National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 1328 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

1328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
National Maritime Union of America , AFL-CIO and Delta
Steamship Lines, Inc.
National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO and Bloom-
field Steamship Company. Cases Nos. 15-CC-189 and 15-CC-
190. June 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 23, 1964, Trial Examiner John F. Funke issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommending that said complaint be dismissed in its en-
tirety, as set forth in his attached Decision. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connec-
tion with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch
and Members Leedom and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the en-
tire record, including the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions,
and brief, and adopts the findings and conclusions of the Trial Ex-
aminer only to the extent consistent herewith:
The complaint in this case covers the picketing and other conduct
of the National Maritime Union of America (NMU) at the Poydras
Street wharf and the Cotton Warehouse wharf in the port of New
Orleans. The Poydras Street wharf is used as a marine terminal for
ships owned by Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., herein called Delta,
while - the Cotton Warehouse wharf is used for similar purposes in
connection with vessels owned by Bloomfield Steamship Company,
herein called Bloomfield.
Delta and Bloomfield are parties to collective-bargaining agree-
ments with the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, herein called
MEBA, and other labor organizations, but have no bargaining rela-
tionship with the NMU. The NMU. concedes that its activity at the
Poydras Street and Cotton Warehouse wharves was unrelated to a
labor dispute with these or any other employers engaged in operations
at said locations. Rather, its action amounted to an extension to the
port of New Orleans of a retaliatory campaign against MEBA, be-
147 NLRB No. 147.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1329
cause of that Union's picketing of the SS Maximus in the port of
Philadelphia.'
NMU pickets first appeared at the Delta and Bloomfield wharves
on June 17, 1963,2 and were finally withdrawn on June 20.3 During
the picketing, employees and other persons refused to cross the picket
line, causing a cessation of normal repair, maintenance, and cargo
operations aboard the SS Del Valle and the SS Del Mar, owned by
Delta and berthed at Poydras Street, and the SS Neva West, owned
by Bloomfield and berthed at the Cotton Warehouse Wharf.
The complaint alleged that Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (4) (i)
and (ii) (B) by inducing and encouraging individuals employed by
Delta, by Bloomfield, and by Dixie Machine, Metal and Welding
Works, Inc., herein called Dixie Machine, as well as by other persons,
to engage in work stoppages; ' and by restraining and coercing all of
said persons, for an object of forcing or requiring them to cease doing
business with other persons.
The Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the complaint, find-
ing that the picketing did not induce work stoppages, and concluding
that Respondent's action sought to force another labor organization
to cease picketing in another port and hence was not for an object
proscribed by the Act. The General Counsel excepts, contending that
the uncontradicted evidence clearly substantiates the allegations of
the complaint. We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions.
Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we are persuaded that Respond-
ent's picketing was designed to induce neutral employees to refrain
i The Maximus was manned by members of the NMU, and its affiliate , the Brotherhood
of Marine Officers . As a result of MEBA's picketing, the Maximus was idled in Phila-
delphia from June 10 through June 21.
The Board has simultaneously considered two other cases involving the NMU's cam-
paign against MEBA in other ports . See National Maritime Union of America (Houston
Maritime Association, Inc.), 147 NLRB 1243, involving NMU's picketing at Houston
and Galveston , Texas ; and National Maritime Union of America ( Weyerhaeuser Lines,
a Division of The Weyerhaeuser Company ), 147 NLRB 1317, involving related conduct
in Philadelphia , Pennsylvania.
3 A11 dates refer to 1963 , unless otherwise indicated.
3 The Maximus dispute was settled on this date.
'Work stoppages during the period of picketing (June 17-20,) occurred as follows:
(1) On June 17 and 18, stevedores, carpenters , and painters assigned by Delta to work
the SS Del Valle refused to cross the picket line ; ( 2) Buck Kriehs and Company and Best
Electric Company ( whose superintendent refused to cross the picket line ), both of which
were engaged by Delta to perform repairs aboard the Del Valle, did not work while NMU
pickets were present; (3) on June 19, cargo operations aboard the SS Del Mar were sus-
pended because stevedores honored the picket line ; (4) on June 17, dockworkers em-
ployed by States Marine Agency, Bloomfield ' s berth agent in New Orleans , engaged in a
work stoppage and did not return to work until the pickets were moved from an area out-
side the Cotton Warehouse to the gangway of the Neva West; (5) in the period from
June 17 to 20, the Neva West could not be loaded . because stevedores , ordered by States
Marine Agency from T. Smith and Company , a stevedoring contractor , honored the picket
line; and (6) Dixie Machine, engaged to perform repairs aboard the Neva West could
not complete the job because an employee honored the picket line.
