion of this issue,
the Guild needs the above-cited information.
On September 23, 1982, Eisenberg responded by letter,
advising Fisdell that Respondent has terminated its ex-
periment with Compu Serve, thereby mooting the re-
quest for information relating thereto. He further called
the Union's paragraph 2(a) of its August 23 request "bur-
densome." He further contended that whether or not ar-
ticle III, section 11 would apply to CompuServe was a
threshold question which must itself be arbitrated before
the information request would be considered.
Thereafter, there have been no further communication
between the parties on this issue, and no information was
ever provided by Respondent to the Union.
In October 1982, a New York Times article described
a CBS-American Telephone and Telegraph Company ex-
periment in Ridgewood, New Jersey, involving a two-
way video service. The article included the following
sentence: "One of the many information providers is the
New York Times." This article came to the attention of
union representatives. Accordingly, Fisdell sent Eisen-
berg a letter dated November 15, 1982, requesting the
following:
1. The names, job classifications, hours of work,
and work functions of any employees of The New
York Times Co. or of its subsidiaries who are per-
forming work on New York Times copy in con-
junction with the videotex operation.
PURPOSE: To enable the Guild to determine
whether and to what extent The Times is violating
the jurisdiction language of the Preamble to the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement.
2. The revenues, if any, The Times has received
from the videotex operation, including a breakdown
for revenues received by story used and author in-
volved.
3. A copy of any contracts The Times has with
other parties pertaining to revenues received from
the videotex operations.
PURPOSE: To enable the Guild to determine
whether and to what extent Section 11 of Article
14, "Reprints," of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement is being violated by The Times.
On December 24, 1982, Respondent, by letter of Ei-
senberg to Fisdell, declined to provide the above-de-
scribed information. Eisenberg stated that there was no
work being performed by any unit employees. He con-
tinued that despite the Guild's contentions that its juris-
diction was being violated or that the "reprint clause"
was applicable, "we quite frankly do not see that the in-
formation you request is relevant at this time." Eisenberg
then reiterated Respondent's contention that an initial de-
termination must first be made by an arbitrator, that the
jurisdiction and reprint clauses are applicable, before the
information requested could be considered relevant.
Fisdell responded to Eisenberg in a letter dated March
23, 1983, in which he reiterated the Union's demand of
November 24, 1982, for the information regarding the vi-
deotex experiment. Respondent did not respond.
Eisenberg testified that sometime following the
Union's initial November 15, 1982 request for videotex
information described above he informally advised Fis-
dell in a telephone conversation that videotex was exper-
imental and had generated no revenues. Fisdell could not
recall this conversation.
I do not credit Eisenberg's testimony in this connec-
tion. His testimony is inconsistent with his written re-
sponse dated December 24, 1982, described above. More-
over, it is inconsistent with his responses and positions
taken throughout the union requests for similar informa-
tion in relation to Compu Serve and On-Line.
There has been no further communication between the
Union and Respondent concerning videotex.
Analysis and Conclusions
Respondent contends that the 8(aX5) violation must
fail because the General Counsel has failed to establish
that the Union represents an appropriate unit for bargain-
ing.
The complaint alleges as the appropriate unit for bar-
gaining the unit described in the 1981-1984 collective-
bargaining agreement, which incorporates by reference a
series of letters and memorandum of agreements provid-
ing numerous additional classifications over a 43-year
bargaining history, including the addition of the "watch-
men" classification in 1943.
Respondent's contention that the unit alleged in the
complaint is an inappropriate unit is based on its allega-
tion that the unit includes "guards" as defined by Section
9(b)(3) of the Act. Section 9(b)(3) provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in
order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
1271
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the
Board shall not . . . (3) decide that any unit is ap-
propriate for such purposes if it includes, together
with other employees, any individual employed as a
guard to enforce against employees and other per-
sons rules to protect property of the employer or to
protect the safety of persons on the employer's
premises; but no labor organization shall be certified
as the representative of employees in a bargaining
unit of guards if such organization admits to mem-
bership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an
organization which admits to membership, employ-
ees other than guards. [29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 159(b)
(1973).]
Respondent, however, has embarked upon a procedure
to determine whether the 30-odd individuals employed in
a unit of 1500 employees are guards within the meaning
of the Act, namely by filing the pending UC petitions. It
is for this reason that Respondent moved before me to
adjourn this trial until there is a final decision in the UC
petition. This motion was denied. The General Counsel
for purposes of this case concedes that the 30 individuals
are guards within the meaning of the Act.
In order to determine the merits of Respondent's con-
tention, several factors must be considered.
First, it must be recognized that whatever the outcome
of the UC petition, the Board will certify the present
contractual unit as an appropriate unit for bargaining
within the meaning of the Act. The only question is
whether such certified unit will include the 30 individ-
uals alleged by Respondent as guards. If the Board ulti-
mately concludes they are guards within the meaning of
the Act it will certify the present bargaining unit exclud-
ing the guards. The result of this will be that the Union
will represent in an appropriate unit 1470 out of 1500
employees. Therefore, Respondent could not contend
that the UC petition could result in a substantial destruc-
tion of the unit.
It is critical to this case that the information requested
by the Union relates to that portion of the unit and to
unit classifications which will certainly, under any deter-
mination, be found appropriate by the Board.
To uphold Respondent's contention would produce an
anomalous result. I would have to conclude that the
present contract unit is not an appropriate unit for bar-
gaining notwithstanding the certainty that the Board will
ultimately find such unit with or without guards to be an
appropriate unit and issue a certification to that effect.
Moreover, such a finding by me would lead to the ludi-
crous result that pending a final determination by the
Board in the UC petition, Respondent could otherwise
violate with impunity, Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, con-
tending each time an unfair labor practice charge was
filed such charge must be dismissed or held in abeyance
for an indefinite period because an appropriate unit
cannot presently be alleged. A finding consistent with
Respondent's contention would encourage industrial
strife and subvert the purpose of the Act.
Moreover, Respondent in its July 16, 1982 answer,
filed in connection with the trial before Judge Gershuny,
Respondent admitted the unit with the exception of su-
pervisors, managerial and confidential employees was an
appropriate unit. It was not until April 20, 1983, follow-
ing the Board's decision reversing Judge Gershuny and
remanding the case for a trial de novo, that Respondent
raised this unit contention. Further, Respondent during
the instant hearing explicitly admitted that the Union
does indeed represent all unit classifications described in
the current collective-bargaining agreement with the ex-
ception of the guards whose status is currently the sub-
ject of the pending UC petitions.
It should further be noted that Section 9(b)3) of the
Act does not prohibit voluntary recognition of a mixed
guard-nonguard unit. It merely provides that the Board
will not certify such unit.
Respondent relies entirely on Supreme Sugar Co., 258
NLRB 243 (1981), as authority for its unit contention.
However, I find the instant case clearly distinguishable
from Supreme Sugar.
In Supreme Sugar, the judge held that the Employer
did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing
working conditions of guards in a mixed guard and non-
guard unit. In so finding, the judge, affirmed without
opinion by the Board, concluded that the status of the in-
dividuals who were the subject of the 8(aX5) complaint
were guards within the meaning of Section 9(bX3). He
therefore concluded that the General Counsel had failed
to establish an appropriate unit within the meaning of the
Act and dismissed the complaint.
I believe the holding in Supreme Sugar is clearly distin-
guishable from the instant case. In Supreme Sugar the
complaint related to unilateral changes in a classification,
namely, guards that the Board could find in a UC peti-
tion that the Union had no right to represent. In the in-
stant case, whatever the outcome of the pending UC pe-
tition the Board will issue a certification in a unit encom-
passing the classifications for whom Respondent has
failed to supply the information requested by the Union.
In Wallace-Murray Corp., 192 NLRB 1090 (1971), the
Board considered the affect a UC petition would have
on a unit which included "watchmen" who had been
recognized as part of a unit since 1943, some 28 years
prior to the UC petition. The Board found that the Re-
gional Director therein had erred by excluding the
guards during the life of the contract, as it would not
serve the purposes of the Act. Primary to the Board's
decision to leave the status quo was the long term volun-
tary inclusion of guards by the Employer in the existing
unit with full knowledge that the Union did not exclu-
sively represent guard employees. The Board stated "to
entertain the Employer's petition for clarification at this
time, in these circumstances, would, in our view, be dis-
ruptive of a bargaining relationship voluntarily continued
by the Employer when it executed the existing contract
with the Union.
It is significant that the Board was so conscious of the
disruptive effect such a midterm modification would
have on the 28-year voluntary relationship between the
parties. The Board apparently did not want to adversely
1272
NEW YORK TIMES CO.
affect the rights of those employees in the middle of a
contract. So too, in the instant case, the guards have
been a part of each and every collective-bargaining
agreement between Respondent and the Union from 1943
through 1978, when the instant UC was filed. Moreover,
they have remained in the unit since 1978 during the
pendency of the UC petition. In Supreme Sugar, the
Judge distinguished Wallace-Murray. He considered sig-
nificant the Employer's lack of knowledge that the
watchmen were guards within the meaning of Section
9(b)3) and therefore they did not have to be voluntarily
included in the unit. While the judge in Supreme Sugar
distinguished Wallace-Murray, such distinction cannot be
made here, where Respondent had full knowledge that
the employees were guards and took the appropriate
steps by filing a UC petition to exclude them.
In Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, 250 NLRB 1132
(1980), the Board found a refusal to bargain where an
employer withdrew recognition and made unilateral
changes alleging that the unit included supervisors who
had been voluntarily included by the employer. The
Board citing NLRB v. Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958), held that after a certification or voluntary recog-
nition, the unit may not be unilaterally attacked. The
Board noted that it would not entertain a UC petition
during the mid term of a contract where supervisors had
been voluntarily included in the unit, nor would it then
permit the far more disruptive practice of unilaterally
modifying the contract covering such unit.
The only difference between the unit issue in the in-
stant case and Arizona Electric Power is that the former
case involves guards and the latter one involves supervi-
sors. The same holding as in Arizona Electric is appropri-
ate here. The parties voluntarily continued the guards in
the unit from 1943 through 1978 without complaint.
Since 1978, the parties have continued to apply the con-
tract and in fact negotiated a renewal agreement in 1981,
retaining the same inclusions. The Board's reasoning in
Arizona Electric is equally appropriate herein where sta-
bility is essential.
The Board requires an appropriate unit for the issu-
ance of a bargaining order, but that may certainly in-
clude voluntarily agreed-upon units which may not be
certified by the Board. This proposition of law was
clearly enunciated by the Board in Chemetron Corp., 258
NLRB 1202 (1981). In Chemetron, the Board, citing Ari-
zona Electric Power, supra, held that the "Board may ap-
propriately issue a bargaining order covering a unit
which it could not have initially certified under the Act,
but concerning which the parties have knowingly and
voluntarily bargained." The instant case is stronger than
Chemtron, where it is certain that the Board in the pend-
ing UC petition will certify a unit, whether it finds the
disputed employees to be guards, which includes all
other employees, all 1470 of them, as an appropriate unit
for bargaining.
I therefore conclude that the General Counsel has es-
tablished an appropriate unit for bargaining. Whether
guards as defined by the Act will ultimately be included
in such unit is a question that will ultimately be resolved
by the Board in the pending UC petition.
An employer has a duty to provide on request infor-
mation relevant to bargainable issues. The law in this
area is clear and well settled. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967). Where the requested infor-
mation concerns wage rates, job descriptions, and other
information relating to employees in the bargaining unit,
the information is presumptively relevant to bargainable
issues. Fawcett Printing Corp., 210 NLRB 964 (1973);
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 145 NLRB 152 (1963), enfd. 347
F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965); Timkin Roller Bearing Co.,
138 NLRB 15 (1962), enfd. 325 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir.
1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964). Where the re-
quest is for information concerning employees outside
the bargaining unit, the union must show the requested
information is relevant to bargainable issues. Brooklyn
Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB 189 (1975); Rockwell-Standard
Corp., 166 NLRB 124 (1967), enfd. 410 F.2d 953 (6th
Cir. 1969); Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra. In determining
whether the information requested by the Union is rele-
vant, the general approach has been to apply a liberal
discovery type standard to the issue of relevancy in eval-
uating each case on its facts. Brazos Electric Power Coop-
erative, 241 NLRB 10 (1979); Acme Industrial Co., supra.
The Board has held in establishing relevancy that the in-
formation is relevant if the information sought is reason-
ably necessary in order to administer a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, detect infractions of its terms, and in-
telligently counsel the employees whom it represents. In
this connection, the Board has held that a union is enti-
tled to information requested which bears on the union's
determination to file a grievance or is helpful in evaluat-
ing the propriety of going to arbitration. Brooklyn Union
Gas Co., supra; Boeing Corp., 182 NLRB 421 (1970).
Respondent contends the Union's request relating to
Benis failed adequately to set forth the relevancy of the
information requested.
I find, contrary to Respondent's contention, that the
Union's June 19, 1981 written request for "copies of all
performance evaluations . .. for Steven Benis" clearly
set forth the reason for the request. The stated reason is
as follows: "the information is necessary for the Guild's
administration of the parties' collective-bargaining agree-
ment with respect to promotions and non-discrimina-
tion." It does not require any special knowledge or
imagination to recognize that the information requested
by the Union related to a complaint by Benis to the
Union concerning his failure to receive a promotion, and
that at least one basis for his complaint was some alleged
discrimination. That Respondent was able to perceive
this was evidenced by its reply which set forth that its
records reflected "no grievance ... by either Mr. Benis
or the Union or the Union concerning a promotion or
some alleged form of discrimination." Respondent then
concluded that Benis should have a copy and that Re-
spondent assumed he would share it with the Union. I
therefore find the Union's request for information and
the reason such information was requested was specifi-
cally set forth by the Union.
Respondent refused to furnish the Union the informa-
tion requested based on its interpretation of an agreement
1273
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which provides that appraisals could not be used by
either side in grievance proceedings. However, such ap-
praisals are clearly relevant to the Union in the investiga-
tion of such complaint by an employee, in order to deter-
mine whether to file a grievance. Bacheller testified, this
is precisely the reason the Union wanted the information.
As set forth above, the Board has held a union is entitled
to information requested which bears on its determina-
tion to file a grievance, Brooklyn Union Gas Co., supra. I
therefore find Respondent's contention that the Union
was not entitled to the information without merit. Re-
spondent's contention that Benis could supply the Union
with the appraisal was found to be without merit by the
Board when it reversed Judge Gershuny's decision, New
York Times Co., 265 NLRB 353 (1982), citing the Kroger
Co., 226 NLRB 512 (1976), and Bel-Air Bowl, Inc., 247
NLRB 6 (1980).
Respondent additionally contends that the Union is not
entitled to the information requested because of the con-
fidentiality of such information within the meaning of the
Supreme Court decision in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,
440 U.S. 301 (1979).
The union in Detroit Edison requested that the employ-
er turn over to it the test battery, answer sheets, and test
scores of certain employees relating to a psychological
aptitude test given employees to determine whether they
were qualified for a particular position. Ten employees
sought the position and took the test, but were rejected
on the ground that none received an "acceptable" score
on the test. The union filed a grievance on behalf of the
rejected employees, claiming that the testing procedure
was unfair and that the company bypassed senior em-
ployees in violation of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The company refused to supply the information
the union sought on the grounds that complete confiden-
tiality of the materials was necessary to insure the future
integrity of the tests and to protect the privacy interests
of the examinees. In this connection the employer's psy-
chologists who administered the tests gave the test appli-
cants express commitments that the scores would be con-
fidential. The tests and scores were kept in the psycholo-
gists' office who deemed themselves ethically bound not
to disclose the numerical test scores, even to manage-
ment representatives. In the course of an arbitration pro-
ceeding, after the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge, the company offered to turn over the test scores
of employees who would sign a waiver of confidential-
ity; however, the union declined to seek such releases.
