National Steel Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 747 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

NATIONAL STEEL CORP. 747
National Steel Corporation and United Steel Workers
of America, AFL–CIO, Local 67 and United
Steel Workers of America, AFL–CIO, Local 30.
Cases 14–CA–25957–1 and 14–CA–25957–2
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On November 13, 2000, Administrative Law Judge
Arthur J. Amchan issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain with Locals 67 and
30 (the Unions) over the use of hidden surveillance cam-
eras and by failing to seek an accommodation with the
Unions over its confidentiality concerns about the Un-
ions’ request for information about the cameras. We
agree.
Beginning in 1987, the Respondent periodically has
used hidden cameras to investigate specific cases of sus-
pected theft or other instances of wrongdoing. One such
investigation occurred in February 1999, when the Re-
spondent installed a camera in a file cabinet in Process
Manager Mike Edgar’s office in an attempt to discover
who was using the office at night when Edgar was not at
work. The Respondent eventually identified employee
Ronnie Williams, a member of Local 67, as the individ-
ual using the office. After determining that Williams had
used Edgar’s telephone to make numerous personal long-
distance calls, the Respondent discharged him. Local 67
subsequently filed a grievance over the termination.
As a result of his participation in the arbitration of
Williams’ grievance, Local 67 President Donald Ogle
became aware of the Board’s decision in Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997), in which the
Board held that the use of hidden surveillance cameras
by an employer is a mandatory subject of bargaining.1
Consequently, at a steering committee meeting on Janu-
ary 5, 2000,2 Ogle presented the Respondent with a copy
of the Colgate-Palmolive decision, asked the Respondent
for information regarding hidden surveillance cameras,
and stated that the Respondent needed to talk to “the Un-
ion” before it installed additional cameras. Five days
later, Ogle followed up on his request in a letter to the
Respondent. He advised the Respondent that “the use of
hidden surveillance cameras has been deemed by the
National Labor Relations Board as a mandatory subject
of bargaining and the Union has not waived its right to
bargain over the subject.” In addition, the letter requested
“all information concerning any existing hidden surveil-
lance cameras that our members are subjected to that
exist in any and all areas” of the Respondent’s property.3

1 Ogle was unaware of the Respondent’s use of the surveillance
cameras prior to the discharge of Williams.
2 All dates hereafter are in 2000 unless otherwise noted.
Approximately 1 month later, by letter dated February
28, the Respondent replied to the information request.
The letter stated that the Respondent had reviewed “your
recent request that we provide you with the location of
hidden surveillance cameras,” that “disclosing the loca-
tion of this equipment would defeat its purpose,” and that
“the Company does not believe that the Union is entitled
to this information.” On March 6, Local 67 filed charges
based upon the Respondent’s refusal to bargain over or
provide information about the surveillance cameras.
The judge found, and we agree, that under Colgate-
Palmolive the Respondent has a duty to bargain with the
Unions over the use of the cameras, and that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refus-
ing to do so in response to the Unions’ request.4 In Col-
gate-Palmolive, the Board determined that the em-
ployer’s use of hidden surveillance cameras to investi-
gate workplace theft and employee misconduct was a
mandatory subject of bargaining because the “installation
of surveillance cameras is both germane to the working
environment and outside the scope of managerial deci-
sions lying at the core of entrepreneurial control.” 323
NLRB at 515. Although the Respondent argues that the
facts in this case require a different result than in Col-
gate-Palmolive, we agree with the judge that Colgate-
Palmolive is not distinguishable in any material respect.
Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s conclusion that the
Respondent’s refusal to bargain over the cameras was
unlawful.
We also agree with the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by its general
3 In addition to Ogle, the letter was signed by representatives of five
other unions that represented the Respondent’s employees, including
Local 30.
4 We agree with the judge’s finding that the Unions requested the
Respondent to bargain over the use of hidden cameras. In this regard,
we rely on both Ogle’s request at the January 5 meeting and his January
10 letter. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we find that the Re-
spondent’s February 28 letter refusing to provide any information re-
garding the location of hidden cameras was effectively a refusal to
bargain.
335 NLRB No. 60
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 748
refusal to provide the Unions with information pertaining
to existing hidden surveillance cameras, and by refusing
to bargain for an accommodation of the Unions’ informa-
tion request that pertained specifically to the location of
hidden cameras and the confidentiality concerns raised
by the Respondent as to that issue. With respect to the
confidentiality claim, it is well established that an em-
ployer may not avoid its obligation to provide a union
with requested information that is relevant to bargaining
simply by asserting a confidentiality interest in the in-
formation. Rather, the employer has the burden to seek
an accommodation that will meet the needs of both par-
ties. Metropolitan Edison Co., 330 NLRB 107 (1999);
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104,
1105–1106 (1991) (and cases cited therein). Thus, upon
informing the Unions of its confidentiality concerns, the
Respondent had an obligation to come forward with an
offer of accommodation.
Our dissenting colleague would find that the Respon-
dent satisfied its legal obligations under Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act by simply asserting its confidentiality con-
cerns about the location of the cameras. We disagree.
First, our colleague’s position is clearly contrary to the
Board precedent cited above. In effect, our colleague
would reverse that precedent and shift any burden to seek
an accommodation from the Respondent to the Unions.
Contrary to our colleague, we adhere to precedent.
Second, the Unions’ information request was not limited
to the location of the cameras. As indicated above, the
Unions sought “all information” concerning existing hid-
den cameras. Such information could include a variety of
information other than location, such as whether any cam-
eras were currently being used, how many such cameras
were being used, the types of cameras involved, etc.
Our colleague acknowledges that the Unions’ request
was not limited to information about location, but faults
the Unions for failing to say what other information they
sought and argues that the Respondent’s reply was suffi-
cient “to put the ball back in the Unions’ court.” Here
again, however, our colleague turns Board law on its
head. “It is well established that an employer may not
simply refuse to comply with an ambiguous or overbroad
information request, but must request clarification and/or
comply with the request to the extent it encompasses
necessary and relevant information.” Keauhou Beach
Hotel, 298 NLRB 702 (1990).
Here, the Respondent did neither. Notwithstanding
that the Unions requested “all information” concerning
existing hidden cameras, the Respondent’s only answer
was to deny information about the cameras’ location. It
provided no information at all about existing hidden
cameras and it sought no clarification about what other
kind of information the Unions were seeking. Contrary
to our colleague, therefore, we find that the Respondent’s
response was insufficient.
Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s findings that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
and adopt his recommended Order.5
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, National Steel Corporation,
Granite City, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns shall take the action set forth in the Order.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting.
I do not agree that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5). My colleagues find that the Respondent refused to
bargain about surveillance cameras. I disagree. Since
1987, the Respondent has had a system of hidden surveil-
lance cameras. On January 5, 2000, Local 67 President
Donald Ogle told the Respondent that it should talk to the
Union before it installed additional cameras. There is no
evidence the Respondent thereafter installed additional
cameras. Thus, there has been no refusal to bargain.
My colleagues also find that the Respondent unlaw-
fully refused to supply information about the cameras.
Again, I disagree. The system was designed to assist the
Respondent in the investigation of suspected theft, van-
dalism, and other types of misconduct. The Unions
made a nonspecific request for “all information” con-
cerning such cameras. The Respondent replied that the
disclosure of the location of the hidden cameras would
defeat their purpose.
My colleagues find that this reply was unlawful. In
my view, it was an appropriate response. The Respon-
dent simply noted the obvious—that disclosure of the
location of the hidden cameras would defeat their pur-
pose. The ball was then back in the Unions’ court. If the
Unions had a way to reconcile their desire for the infor-
mation and the Respondent’s legitimate interests, they
could have suggested same. They did not do so. In these
circumstances, I would not find that the Respondent vio-
lated the Act.

5 In adopting the judge’s order requiring the Respondent to bargain
with the Unions for an agreement that accommodates the Unions’ need
for information regarding the location of hidden cameras and the Re-
spondent’s confidentiality concerns as to that subject matter, we do not
now decide the particular content of that bargaining except to direct the
parties to thoroughly explore all reasonable alternatives to direct disclo-
sure of the location of existing hidden surveillance cameras. “The
Board’s cumulative experience has shown that ‘there should be, and
almost always is, a way that the parties can effectively bargain’ for an
accommodation that will satisfy both the union’s needs and the em-
ployer’s protective concerns.” Metropolitan Edison Co., 330 NLRB
107, 109 (1999) (citation omitted).
NATIONAL STEEL CORP. 749
I recognize that the Unions’ request was not confined
to information concerning location. However, the Un-
ions failed to say what other information they sought. I
also recognize that an employer cannot simply fail to
reply to a request, even if it is nonspecific. However, the
Respondent did reply. It made the valid point that in-
formation concerning location would jeopardize its pro-
gram. Once again, the response put the ball back in the
Unions’ court. If the Unions wanted information other
than location, they could have asked for same. They did
not do so. Accordingly, the Respondent did not violate
the Act.1
My colleagues rely upon the following proposition:
It is well established that an employer may not simply
refuse to comply with an ambiguous or overbroad in-
formation request, but must request clarification and/or
comply with the request to the extent it encompasses
necessary and relevant information.

Although the instant request was “ambiguous and
overbroad,” that was not the real root of the problem.
The real root of the problem was the nonspecific nature
of the request. The Respondent was left to guess what
the Unions had in mind, and the Respondent reasonably
inferred that the Unions wanted to know locations. The
Respondent’s reply contained the obvious point (not dis-
puted by my colleagues) that disclosure of the locations
would defeat the purpose of the cameras.
My colleagues also cite cases for the proposition that
an employer “must offer to accommodate” its concerns
and the Unions’ interests. It should be noted that, under
this view, the employer need not offer a specific accom-
modation. The employer simply has to offer to accom-
modate. Although the Respondent did not expressly
make such an offer, it did not refuse to do so, and the
Unions did not seek an accommodation. In these circum-
stances, I would not find a violation based on the hy-
pertechnical view that the Respondent should have ex-
pressly recited its willingness to bargain about an ac-
commodation.

Kathy J. Talbott-Schehl, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jill K. Luft, Esq. (Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C.), of St.
Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 18, 2000.
The charges were filed on March 6, 2000, and the complaint
was issued May 31, 2000.

1 In view of my conclusion, I do not reach the remedial issue dis-
cussed in fn. 1 of the majority opinion.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, manufactures steel at its facility
in Granite City, Illinois, where it annually sells and ships goods
valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside of the State of
Illinois. Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and that the Unions, United Steelworkers of
America, Locals 67 and 30, are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) in refusing to bargain with the Charging
Party Unions about its use of hidden surveillance cameras and
in failing to provide the Unions with information regarding
such cameras.
Respondent’s Granite City Division produces steel coils and
employs approximately 3000 employees. These employees are
represented by 10 different United Steelworkers (USWA) local
unions. Four of these locals, Nos. 16, 30, 67, and 68 represent
production and maintenance employees. Among the other lo-
cals, Local 9325 represents office and technical employees and
Local 4063 represents the plant guards. Respondent has seven
different collective-bargaining agreements with its Unions.
One local agreement covers the four production and mainte-
nance unions. Respondent is also party to a contract with the
USWA International Union covering all its divisions, referred
to as a settlement agreement.
Within Respondent’s human resources division is an office
responsible for security and fire protection, headed by Marvin
Owca. This office uses over 100 video cameras, that are in
plain view to monitor areas of the Granite City plant. Addi-
tionally, on occasion, it has employed the use of hidden video
cameras. None of the unions at the plant objected to the use of
hidden video cameras, asked for bargaining regarding the use
of such cameras or made an information request regarding the
use of hidden cameras until January 5, 2000.