756-236--65-vol. 147-85
1330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from working the vessels of Delta and Bloomfield, and thereby to
cause the general disruption of stevedore and maintenance operations
that did in fact occur at the picketed wharves: In so finding, we are
mindful of the fact that in the maritime-longshore industry, a picket
line is known for its "signal" effect-that all union men make com-
mon cause with the picketing union.
But most persuasive is the record evidence which affirmatively es-
tablishes Respondent's intention of using the picket line as a signal
for union members, employed by persons engaged on the above-
named ships, to cease work. Thus, on June 17, Edward Theodore, Jr.,
a delegate of an ILA 5 Local, representing dockworkers employed at
the Cotton Warehouse wharf, upon investigation of work stoppages
involving members of his union, was informed by an NMU picket
that "We are not picketing the docks .... We are picketing the
ship to keep longshoremen from going on." On another occasion, a
picket rejected a request by Tillis Gauthier, a pipefitter employed by
Dixie Machine, for permission to board the Neva West to repair a
line, stating : "No ... only people with personal belongings was al-
lowed to go."'
Added to these clear indications as to the purpose of the picketing
is a conversation between Gerard E. Weickoff, Bloomfield's vice presi-
dent for New Orleans operations, and NMU Port Agent George,
wherein George denied Weickoff's plea that pickets be removed to
allow a 6-hour loading job which would permit the Neva West to
sail., with the following comment : "This is the situation .... This
has been going on for some time and this action has become neces-
sary. We realize your position, however, there is nothing we can do
about it .... We just want you to make a lot of noise." When
Weickoff indicated that he did not know how much noise Bloomfield
could make,' George said, "Well I want you to call Paul Hall and
tell him to call off the MEBA pickets on the Maximus.8
The above facts negate Respondent's contention that its picketing
was purely informational in purpose. Its use of the picket line as an
appeal that all union members make common cause and refuse to per-
6 International Longshoremen 's Association.
A The Trial Examiner rejected the statements of the pickets as clearly hearsay and not
binding upon the Respondent . We disagree . The Board has given weight to such evi-
dence where , as here, the statements and actions of the unidentified individuals occurred
in circumstances intimately related to the activities sponsored by the union and were
consistent with the actions or policies of union officials . Highway Truckdrivers and
Helpers , Local 107 , etc. (Iti88 & Company, Inc.), 130 NLRB 943, 945, 957. As the un-
contradicted testimony in the instant case attributes the statements to persons Identified
as NMU pickets, who were encountered by the witnesses at the locus of NMU action, and
as these statements were related to and consistent with expressions by NMU Port Agent
George and the overall conduct of Respondent , we reject the Trial Examiner' s view that
the testimony is incompetent and of no probative value.
7 Bloomfield had previously sought the assistance of various maritime and commercial
trade associations in connection with the picketing at the iCotton Warehouse wharf.
s Paul Hall is the international president of the Seafarers ' International Union which
the NMU charges was the sponsor of MEBA in the Iatter's action against the Maximus.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1331
form their duties behind the picket lines is borne out by the state-
ments of pickets to Theodore and Gauthier, and by Port Agent
George's indication to Weickoff that Respondent wanted the shipping
companies to make a "lot of noise" and bring pressure to bear directly
upon the SIU to compel a cessation of MEBA's action against the
Maximus.
In these circumstances, including the fact that Respondent had no
dispute with any employer engaged at the picketed wharves, and on
the record as a whole, we are satisfied that Respondent's conduct was
intended to prevent all cargo and maintenance operations aboard the
picketed ships by inducing waterfront labor not to perform their
normal duties behind the picket line; and thereby to coerce and re-
strain the neutral employers responsible for the operation and servic-
ing of said vessels, all for an object of causing a cessation of business
as between the neutral employers so engaged.
Having found that Respondent's picketing had at least an object
within the ban of Section 8(b) (4) (B), it is of no consequence that
the Respondent's ultimate aim was to force a cessation of picketing by
another union in another port. The Board in determining legality of
object does not differentiate between the ultimate, alternative, condi-
tional, or immediate nature of the various objectives that may be in-
volved in the activities of a labor organization.' However denomi-
nated, if am object is proscribed by subparagraph (B), an attempt to
achieve it by means within Section 8(b) (4) (i) or (ii) is unlawful.10
As a departure from these well-established principles is not war-
ranted by the fact that Respondent's conduct was founded upon an
interunion controversy over representation, rather than a dispute
with an employer," we reject the Trial Examiner's view that the un-
lawful extension of the dispute to neutral steamship owners, berth
agents, marine repair firms, and stevedore companies was justified be-
cause merely an intermediate step in achieving an end, which itself
was beyond the reach of Section 8(b) (4) (B).12
For the above reasons, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that
Respondent violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) by inducing and
encouraging individuals employed by Delta, Bloomfield, States Marine
9Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, et at., AFL-CIO (Food Employers Council, Inc.), 145
NLRB 307 . International Longshoremen 's Association, etc. (The Board of Harbor Com-
missioners ), 137 NLRB 1178, 1184, enfd. 331 F. 2d 712 (.C.A. 3).
