Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 27, 1967

162 N.L.R.B. 1246 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

1246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the right ,of the said Rinehart to engage , in activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other aid and protection.
4. By such interference and by, such coercion and restraint of other employees,
with the purpose of interfering with their rights to self-organization , to form, join,
or assist - labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Neuhoff Bros . Packers , Inc. and United Packinghouse , Food and
Allied Workers , AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-2677. January 27,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 7, 1966, Trial Examiner Paul E. Weil issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam-
iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner 's Recommended Order.]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed May 11, 1966 , by United Packinghouse , Food and Allied
Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union , against Neuhoff Bros. Packers
Inc., hereinafter called Respondent , and a complaint issued pursuant thereto by the
Regional Director for Region 16, Ft. Worth , Texas, on June 28 , 1966 , a hearing
was duly conducted ' before Trial Examiner Paul E . Weil, on August 25, 1966, at
which all parties were represented . The complaint alleges that Respondent dis-
charged Loyd E. Lewis, an employee, on .or about April 27, 1966, in violation of
Section 8 ( a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act . Respondent 's duly filed 'answer ' denied the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices.
162 NLRB No: 120.
NEUHOFF BROS. PACKERS 1247
Upon the entire record, from my observation of the witnesses, and in considera-
tion of the briefs filed after the hearing by the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Texas corporation, operates a meatpacking business in Dallas,
Texas, from which it annually ships meat products valued in excess of $50,000,
directly to points outside the State of Texas and at which it annually receives goods
valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of Texas.
Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO , is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The only issue before me is whether Loyd Lewis was discharged because of his
union activities and in order to discourage union activities among Respondent's
employees or whether he was discharged for breach of rules of the Employer for-
bidding him to be present in parts of the plant, other than those to which he was
assigned and further rules against unauthorized possession of Respondent's meat
products.
A. Background
The Union commenced organizing employees of Respondent on or about Febru-
ary 1, 1964. Respondent opposed the union organization vigorously. After a hearing
held in July 1964, an election was ordered by the Regional Director and duly con-
ducted, subsequently set aside, and a second election held on February 18, 1965,
which resulted in certification of the Union as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive. In the meantime, on charges filed in June 1964, in Case 16-CA-2073 (151
NLRB 916), unfair labor practices consisting of discrimination against an employee
by discharge and threatening, interrogating, and indicating to employees that their
union activities are under surveillance were found by the Board. Thereafter, addi-
tional charges I were filed by the Union, and, pursuant to a consolidated complaint,
the Board found additional violations by Respondent consisting of a discriminatory
layoff and discharge of an employee, and additional interference, restraint, and
coercion by the threat of Henry Neuhoff, Jr., an officer of Respondent, that strin-
gent rules would be applied and the exhortation of employees to interfere with fel-
low employees' right to engage in protective, concerted activities.
A bargaining order of the Board resulted from a third charge and has been
enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
At the opening of the hearing herein, Respondent vigorously objected to the inter-
jection of the previous cases into the instant case "obviously for setting the tenor
that here is a bad actor who had violated the Act, therefore, he's violated the Act
here before you have heard one word of testimony."
B. The discriminatee
General Counsel contends that Loyd Lewis was discharged because of his union
activities. The record reveals that Loyd Lewis was employed in Respondent's curing
department, where he trimmed and graded bacon, trimmed hams, cured bacon,
washed tubs, and did other work in the department. He had been regularly em-
ployed from May 19, 1960, to April 27, 1966, on which day he was discharged.2
Loyd Lewis was one of approximately 49 persons whom the employer had been
notified were union shop stewards.
Loyd Lewis testified that on the evening of April 25,3 the crew in which he was
working worked overtime, and he and another employee, Vernell Moore, were sent
1 Cases 16-CA-2191 and 16-CA-2244 (159 NLRB 1710).
2 Loyd's brother, Allen Ray Lewis, presently employed by the Charging Union, had
formerly been employed by the Respondent and discharged under circumstances which the
Board has found to be discriminatory.
3 All dates hereinafter are in the year 1966 unless otherwise stated.
1248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on a late break about 6:15 p.m. Breaks were limited to 10 minutes and there was
no clock in the department in which Moore and Lewis were employed. As they
came by the "bacon room" Lewis stepped inside about 15 feet in order to see a
clock on the wall to ascertain when they were due back at work. As he came out of
the bacon room, he met Jack Hynes, night superintendent of the plant, who asked
him what business he had in the bacon room. Lewis told Hynes that he had stopped
to see what time it was. Hynes said "you sure you didn't stop to get some meat."
Lewis answered, "yes, I am sure." Hynes said, "well you know you could get in
trouble like that" and continued down the hall.
After the break, Lewis returned to work and worked another hour and 15 min-
utes and went home.
The next day, April 26, Lewis worked all day until 4 o'clock at which time he
was called to a part of the room in which Night Superintendent Hynes, and Lewis'
foreman, Esser, were standing. Esser stated that Hynes said that he had caught
Lewis coming out of the bacon room with a hand full of luncheon meat .4 Lewis
did not deny having entered the bacon room, but told Esser that he did not have
any meat. Esser then took him to his office where he remained for about 15 min-
utes, after which Esser escorted Lewis to the office of Leonard Hamzy, the secretary-
treasurer of the Employer. Hamzy told Lewis that he had been reported as having
been in the bacon room, where he had no right to be, and having stolen some meat.
Lewis admitted again that he had been in the bacon room but denied stealing any
meat. Hamzy told Lewis to go home, it then being quitting time, and to see him in
the morning. The following morning, a similar conversation took place with Hamzy
suggesting that Lewis had taken a hand full of meat and Lewis denying so. Hamzy
then said ". . . this is something I can't condone regardless of a man's record" and
discharged Lewis.
Hynes stated that he was going by the door of the bacon room, about 6:15 on
April 25, when Lewis came out with a hand full of luncheon meat. He told Lewis
to put the luncheon meat back and told him he could be discharged for that. Hynes
states that he did not recognize Lewis but knew that he was not part of his night
crew and therefore must have been working in the curing room. The following day,
Hynes states, he went to Henry Esser and told him that he had found one of his
men coming out of the bacon room with a hand full of luncheon meat. Esser asked
him to identify the man and Hynes described him. Shortly thereafter Lewis entered
and Hynes identified Lewis as the man he had seen the night before. Esser called
Lewis over and confronted him with Hynes' version of the story. From that point
on there is no significant difference in the two stories .5
There is no question that Respondent has a rule against employees being in
departments other than that in which they are employed and there is no question
that the employer has a rule that employees may not possess company products
without authorization.
Respondent produced two documents which purport to be notices of reprimands
given to Lewis on prior occasions when he was in the wrong part of the plant. One
of those, dated February 22, 1966, indicates that Lewis was reprimanded for "going
through the smoke meat and offal department at noon. Instructions are not to go
through the departments etc." The second, dated February 24, states that Lewis was
reprimanded for "sitting in shipping office at 6:48 a.m.6 He has been told that the
shipping office is off limits to employees." Both reprimands were signed by Foreman
Esser. On cross-examination, however, it appeared that Esser had no present recol-
lection of talking to Lewis about the subject of the reprimands, and Lewis denied
having being reprimanded on those occasions. The Employer also furnished a repri-
mand notice dated April 25, 6 p.m., stating that Lewis "was reprimanded for:
caught this man coming out of sliced bacon department with a hand full of sliced
luncheon meat," signed by Hynes. Hynes testified that he made the reprimand slip
out on April 25, but that he signed it on the 26th. He testified that he made it out
* The bacon room is also used for slicing and packing luncheon meats.
On both occasions when Lewis was interviewed in the office of Hamzy, the interviews
were electronically recorded, without Lewis' knowledge. Respondent contends in his
brief ". . . all of Lewis' testimony with respect to the occurrence which brought about
his discharge is so incredible as to be entirely unworthy of belief" I have carefully com-
pared Lewis' testimony regarding his meetings with Hamzy with a transcript of the
recording and except that he attributed one or two statements to the wrong meeting, com-
parison reveals that Lewis had a remarkable recollection of the statements made by each
of the participants in the meetings, and truthfully reported them.
6 Starting time was 7 a.m.
NEUHOFF BROS. PACKERS 1249
one day and signed it on another because he did not know the man's name, so that
he filled out all of the document except the name of the employee and his signature
on the 25th; he entered the latter on the 26th, after he ascertained Lewis' name.
It does not appear that the giving of reprimands is in any way unusual. Hamzy
testified that he has almost daily conversations with foremen regarding reprimands
and "I wouldn't say every foreman brings some everyday, but some foremen bring
some everyday, yes, sir." Hamzy also testified that concurrent with the union organi-
zation an ironclad policy was adopted by Neuhoff, that all discharges were to be
made by him or by one of the Neuhoffs.
Analysis and Conclusions
The real issue in this case, is whether Lewis was discharged because of his union
activities as the General Counsel claims, or because of his breach of the Employer's
rules as claimed by the Respondent. A subsidiary issue is presented by the denial of
Lewis that he had any unauthorized meat in his possession, and by the testimony of
Hynes that Lewis had several slices of luncheon meat which he had taken from the
bacon room. With regard to the latter issue, the evidence is in sharp conflict. The
General Counsel contends that Hynes' story is incredible, pointing out that: (1)
it appears improbable that any sliced luncheon meat would have been in the bacon
room at the time of the occurrence, (2) if, in fact, the Respondent had actually
caught the dischargee stealing he would have been discharged instantly rather than
2 days later, (3) the Employer made the same claim, that the dischargee stole meat
from the Respondent, before the Texas Employment Commission which, after an
independent investigation,7 found only that the dischargee was discharged for violat-
ing a company rule by entering another department without proper permission, and
made no mention of Respondent's claim that he was in part discharged for the
unauthorized possession of meat, and (4) Lewis credibly was demonstrated by com-
parison of his version of the discharge conference with Respondent's tape recording.
Respondent on the other hand argues that Lewis' story is incredible, relying on
the fact that in his discharge interview, after denying that he stole any meat, in
answer to Hamzy's question, "Well, did you have it in your hand?", Lewis answered,
"I have nothing to say." Respondent concludes "certainly such conduct on the part
of. Lewis in the presence of Hynes demonstrates that he did have the lunch meat in
his hand exactly as Hynes had reported."
Foreman Esser testified that when he talked to Lewis, he said "I understand you
were caught yesterday coming out of the slice lunch meat room with some meat in
your hand", and Lewis answered, "I only had three pieces." This testimony was cor-
roborated by Night Superintendent Hynes who was present at the time. Lewis denies
having made that statement attributed to him and testified that he told Esser that he
did not deny coming out of the bacon room but that he did not have any meat.
The General Counsel's point about the improbability of a box of meat being in
the slicing room 3 hours after the production line had quit for the day, and during
the time that the room was being cleansed with steam or hot running water, is very
appealing. However, there is no contradiction to the evidence of Hynes that a box
of meat was in fact and is normally left in that room until 1, 2, or 3 hours after
the end of the shift. Lewis was not asked whether such a box was there. It is no
part of my function, as I conceive it, to concern myself with the practices of the
Employer with regard to the sliced meat. That the practice might endanger the qual-
ity of the sliced meat in the box is not evidence that it is not followed. In the
absence of any attempt by General Counsel to controvert Hynes' testimony I can
draw no inference from Respondent's failure to call corroborating witnesses .8
With respect to General Counsel's contention concerning the Texas Employment
Commission investigation, in the absence of evidence as to the nature of the investi-
gation and the nature of the decisional process of the Commission, I deem its find-
ing to be of slight weight.
With respect to the discharge interview, I am of the opinion that Respondent's
point is well taken. Lewis impressed me as an articulate and fluent speaker. In the
two interviews, he was accused of taking luncheon meat. In his first interview, he
7 The parties stipulated that the Texas Employment Commission makes an independent
investigation of the facts
8 It appears that at least two employees were in the room ; in addition another employee
who was alleged to have the function of removing the box to a cooler when he cleans up
the sausage side of the room must have been available to either party.
264-047-67-vol. 162-80
1250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
denied that he stole any meat . This of course is consistent with the story of Hynes
that he had meat in his hand which Hynes made him put back into the box. But
when he was asked whether he had it in his hand , he said "I have nothing to say."
When Hamzy said, "Jack says you had it in your hand. I don 't think Jack would
make it up , do you?", Lewis answered , "I can 't say, I don 't have nothing to say, I
didn't steal any meat ." Pressed again whether he wanted to tell Hamzy "anything at
all about it ," Lewis again repeated , "I don 't have nothing to say." In the second
interview Hamzy said "you say you weren 't stealing it and I'm not accusing you of
stealing it but you didn 't have any business up there in that department and you
certainly didn ' t have business taking the lunch meat." Lewis answered , "like I said,
I didn't take any meat . I don't have anything else to say ." Later in the same inter-
view, Hamzy said , "and you saw this lunch meat there and took some . Are you
denying you took it?" Lewis answered , "I'm denying that I took any meat, yes."
Esser said "he told me that he had 3 slices and I told him 1 slice was too many to
take." Hamzy then said "got anything to say to that?" Lewis made no answer.
I agree with Respondent that if Lewis had in fact not picked up any luncheon
meat, he was completely capable, and called upon , to answer the repeated questions
of Hamzy by some more definitive statement than he made. His failure to deny
picking up the meat casts a shadow on his denial that the circumstances were as
Hynes testified . I cannot find that the General Counsel has proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Lewis did not pick up several slices of luncheon meat,
which he was forced by Hynes to put back.
This finding , however, is not the whole story and is not dispositive of the issue
with which we are here faced. Assuming that, in fact, Lewis was guilty of two infrac
tions rather than of the one which he has admitted , the question remains, is this
the reason he was discharged? Respondent asserts that the General Counsel would
have me substitute my judgment for that of the Respondent with respect to whether
or not Lewis should have been discharged , but this is a misstatement of the issue.
My function is not to determine whether Respondent could or should have dis-
charged Lewis for the infractions , but whether in fact Respondent did discharge
Lewis for the infractions , as Respondent asserts. The issue is one of motivation.
There is no legal doubt that Respondent could have discharged Lewis for either or
both infractions or for no reason whatsoever , but if any part of Respondent 's motive
was to retaliate against Lewis for his union activities , which were extensive and
which at least in part were known to Respondent , or for the purpose of discourag-
ing union activities and membership of its employees , then whether or not Respond-
ent could have discharged Lewis for the infractions , it is guilty of an unfair labor
practice.
The determination of motivation is never a simple matter . Respondent 's official,
Hamzy, testified that he discharged Lewis for unauthorized possession of some
luncheon meat and for being in a department where he was not authorized to be .9
As against this more or less direct testimony of Hamzy, the General Counsel is, of
course, unable to produce direct controversion . Since motive is essentially a subjec-
tive thing it is seldom demonstrable by direct evidence. If substantial evidence
reveals that the circumstances surrounding the discharge present a picture against
which the discharge , for the avowed reasons, appears abnormal , the inference may
fairly be drawn that the avowed reasons are not the true, or at least not the sole,
reasons for the discharge . To put it another way, if the record reveals that normally
an employee charged with infractions such as these would not be discharged, or
would have been handled differently , we must seek further for the motivation for
the discharge.
There is no question that Lewis was guilty of being in the wrong department.
This he admits and gives a perfectly rational explanation . And it is clear that this
is a common, in fact daily , infraction at the Respondent 's plant. Yet Hamzy, the
only representative of the Employer authorized to effect a discharge , testified that
he could recall no incident of a man having been discharged for being in the wrong
department . Hamzy also testified that he has never fired a man for eating luncheon
meat on the job and was able to think of only two occasions when he had dis-
Hamzy did not state specifically that the two reasons he gave were the only reasons.
He was not asked . His testimony took the following form :
Q. (By Mr. PENaICE .) I take it from your statement that you discharged him for
the two reasons that you have named, is that correct?
A. [No audible response.]
Q. Mr. Rhea : Did he answer that?
A. The WITNESS. Yes.
NEUHOFF BROS. PACKERS 1251
charged employees for converting the Company's product. On one of these occa-
sions an employee was caught taking about 80 pounds of meat "over the fence" and
on the other, an employee was packing a box with sausage and a beef tongue and,
upon being challenged, announced that he did not trust the shipping department and
he would make up his own order, whereupon he was discharged. Hamzy testified
that employees have been discharged for cooking meat in the knife sterilizing box
or in the lard cooking tank but he was apparently unable to give any instance where
an infraction of the type with which Lewis was charged resulted in a discharge.
It thus appears that in the past neither of the infractions with which Lewis was
charged were considered to warrant the extreme penalty of discharge. Further sup-
port of this conclusion is to be found in the actions of Night Supervisor Hynes.
Although Hynes testified that he caught Lewis at 6:10 or 6:15 in the evening, he
testified that he did not know Lewis and that although he worked at least until 11
o'clock that night and Lewis worked until 7 or 7:30, he made no attempt to find
out who Lewis was. It would appear normal that if he had deemed Lewis' infraction
to be a major one he would have asked him his name. Failing that, it appears
improbable that he would have waited until the next night to identify the culprit
when he very easily at any time could have gone down to the curing room where he
knew Lewis must be working and identified him there. His testimony that he filled
out a reprimand slip with regard to the infraction without signing it and without
putting Lewis' name on it and then, the next night, signed and put Lewis' name on
it does not ring true.
It is my considered opinion that Hynes gave no further thought to the incident
until he happened to mention it to Foreman Esser, the following night. When Esser
identified the culprit as Lewis, the shop steward, the incident immediately took on
proportions that Hynes had not theretofore considered.
No explanation is provided by Respondent for the fact that infractions, which
in no other case had been deemed to require the discharge of an employee, in the
instant case required the immediate discharge of Lewis. I am convinced by the cir-
cumstances herein that Respondent seized upon Lewis' insignificant derelictions to
rid itself of a most active union supporter. In view of the Respondent's well-known
union animus which in the past led it to an equally pretextual discharge of Lewis'
brother,1e 1 am convinced that Lewis was discharged because of his union activi-
ties and accordingly that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of
the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent as set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. By discharging Loyd Lewis for discriminatory reasons Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
10 While the conduct related in the Board's decisions in prior cases as set forth above
may not serve as a basis of any finding of unfair labor practices, they can properly be
considered to explain ambiguous and equivocal conduct and may be used to supply the real
reason for alleged unlawful actions occurring within the 10(b) period. See Tennessee
Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Division, 146 NLRB 165, 172; Local Lodge No. 1424, 1AM
(Bryan Manufacturing Company) v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411, 416, 417. The Board has
heretofore found animus clearly established by prior unfair labor practices committed by
employers. See Southwire Company, 159 NLRB 394; Tennessee Packers, Inc., supra;
Editorial "El Impartial" Inc., 99 NLRB 8.
1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has discriminated against Loyd Lewis, its
employee, by discharging him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall
recommend that Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum
of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages from the date of the
discrimination to the date of reinstatement less any net earnings during such period,
in accordance with the formula prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, together with interest on that sum, such interest to be computed in
accordance with the formula prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings and conclusions of law and upon the entire
record in the case, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees or discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment because they have engaged
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Loyd Lewis immediate and full reinstatement to his former or sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Loyd Lewis whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason
of the discrimination against him in the manner and in accordance with the
methods referred to in the action of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Notify Loyd Lewis if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Post at its plant in Dallas, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 11 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 16, after being duly signed by the Company's representative, shall be
posted by the Company immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days of
the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.12
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order," will be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall
be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
COREY BROTHERS, INC. 1253
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge employees or discriminate in regard to their hire,
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment because they
have engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form, join, or
assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from
any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer to Loyd Lewis immediate and full reinstatement to his for-
mer or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority and
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make whole Loyd Lewis for any loss he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him.
NEUHOFF BROS. PACKERS INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Room
8A24, Federal Office Building , 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth , Texas 76102, Tele-
phone 334-2931.
Corey Brothers , Inc. and Chauffeurs , Teamsters & Helpers Local
Union No. 175, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, Petitioner . Case 9-RC-6648. January 27, 1967
DECISION AND DIRECTION
Pursuant to an order directing hearing in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, issued by the National Labor Relations Board on June 29,
1966,1 the Regional Director for Region 9 issued a notice of hearing
on challenged ballots. The hearing was held on August 4, 1966,
before Hearing Officer Jack V. Baker, duly designated for that pur-
pose.= The Employer and the Petitioner were represented by coun-
1 Not published in NLRB volumes.
The tally of ballots showed that there were approximately 14 eligible voters, and that
17 ballots were cast, of which 7 were for , and 5 against , the Petitioner , and 5 were
challenged . In the absence of exceptions , the Board adopted the Regional Director's recom-
mendation that the challenges to the ballots of Opie Schoolcraft and James Thomas be
sustained . The Board further ordered that a hearing be held for the purpose of receiving
evidence to resolve the credibility questions involved in the challenges to the ballots of
Peter Biagi and Thomas Bardwell , and to resolve the question of Raymond Miller's em-
ployment status at the time of the election.
162 NLRB No. 115.