Nevada Cement Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 19, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 738 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Nevada Cement Company and United Cement, Lime
and Gypsum Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 445. Cases
20-CA-4936 and 20-CA-5196
March 19, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On December 16, 1969, Trial Examiner Robert L.
Piper issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
and recommended that such allegations be
dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel,
Respondent, and Charging Party filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
The Respondent also filed a brief in answer to the
General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a
three-member panel
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Nevada Cement
Company, Fernley, Nevada, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT L. PIPER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, was heard at Reno, Nevada on September
16, 1969, pursuant to due notice. The consolidated
complaint, which was issued January 28, 1969, on charges
filed April 2 and September 4, 1968,' respectively , alleged
in substance as amended that Nevada Cement Company
(hereinafter called Respondent ) engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
by (1) various specified acts of interference , restraint and
coercion ; and (2 ) refusing to bargain with United Cement,
Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 445 (hereinafter
collectively called the Unions and respectively called the
International and the Local ), on and after March 20
Respondent ' s answer denied the alleged unfair labor
practices At the opening of the hearing the General
Counsel ' s unopposed motion to amend the complaint in
certain respects , including the deletion of paragraph 6(c)
thereof, and Respondent 's corresponding motion to amend
its answer , were granted . The General Counsel and
Respondent filed briefs . Thereafter the General Counsel
filed a motion , opposed by Respondent , to strike certain
portions of Respondent ' s brief, upon the grounds that
such portions referred to matters which were not part of
the record in this proceeding , and were not properly
subject to judicial or official notice . The General
Counsel's motion is hereby granted.'
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following-
'All dates hereinafter refer to 1968 unless otherwise indicated
'The portions of Respondent's brief stricken are the last complete
sentence on p 10, the last three lines on p 30, all of pp 31 and 32, and
the first two lines on p 33, consisting of the Unions' purported lack of
exceptions, the asserted testimony of a witness , asserted arguments in the
Unions: brief to the Trial Examiner , and asserted arguments in the
Unions' brief in support of their exceptions to the Board, all in a prior
proceeding , Case 20-CB- 1751, between the same parties , in which the
Unions were the Respondents (173 NLRB No. 214) Such matters were
not made part of the record in this proceeding and are not properly the
subject of judicial or official notice It is of course well settled that the
Board and its Trial Examiners take official notice of the Board's prior
decisions , including its findings of fact, conclusions and orders , but such
notice cannot properly include everything which was a matter of record in
a prior proceeding , such as arguments, briefs and exceptions or the lack
thereof Respondent's answer to the General Counsel ' s motion incorrectly
states that the Trial Examiner took official notice of the prior record in an
off-the-record discussion The transcript herein (p 24) establishes that
when Respondent requested the Trial Examiner to take official notice of
the record in Case 20-CB- 1751, an off-the-record discussion ensued,
followed by a stipulation , proposed by Respondent and accepted by the
General Counsel (that the subject of supplemental income or a
supplemental or administrative plan or payments of supplemental income
was not an issue in the prior case and no testimony with respect thereto
was received ), in lieu of said request, which the transcript reveals was not
granted Moreover , Section 7 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act
requires that the opposing party be given an opportunity to rebut matters
of which official notice is taken, and patently the General Counsel would
have no such opportunity when such matters are first set forth in a brief
It is well settled that matters which are not part of the regord in a
proceeding should not be set forth in briefs , and that the matters cited are
not appropriate subjects for judicial or official notice With respect to the
cited testimony , the prior decision (fn 4) specifically found that witness not
credible, stating " I do not credit his testimony unless corroborated by
otherwise credited testimony " Respondent does not contend that the
asserted testimony was otherwise corroborated Respondent 's reference to
the Board ' s Rule (Section 102 45(b)), defining what constitutes the record
in a case, while correct is misapplied Clearly the lack of exceptions and
arguments in briefs in a prior proceeding while part of the record are not
properly the subject of judicial or official notice in a subsequent
proceeding Respondent 's contention that the footnotes in the Board's
decisions cited by the General Counsel are dicta because they do not
appear in the reports of the Board's decisions published by private
reporting services is without merit Such footnotes do appear in the
Board's official reports of its decisions
181 NLRB No. 112
NEVADA CEMENT COMPANY 739
FINDINGS OF FACT
L JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent is a Nevada corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cement with its principal office
and place of business located in Fernley, Nevada . During
the past year it sold and shipped products valued in excess
of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Nevada
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The Unions are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
On December 26 the Board issued its Decision and
Order,' corrected February 7, 1969, finding that the
Unions had refused to bargain with Respondent in
violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to sign
the written contract agreed to by the parties on August
29, 1967, and thereafter submitted to the Unions by
Respondent on October 2, 1967, and ordered the Unions
to execute such written contract. The Unions then and
thereafter refused to execute such contract, and on
February 27 and March 11 requested Respondent to
bargain collectively with respect to a Supplemental
Income Plan (hereinafter called SIP), which request
Respondent refused on March 20 because of the prior
agreement.
The issues as framed by the pleadings are: (1) refusal to
bargain on and after March 20 concerning SIP with the
Unions as the exclusive bargaining representative certified
by the Board of Respondent 's employees in an appropriate
unit ; and (2 ) interference, restraint , and coercion
thereafter by offering employees increased wages and
improved fringe benefits if they rejected the Unions as
their collective-bargaining representative
B. Chronology of Events
On July 29, 1964, the parties executed a collective
bargaining agreement running to May 1, 1967, but
providing that on or before July 1, 1965 the Unions by
notice could reopen the contract for the purpose of
negotiating straight time hourly wage rates and two fringe
benefits . As a result of such notice by the Unions, the
parties entered into an amendment to the contract
effective August 1, 1965, providing for changed wage rates
and the addition of a paragraph, number 26, to the
original agreement providing for the payment by
Respondent of SIP at the rate of 5 cents per hour worked
by each employee after August 1, 1965, and 10 cents per
hour for each hour worked after May 1, 1966 , until May
1, 1968. The original contract contained no SIP clause.
Although the SIP clause added to the contract in 1965
provided that Respondent was to make contributions "to
a Supplemental Income Plan to be established pursuant to
Exhibit A" thereof, at the time and in the manner
provided therein , no exhibit A was attached to the
'173 NLRB No. 214.
contract, and although Respondent proposed several such
plans, the parties never agreed upon any plan of
administration or trust to administer the supplemental
income contributions In lieu thereof, Respondent
thereafter made the required contributions to a trust
account in its name at the Security National Bank of
Reno, Nevada for the benefit of the respective employees
On February 23, 1967, the Unions by letter requested
negotiations for a new contract to replace the
collective- bargaining agreement expiring May 1, 1967,
enclosing various proposed amendments and
modifications , but not proposing any alteration or
modification of SIP. At least two of the Unions'
proposals referred to the existing SIP. Thereafter a
number of negotiation meetings ensued without success
On August 14, 1967, the Unions terminated the 1964
collective-bargaining contract with Respondent by letter
dated August 12, 1967, and the following day, August 15,
went on strike
On August 29, 1967, under the aegis of the Federal
Mediation Service, the parties again met to bargain.
Respondent proposed the prior contract with certain
changes, the Unions counterproposed other changes and
after bargaining agreement was reached, as found by the
Board in its prior Decision At the Unions' request
Respondent agreed to draft the written contract and
submit it to the Unions for examination and approval of
language content. That evening the membership of the
Local approved the agreement and the following day,
August 30, 1967, the employees returned to work
Commencing August 30, 1967, Respondent carried out all
the terms of the contract agreed to by the parties,
including the resumption of the payment of SIP into the
trust account On October 2, 1967, Respondent submitted
the written contract to the Unions, which then and
thereafter refused to execute it , although not questioning
its accuracy
The last paragraph of the contract contained the same
SIP provision as contained in the previous contract, as
amended August 1, 1965, again concluding with the
language: "Such Plan and such contributions shall
continue until May 1, 1968." The SIP clause contained no
provision for reopening, alteration or modification. Unlike
the 1964 agreement, which permitted reopening during its
term for certain modifications, the 1967 "Terms of
Agreement" clause provided that the contract should
remain in full force and effect until May 1, 1970, and
thereafter from year to year until either party on or before
March 1 of any year beginning with 1970 gave written
notice to the other of its desire to alter, modify or
terminate same. The parties stipulated that throughout the
contract negotiations in 1967, specifically from February
to October, the parties did not discuss the subject of SIP
On October 23, 1967, Respondent filed charges with the
Board of refusal to bargain by the Unions by refusing to
execute the contract. On January 18, the General Counsel
issued his complaint against the Unions, alleging a refusal
to bargain as so charged. On February 27 and March 11
the Unions by letters requested Respondent to bargain
concerning SIP, enclosing specific proposals. On March
20 Respondent by letter rejected the Unions' request to
bargain about SIP, pointing out that the parties had
reached agreement August 29, 1967, to a
collective- bargaining contract , including SIP , to remain in
full force and effect and not be subject to alteration,
modification or change until May 1, 1970 After
Respondent's letter of March 20 there were no further
communications between the parties. On April 2 the
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unions filed their refusal to bargain charge in this
proceeding against Respondent . On May 1, in accordance
with the terms of the 1967 contract , Respondent
terminated its SIP payments , granted its employees the
May t pay raise, and on May 8 so notified them. On May
7 and 8, hearings in the prior proceeding were held
Respondent admitted and the parties stipulated that
Peter M . Smith , Jr , was Respondent ' s executive vice
president (now president ), and Alton Green , Mel Wells
and Frances Raymond Harris , foremen , were agents of
Respondent and supervisors within the meaning of the
Act. Wells was Respondent 's plant chemist and supervised
approximately three employees in Respondent's
laboratory . Howard L . Carlson was employed under Wells
as a physical tester . During the summer of 1968, the
employees in the laboratory , including Wells, frequently
discussed the Unions and their activities . During June,
July or August , Wells, who had criticized his employees
for taking too much time on coffee breaks, told Carlson
that if the employees dropped the Unions, Wells would be
easier to get along with , their coffee breaks would be
longer , their lunch breaks would not be watched over so
closely, and they could get days off to go hunting during
the hunting season . The record establishes that many of
the employees , including Wells, were avid hunters On
another occasion , Wells told Carlson that Smith and Karl
Cosens, Respondent 's plant manager , had said that if the
employees would drop the Unions, Smith and Cosens
would see that they received at least as good pay as they
had been getting and better working conditions. These
conversations occurred in the presence of Thomas G.
Jackson , another laboratory employee under Wells.
Wells denied that he told Carlson that the employees
would get longer coffee breaks or days off during the
hunting season if they dropped the Unions, pointing out
that he had no authority to make such promises or grant
such benefits However, Wells was not asked and did not
deny telling Carlson that the employees ' lunch breaks
would not be watched over so closely if they dropped the
Unions, and, more significantly , telling Carlson that
Smith and Cosens had said that if the employees dropped
the Unions they would get at least as good wages as they
were getting and better working conditions . Jackson
testified that he, Wells and Carlson frequently discussed
the Unions , but he had never heard Wells tell Carlson that
if the employees dropped the Unions they would get
longer coffee breaks or days off to go hunting . Jackson
admitted asking Wells what benefits the employees would
have if they dropped the Unions and that Wells replied
that Jackson would be better off salaried than in the
Unions. Like Wells, Jackson did not deny Wells'
statement concerning observation of the employees'
luncheon breaks or Wells' statement concerning the
benefits promised by Smith and Cosens, if the employees
would drop the Unions
James T. Mitchell was employed as an overhead crane
operator under the supervision of Harris They discussed
the Unions many times. During the last week in July or
the first week in August, Harris told Mitchell that if the
employees would drop the Unions and form an
independent union of their own , Cosens would probably
meet or give them better wages than the other West Coast
cement plants were paying, or union scale, and better
fringe benefits. Mitchell believed that Respondent ' s wages
were less than union scale or what the other West Coast
cement plants were paying . Harris denied telling Mitchell
that if the employees dropped the Unions they would get
West Coast or union scale wages for overhead crane
operators, adding that he did not know what such West
Coast or union scale of wages was. However, Harris did
not deny telling Mitchell that if the employees would drop
the Unions Cosens would probably meet or better the
West Coast cement plants wages, or union scale, and
grant them better fringe benefits, or deny making any
statement concerning West Coast wages generally, as
distinguished from those of crane operators. On
cross-examination, Harris admitted that he had heard that
Respondent's wages were less than those paid by the other
cement companies on the West Coast. Harris did testify
that Cosens had never authorized him to discuss with
Mitchell the wages of crane operators or rejecting the
Unions. I credit Mitchell.
Harry Hubred, who was employed by Respondent as a
truckdriver under the supervision of Green, testified that
one evening in the latter part of July or early August
Green and his wife came to Hubred's home to visit him
and his family. The record establishes that Green and
Hubred were friends and had previously exchanged such
social visits. Green brought along a six-pack of cold beer
and the men drank a beer while the couples visited.
During the course of their conversation, the Unions were
discussed. Hubred testified that Green asked him if he was
going to join the strike if the employees struck because of
SIP. Hubred testified that the subject was no secret,
having been the subject of general discussion in the plant
for several weeks, and that he replied that he would join
the employees if they struck According to Hubred, Green
then said that if the employees would drop the Unions
Cosens would perhaps give them a substantial raise and
probably some annual picnics like they used to have, in
exchange for SIP.
Green testified that he had known Hubred since 1954
and that the family visit was purely social, as had been
their custom in the past. Green admitted that they
discussed the Unions but denied making the statement
concerning promises by Cosens attributed to him by
Hubred. Green also denied any discussion with Hubred
concerning wage increases. Both Hubred and Green had
been employed at Respondent's plant since it opened, and
the record establishes that Respondent had never had an
annual or any other kind of picnic I credit Green.
On December 26 the Board found that the written
contract submitted by Respondent October 2, 1967, was in
fact the agreement of the parties entered into August 29,
1967, stating: "The written contract embodies the terms of
the contract arrived at on August 29." The Board
thereupon ordered the Unions to sign the written contract
submitted by Respondent, which the Unions have failed to
do to the date of this proceeding.
C. Refusal to Bargain
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleged, Respondent admitted, and I find
the following to be a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees,
warehousemen, physical testers, statisticians and analysts
of Respondent at its Fernley, Nevada, operations,
excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
NEVADA CEMENT COMPANY 741
2 The majority designation
The complaint alleged, Respondent admitted, and I find
that the Unions at all relevant times herein have been the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
abovefound appropriate unit by virtue of a Board
certification.
3. The alleged refusal to bargain
The complaint alleged that on and after March 20,
Respondent refused to meet and bargain with the Unions
with respect to SIP. Admittedly, Respondent then and
thereafter refused to bargain with the Unions concerning
SIP because it had a contract, including a specific SIP
clause, agreed to by the parties, which the Unions had
refused to sign. Although the Board found that the written
contract submitted by Respondent to the Unions,
containing a specific clause covering SIP and specifically
providing that the contract should remain in full force and
effect and could not be altered, modified or terminated
before 1970, embodied the terms of the agreement arrived
at by the parties, nevertheless the General Counsel
contends that the Unions have not "waived" their right to
negotiate and bargain about SIP, because said contract
provides that "such Plan and such contributions shall
continue until May 1, 1968."
The General Counsel argues that parties to a contract
may not be found to have waived the right to bargain
concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining except upon
clear and unmistakable evidence thereof, which is of
course a well established principle. However, the principle
and decisions relied upon by the General Counsel are
inapposite, inasmuch as they stand for the proposition
that, even where parties negotiate with respect to a
statutory bargaining right, subsequent silence in the
contract does not constitute a waiver thereof. The
decisions relied upon by the General Counsel concern such
silence in the contract ' Here the contract found by the
Board to have been the actual agreement of the parties
specifically included SIP and specifically provided that the
contract could not be reopened until 1970. Patently
inclusion of the specific subject matter in the contract
constitutes the most clear and unmistakable evidence
possible, and parties should not be permitted, contrary to
the specific provisions of their contracts, to insist upon
bargaining about a subject matter specifically included
therein. Any other conclusion would render such contracts
meaningless Even where a contract contains a
compromise or substitute provision in lieu of the
particular matter requested, the Board has held that such
constitutes a waiver of the right to bargain about such
subject matter
The parties stipulated that during the 1967 negotiations
for the contract ultimately agreed to they did not discuss
the subject of SIP. The parties further stipulated that in
the prior proceeding before the Board, resulting in the
finding that the written contract submitted by Respondent
was the actual agreement of the parties, the question of
SIP was never raised as an issue nor was any testimony
offered with respect thereto. Thus the record in the prior
proceeding establishes that the Unions did not contend
that the written contract submitted by Respondent was
not the agreement of the parties because of its inclusion of
'Timken Roller Bearing Co v N L R B, 325 F 2d 746 (C A 6), and
NLRB v The Item Company, 220 F 2d 956 (C.A 5)
'Wrought Washer Mfg Co, 171 NLRB No 85
SIP, including the specific provision that it should
continue until May 1, 1968. Be that as it may, the Board
in the prior proceeding specifically found that the written
contract submitted by Respondent embodied the terms of
the agreement arrived at between the parties, that no
representative of the Unions had ever questioned the
wording or language of such written contract, and that the
Unions had violated the Act by refusing to sign such
written contract. Clearly an employer cannot be found
guilty of refusing to bargain about a subject matter
specifically covered by a contract found to be the current
agreement of the parties by the Board, which specifically
provides that it cannot be reopened until 1970. Section
8(d) of the Act specifically provides that "where there is
in effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract , unless
the party desiring such termination or modification - .. .
continues in full force and effect, . . . all terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of 60 days
after such notice or until the expiration date of such
contract, whichever occurs later "
After the agreement of August 29, 1967, Respondent
resumed its contributions to SIP and lived up to all of the
terms of that contract, including the subsequent wage
increase, although the Unions never signed the contract.
The contract agreed to provided for a wage increase for
the employees on May 1, 1968 greater than the amount of
the SIP contributions terminating that date. The General
Counsel's contentions with respect to the significance of
the 1964 contract and its amendment incorporating SIP in
1965 are immaterial, inasmuch as the Board found that
the written contract of 1967 in fact represented the
agreement between the parties. Moreover, prior to the
1967 agreement, the Unions had specifically terminated
the 1964 contract by written notice to Respondent
effective August 12. In effect the General Counsel's
position seems to be that the Unions did not know what
they were doing in 1967, contrary to the specific findings
of the Board I am satisfied and find that the General
Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proving that
Respondent refused to bargain with the Unions in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
D. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
The complaint as amended alleged that on various
dates in July and August Respondent offered employees
increased wages and improved fringe benefits if they
rejected the Unions as their collective bargaining
representative. As hereinabove found, it was undenied that
during the summer of 1968 Wells told Carlson that if the
employees would drop the Unions their luncheon breaks
would not be so closely observed and that Smith and
Cosens had said that if the employees dropped the Unions
they would get at least as good wages as they were getting
and better working conditions During late July or early
August, Harris told Mitchell that if the employees would
drop the Unions and form an independent union of their
own, Cosens would probably meet or give them better
wages than the other West Coast cement companies, or
union scale, and better fringe benefits A preponderance of
the reliable, credible and substantial evidence in the entire
record convinces me, and I find, that by such statements
Respondent offered its employees increased wages and
improved fringe benefits if they would reject the Unions as
their collective-bargain ing representative, thereby
interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent's
contention that Wells and Harris lacked authority to
make such statements or promises is without merit. As
hereinabove found, I credited Green and accordingly
conclude that he did not tell Hubred that if the employees
dropped the Unions Cosens would perhaps give them a
substantial raise and probably some annual picnics in
exchange for SIP, and that, by the conversation between
Green and Hubred, Respondent did not, as alleged in the
complaint, offer its employees increased wages or
improved fringe benefits if they rejected the Unions, in
violation of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce,
and the Unions are labor organizations , within the
meaning of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not , as alleged in the complaint,
refused to bargain with the Unions in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action of the
type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as
provided in the Recommended Order below, which I find
necessary to remedy and to remove the effects of the
unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Nevada Cement Company, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Promising or offering its employees increased wages
or improved fringe benefits in exchange for dropping or
rejecting their collective-bargaining representative.
(b) In ' any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or ceorcing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Fernley, Nevada, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.'
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegation in the
complaint of refusal to bargain be and hereby is
dismissed.
'In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted
pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 20, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board an agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT promise or offer our employees
increased wages or improved fringe benefits in exchange
for dropping or rejecting their collective-bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain or coerce our employees in the exercise of
any of the rights guaranteed them by the National
Labor Relations Act.
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the
United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers,
International Union, AFL-CIO, its Local Union No. 445,
or any other labor organization.
NEVADA CEMENT
COMPANY '
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office,
13050 Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box
'36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone
556-0335