The Board upholding the administrative law judge or-
dered the employer to turn over the information to the
union. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld
the Board's order. The Supreme Court reversed the
Board and the circuit court. The court took judicial
notice of the sensitivity of any human being to the dis-
closure of such psychological information that may be
taken to bear on his or her basic confidence, the court
held that:
In light of the sensitive nature of testing informa-
tion, the minimal burden that compliance with the
Company's offer would have placed on the Union,
and the total absence of evidence that the Company
had fabricated concern for employee confidentiality
only to frustrate the Union in the discharge of its
responsibilities, we are unable to sustain the Board
in its conclusion that the Company, in resisting an
unconsented-to disclosure of individual test results,
violated the statutory obligation to bargain in good
faith.
The court also pointed out that the company had a le-
gitimate concern that the secrecy of the questions com-
prising the test would be comprised by turning over the
test and scores to the union and that the test, which was
of considerable importance to the company, would be
rendered valueless.
It is clear that Detroit Edison represents an exception
to the long-established liberal policy of the Board, the
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court in requiring an
employer to furnish a labor organization information re-
quested which is necessary in order to administer its col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra;
Acme Industrial Co. supra; Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra;
Timkin Roller Bearing Co., supra; and Brooklyn Union
Gas Co., supra.
The Board recently held in PPG Industries, 255 NLRB
296 (1981), that an employee's work evaluation report,
called "rating sheets," were relevant in the union's col-
lective-bargaining role even where the employees in-
volved may not be included in the unit. In LaGuardia
Hospital, 260 NLRB 1455 (1982), the administrative law
judge was affirmed by the Board with respect to his
order calling for the production of employees' personnel
files. The administrative law judge found that the person-
nel files in question were those of two competing em-
ployees for a promotion, and therefore would be relevant
to the grievance of the employee who had been denied
the promotion.
In J.P. Stevens & Co., 239 NLRB 738 (1978), a union's
request for employee "efficiency" ratings was found by
an administrative law judge, with subsequent Board ap-
proval, to be relevant to the union's performance of its
statutory duty.
I conclude that the material requested in the instant
case is no different from that in PPG, LaGuardia Hospi-
tal, and J.P. Stevens & Co., supra.
The facts of Detroit Edison are unique and clearly dis-
tinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In the in-
stant case the appraisal itself is not so secretive so that
disclosure of an employee's appraisal would render val-
ueless further appraisals. Unlike Detroit Edison, employ-
ees were not expressly advised as to the confidentiality
of the appraisal, nor did they contain any material where
it could reasonably be assumed an employee would be
sensitive to such disclosure. Indeed, there is no evidence
that Benis was opposed to the Union obtaining copies of
his appraisals, or that Respondent believed he was so op-
posed. Moreover, Respondent in its response to the
Union's June 19 request never raised the issue of confi-
dentiality.
Accordingly, I conclude Respondent's claim of confi-
dentiality is pretextual. I further conclude that based on
the facts of the instant case and on the authority of the
above-cited cases, the Union was entitled to the informa-
1274
NEW YORK TIMES CO.
tion requested in its June 19 letter, and that by failing to
provide such requested information, directly to the
Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (5).
The evidence established that as a result of reading
various articles, described above, Gordon Thompson,
union representative, became aware of Respondent's par-
ticipation in Compu Serve, On-Line, and Videotex. He
recognized someone had to be performing editing and
formatting work for these services and that such work
was unit work. He discussed his concern that nonunit
employees might be performing unit work with other
union representatives. The Union had no way of know-
ing based on the articles read by Thompson who was
performing such editing or formatting work and so by
various letters it requested such information.
The information requested in the various union re-
quests described above may be summarized as follows:
the names, job classifications, description of work func-
tions of all employees employed by Respondent (includ-
ing its subsidiaries and affiliates) performing work in con-
nection with the above services, and the revenues re-
ceived by Respondent in connection with these services.
The basis for the request was set forth in the same
series of union requests and may be set forth as follows.
The information was needed to enable the Union to bar-
gain in connection with the May 7, 1981 memorandum
of agreement which provided that issues relating to elec-
tronic journalism would be subject to future "discus-
sion." Further, such information was needed to enable
the Union to determine whether, and to what extent,
nonunit employees employed by Respondent (or its sub-
sidiaries and affiliates) were performing unit work. The
financial information was requested to determine what if
any revenues were due to employees performing unit
work pursuant to the reprint clause in their agreement.
Respondent's response to the Union's requests may be
summarized as follows. There were no unit employees
performing any work on the above-named computerized
services. Eisenberg refused to provide further informa-
tion concerning the Union's request for the purpose of
negotiating pursuant to the May 7 memorandum of
agreement because Respondent contended such agree-
ment was an agreement to "discuss" rather than "negoti-
ate" and therefore such information was not necessary.
Eisenberg refused to provide further information con-
cerning the Union's request for the purpose of determin-
ing whether unit work was being performed by nonunit
employees, and whether the reprint clause was being
violated because Respondent through Eisenberg's re-
sponses took the position that before Respondent was re-
quired to furnish such information there must be an ini-
tial determination made by an arbitrator that the Union
was entitled to the editing and formatting work in con-
nection with the Compu Serve, On-Line, and Videotex
services.
The issue to be resolved is whether the information
was relevant for the purposes stated by the Union.
I will first consider the information requested for the
purpose of determining if unit work was being performed
by nonunit personnel. In view of Respondent's response
that unit personnel was not performing the disputed
work, the question is raised whether the Union is entitled
to the information concerning nonunit personnel. The
Board and the courts have held where the request is for
information concerning nonunit employees the union is
entitled to such information if it can show the informa-
tion is relevant to bargainable issues. Brooklyn Union Gas'
Rockwell-Standard Corp.; Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra. See
also Press Democrat Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d
1320 (9th Cir. 1980). However, the Board and court ap-
proach in determining relevancy has been to accord the
union liberal discovery on a good-faith showing of same
relevance. Brazos Electrical Power Cooperative; Acme In-
dustrial Co., supra. In Newspaper Guild, Local 95 v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1977), the court
stated:
When [a] union asks for information which is not
presumptively relevant, the showing by the union
must be more than a mere concoction of some gen-
eral theory which explains how the information
would be useful to the union in determining if the
employer has committed some unknown contract
violation.... Conversely, however, to require an
initial, burdensome showing by the union before it
can gain access to information which js necessary
for it to determine if a violation has occurred de-
feats the very purpose of the "liberal discovery
standard" of relevance which is to be used. Balanc-
ing these two conflicting propositions, the solution
is to require some initial, but not overwhelming,
demonstration by the union that some violation is or
has been taking place.
The Board and courts have found requests for informa-
tion relevant where the information is reasonably neces-
sary in order to administer a collective-bargaining agree-
ment and determine whether there are infractions of said
agreement. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.; Newspaper Guild,
supra.
Applying such rationale to the facts of this case, it is
clear that the Union's request for information as it relates
to nonunit employees was most relevant. The Union was
aware that editing and formatting work was being per-
formed in connection with services in which Respondent
was involved. Editing and formatting work are unit
work, and it is clearly relevant to the Union in the ad-
ministration of its contract and in detecting violations
thereto, whether such work is being performed by non-
unit employees.
I find no merit in Respondent's contention that before
it has an obligation to furnish the information requested
by the Union, the issues of whether the Union is entitled
to such "electronic" journalistic work under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement's jurisdiction clause and the fi-
nancial data under the reprint clause, must first be deter-
mined by an arbitrator. Nor is it the function of the
Board to make such determination. This is the equivalent
of putting the cart before the horse. As the Supreme
Court stated so clearly in Acme Industrial Co., supra at
437-438: "This discovery-type standard decide[s] nothing
about the merits of the Union's contractual claims" since
their eventual rejection by an arbitrator "would clearly
not be precluded by the Board's threshold determination
1275
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concerning the potential relevance of the requested infor-
mation." See also in this connection, Boeing Corp., supra.
In connection with the Union's request for the infor-
mation for the purpose of negotiating the issues relating
to electronic journalism as set forth in the May 7 memo-
randum of agreement it is obvious that the information
requested would be necessary for the Union to engage in
meaningful negotiations concerning electronic journal-
ism. For example, the number and duties of employees
engaged in editing and formatting work in connection
with the electronic systems described above would be
basic information necessary for the Union to bargain in-
telligently as to whether such work falls within their ju-
risdiction. Respondent's contention that the agreement
does not require "negotiation" is not for the Board to
decide but rather for an arbitrator, after the Union has
received the information requested. Once again Respond-
ent places the cart before the horse. Accordingly, I
reject Respondent's argument. Acme Industrial Co;
Boeing Corp., supra.
I therefore conclude that by failing to provide the
Union with the information requested as set forth in its
letters dated August 20 and December 8, 1981, and July
7 and November 15, 1982, Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
exclusive representative of all editorial and news depart-
ment and other enployees as set forth in their current
collective-bargaining agreement effective from May 1981
through May 1984.6
4. By refusing to furnish the Union with the informa-
tion requested by the Union concerning employee Steven
Benis and described by the Union's letter to Respondent
dated June 19, 1981, and by refusing to furnish the Union
with the information requested by the Union concerning
Compu Serve, On-Line, and Videotex, as described by
the Union's letters to Respondent dated August 20 and
December 8, 1981, and July 7 and November 15, 1982,
Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union and
thereby engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
and is thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(aXI) of the Act.
' As set forth above there is presently pending two UC petitions, Cases
2-UC-131 and 2-UC-135. In issue are certain classifications described in
the parties' collective-bargaining agreement including certain supervisory,
managerial, and confidential classifications and approximately 30 watch-
men. The appropriate unit herein shall be modified to the extent, if any,
as determined by the Board in the ultimate determination of said peti-
tions.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has committed an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I will recommend it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes
and policies of the Act. Specifically, I will recommend
that Respondent be ordered to provide to the Union the
information requested by it in its letters dated June 19,
August 20, and December 8, 1981, and July 7 and No-
vember 15, 1982, as set forth and described above.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I make the following recommend-
ed'
ORDER
The Respondent, The New York Times Company,
New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to furnish Newspaper Guild of New
York, Local 3, The Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, with
the information specifically set forth and contained in the
Union's letters to Respondent dated June 19, August 20,
and December 8, 1981, and July 7 and November 15,
1982 as set forth and described above.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish the Union in writing that information re-
quested by the Union in its letters to Respondent dated
June 19, August 20, and December 8, 1981 and July 7
and November 15, 1982.
(b) Post at its New York, New York facilities copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps have been
taken to comply.
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
a If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
1276
NEW YORK TIMES CO.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish Newspaper Guild of
New York, Local 3, The Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO
with the information specificially set forth and contained
in the Union's letters to us dated June 19, August 20, and
December 8, 1981, and July 7 and November 15, 1982, as
set forth and described in the Decision.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union in writing that information
requested by the Union in its letters to us dated June 19,
August 20, and December 8, 1981, and July 7 and No-
vember 15, 1982.
THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
1277