10 N.L .R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al . ( Gould &
Preisner), 341 U. S. 675, 688.
n See Local 1355 , International Longshoremen 's Association ( Maryland Ship Ceiling
Company), 146 NLRB 723, enforcement denied on other grounds, 332 F. 2d 992
(C.A. 4).
12 The Trial Examiner relied upon the Second Circuit's decision in Douds v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association, Independent ( New York Shipping Association), 224
F. 2d 455 ( C.A. 2), which is inconsistent with the cases cited in footnote 9, supra. See
also Maryland Ship Ceiling Company, supra . Accordingly, we do not view the Douds v.
"ILA decision as controlling herein.
1332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Agency, T. Smith and Company, Best Electric Company , and Pixie
Machine to refuse in the course of their employment to perform services
aboard the SS Del Valle, the SS Del Mar, and the SS Neva West,
and by coercing and restraining said employers and Buck Kriehs and
Company, with an object of forcing or requiring said employers to
cease doing business between themselves and with other persons within
the meaning of the Act."
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities and conduct of the Respondent National Maritime
Union of America, AFL-CIO,^occurring in connection with the opera-
tions of Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.; Bloomfield Steamship Company;
States Marine Agency; T. Smith and Company; Buck Kriehs and
Company; Best Electric Company; and Dixie Machine, Metal and
Welding Works, Inc.,14 and of other employers engaged in commerce or
an industry affecting commerce in the port of New Orleans, Louisiana,
described above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and between
the States and foreign countries, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act,
we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action designed to remedy the unfair labor practices and to
otherwise effectuate the policies of the Act.
'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act.
2. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., and Bloomfield Steamship Company
are persons engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
13 See United Marine Division, Local 333 , et al . ( New York Shipping Association), 107
NLRB 686. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local No. 46 (Knight Newspapers,
Inc.), 138 NLRB 1346, 1353 , enfd. 322 F. 2d 405 (C.A.D.C.).
11 The Trial Examiner properly found that Delta and Bloomfield are engaged in com-
merce. We further find that States Marine Agency (engaged in the general husbandry
of vessels used in Interstate and foreign seaborne commerce ), T'. Smith and Company
(engaged in general stevedore operations ), Buck Kriehs and Company , Best Electric
Company, and Dixie Machine, Metal and Welding Works, Inc . ( all engaged in maritime
repair and maintenance work aboard vessels engaged in Interstate and foreign commerce),
are engaged in activities bearing a close and intimate relationship to the maritime in-
dustry and are thereby engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of
the Act. See Sheet Metal Workers International Association , Local Union 299, at al.
(S. M. Kisner ( deceased), at al., d/ b/a S. M. Kisner and Sons), 131 NLRB 1196,
1197-1199.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA , AFL-CIO 1333
3. States Marine Agency; T. Smith and Company; Buck Kriehs
and Company ; Best Electric Company; and Dixie Machine, Metal
and Welding Works , Inc., are persons engaged in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
4. By inducing and encouraging employees of Delta Steamship
Lines, Inc.; Bloomfield Steamship Company; States Marine Agency;
T. Smith and Company; Best Electric Company; and Dixie Machine,
Metal and Welding Works, Inc., in the port of New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment
to perform services with an object of forcing or requiring said persons
to cease doing business with each other and with other persons, the
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section '8('b) (4) (i ) ( B) and Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
5. By coercing and restraining said persons and Buck Kriehs and
Company with an object of forcing or requiring them to cease doing
business with each other and with other persons , the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) and Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of-law, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is ordered that the National
Maritime Union of America , AFL=CIO, its officers , agents, representa-
tives, successors , and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed in the port
of New Orleans, Louisiana, by Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. ; Bloom-
field Steamship Company; States Marine Agency; T. Smith and Com-
pany; Best Electric Company ; and Dixie Machine , Metal and
Welding Works, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or an
industry affecting commerce , to engage in a strike or a refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture , process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods; articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force
or require any of the foregoing persons to cease doing business with
each other or any other person.
(b) Threatening, coercing , or restraining in the port of New
Orleans, Louisiana , said persons and Buck Kriehs and Company, or
any other person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting com-
merce, where an object thereof is to force or require any of the fore-
going persons to cease doing business with each other or with any
other person.
1334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action which is hereby found nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places in each of the Respondent's business
offices, meeting halls, and other places in New Orleans, Louisiana,
where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 11 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative of said Respond-
ent, shall be posted by said Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by said Respondent to insure that such notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail signed copies of the notices to the Regional Director for
the Fifteenth Region, for posting by the above-named Employers,
said Employers being willing, at all locations in the port of New
Orleans, Louisiana, where notices to their employees are customarily
posted.
(c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
receipt of this Decision and Order, what steps have been taken to
comply herewith.
15 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals , the words . "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order"
shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC.; BLOOM-
FIELD STEAMSHIP COMPANY; STATES MARINE AGENCY; T. SMITH
AND COMPANY; BUCK KRIEHS AND COMPANY; BEST ELECTRIC COM-
PANY; AND DIXIE MACHINE, METAL AND WELDING WORKS, INC.;
AND OF ALL OTHER PERSONS ENGAGED IN COMMERCE OR AN INDUS-
TRY AFFECTING COMMERCE EMPLOYED IN THE PORT OF NEW
ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage individuals employed in
New Orleans by Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.; by Bloomfield
Steamship Company; by States Marine Agency; by T. Smith
and Company; by Best Electric Company; and by Dixie Ma-
chine, Metal and Welding Works, Inc. ; or by any other person
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, to en-
gage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1335
any services, where an object thereof is to force or require any of
the foregoing persons to cease doing business with each other or
any other person.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain, in the port of New
Orleans, the above-named Employers and/or Buck Kriehs and
Company or any other person engaged in commerce or an in-
dustry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or
require any of the foregoing employers to cease doing business
with each other or with any.other person.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Labor organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, T6024 Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana, Telephone No. 529-2411, if they have any ques-
tion concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., herein called Delta , in Case
No. 15-CC-189, and by Bloomfield Steamship Company , herein called Bloomfield, on
June 17 and 20, 1963, against National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the NMU or the Respondent , the General Counsel issued a consolidated
complaint alleging the NMU had violated Section 8(b) (4) (i ) and (ii) (B ) of the Act.
The answer of Respondent denied the commission of unfair labor practices and fur-
ther averred that the activities of the Respondent were protected by the 1st and 14th
amendments to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the
State of Louisiana.
This proceeding , with the General Counsel and the Respondent represented, was
heard before Trial Examiner John F . Funke at New Orleans, Louisiana , on Octo-
ber 14, 1963. Briefs were received from the General Counsel and the Respondent
by November 20, 1963.1
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
Delta is a steamship company engaged at New Orleans, Louisiana , and other ports
in the United States, in the transportation by ship of passengers and cargo between
ports in the United States and ports in foreign countries . Its annual revenue from
these operations exceeds $50,000.
Bloomfield is a steamship company engaged at New Orleans, Louisiana, and other
ports in the United States, in the transportation by ship of passengers and cargo be-
tween ports in the United States and ports in foreign countries . Its annual revenue
from these operations exceeds $50,000.
I find Delta and Bloomfield engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
1 Unless otherwise noted all dates refer to 1963.
1336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The NMU is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The facts
Since Respondent rested at the conclusion of the General Counsel 's case , electing
to call no witnesses, the facts are not in dispute. Charles Spicer, vice president in
charge of operations for Delta, testified that Delta had preferential rights at the Poy-
dras Street wharf owned by the State of Louisiana, and that it loaded and unloaded
its ships at this wharf. The loading and unloading was done by members of Locals
1418 and 1419 of the International Longshoremen's Association, herein collectively
referred to as the ILA. On June 17 the Delta SS Del Valle arrived at the wharf and
longshoremen were ordered to report at 1 p.m. to unload its cargo. At 1 p.m. Spicer
testified that two pickets who had reported at the wharf about 7:30 a.m. commenced
picketing with signs which bore. the legend: 2
INFORMATION
PICKETING
MEBA Engineers
Interfere
With Employers
Who Lawfully
Recognize
N.M.U.
The picketing took place at the gangway of the ship and on the wharf itself and con-
tinued through another shapeup which had been ordered for 5 p.m. It continued the
next day at 8 a.m. with two pickets and the same signs, and at 1 p.m. the Del Valle left
the wharf and proceeded to anchor in the river. None of its cargo had been unloaded
and none of the longshoremen had worked.
About 3:40 p.m. the Delta SS Del Mar tied up at the wharf and no pickets ap-
peared.3 Longshoremen worked discharging mail, passengers , and baggage. The
next morning, however, the Del Mar was picketed at 8 a.m. and no unloading was
done and the gangs ordered for 6 p.m. did not even appear at the wharf to work.
On June 20 a number of longshoremen appeared and went aboard the Del Mar
but did not work because of rain, and about 2 p.m. the pickets left.
At the times the picketing took place Delta did not recognize the NMU nor did
it have any contracts with the NMU. The NMU made no claim for recognition or
a contract and it had no dispute with Delta.
Charles J. Boudreaux, assistant port engineer for Delta at New Orleans, testified
that he went aboard the Del Valle when it tied up on the 17th to check for neces-
sary repairs. As a result of his inspection he called Buck Kriehs and Company and
Best Electric Company and ordered certain repair work to be done aboard the ship.
He informed the managers of both companies that the ship was picketed and each
company, according to Boudreaux, sent a superintendent to the ship and after they
observed the picket line no work was done by either company. Boudreaux also
testified that the carpenter foreman and the paint foreman employed by Delta re-
fused to cross the picket line with their men to perform necessary work.
George E. Wieckhoff, vice president of Bloomfield, testified that Bloomfield con-
ducted its loading operations at the Cotton Warehouse wharf utilizing the services
of its agents, States Marine Corporation. On June 13 and again on June 15 the
Bloomfield SS Neva West tied up at the wharf to load cargo. It returned to the
wharf again on June 17 to complete the loading which Wieckhoff estimated would
take about 6 hours. Wieckhoff stated that he was informed that there was picketing
at the wharf and that the longshoremen (employed by States Marine) would not
work and that as a result of this information he called Mr. George, whom he identi-
fied as port agent for the NMU, and told him the longshoremen had refused to cross
the picket line on the 17th and 18th. Wieckhoff requested that the pickets be re-
moved so the ship could load and George told him that while he had full authority
to call off the picket line he had to "go along like this." Wieckhoff talked to George
2 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 3.
3 There is confusion in the testimony as to the dates and times as to the arrival and
departure of the two ships. This confusion, however, does not affect the substance of
the case.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1337
again on June 19 and again George told him he would do nothing and that the
NMU wanted Bloomfield "to get good and mad and make a lot of noise." George
then told him to get hold of Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers International
Union,4 and have Hall call off the SIU pickets who were picketing the SS Maximus
in Philadelphia.
Harry B. Estes, wharf superintendent of the States Marine Agency, testified that
he first saw picketing at the Cotton Warehouse wharf on June 17 when the Neva
West was docked there. The legend on the picket signs was the same as the legend
borne at Delta. Estes testified that he had ordered 6 longshoremen gangs and
12 carpenters to work on the Neva West on the 17th from T . Smith and Company,
stevedores , and that no work was performed , and that again at 4 p .m. he ordered
4 gangs and 12 carpenters and no work was performed . The forklift operators
who work on the wharf and who start work at 8 a .m. did not work until 9:30 a.m.
on June 17. Estes testified that the operators gassed their forklifts but refused to go
further when they saw the pickets who were at the entrance to the wharf. As to
the longshoremen and the carpenters , they were requested for the 18th , 19th, and
20th but no work was done until the afternoon of the 20th when the pickets left.
Estes at no time made any inquiry as to the purpose of the picketing or as to why
it ceased.
Tillis Gauthier, pipe foreman for Dixie Machine, Metal and Welding Works,
Incorporated, testified that on June 15 he was sent to the Neva West to repair a
line. When he arrived ( he knew that a picket line had been established ) he asked
"the man with the picket " if he could go aboard to do repair work and was told he
could not. He left and reported to Mr. Steel , Dixie's superintendent , who told him
they had better not try to do any work. Gauthier later (date unspecified ) returned
and did the work after the picket line had , been withdrawn.
Edward Theodore , Jr., testified that he was the delegate representing Local 854,
ILA, which represented the forklift drivers at the Cotton Warehouse wharf. When
he checked at his office on the morning of June 17 he was told he had a call from
his men at Cotton Warehouse and he went to the wharf . The men were outside the
wharf because of the pickets and Theodore asked the pickets , who were in the street
leading to the wharf, what it was about. Theodore could not remember the re-
sponse but he did tell the pickets they were at the wrong place. He and one of the
pickets then went to a telephone booth where the picket made a call . When the
picket came out he told Theodore , "We are not picketing the docks . We are picket-
ing the ships to keep the longshoremen from going on ." Theodore then put his
men back to work at 10 a.m.
Theodore also testified that while at the wharf he saw a Tom Harris, identified
only as with the NMU, who told him that it was only informational picketing and
that as soon as the NMU received permission to get on the apron of the wharf the
pickets moved to the ship area.
B. Conclusions
The issues presented by this case are familiar:
(a) Did the picketing induce and encourage any individual to strike or refuse to
perform services?
(b) Did the picketing threaten , coerce, or restrain any employer engaged in
commerce?
(c) Was the object of the inducement and encouragement, and the threats, co-
ercion, and restraint , the forcing of any person to cease doing business with any
other person?
The picket legends did not induce or encourage any individual to refuse to work;
they did not publicize any dispute between the NMU and either Delta or Bloomfield.
What they did publicize was a dispute between NMU and MEBA. The motive of
the picketing , so far as it is revealed by this record ( and more fully in the briefs),
was retaliatory . MEBA, supported by SIU, was picketing the SS Maximus in
Philadelphia ( the Maximus employed NMU seamen ) and it was to protest this
picketing that the NMU picketed the Delta and Bloomfield ships at New Orleans.
The primary object of the picketing was not to cause Delta and Bloomfield to cease
doing business with any person or to compel any person to cease doing business
with Delta and Bloomfield . The primary object was to force MEBA to cease its
picketing of the Maximus. The question is whether this for such an objective falls
within the interdict of Section 8(b)(4)(B).
4 Bloomfield had a contract with the SIU ; it had none with NMU , nor did the NMU
make any request for recognition or a contract.
1338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In reaching decision two principles must be kept in mind:
(a) A literal construction of Section 8(b) (4) would , as the Supreme Court pointed
out in the General Electric case,5 bar all primary picketing.
(b) It is not necessary that the primary object of the picketing be the cessation
of business between Delta and Bloomfield and other persons but that an object of
such picketing be the cessation of business .6
Although the situation is novel in that no employer is directly involved in the
dispute and no demand is made upon any employer , two Trial Examiners have
faced the same dispute and the same conduct and found the Respondent guilty.7
I do not reach that conclusion . This is a type of case which does not appear to have
been within the contemplation of the Congress when it enacted Section 8 (b) (4) (B)
for it involves no secondary boycott of any goods , products, or services as a means
to compel action on the part of any employer . The case comes to the Board as
one of first impression and the determination will ultimately hinge on the construc-
tion given the statute by the Board, i.e., whether it gives generous scope to the
language of Section 8(b) (4) (B ) in the interests of furthering the policies of the Act,
or exercises restraint in the interests of protecting the freedom of persons to engage
in conduct not specifically prohibited . In the past the Board has given a rather full
scope to the prohibitions of Section 8(b) but a full scope which imposes sweeping
restraints on the conduct of labor organizations has not received the sanction of the
Supreme Courts
A careful reading of the cases cited in the briefs in this case and in the decisions
of Trial Examiners Goldberg and Libbin reveals that none, with one exception, faces
a situation at all comparable to that in the instant case . The others are the typical
cases where an employer is struck or picketed to compel him to stop using nonunion
goods, a secondary employer is picketed to compel him to stop supplying the primary
employer or using his goods , or common situs picketing is involved.
The exception is Douds v. International Longshoremen 's Association , Independent
(New York Shipping Association ), 224 F. 2d 455 (C.A. 2). In that case there was a
struggle for control of the New York piers between the ILA-AFL and the ILA-
Independent . One McMahon , a member of the ILA-Independent (the original ILA),
resigned and joined the ILA-AFL. Employed at a pier operated by the Moore-
McCormack Line, which had a contract with the ILA-Independent , McMahon was
discharged and picketed the Moore-McCormack pier in protest . Members of Local
807, Teamsters, refused to make deliveries to the pier because of McMahon's
picketing and in retaliation members of the ILA-Independent refused to handle
cargo delivered by Local 807 at piers which they worked . There was no dispute be-
tween the ILA-Independent and any employer.
Upon application of the Regional Director for the Second Region an injunction
was issued in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the
ILA-Independent and eight of its locals .9 The International , the eight locals, and three
5 Local 761 , International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
( General Electric Company ) v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667.
6 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council , at al., 341 U . S. 675.
.7 See Trial Examiner Goldberg' s decision in Case No. 23-CC-125 [147 NLRB 1243],
dated December 23, 1963, and Trial Examiner Libbin's decision in Case No . 4-CC-262
[147 NLRB 1317], dated January 10, 1964.
8 N.L.R.B. v. News Syndicate Company, Inc., at at ., 365 U.S. 695 ; Local 357 , Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters , etc. (Los Angeles -Seattle Motor Express ) v. N.L.R.B.,
365 U.S. 667; Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO ( General Electric Company ) v. N.L.R.B., 366 U. S. 667; Local 60, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, et at. (Mechanical Han-
dling Systems ) v. N.L.R.B., 365 U. S. 651; Local Lodge No. 1424 , International Associa-
tion of Machinists , et al. (Bryan Manufacturing Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411 ; N.L.R.B.
v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477; N.L.R.B. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs
and Helpers Local Union No. 639, etc . ( Curtis Bros .), 362 U.S. 274.
D The pertinent part of the injunction enjoined the defendants from :
Engaging in, or , by orders, directions , instructions , appeals, or other means, or by
permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, inducing or encouraging the
employees of members of New York Shipping Association and of other employers to
engage in , strikes or concerted refusals in the course of their employment, to use,
process , transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods , articles , materials, or
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO. 1339
individuals were fined for disobeying the order and appeal was taken from the con-
victions to the Second Circuit . In reversing the convictions, Judge Learned Hand,
speaking for the court , stated the issue clearly, as follows:
We shall for the moment assume that whatever was a violation of § 8(b ) (4) (A),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A), was disobedience of the order and address our-
selves to whether the refusal was such a violation . It was not, we think , within
the three most recent decisions of the Supreme Court construing the section.3
In the first place it was not a "secondary boycott" in the usual meaning of that
term ; for that presupposes a labor dispute between the employees of one em-
ployer, with whom another employer has business relations , as a customer, or as
the source of his material , or the like. It further presupposes that the employees
of the second employer, wishing to make common cause with those of the first,
strike, or threaten to strike , against their . own employer , unless he will dis-
continue his relations with the first , by this means putting pressure on the first to
come to terms with his own employees . Section 8 (b) (4) (A) does indeed go
further than that ; for in the three decisions that we have cited , the employees
were not helping the employees of another employer in a dispute between them
and him . Nor had they any dispute with their own employer as to the conditions
of work or bargaining representative . On the contrary, their only "object" was
to promote the general solidarity of unionism by refusing to work with non-
union men, even though these were in a different craft from theirs. In the case
at bar it is true that the "807 " drivers were in a different craft from the long-
shoremen ; but the "object" of the "Independent 's" refusal to serve their trucks
was not to advance the union solidarity , but a move against "807" for taking part
in the dispute between itself and "AFL-ILA." If this was within the statute
it means that a union may not advance its own cause in a dispute with another
to gain representation , if the step it takes causes a cessation of business between
its employer and a third person , or between two third persons. It is one thing
to say that such interference is unlawful when its "object " is the promotion of
unionism in general , and a very different thing to forbid such a sanction as part
of the contest for control . We start therefore with the premises that, if the
section goes so far , it ought to appear very plainly in the text , and we do no think
that it does.
Turning then to the text , we are to ask whether it was an "object" of the
"Independent's" refusal to serve the trucks to force the "Association" "to cease
doing business with the trucking concerns " or to force "customers" of "the
trucking concerns" to "cease doing business" with them . It is indeed true that
this was one of the probable, nay perhaps inevitable, consequences of the re-
fusal ; but the liability imposed by the section is much more limited .than the
usual liability for a tort, which extends to any damage that the tortfeasor
should reasonably have expected to result from his act . All strikes and "con-
certed refusals" to work involve some cessation of business ; that is the only
sanction they can have . When Congress limited the wrong to occasions when
the cessation was an "object " of the conduct , it excluded much indeed that the
ordinary law of tort would have included . If it had not done so, it would have
made nearly all strikes unlawful. The "object" of an action is the concluding
state of things that the actor seeks to bring about : that which satisfies his aim.
Hence it is a term relative to the whole sequence of steps that he proposes;
and it does not apply to those that are only intermediate to it.
3 N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U . S. 665, 71 S. Ct . 961, 95 L. Ed.
1277; N.L.R . B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
71 S. Ct. 943 , 95 L. Ed . 1284; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers V.
N.L.R.B., '341 U.S. 694 , 71 S. Ct. 954 , 95 L. Ed. 1299; Local 74 v. N . L.R.B., 341
U.S. 707, 71 S. Ct. 966 , 95 L. Ed 1309.
commodities , or to perform services for their employers , where objects thereof are
(1) to force or require members of New York 'Shipping Association and other em-
ployers to cease doing business with trucking concerns employing members of Local
807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , 'Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America , AFL, and (2) to force or require customers of trucking concerns
employing members of Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , AFL, to cease doing business with said
trucking concerns ; . . .
1340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The case at bar is even weaker against the. NMU than the case before the Second
Circuit. Here the members of the NMU engaged in no refusal to work or to refuse
to handle any goods nor did they request the members of any other union or the
employees of any employer to refuse to work or handle. goods. Their picket signs
stated only that MEBA was interfering with employers who lawfully recognized the
NMU. I do not know what inducement to action of any kind can be spelled out of
such a sign. It is true that the General Counsel states that the record is replete
with direct evidence of inducement and encouragement but cites only two unrelated
incidents to support this assertion. When the forklift operators refused to cross the
picket line at the Cotton Warehouse wharf on June 17, Delegate Theodore visited
the scene. When Theodore arrived he told the NMU pickets they were picketing
at the wrong place. Theodore and a picket then went to a telephone booth where
the picket made a call and then told Theodore they were not picketing the docks
but were picketing the ships to keep the longshoremen from going aboard. But this
statement is clearly hearsay as to Respondent.'() There is no showing that the picket
was an agent of Respondent or was authorized to state the purpose of the picketing
nor was it revealed to whom the call was made. The second incident refers to the
visit of Gauthier to the same wharf and his request to go aboard and do repair work
on the Neva West. Gauthier's testimony was that the picket told him he could not
go aboard, that only persons with personal belongings could go aboard. Again,
and for the reasons just stated, the testimony is not binding upon the Respondent
absent a showing that the picket was authorized to speak for the Respondent.
It is true that the waterfront unions are disciplined unions and that a picket line
is a signal which generally will be observed without examination of the picket-sign
legend. It is probably true the NMU hoped that this would be the case and that
the economic distress caused the companies would induce them to appeal to MEBA
to cease picketing the Maximus. But hope of such incidental effect does not make
such picketing unlawful. The Supreme Court in Local 761, International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (General Electric) v. N.L.R.B.,
366 U.S. 667, 673, cited the following language from the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals decision in Salt Dome 11 with approval:
. It is clear that, when a union pickets an employer with whom it has a dis-
pute, it hopes, even if it does not intend, that all persons will honor the picket
line, and that hope encompasses the employees of neutral employers who may
in the course of their employment (deliverymen and the like) have to enter
the premises.
The Court then went on to say:
. But picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line
is not the equivalent of picketing which has an object of inducing those em-
ployees to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order to force
him to refuse to deal with the struck employer.'()
It is true that the situations with which the District Court of Appeals was deal-
ing in Salt Dome and the Supreme Court in General Electric were dissimilar to
the instant case in that the former dealt with common situs picketing and the latter
with separate gate picketing. Whether picketing of an employer's premises which
merely publicizes a dispute between the picketing union and another union con-
stitutes inducement and encouragement of other individuals to cease work presents
IO See Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, et al. (Westinghouse
Electric Corporation), 94 NLRB 415, where the Board held the testimony of two Westing-
house officials that two riggers told them that the Respondents had refused to give them
"clearance" to work was clearly hearsay as to the Respondent. The Trial Examiner's
findings were reversed on this point. See also Local 825, International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers, AFL-CIO (R. G. Maupat Co., Inc.), 135 NLRB 578, 584, 585.
"Seafarers International Union, etc. (Salt Dome Production Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 265 F.
2d 585. Cf. Superior Derrick Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 273 F. 2d 891, cited in 366 U.S. 66T, 677,
supra, as establishing too mechanical a standard of intent. .1112 The Court was construing former Section 8(b) (4) (A) which referred to a "'concerted"
refusal. The 1959 amendments struck the word "concerted" from Section 8(b) (4) (i).
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1341
a novel question. Would, e.g., the Board find a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B)
if the Negro division of a local picketed at an employer's premises to protest that
the white division was unfair to it? I think not. It is true that in Calumet Con-
tractors 13 the Board held that any form of picketing constitutes inducement and
encouragement of other employees who work behind the picket line but in that case
the objective of the picketing was to cause the employer to take action-pay pre-
vailing wages. The dispute which provoked the picketing was with the employer,
Calumet. In any event Calumet begs the question since an unlawful objective was
found.
Convinced that the reasoning of the Second Circuit in reversing the contempt
citations in the ILA-Independent case was sound 14 and persuaded that the language
and reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in the General Electric and Salt Dome cases, distinguishing between the
intended objective of the picketing and derivative consequences, compel the con-
clusion that the picketing which took place at the Delta. and Bloomfield ships was
not unlawful, I find that the picketing which took place here (and I have found
that no more than picketing took place) had for its object the cessation of picketing
by another union at another port. I do not find that object proscribed by the
statute.
Another approach, not urged by Respondent, might be taken. Assume, arguendo,
MEBA to be an employer with whom the NMU had a primary dispute and the
members of MEBA to be MEBA employees. The picketing would then clearly meet
the standards imposed by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Company.15 The picketing
occurred while MEBA's engineers were present on the ships; 16 the picketing was
limited to the area close to the ships, the gangplanks, or the sides; the picket-sign
legends indicated clearly that the dispute was with MEBA alone; MEBA's engineers
were engaged in MEBA's normal business on the ships. It would not be necessary
to apply the modifications to Moore Dry Dock imposed by the courts in Salt Dome,
supra, and in Otis Massey Co.,17 and by the Board in its recent New York Power
and Wire Electric Corp.'s decision to sustain the conduct of the NMU here.19
I prefer, however, to rest this decision on grounds which involve no hypothesis.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delta and Bloomfield are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
The NMU is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The NMU has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(i). and (ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
"International Hod Carriers , etc., Local No. 41 ( Calumet Contractors Association,
et al.), 130 NLRB 78.
141 cannot accept the argument that stronger standards of evidence were required in
the ILA-Independent case because it involved contempt citations.. In neither that case
nor this was the evidence in dispute and the decisions are decisions of law.
" Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547.
is Ship's engineers are required to stand watches while the ship Is in port.
17N.L.R.B. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local-968,-etc., 225 V. 2d
205 (;C.A. 5), setting aside 109 NLRB 275.
18144 NLRB 1089.
"'There is no evidence that MEBA had offices in New Orleans but it may be presumed It
did. Since it Is a safe conclusion that no purpose would be served by picketing at MEBA's
offices, it would make no sense to require the NMU to engage in the folly and conjectural
risk of such picketing. Hostility at the waterfront is not to be taken lightly and the
ivory tower approach to labor problems must occasionally yield to the realities of specific
situations.