New Britain Machine Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 1953

105 N.L.R.B. 646 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY and LODGE 1021, INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL. Case No.
1-CA-1288. June 18, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 24, 1953, Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider
is sued his Intermediate Report in the above -entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in
certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached
hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board' has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner
made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.' The Board has
considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief,
and the entire record in the case and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with
the modification noted below.I
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case , and pursuant to Section
10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respond-
ent, New Britain Machine Company, New Britain, Connecticut,
its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Lodge 1021, Inter-
national Association of Machinists , AFL, as the exclusive
I Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members
Houston, Murdock, and Peterson].
'During the course of the hearing, the Board, on appeal, overruled the Trial Examiner's
denial of the motion of the attorney general of the State of Connecticut to quash the subpena
served upon Father Donnelly, chairman of the Board of Mediation and Arbitration of the
State of Connecticut. In so doing, the Board sustained the claim of privilege of Father
Donnelly who refused to testify to any conversations had during contract negotiations between
the Respondent and the Union, in which he participated in his official capacity of conciliator,
on the ground that the laws of Connecticut (Section 7387, Connecticut General Statutes,
Revision of 1949) prohibit such disclosure. We adhere to our former ruling. Tomlinson of
High Point, Inc., 74 NLRB 681. Moreover, as the evidence sought to be elicited from Father
Donnelly was of a corroborative nature which would not establish a firm and binding com-
mitment by the Union which would relieve the Respondent of its statutory duty to supply the
Union with the information in question, we find that the Respondent was not prejudiced by the
Board's ruling. Furthermore, the Respondent had a sufficient opportunity, of which it availed
itself, to present testimony concerning the wage-data dispute from other witnesses who
attended the meetings over which Father Donnelly presided.
S In view of our agreement with the Trial Examiner that the Union did not waive its right
to the information in question but that it concluded a contract with the Respondent with the
understanding that it would seek a determination of its rights by the Board, we find it un-
necessary to consider the Trial Examiner's further finding that the Respondent adamantly
insisted upon the waiver as a condition of agreement.
105 NLRB No. 90.
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY 647
representative of all its production and maintenance employees
employed at the Respondent's New Britain, Connecticut, plant,
excluding guards, watchmen, office clerical employees, rate
setters, time setters, expediters, stock chasers, dispatchers,
timekeepers, cafeteria employees, technical department em-
ployees consisting of engineers, draftsmen, designers, detailers,
tracers, blueprint and photostat machine operators, profes-
sional employees, salesmen, and all supervisors as defined
in the Act, by refusing to furnish to the above-named Union the
names, classifications, wage rates, and seniority of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and by refusing to agree to
notify the said Union of any changes in the status of said
employees.
(b) Interfering with the efforts of Lodge 1021, International
Association of Machinists, AFL, to bargain collectively with
the Respondent on behalf of employees in the appropriate unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board
finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Furnish to the above-named Union the names, classifica-
tions, wage rates, and seniority of the employees in the appro-
priate unit, and notify the said Union of any change in status
of any of these employees.
(b) Post at its plant in New Britain, Connecticut, copies of
the notice attached hereto as an appendix.' Copies of such
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First
Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive
days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Re tonal Director for the First Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, as
to what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
4In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of
the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL bargain collectively with Lodge 1021, Inter-
national Association of Machinists, AFL, as the exclusive
representative of all our employees in the bargaining unit
described below.
291555 0 - 54 - 42
648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts of the above-
named union to bargain collectively with us on behalf of
employees in said bargaining unit.
WE WILL furnish to the above -named union the names,
classifications , wage rates , and seniority of the employees
in the bargaining unit , and we will notify the said union of
any change in status of such employees . The bargaining
unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at the Re-
spondent ' s New Britain , Connecticut , plant , excluding
guards, watchmen, office clerical employees, rate
setters, time setters , expediters, stock chasers, dis-
patchers , timekeepers , cafeteria employees , technical
department employees consisting of engineers , drafts-
men, designers , detailers, tracers, blueprint andphoto-
stat machine operators , professional employees,
salesmen, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated ................ By....................................................
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date
hereof, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act (61 Stat.
136), was heard in New Britain, Connecticut, on December 11 and 12, 1952, and in Hartford,
Connecticut, on January 5 and 6, and February 19, 1953, upon due notice. The complaint,
issued on October 29, 1952, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
and based upon a charge duly filed and served, alleged in substance that the Respondent, New
Britain Machine Company, New Britain, Connecticut, had engaged in unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union. By answer duly filed the Respondent denied the commission of unfair labor practices.
All parties were represented at the hearing, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, i to argue orally, and
to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions.
i A subpena issued at the instance of the Respondent, calling for the testimony of Father
Joseph F. Donnelly, chairman of the Board of Mediation and Arbitration of the State of
Connecticut, was quashed by the National Labor Relations Board on January 30, 1953, upon
motion of the attorney general of the State of Connecticut. The Respondent sought by the
subpena to adduce testimony by Father Donnelly as to positions and actions taken by the
Union and the Respondent during negotiations for renewal of a collective-bargaining con-
tract; in the course of which negotiations the Respondent claims, and the Union denies,
that the instant dispute was adjusted. In these negotiations Father Donnelly and other State
and Federal conciliators participated in the performance of their official governmental
duties in an effort to assist in the resolution of the issues.
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY 649
A motion made by the Respondent on December 11, 1952, to dismiss the complaint for non-
compliance by the Union, at the time of original filing of the charges, with Section 9 (f), (g),
and (h) of the Act, is disposed of by the court of appeals, action of February 6, 1953, in the
case of Tennessee Egg Co., 201 F. 2d 370 (C. A. 6). The Respondent's motion was based on
the earlier opinion of that court in the same case, reported at 199 F. 2d 95. The court of
appeals reversed the latter judgment on February 6, on the authority of the Supreme Court's
opinion in the case of Dant and Russell, 73 S. Ct. 375. The court of appeals' action has thus
removed the basis for the Respondent's motion.
On March 13, 1953, the Respondent filed a brief, which has been considered.
Upon the basis of my observation of the witnesses and consideration of all material evidence,
and upon the entire record, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The following facts were stipulated by the parties:
New Britain Machine Company is a Connecticut corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of machine tools at 2 plants located in New Britain, Connecticut. During the 12 months
prior to the hearing the Respondent shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000
to points outside the State of Connecticut. It is conceded that the Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Lodge 1021, International Association of Machinists, AFL, is a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The basic issue is relatively narrow: whether the Respondent is required to provide the
Union with certain wage data requested by the Union during bargaining negotiations; and
whether, in any event, the matter was finally concluded in the negotiations. There is little
substantial dispute as to what I deem the essential facts.
For a number of years the Union has been, and is today, concededly the designated collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit. Relations between the parties, for the most part under contract, have been and are
seemingly amicable.
The dispute here involved arose during the course of negotiations from May 21 to August 14,
1952, for renewal of an expiring bargaining agreement; negotiations initiated by notice from
the Union that it desired certain contract changes, modifications, and additions.
The dispute had its inception in a union proposal (among others) for a clause in the wage
section of the new contract by which the Respondent would supply the Union with the following
wage data: (1) The name, classification, seniority, and wage rate of each employee in the
appropriate unit; (2) information as to the operation of incentive systems; and (3) notification
of any change in the status of an employee during the contract year. Under the then (and pres-
ently) existing practice, certain changes in status, such as reclassification of employees,
merit increases, and transfers, are the prerogative of management and within its unilateral
discretion and no notice is given the Union of such revisions.
The Respondent, in counterproposals submitted on July 8 and 11, indicated willingness, in
accordance with and continuation of past practices, to supply the Union with a list of the job
classifications with the specifications and rate ranges therefor (but not the names and indi-
vidual rate); all wage data necessary (here including names and individual rates if needed) in
grievance actions; and also the requested information as to the incentive systems.
The Respondent declined to commit itself tonotifyingthe Union as to any change in status of
employees.
The final differences between the parties, then, were as follows: (1) As to whether there
should be notification of changes in status when made; and (2) as to whether the Respondent
should supply names, seniority, and individual wage as a matter of general information. The
following example will serve to illustrate the differences on the latter issue: The Respondent
was willing to supply "first class machinist, rate range $1.67 to $1.75." What the Union wanted
was "John Jones, first class machinist, rate $1.70, seniority January 1, 1950." Where neces-
650 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sary to the settlement of a grievance under the grievance procedure, however, the Respondent
was willing to supply the requested information. 2 Seniority is a factor in some personnel
actions.
The Union wanted this data in order to have complete information as to the status of em-
ployees: for bargaining purposes, for policing and administering the provisions of the contract
(which contained agreed-upon standards for some personnel action, such as merit increases),
to determine whether inequities existed as between individuals, divisions, and plants, and in
order to evaluate employee grievances or complaints concerning status or wages. 3
On August 8, 1952, during the course of the negotiations, the Union filed with the Board a
charge of refusal to bargain based, inter alia, on the Respondent's unwillingness to supply the
denied information. On August 14, agreement was reached on the other outstanding bargaining
issues, a memorandum of agreement signed, and ultimately a new contract executed.
The Respondent's position here, in sum, is as follows: (1) That its offer constituted a com-
plete fulfillment of its obligations under the statute to supply information to the Union; (2)
having submitted the matter to the collective-bargaining process, the Union waived whatever
statutory rights it had to the information; and(3) the parties having reached accord during the
negotiations, the Respondent is not obligated to bargain further on the issue, and the Union is
consequently repudiating its agreement.
The Union denies that an accord was reached on the wage data matter.
Conclusions
The bargaining representative of employees is entitled to secure from the employer
"the pertinent facts constituting the wage history of its members." Aluminum Ore Co. v.
N. L. R. B., 131 F. 2d 485 (C. A. 7). It is now well settled that such information as the
names, classification, wage rates, and seniority of each employee in the appropriate unit
is necessary to the proper functioning of a representative and discharge of its duties and
that the employer is under an obligation to supply it upon proper request. The Board and
the courts have of recent years uniformly so held. General Controls Co., 88 NLRB 1340;
B. F. Goodrich Co., 89 NLRB 1151; Electric Autolite Co., 89 NLRB 1192; Leland Gifford
Co., 95 NLRB 1306, 200 F. 2d 620 (C. A. 1); Hekman Furniture Co., 101 NLRB 631; Cali-
fornia Portland Cement Co., 101 NLRB 1436; Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 102 NLRB
627; Hastings and Sons, 102 NLRB 708; Hearst Corp., 102 NLRB 637; Post Publishing Co.,
102 NLRB 648; Aluminum Ore Co., 131 F. 2d 485 (C. A. 7); J. H. Allison Co., 165 F. 2d 766
(C. A. 6); Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F. 2d 947 (C. A. 2). Unless the information is
"plainly irrelevant" (Yawman & Erbe, supra ) it must be submitted. The information has
been held essential and relevant not only in the negotiation of wage questions, but also to
protect the Union's "proper interest in the manner in which an employer administers an
existing contract," and for "policing" it. Leland Gifford Co.; California Portland Cement,
supra
The Union wished the information for administrative and policing purposes here; it wanted
to determine whether there were wage or other inequities; whether employee complaints had
sufficient prima facie merit to warrant grievance action; and whether the Respondent's
unilateral authority to give reclassifications, merit increases, and to transfer, was being
exercised in accordance with the contractual standards. In these matters the Union has a
proper interest, indeed, a duty. And without the information it requested it could neither
satisfy the interest nor discharge the duty. Cases such as Pool Mfg. Co., 70 NLRB 540,
at 550 (footnote 11). Turning upon the question as to whether the negotiations were impeded
2James Petano, president of the local union, testified that in the past the Respondent has
given union stewards copies of seniority lists upon request. The failure of the Respondent
to agree during the negotiations to furnish seniority data as a matter of general information
is thus either contradiction or a reversal of practice, presumably the latter. There is no
indication in the testimony that on this issue the Company's position was that it had always
supplied the seniority information in the form of lists, and was willing to continue to do so.
3There is dispute as to when, during the negotiations, the Union first stated fully its
reasons for wanting the data. The Union's testimony is that the reasons were stated at the
first meeting on May 21. Vice-President Morrow's testimony, for the Respondent, is that it
was July 11. Since it is not disputed that the reasons were fully given before the parties
executed a memorandum of agreement concluding the negotiations on August 14, the conflict
need not be resolved. Whether articulation of reasons for wanting the data is a condition
precedent to the creation of an obligation to supply it, consequently need not be determined.
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY 651
by refusal to supply data , are therefore inapposite , if not indeed overruled by subsequent
decisions . The Respondent ' s offer to provide the data in grievance situations is not, under the
cases, a fulfillment of the Respondent 's obligation.
The collective bargaining requirement of the Act is not satisfied by a substitution of the
grievance procedure ... for the obligation to furnish the Union with information it
needed to perform its statutory function . (Hekman Furniture Co ., supra Leland Gifford
Co., supra.)
Moreover , where, as here , an employee 's status may be revised unilaterally , neither the
representative nor other interested employees are in a position--lacking the basic data--to
determine whether the contract is being properly administered or not, whether its standards
are being met, and whether there is ground for grievance action . (California Portland Cement
Co., supra)
It is consequently found, on the authority of the cited decisions , that the Respondent was
required under the statute to furnish the Union the information which it sought
The only remaining questions are whether , as asserted by the Respondent and disputed
by the Union , the parties reached accord on the issue ; or that the Union waived its right to
the information by submitting the matter to the bargaining process , and by accepting the
following clauses in the formal contract ultimately executed:
Article XI. M. The Company will supply within thirty (30) days from the signing of
this agreement a list of all job classifications with specifications and rate ranges, also
an explanation of all incentive plans by divisions ; and from time to time will submit all
wage data required on grievances.
Article XXV. 25.1. The parties agree that this constitutes a full settlement of all
issues and that no other proposals will be made by either party, except as provided
herein, or except as mutually agreed upon during the life of this agreement.
Assuming that the right to the information may be waived or bargained away , the waiver
or bargain must be clearly and unequivocally expressed . In California Portland Cement Co.,
supra , the Board said:
... we are dealing here with a right that derives from statute and not from contract.
Assuming , without deciding , that this statutory right may be waived by a union, the
Board will not, in any event, give effect to-any purported waiver of such right unless
it is expressed in clear and unequivocal language.
See also Hekman Furniture Co., supra; Leland Gifford Co., su r. Contract clauses of sub-
stantially similar import as articles XI and XXV were found by the Board in the Leland
Gifford case as "not intended , and cannot be construed, as a waiver by the Union of its
right to obtain data necessary to the effective administration of a contract."
Article XI , M, is substantially the Respondent 's counterproposal of July 8 and 11 on the
wage-data matter. The Respondent contends that on July 11 , 1952 , the union negotiating
committee accepted article XI , M, and that the Union 's present position constitutes a re-
pudiation of that agreement. The Respondent 's testimony in support of this contention is
that the conciliators reported to the Respondent that this proposal had been accepted by
the union representatives . 4 The Union denies having accepted the proposal . I do not find it
necessary to resolve the conflict.
Whether they were merely proposals , or an actual record of accord between the nego-
tiators , the Respondent 's offers (including article XI , M) were submitted to the union mem-
bership on July 12 , which rejected them. Two days later the Union served a strike notice
because of the unresolved contract issues.
The Respondent 's contention therefore boils down to the assertion that as a matter of legal
conclusion , the acceptance of particular clauses by the negotiators constitutes binding accord
on those subjects ; or, in the alternative, that agreement between negotiators , subject to
ratification by the principals , is final and binding upon the parties even though the principals
thereafter reject it.
4Meetmngs were at that time being held separately , with the conciliators shuttling back and
forth between the two groups.
652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
No doubt negotiators can obligate themselves in advance to bargain each disputed issue,
item by item , to final and irrevocable resolution . But there is no evidence or assertion of
any such commitment here; and in its absence I would not construe agreement on individual
issues , short of complete accord, to be anything more than tentative agreement: conditional
upon reaching a complete meeting of the minds on all issues . And where , as here, the agree-
ment is subject to approval by the union membership , accord between the negotiators is not
final settlement . The Todd Co., 71 NLRB 192 at p. 207 (agreement by negotiators on all
issues, subject to ratification by employer principal of one of the clauses, is only tentative
agreement and not a final accord); cf. Franklin Hosiery Mills, 83 NLRB 276 (repeated
repudiation of agreement after having several times reached admitted final accord on all
outstanding issues is indicative of bad faith).
It is therefore found that no final accord with respect to the wage -data issue was reached
on July 11.
During the August negotiations the Union several times stated its dissatisfaction with the
Respondent 's offer of article XI, M. On August 8 it filed a charge of refusal to bargain
respecting the issue . The Respondent not only received a copy of that charge in the mail
within several days--the Union actually submitted it to the Respondent prior to filing. The
memorandum of agreement executed on August 14 was rewritten before signing for the
reason, expressed to the Respondent, that the Union wished to be sure that It was not fore-
closing its right to secure the requested data through the processes of the Board.k There is
no indication in the evidence that the Respondent suggested to the Union before signing that
the Respondent considered that the issue of wage data had been bargained out to the satis-
faction of both parties.
Consequently , so far as the wage-data issue is concerned , the formal contract thereafter
executed represents, not a mutual recognition of the discharge of the Respondent's obligation,
but only the extent of its contractual commitment. Where, as here, the Union 's joinder in
the contract was accompanied by its clearly expressed reservation of intention to litigate
the validity of the Respondent 's resistance, acceptance of what the Respondent was willing
to give voluntarily did not, as a matter of law, operate as a waiver of the Union's right to
seek in a legal form what the Respondent resisted giving. Article XXV. 25.1 must be read
in connection with the understanding of the parties that the Union would seek to adjudicate
the legality of the resistance. In such a circumstance the Jacobs case, 94 NLRB 1214, 196
F. 2d 680 (C. A. 2), is not supportive of the Respondent's position.
It is therefore found that the negotiations do not reflect any clear and unequivocal waiver
by the Union of its right to insist upon the denied information.
That the Union chose to make a contract proposal the vehicle for communication of the
request for the data does not seem dispositive , since the issue was not resolved by the
bargaining process. Any other conclusion would mean that the right to the information is
lost unless the employer agrees to supply it. To conclude that the demand is of lesser
viability if communicated in the form of a contract proposal, than if communicated sepa-
rately , would be to exalt form above substance ; and, in addition, likely deprive the employer
of opportunity to arrive at a mutually satisfactory • (and, I assume, mutually binding and
enforceable) adjustment of any differences on it. For if submission of the issue to the
bargaining process is to operate as an automatic abandonment of the statutory right to
insist upon the information and" discharge of the obligation to supply it, unions will simply
seek to exclude the matter from the area of discussion altogether; a result employers will
do well to ponder.
In any event, the matter being one of basic statutory rights and obligations, it is not a
bargaining subject of such character that the Respondent's desire for its waiver may be
adamantly insisted upon , as it was here, as a condition of agreement . For, if, once the
matter is submitted to the bargaining process the employer may refuse to contract unless
the Union abandons its demand, the right to receive and the obligation to supply the Infor-
mation have no statutory substance at all; but are instead merely a license to bargain about
the matter.
There is dispute , unnecessary to resolve , as to whether the Union has made a request for
the data since August 14. Since the Respondent , both during the negotiations and at the hearing,
has made its position crystal clear, any such renewal of application would be futile. But in
any event, the Union's unwithdrawn and unsatisfied earlier requests were at all times before
5 Thus, among other changes, the following paragraph was added to that agreement.
8 The Company recognizes that the Union has filed charges relative to the submis-
sion of wage data with the NLRB and the contract is signed with knowledge that the
Union intends to press those charges
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE COMPANY 653
the Respondent for satisfaction. Cf. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 102 NLRB 627 (request
for data, withdrawn during the course of the negotiations, cannot be made the basis of a
charge of refusal to furnish; and reiteration of the incident in the charge is not a new de-
mand).
It is found that by refusing to supply the Union with information as to the names, classifi-
cation, wage rates, and seniority of employees in the appropriate unit, and notification of
changes in their status, the Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union,
thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection
with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above , have a close , intimate,
and substantial relation to trade , traffic , and commerce among the several States , and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union by refusing it
certain wage data, it will be recommended that, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act,
the Respondent furnish the Union with the following information: (1) The name, classifica-
tion, seniority , and wage rate of each employee in the appropriate unit ; and (2) notification
of any change in the status of such employees.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lodge 1021, International Association of Machinists, AFL, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent employed at its New Britain
plant, exclusive of guards, watchmen, office and clerical employees, rate setters, time
setters , expediters , stock chasers , dispatchers , timekeepers , cafeteria employees , technical
department employees consisting of engineers , draftsmen , designers , detailers, tracers,
blueprint and photostat machine operators , professional employees, salesmen, and all
supervisors as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. At all times since October 28, 1948, the Union has been the exclusive representative
for purposes of collective bargaining of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit,
within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing to provide the Union with information as to (1) the name, classification,
seniority , and wage rate of each employee in the appropriate unit ; and (2) notification of any
change in status of such employees , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
STERLING FURNITURE COMPANY and CHARLES O. BARNES
CARPET, LINOLEUM & SOFT TILE WORKERS, LOCAL NO.
1235 and CHARLES O. BARNES. Cases Nos. 20-CA-350 and
20-CB-109. June 18, 1953
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION, RECOMMENDATION, AND
AMENDED ORDER
On April 27, 1951, the National Labor Relations Board issued
a Decision and Order in these cases,' in which it found that
194 NLRB 32.
105 NLRB No. 88.