On January 5, at a meeting of a steering committee, com-
prised of company and union officials, Local 67 President Don-
ald Ogle presented management with a copy of the Board’s
decision in Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997), and
asked for information regarding all hidden surveillance cam-
eras. He also stated that before additional cameras are in-
stalled, management needed to talk to “the Union.”1 Respon-
dent’s human resources director, Byron Heape, said that the
issue was inappropriate for the steering committee since it had
1 Ogle’s interest in hidden surveillance cameras arose from the dis-
cipline given to a member of his local who was caught by such a hidden
camera in supervisor’s office using the telephone for extended periods
of time. This incident will be discussed more fully with regard to the
recitation of Respondent’s past practices with regard to hidden cameras.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 750
not been discussed at lower levels and suggested that the matter
be referred to the Company’s labor relations staff; Ogle agreed.
Ogle and representatives of Local Unions 16, 30, 68, 4063,
and 9325 also sent a letter to management on January 10, 2000.
The letter stated that the Board had determined that the use of
hidden surveillance cameras was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining and that “the Union” had not waived its right to bargain
over the subject. The letter also asked for all information con-
cerning any existing surveillance cameras “that our members
are subjected to that exist in any and all areas and locations of
Granite City, National Steel property.”
Joseph Costanzo, Respondent’s employee relations manager,
replied on February 28, 2000, concluding that National Steel
did not believe that “the Union” is entitled to this information.
Costanzo cited a “consistent and long-standing practice of us-
ing surveillance when there is a reasonable suspicion of wrong-
doing and in areas where employees should have no expecta-
tion of privacy.” He also noted that “the Union” had never chal-
lenged this practice and had previously requested that its mem-
bers install such equipment. Costanzo also stated that disclos-
ing the location of the equipment would defeat the purpose of
utilizing it. Locals 30 and 67 responded to this letter by filing
the charges in the instant case.
A. Respondent’s use of Hidden Surveillance Cameras Prior
to January 5, 2000
Respondent has periodically used hidden surveillance cam-
eras to investigate specific situations in which it suspected
theft, vandalism, or other instances of wrongdoing. The first
instance that Owca recalls was the installation of a hidden cam-
era in the Basic Oxygen Furnace Warehouse in 1987, to catch
an individual who was stealing copper. A union electrician
assisted in the installation of the camera. The camera remained
in place for about 6 months. According to Owca, the thefts
stopped because employees became aware of the camera. The
thief or thieves were never apprehended.
In June 1996, Respondent installed another hidden camera to
monitor equipment in the facility’s South Power Plant, from
which copper was being stolen. A camera was used for 2
weeks and assisted in the apprehension of a trespasser, who had
been taking the copper from the machinery.
In 1998, Respondent installed a hidden camera in an effort to
catch an individual who was pulling an electrical switch that
shut down the cold strip production line. The camera was used
for 1 month. Although an individual was observed pulling the
switch, nobody was ever apprehended.
Again in 1998, a camera was used to try to catch someone who
was greasing the foot and hand rails of railroad cars in the cold
strip area. The camera monitored the area for 1 or 2 months;
nobody was apprehended. In September 1998, USWA Local 68,
which represents Respondent’s electricians, filed a grievance
over the installation and removal of the hidden video camera by
management, rather than by bargaining unit employees.
The same year a hidden camera was used again in the Basic
Oxygen Furnace Warehouse to investigate the theft of copper
briquettes. The camera was used for 2–3 weeks and revealed a
union employee, Mark Hale, stealing the material. This em-
ployee was terminated by Respondent. USWA Local 16 ini-
tially grieved Hale’s termination, but then withdrew the griev-
ance. In preparation for the grievance, Local 16 officials asked
to see the videotape and thus were made aware that Hale had
been observed by a hidden surveillance camera. Local 68 filed
another grievance over the installation and removal of the cam-
era by Security Chief Owca, rather than by bargaining unit
electricians.
In March 1999, a hidden camera was installed behind the
glass of the office door of a supervisor, which was being van-
dalized. The camera was used for 1 or 2 months. An individ-
ual was caught on camera trying to break into the office, but he
could not be identified. The identity of the vandal or vandals
was never determined.
At about the same time, Respondent installed a camera in a
file cabinet to catch a person who was using Process Manager
Mike Edgar’s office at night when Edgar was not at work.2
After some weeks, Local 67 member Ronnie Williams was
identified as the person using Edgar’s office. Further investiga-
tion disclosed that Williams was making extensive use of Ed-
gar’s telephone to place long-distance telephone calls. Respon-
dent discharged Williams and the Union grieved his termina-
tion. Pursuant to the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement,
an arbitrator reinstated Williams to his job with no loss of sen-
iority. However, he declined to award Williams backpay for
the time he was off of work.
Local 67 President Donald Ogle became aware of Respon-
dent’s use of hidden surveillance cameras as the result of the
discharge of Ronnie Williams. While preparing for the arbitra-
tion of the Williams’ grievance, Ogle became aware of the
Board’s Colgate-Palmolive decision. He asked the arbitrator
not to consider the evidence from the video camera. The arbi-
trator found that the Board’s decision did not warrant the exclu-
sion of the videotaped evidence from consideration.
B. Discussion of Hidden Surveillance Cameras During
Contract Negotiations
During contract negotiations in June 1999, Michael Har-
grave, president of USWA Local 9325, which represents office
and technical employees, asked Respondent’s attorney if it
would cease using all video and recording devices used for
surveillance. The attorney, Lydia Kachigian, replied that Re-
spondent would give Local 9325 the benefit of any agreement
reached with other USWA locals on this issue, but that the
company retained all its rights on this matter. There is no evi-
dence that the issue of hidden surveillance cameras was dis-
cussed during contract negotiations between Respondent and
the production locals in 1999.3

2 Respondent had installed the camera for a period of time in 1998
and then discontinued its use.
3 The General Counsel’s brief recites that the most recent local con-
tract between the production and maintenance local unions and Re-
spondent, as well as the most recent “settlement agreement” between
Respondent and the USWA International Union run from August 1,
1999, through July 31, 2004. The record herein contains and refers
only to prior contracts which expired by their terms on August 1, 1999.
Since, there appears to be no issue about this matter, I assume the rep-
resentation by the General Counsel is accurate.
NATIONAL STEEL CORP. 751
Analysis
The General Counsel contends, and I agree, that the Board’s
decision in Colgate-Palmolive is dispositive of the instant case.
In Colgate, the employer had placed hidden surveillance cam-
eras in a restroom and exercise facility, apparently to catch
suspected thieves. The Board found the use of such cameras
was a mandatory subject bargaining since it was plainly ger-
mane to the working environment and not among those mana-
gerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
The Board noted that many other techniques of investigating
employee wrongdoing had previously been found to be manda-
tory subjects of bargaining, such as polygraph testing and
drug/alcohol testing.
While Respondent submits that its situation is distinguish-
able from Colgate-Palmolive, I conclude that it is not distin-
guishable in any material way. Although Respondent has not
utilized hidden surveillance cameras in areas such as restrooms,
there is no reason for the Union to conclude that it might not do
so if it had cause to believe that violations of the law or com-
pany work rules were occurring in such areas. It is clearly
relevant to the working environment of the Union’s members if
they are under surveillance by hidden cameras even in their
normal work areas. The Union obviously has an interest in
preventing indiscriminate use of such cameras.
National Steel also contends that requiring it to bargain is
unduly burdensome in view of the fact that there are 10 differ-
ent local unions at its Granite City plant. Obviously, there are
many mandatory subjects of bargaining which require Respon-
dent to negotiate with all of its unions. There is no authority
for the proposition that an employer is excused from its obliga-
tion to bargain over such subjects by virtue of the number of
labor organizations with which it must negotiate.
Thirdly, Respondent, like Colgate-Palmolive, contends that
it is excused from an obligation to bargain by the adverse im-
pact bargaining would have on its ability to protect its property
and employees. As noted in footnote 10 of the Board’s Col-
gate-Palmolive decision, “the placing of cameras, and the ex-
tent to which they will be secret or hidden, if at all, is a proper
subject of negotiations between Respondent and the Union . . .
bargaining about hidden cameras can embrace a host of matters
other than mere location. And even as to location, mutual ac-
commodations can and should be negotiated . . . .”
Bargaining need not necessarily defeat the purpose of using
hidden surveillance cameras. For example, Respondent could
bargain for a mutually satisfactory confidentiality agreement or
protective order, that would limit the dissemination of informa-
tion about the cameras. Moreover, Respondent could bargain
over the specificity of the information to be divulged, possibly
giving only a very general description of where the camera will
be placed and the area under surveillance. Finally, Respon-
dent’s past history in using hidden surveillance cameras indi-
cates that while employees’ discovery of the camera on several
occasions prevented the apprehension of the wrongdoer, in
several situations, it stopped the thefts or other conduct which
endangered Respondent’s employees and their property.4

4 I see no merit in Respondent’s argument that its use of hidden sur-
veillance cameras often placed under surveillance persons other than
The Union(s) Requested Bargaining
At page 14 of its brief, Respondent states that at no time dur-
ing the January 5, 2000 steering committee meeting, or at any
other time, did any of the union representatives request that
National Steel bargain about the use of hidden cameras. A
bargaining request need not be made in so many words if it is
implicit from the language used and the context in which it is
made, Legal Aid Bureau, 319 NLRB 159 fn. 2 (1995); Cottage
Bakers, 120 NLRB 841 (1958). I conclude that the Union
President Ogle’s statement that Respondent needed to talk to
the Union before installing additional hidden surveillance cam-
eras, following his presentation to management of the Colgate-
Palmolive decision constitutes a bargaining request.
The Union(s) has (have) not Waived its (their) Right to Bargain
Respondent further contends that the Union(s) waived their
right to bargain over the use of hidden surveillance cameras by
virtue of their knowledge of prior use of such cameras by Re-
spondent and their failure to request bargaining on these occa-
sions. A similar argument was made by the employer in Col-
gate-Palmolive, which was rejected by the Board.
The Board generally does not find a waiver of the statutory
right to bargain without a showing that the matter at issue was
fully discussed and consciously explored and that the Union
unmistakably waived its interest in the matter, Rockwell Inter-
national Corp., 260 NLRB 1346, 1347 (1982); Midwest Power
Systems, 323 NLRB 404, 407 (1997). Respondent has made no
such showing in the instant case. As in Colgate-Palmolive, the
Unions herein learned about the past use of hidden surveillance
cameras after they had been installed and then dismantled.
There is no showing that Respondent ever provided the Unions
advance notice that it intended to use such cameras. The Un-
ion’s failure to request bargaining on prior occasions does not
therefore constitute a waiver of its (their) right to bargain over
the future installation of hidden surveillance cameras.5

bargaining unit employees and indeed led to apprehension of such
individuals for theft in several circumstances. It is merely fortuitous
that the wrongdoer in such situations was not a bargaining unit em-
ployee or that the camera did not capture a bargaining unit employee
engaged in a violation of company rules other than that for which the
camera was installed. Thus, a camera installed in a warehouse to cap-
ture a thief may record an employee sleeping on the job or absent from
his workstation without authorization.
5 I regard Respondent’s reliance on its history or past practice of us-
ing hidden surveillance cameras to be part of its contention that the
Unions waived their right to bargain over this issue, rather than a sepa-
rate argument. An employer’s past practices and a union’s conscious
acquiescence in such practices is a common way of establishing a
waiver of bargaining rights. In this case, I find no such conscious
waiver. I would note that Respondent’s past practice consists of several
ad hoc decisions to use hidden cameras, rather than a general policy of
which the Unions were apprised. Moreover, the instances in which
hidden surveillance cameras have been used all occurred since 1998,
except for the 1987 surveillance of the Basic Oxygen Furnace Ware-
house and the 1996 utilization of the camera in the South Power Plant.
Thus, Respondent’s recurring utilization of hidden surveillance camera
is a relatively recent phenomena.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 752
Respondent Violated the Act in not Providing the Union(s) with
the Information it (they)Requested
It is well settled that an employer, on request, must provide a
union with information that is relevant to its carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities in representing employees.
The Board uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining
relevance. Information about terms and conditions of employ-
ees actually represented by a union is presumptively relevant
and necessary and must be produced, Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB
622, 625 (1993). It follows from the Board’s conclusion in
Colgate-Palmolive, that an employer’s use of hidden surveil-
lance cameras is germane to the working environment, that
information regarding these cameras is relevant to the Union’s
discharge of its statutory duties and responsibilities.
A union’s interest in relevant and necessary information,
however, does not always predominate over other legitimate
interests. As explained by the Supreme Court in Detroit Edison
v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979), “a union’s bare assertion
that it needs information to process a grievance does not auto-
matically oblige the employer to supply all the information in
the manner requested.” Thus, in dealing with union requests
for relevant but assertedly confidential information possessed
by an employer, the Board is required to balance a union’s need
for the information against any “legitimate and substantial”
confidentiality interest established by the employer.
However, an employer possessing requested information and
refusing to disclose it on confidentiality grounds has a duty to
seek an accommodation through the bargaining process. The
employer must bargain towards an accommodation between the
Union’s need for the information and the employer’s justified
confidentiality concerns, Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB
1104, 1105–1106 (1991).
In the instant case, there is no evidence as to whether Re-
spondent had information concerning its use of existing hidden
surveillance cameras because there is no evidence that Respon-
dent has utilized such cameras since January 10, 2000. How-
ever, if it has done so or will do so, it should be ordered to dis-
close the requested information to the Union(s) conditionally. I
conclude that Respondent has established a legitimate confiden-
tiality concern with regard to some of the requested informa-
tion, such as the precise location that is under surveillance,
Lasher Service Corp., 332 NLRB 834 (2000). The disclosure
will therefore be subject to the parties’ bargaining in good faith
to a mutually satisfactory confidentiality agreement, protective
order, or other appropriate procedure, Exxon Co. USA, 321
NLRB 896 (1996).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent’s use of hidden surveillance cameras is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
2. By refusing to notify and bargain with the Union prior to
the installation of hidden surveillance cameras, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by failing and
refusing to bargain with the Union for a mutually satisfactory
confidentiality agreement, protective order, or other appropriate
procedure that balances its legitimate confidentiality concerns
with the Union’s need for the information it requested regard-
ing existing hidden surveillance cameras.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, National Steel Corporation, Granite City,
Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union(s) with re-
spect to the installation and use of hidden surveillance cameras.
(b) Failing to comply with information requests regarding
hidden surveillance cameras without bargaining for a mutually
satisfactory confidentiality agreement, protective order or other
procedure that balances Respondent’s confidentiality concerns
with the Union(s) need for the information requested.
(c) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union(s) with
respect to the installation and use of hidden surveillance cam-
eras.
(b) Bargain collectively with the Union(s) for a mutually sat-
isfactory confidentiality agreement, protective order or other
procedure that balances Respondent's confidentiality concerns
with the Union(s)’s need for information regarding hidden sur-
veillance cameras.
(c) Provide the Union(s) with the information requested re-
garding hidden surveillance cameras in accordance with what-
ever confidentiality agreement, protective order etc., upon
which Respondent and the Union(s) agree.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Granite City, Illinois facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices

6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

NATIONAL STEEL CORP. 753
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since January 5, 2000.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director, a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local
Unions 30 and 67 of the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO over the installation and use of hidden surveillance
cameras within our facility.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide information that is re-
quested by the Union(s) that is necessary and relevant to their
duties as collective-bargaining representatives.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Un-
ion(s) over the installation and use of hidden surveillance cam-
eras within our facility.
WE WILL, on request, provide information that is requested
by the Union(s) that is necessary and relevant to their duties as
collective-bargaining representatives. In the event that we have
legitimate confidentiality concerns, we will collectively bargain
with the Union(s) for a mutually satisfactory confidentiality
agreement, protective order or similar procedure that will bal-
ance the Union(s)’s need for the information and our confiden-
tiality concerns.
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION