New York Telephone Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 29, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 679 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY 679
New York Telephone Company and Michael Mark-
son. Case 2-CA-12757
July 29, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND
KENNEDY
On July 16, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jo-
seph I. Nachman issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Respondent filed exceptions to the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's Decision and a brief in sup-
port of its exceptions.' Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, the Intervenor, filed an answer-
ing brief to Respondent's exceptions, and the Gener-
al Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision.
Thereafter, on February 27, 1975, the parties were
advised that, in view of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in Weingarten, Inc.2 and Qual-
ity Manufacturing Company,' the Board would accept
statements of position with respect to the impact of
the Supreme Court decisions on this case. On April 4,
1975, the General Counsel and Intervenor each filed
a separate statement of position. On April 8, 1975,
Respondent filed a letter statement of position.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions, briefs, and
statements of position and has decided to affirm the
rulings, findings, conclusions and recommendations
of the Administrative Law Judge with the following
additions, and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by deny-
ing employee Michael Markson's request, on Sep-
tember 14, 1972, to have a union representative
present at a meeting called by Respondent to investi-
gate charges of alleged fighting between Markson
i Respondent also filed a motion for consideration by the full Board and
a request for oral argument on the ground that the Board had not definitive-
ly interpreted the issues . In view of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions disposing of the major issues and our disposition of other issues on
factual grounds , we deny the motion for full Board consideration . We are of
the opinion that the record , exceptions , briefs , and statements of position
filed by the parties adequately present the issues , and we therefore deny the
request for oral argument.
N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), reversing 485 F.2d
1135 (C.A. 5, 1973).
3 International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Upper South Department,
AFL-CIO v. Quality Manufacturing Company, 420 U.S. 276 ( 1975), reversing
and remanding 481 F.2d 1018 (C.A. 4, 1973).
and another employee. He held that Markson might
reasonably believe that Respondent's interrogation
of him under the circumstances might result in disci-
plinary action and therefore the employee had a stat-
utory right to representation at the time. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge relied on the Board's opinions in
Quality Manufacturing Company,4 J. Weingarten,
Inc.,5 and Mobil Oil Corporation.6 The Board's posi-
tion in those cases has been sustained by the United
States Supreme Court. See footnotes 2 and 3, supra.
The Administrative Law Judge further found that
the Union, during bargaining negotiations to renew
the collective-bargaining agreement, had not waived
the employees' statutorily protected right to repre-
sentation if requested at an investigatory meeting
called by Respondent. Respondent argues to the con-
trary that the facts demonstrate that the Union had
given up whatever right to representation Markson
had. Our review of the record convinces us that the
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion is correct
and that Respondent's argument is not supported by
the evidence.'
The Union has been the collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of Respondent's employees in an appro-
priate unit for some years, and it has entered into
successive collective-bargaining agreements with Re-
spondent. The last agreement, which was in effect at
the time of the hearing, was executed by the parties
on February 17, 1972.8 It contained no provision for
employee representation at investigative interviews
called by Respondent.
From the beginning of negotiations on July 6,
1971, the Union proposed to add a written provision
to an article dealing with grievance procedure that
would have given an employee union representation
at any time he requested it, whether before or after a
grievance had been initiated? Respondent's unwrit-
ten practice at the time was to deny union represen-
tation to employees when it interviewed them, except
in the following circumstances: where the matter in-
vestigated might result in criminal prosecution;
whenever discipline was to be announced at that spe-
cific meeting; when the employee being interrogated
was currently under discipline; and if a grievance
was being processed. Respondent's consistent posi-
tion was that employee representation was unneces-
4195 NLRB 197 (1972).
'202 NLRB 446 (1973).
6 196 NLRB 1052 (1972).
7 The Administrative Law Judge found that there was no waiver. He did
not pass on the question whether an employee's right to'representation may
be waived We also find it unnecessary to decide that question. -
8 The agreement , executed in February 1972, was made effective frQm
July 18, 1971, until July 18, 1974 , and thereafter from year to year unless
terminated by the required notice.
9 The grievance procedure which the Union was seeking to amend is
found in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement expiring in July 1971.
Resp . Exh. 2. New York Telephone Company, 203 NLRB 1153 (1973).
219 NLRB No. 136
680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sary at investigative interviews , and it rejected the
Union's proposal . On July 17 or 18, 1971, as the par-
ties were approaching agreement , Respondent's
notes reflect that the Union withdrew - demands for
revisions of the grievance procedure . The parties
reached agreement on July 18, 1971, subject to ratifi-
cation by the Union 's membership . Thereafter the
membership rejected the agreement.
After the parties resumed negotiations on August
31, 1971, the Union renewed its proposal for union
representation whenever requested by an employee.
At the several meetings when the parties discussed
the Union's demand for representation, Respondent
rejected it.
In January 1972, the parties met with the chairman
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The Union adhered to its proposal . The conciliator
later presented Respondent's contract proposals to
the Union . The Union rejected them without singling
out any specific item . On February 3, 1972, the con-
ciliator submitted contract proposals intended to set-
tle an ongoing strike . It contained essentially
Respondent's position respecting union representa-
tion , requiring it when requested by an employee at
meetings between Company and employee , but only
when "a final warning , suspension , demotion or dis-
charge for cause is to be announced ...." 10
The Union did not endorse the settlement propos-
als but agreed to submit them to its membership. The
membership voted to ratify the proposals , and a con-
tract embodying them was signed by union repre-
sentatives on February 17, 1972.
Respondent argues that the Union relinquished its
demand for union representation at investigatory in-
terviews with employees on October 20, 1971, and
the question of union representation was no longer
an issue after that date . This argument is not borne
out by the record. According to Respondent's incom-
plete notes of negotiations held on that date, the
Union was pressing for representation not only at
company meetings held with an employee when dis-
ciplinary action was going to be taken , but also when
Respondent intended to interrogate an employee
where discipline might thereafter be imposed. After
October 20, Respondent 's notes of the November 4,
1971, meeting show that the Union reiterated its de-
mand for a provision which "permits a Union mem-
ber representation at any time upon request. This
provision to apply before and after a grievance has
been instituted ." The Union repeated its demand to
the Federal conciliator in January, 1972. There is no
showing that this demand was withdrawn. The
Union's eventual execution of an agreement with Re-
spondent in settlement of the strike did not constitute
a waiver of the employees' rights in the circum-
stances.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent , New York Telephone
Company , New York, New York, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
tO Resp. Exh. I
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding heard before me at New York, New York, on May
22, 1973, with all parties present and represented by coun-
sel, involves a complaint pursuant to Section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the
Act), which alleges that New York Telephone Company
(herein Respondent or Company) violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by denying the request of Michael Markson, a
member of the bargaining unit for which Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO 2 (herein the Union), is the
bargaining representative , for union representation while
being interrogated by Respondent concerning an alleged
fight with a fellow employee . The basic issue to be decided
is whether Respondent 's admitted refusal to grant
Markson 's request for union representation during its in-
vestigation of the above -mentioned incident is removed
from the ambit of the Board 's holding in Mobil Oil Corpo-
ration, 196 NLRB 1052 (1972), and related cases, because
of a provision in the contract between the parties which
Respondent interprets as permitting it to refuse union rep-
resentation , except in those cases where the employee is
called in for the imposition of "a final warning, suspension,
demotion or discharge for cause ." For reasons hereafter
more fully detailed, I find and -conclude that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in the com-
plaint, and recommend an appropriate remedial order.
At the hearing all parties were permitted to introduce
evidence relevant and material to the issue , to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, and
to submit briefs . Oral argument was waived . Briefs submit-
ted by the General Counsel, Respondent, and Intervenor,
respectively, have been duly considered. Upon the plead-
ings, stipulations of counsel , the evidence including my ob-
servation of the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying,
1 Issued March 13, 1973, on a charge filed and served September 26, 1972.
2 At the hearing, Communications Workers of America , the collective-
bargaining representative of the employees involved , moved to intervene in
the proceeding. There being no objection , the motion was granted.
NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY 681
and the entire record in the case ,3 I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT 4
Background
For some years the Company has recognized the Union
as the collective -bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in an appropriate unit , and successive contracts were
entered into providing for the wages , hours , and terms and
conditions of employment of the unit employees. The last
such contract, which is currently in effect, was executed
February 17, 1972, retroactive to July 18, 1971, effective
until July 18, 1974, and thereafter from year to year unless
terminated by prescribed notices Article 10, of the current
contract entitled "Discharges , Suspensions and Termina-
tions for cause ," has a subsection designated as 10.05,
which reads:
At any meeting between a representative of the Com-
pany and an employee in which a final warning, sus-
pension, demotion or discharge for cause is to be an-
nounced, a union representative may be present if the
employee so requests. [Emphasis supplied.] 6
Prior to the current contract, the collective -bargaining
agreement contained no provision comparable to article
10.05. As the case turns on the application of that provi-
sion , something of its genesis is in order . Bargaining for the
current contract began on July 6, 1971, and by July 18
agreement was reached subject to ratification by the union
membership. However, the membership rejected the agree-
ment, and on August 31, 1971, bargaining was resumed. By
January 1972, no agreement having been reached, the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service joined the negotia-
tions. After a prior meeting with the parties, the conciliator
on February 3, 1972, submitted a proposal dealing with a
number of items designed to produce an agreement. Al-
though the Union did not accept that proposal, it agreed to
and did submit it for ratification by the membership. After
the membership approved the proposal, the portion thereof
dealing with union representation was revised to put it into
contract language , and it became article 10.05 of the con-
tract.
Prior to the current contract the Company apparently
followed the policy of denying union representation ex-
cept, if (1) the investigation involved matters which might
constitute a criminal offense ; (2). the meeting was to im-
pose discipline , or to determine the discipline to be im-
posed; (3) the employee being interrogated was then under
discipline; or (4) a grievance was pending. The record
3 Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
° No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented . The complaint
alleges, and the answer admits, facts which establish these jurisdictional
elements . I find those facts to be as pleaded . Additionally, the Board has
heretofore asserted jurisdiction over Respondent . See, i .e., New York Tele-
phone Company 203 NLRB 1153 (1973).
5 Although the contracting parties were always the Company and Com-
munication Workers of America, the latter designated its Local 1101 to
administer each contract during its effective period.
6 The contract also provides for settlement of disputes through a griev-
ance procedure detailed in art. 11, culminating in arbitration as provided in
art. 12.
shows that during this period a number of grievances were
filed relating to the refusal of the Company to provide
union representation on request, which were denied be-
cause the interrogation was not for the purpose of impos-
ing final discipline. The evidence is silent, however, on
whether these grievances went to arbitration as provided in
the contract, and, if they did, the results of such arbitra-
tion.
Additionally, the evidence shows that, during the origi-
nal and resumed bargaining in 1971-72, the Union made,
and from time to time modified, proposals designed to as-
sure union representation at any employee interrogation by
management , but all such proposals were rejected by the
Company. Even at the final meeting with the conciliator, at
which both union and company representatives were pre-
sent, Union Representative Bahr, in explaining the Union's
position on the issue of union representation, referred to it
as a "protective provision" which the Union had to have to
protect employees from roving company investigators it re-
ferred to as "gumshoes." And when the conciliator at his
final meeting with the parties made proposals for settle-
ment of the contract dispute, which included inter alia the
proposal that is now article 10.05 of the contract, the
Union rejected the entire proposal.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
While at work during the evening of September 13,7 Mi-
chael Markson, a unit employee, was told by Santoro, his
first-line foreman, that he (Markson), was wanted in man-
agements office on the 10th floor. While waiting for the
elevator, Markson asked Santoro what the problem was,
and was informed that his fellow employee Malkowski
complained he had been assaulted by Markson. Reaching
the office, Markson was asked by Santoro to write out a
statement explaining where he was, whom he saw, and
what he did at approximately 6 p.m. that day, and Mark-
son did so. In the statement he prepared, Markson men-
tioned the name of fellow employee Joseph Taylor. Upon
completion of his statement Markson was directed to re-
turn to work. At approximately 9 p.m., Santoro told Mark-
son to report to the office of Michael J. Donohue, an ad-
mitted-supervisor, at 4 p.m. the following day. Donohue
admittedly had authority to discipline employees, and had
on prior occasions disciplined Markson. When Markson
reported as directed, he found Donohue and Foreman Ja-
mison present . Shortly thereafter Malkowski entered the
room, and Donohue directed Jamison to get Taylor. While
Jamison was thus absent, Markson asked Donohue for a
union steward, but Donohue asked that Markson wait un-
til Taylor arrived. When Jamison returned to the room
with Taylor, Markson again asked Donohue for a steward,
but Donohue admittedly refused the request because, un-
der article 10.05 of the contract, an employee was entitled
to union representation only if final warnintor other disci-
pline was to be imposed at that meeting, and he had no
intention of imposing discipline at the time. After some
discussion of the various statements Donohue had before
him, the latter announced that he was unable to reach a
7 This and all dates hereafter mentioned are 1972, unless otherwise stated.
682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decision and would forward the material before him to
higher authority for action by the latter. In the course of
the discussion, Markson asked Donohue whether the latter
would impose discipline if he (Markson) were to admit he
struck Malkowski . Donohue replied that he would, and
that such discipline would take the form of suspension or
discharge . Donohue testified that in such event it would
have been necessary for him to call Markson to another
meeting, and at that time it would have been incumbent on
him to honor any request by Markson for union represen-
tation . Markson testified that since September 14 he has
heard nothing further about the matter; that no discipline
has been imposed upon him for this incident, nor has he
filed any grievance concerning the matters involved.
CONTENTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Respondent argues that because in the 1971-72 bargain-
ing the Union sought and failed to obtain a provision giv-
ing employees the right to union representation at employ-
ee interrogation and thereafter agreed to a provision
limiting union representation to those situations in which
final warning or other discipline is to be announced, the
Union waived its rights to union representation except in
those instances specified in the contract . On the other
hand, the General Counsel and the Intervenor argue that
on the facts of the instant case the Union did not waive the
statutorily protected right of employees to have union rep-
resentation at any employee interview from which the em-
ployee might reasonably conclude that his job security
might be in jeopardy.
The Board has often said that waivers of statutory rights
are not to be lightly or readily inferred, and that a waiver
will not be found:
Mobil Oil Corporation, 196 NLRB 1052 (1972), makes it
clear that, if an employee is being interrogated by his em-
ployer under circumstances from which the employee
might reasonably believe that his job security may be in
jeopardy, the denial of the employee's request for union
representation at such interrogation is an invasion of his
Section 7 rights , and hence a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. To the same effect Quality Manufacturing Compa-
ny, 195 NLRB 197 (1972); J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 NLRB
446 (1973); New York Telephone Company, 203 NLRB 1153
(1973) .8 There can be no doubt-leaving to one side the
legal effect of article 10.05 of the contract-that the facts
of this case fall squarely within the rule of Mobil Oil and
related cases . Markson was called in for interrogation con-
cerning a charge that he had assaulted a fellow employee.
Management Representative Donohue admitted that, un-
der company policy, such a charge, if proved, calls for dis-
cipline in the form of suspension or discharge , although
another meeting would have been necessary for that pur-
pose, and Markson knew that Donohue had the authority
to impose discipline . Because Donohue felt unable to make
a decision on the facts before him , he decided , to use his
words, to pass the information on to higher authority for
appropriate action . It is quite true Markson heard nothing
further about the matter , and that no discipline was in fact
imposed upon him, but on the facts of this case I must and
do find and conclude that in the position Markson found
himself he could reasonably anticipate that action might be
taken against him which would put his job security in jeop-
ardy. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 NLRB 466 (1973). Whether
Markson in fact thought that his job security might be in
jeopardy is beside the point , for the reasonable basis for
such belief is to be measured by objective standards in light
of the circumstances of the particular case , and the facts of
the instant case satisfy that standard . (J Weingarten, Inc.,
supra, and the cases there cited.) Accordingly, were it not
for article 10.05 of the contract, the facts before me would
establish a clear violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I
turn now to consider whether a contrary result is dictated
by the aforesaid contractual provision.
9 New York Telephone Company, supra, is not diapositive of the issue here
because the events there involved occurred in 1971, and before article 10.05
became a part of the contract.
... unless it can be said from an evaluation of the
prior negotiations that the matter was "fully dis-
cussed" or "consciously explored" and the union
"consciously yielded" or clearly and unmistakably
waived its interest in the matter. [The Press Company,
Incorporated, 121 NLRB 976 (1958).]
To the same effect see The Timken Roller Bearing Compa-
ny, 138 NLRB 15, 16 (1962); Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co.,
129 NLRB 42, 43-44 (1960); Proctor Manufacturing Corpo-
ration, 131 NLRB 1166, 1169-70 (1961).
Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of the instant
case, I find and conclude that the record fails to establish
that, by agreeing to what is now article 10.05 of the con-
tract, the Union "consciously yielded," or "clearly and un-
mistakably waived," its position taken throughout the bar-
gaining. To construe the aforesaid contract provision as
limiting the right to union representation only to those
cases where final discipline is to be imposed raises the ques-
tion whether it was the intent of the parties that such right
should not exist in other situations , or was it the intent of
the parties that in other situations Board law; namely, the
rule of Mobil Oil, supra, should prevail. The answer to this
question is by no means clear from the contract language
itself . The most that can be said for Respondent 's position
is that when the conciliator advanced the proposal which is
now article 10.05, the Union remained silent and accepted
the package proposal. But silence gives consent only in
those situations where there is duty to speak, and in the
circumstances here no such duty rested upon the Union. It
could very properly proceed on the theory that it would
take what the provision gave , and rely on general Board
law to take care of those situations to which the contract
provision did not apply. This, I find and conclude, is quite
different from "consciously yield[ing] or clearly and unmis-
takably waiv[ing]" its position taken during bargaining .9
9 Having reached this conclusion , it is immaterial and therefore unneces-
sory to decide whether an employee 's right to union representation under
the circumstances here involved is a right which a union may lawfully
waive . Cf. Armco Steel Corporation, 148 NLRB 1179 (1964), enforcement
denied 344 F.2d 621 (C.A. 6, 1966), and International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, District No 9, (McDonnell Douglas) 171 NLRB
234 (1968), enfd . 415 F.2d 113 (C.A. 8, 1969). To the extent that the Board
has spoken to this issue, the indication is that it would answer that the right
referred to is waivable by a union. See Western Electric Company, Haw-
NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY 683
Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, 198 NLRB
623 (1972), on which Respondent relies so strongly, I find
inapposite here. In the first place, the decision there is by a
Board panel; Members Kennedy and Penello voting to dis-
miss the complaint on the theory of Member Kennedy's
dissent in Quality Manufacturing, supra, and Mobil Oil Cor-
poration, supra, while Chairman Miller joined in the result,
but for a different reason. The basis for his conclusion was
that the contractual provision in that case had been inter-
preted by arbitrators, and its meaning definitely estab-
lished. Here, although the contract provision is apparently
the same or very similar to that in Western Electric, supra,
no arbitrator or other forum has interpreted this provision
which, as I have found, is by no means clear and unambig-
uous.
Accordingly, and for reasons stated, I find and conclude
that , by denying Markson's request for union representa-
tion under the circumstances herein found , Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.10
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire re-
cord in the case, I state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
with the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By denying Markson's request for union representa-
tion at an interview conducted by Respondent under cir-
cumstances from which Markson could reasonably con-
clude that his job security was in jeopardy, Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act, and thereby engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
thorne Works, 198 NLRB 623 (1972).
10 By its answer filed herein, Respondent advanced the contention that
this dispute should be referred for resolution under the grievance and arbi-
tration provisions of the contract , in accordance with Collyer Insulated Wire,
A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB 837 (1971). The General Coun-
sel and the Intervenor argue that under the facts of this case deferral to
arbitration is inappropriate . However , in its brief to me Respondent with-
drew its request for deferral to arbitration and requested a decision on the
merits. It is doing so, Respondent says , "because of a commitment to seek a
speedy resolution of the issues in this case , which we gave in a motion to the
Board in another case , New York Telephone Co.," 203 NLRB 1153 (1973),
pending before the Board on a motion to reconsider and modify order. As
no party now seeks deferral to arbitration , it is unnecessary to consider
whether such deferral is appropriate . Salt River Valley Water Users' Associa-
tion , 204 NLRB 83 (1973), In. I.
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER II
The Respondent, New York Telephone Company, New
York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs , shall:
1. Cease and desist from requiring any employee to take
part in an interview or meeting without union representa-
tion, if such representation has been requested by the em-
ployee and if the employee has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the matters to be discussed at such interview may
result in his being subject to disciplinary action.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at each of its establishments copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2
(New York, New York), after being duly signed by an au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
it has taken to comply herewith.
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 10246 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102
.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
12 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a full hearing in which all sides had the opportunity
to present their evidence , the National Labor Relations
Board has found that we , New York Telephone Company,
violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us
to post this notice . We will carry out the order of the
Board, and comply with the following:
WE WILL NOT require that any employee take part in
an interview or meeting with us without union repre-
sentation if the employee requests such representation
and if the employee has reasonable grounds to believe
that the matter to be discussed at such interview or
meeting may result in his being subject to disciplinary
action.
NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY