National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 1317 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1317
National Maritime Union of America , AFL-CIO and Weyer-
haeuser Lines, A Division of The Weyerhaeuser Company
National Maritime Union of America , AFL-CIO and Calmar
Steamship Corporation . Cases Nos. 4-CC-262 and 4-CC-P63.
June 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 10, 1964, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as
set forth in his attached Decision. 'Thereafter, the General Counsel,
Charging Parties, and the Respondent filed exceptions and support-
ing briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chair-
man McCulloch and Members Leedom-and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error Was committed. The
rulings are hereby 'affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs and the entire record
in this case and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions ,2 and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the additions noted below.'
1 We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent's picketing constituted coercion
and restraint within Section 8(b) (4) (11), but in so finding, we rely upon the evidence,
noted in footnote 2, infra, that Respondent's picketing was for an object of causing a
general cessation of business between employers'. engaged at the situs of the picketing.
See, e.g., Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Uiviosi. No.. 1i 3, AFL-CIO (Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.,
d/b/a Piggly,Wiggly), 133 NLRB 307, 314.
2 Respondent, while conceding that it. bad no controversy with the employers engaged
In operations at pier 27, nevertheless argues that the vessels berthed at this pier were
the primary situs of the dispute because manned by employees, represented,; by MEBA.
There is no merit in this contention, as it had no dispute with the owners of, the vessels,
and like the Trial Examiner, we conclude that Respondent's action occurred at 'a purely
neutral situs.
We also agree with the Trial Examiner that the record affirmatively shows that Re-
spondent's conduct had a cessation of business objective. In addition to the facts on
which he relied, further evidentiary support for this conclusion appears in the leaflet
distributed from the picket line, which; by its implicit appeal that union members bonor
the picket line and by its express indication that "trouble" was in store for the ship-
owners and stevedore companies, manifested Respondent's clear intention of denying
neutral employers the work force on which- their operations depended, so as to force and
require a cessation of business between said employers and other persons within the
meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the Act.
' 3 Respondent contends that the Board may not assert jurisdiction in the instant case
because the record does not disclose the existence of a "labor dispute." We disagree. As
the instant case stems from an interunion controversy concerning the representation of
employees for purposes of collective bargaining, an underlying labor dispute is involved.
Furthermore, we have held that our jurisdiction is not predicated upon the existence of
a labor dispute. Local 1355, International Longshoremen 's Association (Maryland Ship
Ceiling Company), 146 NLRB 723, enforcement denied 332 F. 2d 992 (C.A. 4).' Al-
though the Fourth Circuit, in reversing the cited ease, disagreed , finding such a dispute
147 NLRB No. 144.
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD .
. ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner with the following modifications, and
orders that the Respondent, its officers, agents, representatives, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall abide by the terms of the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as modified below.
1. The Recommended Order is modified by substituting the follow-
ing for paragraph 1:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed in the port of
Philadelphia by Weyerhaeuser Lines, A Division of The Weyer-
haeuser Company; by Calmar Steamship Corporation; by Nacirema
Operating Company; by Hinkins Steamship Agency; or by any other
person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, to
engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is to force or require any of the afore-
mentioned persons to cease doing. business with each other or any
other person.
. (b) Threatening, coercing, or restraining, in the port of Phila-
delphia, said persons or any other person engaged in commerce or
an industry affecting commerce where an object thereof is to force-or
require any of the foregoing persons to cease doing business with
each other or any other person.
2. The attached notice marked "Appendix" is substituted for the
notice recommended by the Trial Examiner.
to be essential , the Board respectfully adheres , until such time as the issue is finally re-
solved by the Supreme Court, 'to the view 'that its power to prevent unfair labor practices
is not so qualified.
We also reject Respondent 's contention that the conduct involved herein is protected
by the "publicity , other than picketing" proviso to 8(b)(4). International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et at. (Samuel Langer ) v. N.L.R.B., 341 U .S. 694, 705.
,APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF WEYERHAEUSER LINES, A DIVISION OF
THE WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY; CALMAR STEAMSHIP CORPORATION;
NACIREMA OPERATING COMPANY, INC.; HINKINS STEAMSHIP
AGENCY, AND OF ALL OTHER PERSONS ENGAGED IN COMMERCE- OR
AN INDUSTRY AFFECTING COMMERCE IN THE PORT OF PHILADEL-
PHIA, PENNSYLVANIA ,
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1319
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage individuals employed in
the port of Philadelphia, by any of the above-named persons or
any other persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affect-
ing commerce, to engage in a strike or refusals in the course of
their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, materials, articles, or
commodities, or to perform any services where an object thereof
is to force or require any of the aforesaid persons to cease doing
business with each other or with any other person.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain, in the port of Phila-
delphia, any of the above-named persons or any other person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce where
an object thereof is to force or require said persons to cease doing
business with each other or any other person.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By----------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 1700 Bankers Security Building, Walnut and Juniper Streets,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Telephone No. 735-2612, if they have any
question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
TRIAL -EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed on June 18 , 1963, by Weyerhaeuser Lines, a division of the
Weyerhaeuser Company, herein called Weyerhaeuser , and on June 20, 1963, by
Calmar Steamship Corporation, herein called Calmar, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board , by the then Regional Director for the Fourth
Region ( Philadelphia , Pennsylvania ), issued his consolidated complaint, dated
July 22, 1963, against National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, herein
called NMU or the Respondent . With respect to the unfair labor practices, the
consolidated complaint alleges, in substance , that Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(b)(4)(i ) and (ii )(B) of the Act. In its duly filed answer
,Respondent denied the unfair labor practice allegations.
Pursuant to due notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Louis Libbin
in Philadelphia , Pennsylvania , on October 2, 3, and 14, 1963. All parties were
represented by counsel, who participated in the hearing, and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross -examine witnesses , to introduce
relevant evidence, to argue orally , and to file briefs . On December 6, 1963, the
General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs , which I have fully considered.
At the same time , counsel for the Charging Parties submitted a letter in which he
stated that the Charging Parties "will rely on the brief of the General Counsel."
1320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record 1 in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED AND THEIR BUSINESS
Weyerhaeuser Lines, a division of the Weyerhaeuser Company, one of the Charg-
ing Parties, herein called Weyerhaeuser, is a Washington corporation engaged in
the business of transporting cargo by oceangoing vessels between various States
in the United States and in performing services related thereto. It is licensed by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and receives approximately $10,000,000, a
year in revenue from its intercoastal operation of six vessels.
Calmar Steamship Corporation, the other Charging Party, herein called Calmar, is
a Delaware corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion, and is engaged in the business of transporting cargo by oceangoing vessels
between various States in the United States and in performing services related
thereto. It is licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and receives in excess
of $10,000,000 a year in revenue from its intercoastal operation of 10 vessels.
Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., herein called Nacirema, is a corporation engaged
in the port of Philadelphia in performing stevedoring services. It has an office on
the north side of pier 27 and a contract with Weyerhaeuser for the performance of
its stevedoring operations on the Atlantic coast.
Hinkins Steamship Agency, herein, called Hinkins, is the agent for Weyerhaeuser
in soliciting its cargo, in receiving its cargo on the pier, in arranging for its bookings,
in arranging for the docking of its ships, and in ordering longshoremen for the
unloading and loading of its ships.
Upon the above undisputed facts, I find that Weyerhaeuser, Calmar, Nacirema,
and Hinkins are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) and Section 8(b) (4) of the Act. ,
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, the record shows, and I find, that
National Maritime Union of America , AFL-CIO, the Respondent herein, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 2
A. Introduction, the issues
The SS George S. Long, one of the vessels operated by Weyerhaeuser, docked at
pier 27 in the port of Philadelphia on June 14,1963. It was scheduled to be loaded
that morning and to sail that evening for Baltimore, Maryland, where it would com-
plete its loading before sailing for the west coast. The SS Portmar, one of the
vessels operated by Calmar, docked at pier 27, and was scheduled to be loaded on
Wednesday, June 19. Both Weyerhaeuser and Calmar, at all times material herein,
had collective-bargaining agreements with various labor organizations, other than
NMU, representing the employees on their vessels. One of the agreements was with
the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, herein called MEBA, which repre-
sented the licensed engineers employed by both companies on these vessels. From
June 14 to 20, 1963, Respondent NMU.. picketed at pier 27. As a result of the
picketing, the George S. Long and the Portmar were not loaded until June 20.
Respondent concedes that it had no dispute of any kind with Weyerhaeuser, Calmar,
Nacirema, Hinkins, or with any other employer or person performing services 'at
pier 27.
1 I hereby note and correct the following obvious errors in the typewritten transcript
of testimony:
Page 21, line 21, substitute "had no" for..the word "had"; page 64, line 13, substi-
tute "employers" for the word "employees" ; page 92, line 8, substitute "future" for
the word "further" ; page 132, line 5, substitute "to" for the word "the" ; page 151,
line 1, substitute "Lippman" for the word "Litvin" ; page 21.8, line 25, substitute
"Lippman" for the word "Litvin" ; page 225, line 8, substitute "And" for the word
"Now?'; page 235, line 11, substitute "signs" for the word "flues"; page 255, line 1,
substitute "at" for the word "as"; page 268, line 24, substitute "ILA" for "IRA";
page 273, line 7, substitute "ILA" for "IRA" ; page 326, line 5, substitute "consent"
for the word "content" ; page 328, line 25, substitute "out" for the word "at".
Unless otherwise indicated, the factual findings are based on exhibits and credited
testimony which are either admitted or undenied.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1321
The issue litigated in this proceeding is whether the picketing and Respondent's
concurrent conduct at pier 27 was violative of Section 8(b) (4) (i ) and (ii) (B) of
the Act.
B. The dispute which caused Respondent's picketing at pier 27
On June 10 , 1963, the SS Maximus, then owned by Cambridge Carriers , docked
at pier 84, south in the port of Philadelphia . That vessel had been commissioned
to take food and drugs to Cuba in exchange for prisoners captured during the "Bay
of Pigs" invasion . Cambridge Carriers had previously entered into collective-
bargaining agreements with NMU and the Brotherhood of Marine Officers, an NMU
affiliate, as the representatives of its unlicensed and licensed personnel , respectively.
Beginning with June 10, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association , herein
called MEBA , established picket lines at pier 84 south and exhibited placards de-
scribing Cambridge Carriers as unfair to MEBA engineers. At the same time,
Luckenbach Stevedoring Company, with whom Cambridge Carriers had a contract
for the loading of the Maximus, failed to order the longshoremen gangs required by
the contract . As a result , the Maximus remained unloaded at pier 84 south until
June 21 , when the picketing ceased and the cargo began to be loaded.
Meanwhile , on Wednesday morning, June 12, NMU established counterpicket
lines at pier 84 south , carrying three sets of placards . One stated that "This is an
interunion dispute only "; another stated , "The MEBA picketing is only jurisdic-
tional" ; and the third stated, "MEBA has no contract with Cambridge , Inc., SS
Maximus."
C. Respondent's picketing at pier 27
Beginning with Friday, June 14, NMU established picket lines at various piers in
the port of Philadelphia, including pier 27. The pickets carried large white placards,
suspended from their necks by a string, which contained the statement arranged in
the following sequence:
INFORMATIONAL
PICKETING
MEBA ENGINEERS
INTERFERES
WITH LAWFULLY
RECOGNIZED
N.M.U.
On June 14 , Weyerhaeuser's vessel; the George S. Long, was moored at the north
side of pier 27 . On June 19 , Calmar's vessel, the SS Portmar, was moored at the
south side of pier 27. Louis Parisi, Respondent's port agent in the port of Phila-
delphia, testified that the only standard used for choosing the picketing site was the
presence of an MEBA crew aboard a vessel that was berthed at a particular pier.
As previously noted, both the SS George S. Long and the SS Portmar had MEBA
crews under collective-bargaining agreements with Weyerhaeuser and Calmar,
respectively.
The pickets were patrolling on a public street in front of the three entrances to
pier 27. During the period from June 14 to June 20, two pickets patrolled at each
of the two entrances to the north side of the pier ; and during part of that period,
when the SS Portmar was moored on the south side of the pier, two additional
pickets also patrolled in front of the entrance to the south side of the pier. The
picketing began about 7 a.m. and continued until about 2:30 or 3 p.m ., except for
the first day when it continued until about 7 or 8 p.m. About 10 other men stood
or sat around in nearby parked-cars , which also contained the same placards. Six
of these men relieved the pickets every half hour; the remaining number relieved
the latter group during lunch period. The pickets, as well as the other NMU men,
also passed out leaflets , addressed "To all union men." This leaflet stated , in sub-
stance, that the crew and licensed officers of the Maximus are members of the NMU
and its affiliate, that they are all under union contract, that MEBA is picketing the
Maximus because it wants the jobs of the members of the NMU and its affiliate;
that "you're the only ones that can stop them from making this trouble"; and that
"the NMU is out to put a stop to this kind of thing."
The picketing continued from June 14 to 20 excluding Sunday. During that
period, the SS George S. Long and the SS Portmar could not be unloaded or loaded
because ' the longshoremen would not cross the picket lines. Nacirema had a con-
tract with Weyerhaeuser for the performance of the stevedoring operations on the
Atlantic coast . Thomas Cadden , the stevedoring superintendent for Nacirema,
1322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hired groups of longshoremen for loading cargo on the George S. Long each day,
except Sunday, from June 14 to 19. The longshoremen shaped up about 7 a.m.
and were hired at 7:30 a.m. for an 8 o'clock start. Each morning when the gangs
of longshoremen arrived at the north side of pier. 27, where the George S. Long
was berthed, the picket line was there and the men refused to cross the picket line
to go to work. Robert E. Moran, the district agent of Calmar, ordered a day and
night gang of longshoremen for June 19 and 20 to unload the cargo of the Portmar.
Each day, the day gang reported at 8 a.m. but refused to cross the picket line.
There was no picket line at night, and the night gang worked.
The MEBA picketing of the Maximus ended on June 20, 1963, and loading opera-
tions began the following day. Respondent's picketing at the various piers in the
port of Philadelphia, including pier 27, ended at the same time, and the vessels,
George S. Long and Portmar, were then loaded.
D. Respondent's conduct in conjunction with said picketing
The Hinkins Steamship Agency, herein called Hinkins, is located on the south
side of pier 27. It is Weyerhaeuser's agent for the soliciting and receiving of cargo
which is to be loaded in Weyerhaeuser's vessels. Charles Donahue, a receiving
clerk of Hinkins, was informed of the picketing at pier 27 shortly before 8 a.m. on
June 14, when he and other employees were preparing to receive cargo on the pier
for the George S. Long. He looked out and observed the pickets congregated on
the north side of pier 27 where. the George S. Long was moored. Being a member
of Local 1242 of the International Longshoremen's Association, herein called the
ILA, Donahue telephoned to his delegate and was informed that, as long as there
were no pickets on the south side of the pier, he could work. However, as he was
preparing to unload certain trucks which were Waiting, he observed a stray picket
with a placard walking past the south side of the pier. Upon his inquiry, Donahue
was directed by one of the pickets to the picket captain. He then asked the picket
captain, Francisco Jardine, if he had any objection to the Company receiving freight
on the south side of the pier. At that time, no ship was docked on the south side.
Jardine replied, "Yes." Donahue then stated, "Well, if you have any objections,
then you'd better put pickets over there because I must have a reason for not going
in there." Immediately thereafter, four pickets were sent to the south side of the
pier, and the truck unloading operations on the pier ceased .3
Edward Shallow, manager of Hinkins, was informed by Donahue on the morn-
ing of June 14 that there were picket lines in front of pier 27 . Shallow's office had
previously ordered longshoremen gangs; clerks, and checkers, all union members,
to work on cargo for the George S. Long. On the afternoon of June 14, Shallow
telephoned the NMU hall and talked to Lucien Smith, one of Respondent's
patrolmen . Shallow inquired about the status of the picket line and was informed
that meetings were then in progress in Philadelphia and New York . Shallow tele-
phoned again that evening and was informed by Smith that there were no develop-
ments and that the picketing would continue. As a ship of another line was expected
to arrive on Monday or Tuesday, Shallow again telephoned to the NMU hall on
Sunday morning and talked to Louis Parisi, Respondent's agent for the port of
Philadelphia . Shallow inquired as to the status of the picketing and was told by
Parisi that "any MEBA-manned ships would be picketed by the NMU."
Although longshoremen gangs had been ordered for every day, the George S.
Long continued to remain unloaded. On Tuesday, June 18, Shallow telephoned
the NMU hall and spoke to Jardine, Respondent's patrolman and picket captain.
3 The findings in this paragraph are based on the credited testimony of Charles Donahue,
who impressed me as being a frank, candid, and truthful witness. Although Donahue did
not know the name of the picket captain, he identified him sufficiently so that I was able
to recognize Jardine as being the person whom Donahue described. Jardine admitted
that he was Respondent's patrolman in the port of Philadelphia and the picket captain at
pier 27 during June 1963. At first he denied that he was ever asked by anyone at pier 27
If he had any objection to receiving freight on the south side of the pier. After his recol-
lection was allegedly refreshed, he admitted that "some fellow" who works there did ask
him that, and testified that he replied "it was perfectly all right," and that he was "not
stopping nothing." Jardine did not impress me as being a credible witness. He was
frequently evasive, at times fenced with the General Counsel, and at other times assumed
a pose of extreme naivete with respect to union matters of common knowledge. In view
of all the foregoing , including the demeanor of the witnesses , I do not credit Jardine's
testimony to the extent that it conflicts with that of Donahue, set forth in the text.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1323
Shallow requested that the pickets be removed from the front of pier 27 and be
placed alongside the gangway to the George S. Long.4 Jardine replied that Shallow
was "out of his mind." The next day, Shallow telephoned Parisi at the NMU
hall and found that he was not available. Jardine returned the call about 2:15 p.m.
Shallow again asked Jardine if the picket line could be removed from the head of
the pier to the gangway of the George S. Long on the north side. of pier 27. Jardine
.again stated that it was not possible and could not be done. Later that day,
Jardine telephoned Shallow, informed him that his request had been reconsidered,
and stated that it would be all right to receive the cargo that night. However, as
Weyerhaeuser had not ordered any night gangs since docking on June 14, Shallow
replied that he could not receive the cargo on that night on such short notice because
he did not have truckers available, but pointed out that he wanted to start the
following morning when he could get,the trucks lined up and the Company's clerks
and checkers. At that time, Jardine said that it would be "okay to work the ship." 8
The next morning, June 19, Shallow went down to the pier and saw the picket
lines still in front of the pier. Upon being referred by a picket to Jardine as the
man in charge, Shallow introduced himself to Jardine and referred to their telephone
-conversation of the preceding evening. Jardine thereupon accused Shallow of
"pulling a fast one." Once again the removal of the picket line was discussed.
.Jardine then went into his office and telephoned Parisi, and both Jardine and
Shallow, in turn, talked to Parisi. Shallow asked Parisi to remove the pickets and
referred to Shallow's conversation with Jardine on the previous evening. Parisi
stated that it was not at all possible to remove the pickets on a local basis and that
the NMU in New York would have to be contacted. Shallow relayed this informa-
tion to his principal, Weyerhaeuser .6
Robert Moran, the district agent of Calmar, is in charge of supervising the loading
of Calmar's ships and the laying out and accumulating of cargo alongside the vessels,
work which is performed on the pier. On Wednesday, June 19, Calmar's vessel, the
SS Portmar, was moored on the south side of pier 27. That day, Moran needed to get
his union clerks on the pier so that they could order the cargo down on car floats and
belt lines. He therefore requested Picket Captain Jardine to split the picket line
by moving the pickets away from each side of the doorway so that he could have a
doorway open to get his unionized clerks into Calmar's office on the pier, as the clerks
* Shallow's reason for this request was to enable him to receive 10 truckloads of cargo,
which had been booked for the George S. Long, on the pier so that the cargo would ne
in a position to be loaded immediately upon the removal of the pickets from the vicinity
,of the George S. Long.
5 On the previous day, Weyerhaeuser had filed its unfair labor practice charge with the
Board's Regional Office.
P The findings in the preceding paragraphs with respect to Shallow's conversations and
activities are based on the credited testimony of Edward Shallow, who impressed me as
a truthful witness. Lucien Smith did not testify. Parisi admitted that Jardine tele-
phoned him on the morning of June 19 and that he also spoke to Shallow at that time.
He testified that Shallow asked him if he' would remove the pickets so that he could bring
certain truckloads onto the pier and that he told Shallow that no one was stopping the
trucks from coming in. Parisi admitted that he (Parisi) did not suggest any alternative
place for the pickets and did not move the pickets after talking to Shallow. He further
testified that no one .is at the NMU hall on Sundays and that no one is there to receive
telephone calls. Jardine denied ever being asked by anyone to move the pickets alongside
the ship or to some place else on the pier. He admitted being asked one morning by a
person at pier 27 to move the pickets. He testified that he replied he could not do so
without authorization from his agent. He admitted that he then telephoned Parisi and
that both he and this person talked to Parisi. He testified that Parisi told him (Jardine)
not to stop any trucks from going in and that he replied that he was complying with those
instructions. He denied ever telling anyone that "he was out of his mind" in connection
with a request to move the pickets. He denied having had any other conversation, or
making any other statements, as testified by Shallow.
I was not favorably impressed by the veracity of Parisi from his demeanor on the
stand. In addition, he was frequently evasive and at times fenced with the General
Counsel. I have previously indicated (see footnote 3, supra) that I do not regard,
Jardine as a credible witness. Under the circumstances, I do not credit the testimony of
Parisi and Jardine to the extent that it conflicts with that of Shallow, as set forth in
the text.
1324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would not cross the picket line? Jardine refused, stating that "we have to picket the
whole pier." The pickets continued to cover the same area and Calmar's clerks re-
fused to cross the picket line to go to work. Moran then made a similar request
of Parisi in a telephone conversation that same morning. Parisi replied that he
expected the matter to be resolved in the near future and that all he could tell
Moran at that time was to wait. The next day, June 20, Moran again attempted to
have Jardine move the picket line, suggesting that the picket line be moved down to
the gangway. Jardine refused, stating that they were going to picket across the front
of the pier.8
E. The illegality of Respondent's conduct
Respondent concedes that it had no dispute with any of the Employers herein
involved. In order to find Respondent's conduct violative of Section 8(b) (4) (i)
and (ii) (B) of the Act, the following three elements must exist: (I) There must be
inducement or encouragement of any individual employed by any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to strike or to engage in a work
stoppage; (2) there must be threats or coercion or restraint of any such person
engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce; and (3) an object in
each case must be forcing or requiring any person to cease using , selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.
Respondent does not seriously dispute the existence of the first element . Counsel
for Respondent admitted at the oral argument that "there is no serious quarrel that
work did not go on during this period of time." He further admits in his brief
that longshoremen, truckers, clerks, and checkers, all union members, refused to
cross the picket line. The result was that the George S. Long and the Portmar could
not be loaded or unloaded. The preponderance of the record evidence clearly war-
rants the findings, which I herein make, (1) that Respondent's agents knew that this
would be the effect of its picketing at the entrances to pier 27 and •(2) that the
picketing was intended to be Respondent's signal to uhion members employed by
employers using pier 27 to cease work. I therefore find that Respondent's picketing
and Picket Captain Jardine's statement on June 14 to Charles Donahue, the receiving
clerk of Hinkins Steamship Agency, to the effect that he (Jardine) objected to the
Company receiving freight on the south side of pier 27,9 induced and encouraged a
work stoppage by individuals employed by persons engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) of the Act
and outside the free speech protection asserted by Respondent.10
With respect to the second element, it is conceded that all the employers involved
were clearly -neutrals and that there is no question of any primary employer being at
the situs of the picketing at pier 27. Under these circumstances, I find, in accordance
with the Board's consistent holdings,ll that the picketing at pier 27 also constituted
restraint and coercion of persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act. I also find that
the conduct of Picket Captain Jardine and Port.Agent Parisi 12 in refusing to move
7 Although Moran did not know Jardine's name, he was referred by one of the pickets
to the person in charge who, in turn, stated that he was in charge of the picket line. In
addition, Moran Identified Jardine on the witness -stand to my complete satisfaction. I
find that Moran did speak to Jardine on the occasion related in the text.
s The findings in this paragraph are based on the credited testimony of Robert Moran,
who impressed me as a trustworthy witness. Jardine admitted being asked at the pier by
someone to remove the pickets so that the checkers could go through. He testified that
he replied that they could go through and that no one was stopping them. Parisi denied
ever talking to Moran. For reasons previously indicated, I do not credit the testimony
of Jardine and Parisi to the extent that it may conflict with that of Moran, set forth
in the text.
91 find that as Respondent's patrolman and picket captain at pier 27, Jardine was an
agent of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act and that Respondent
is therefore responsible for his conduct.
10 See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al. (Samuel
Langer) v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, 701-704.
11 General Teamsters Local No. 324, etc. (Cascade Employers Association, Inc.), 144
NLRB 836, and cases cited therein. -
111 find that Parisi is also an agent of Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act and that Respondent is liable for his conduct.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF •AMERICA-, AFL-CIO 1325
the picket line to enable union employees to enter the pier, when requested to do so
by Manager Shallow of Hinkins Steamship Agency and by District Agent Moran
of Calmar, constituted, under all the circumstances, further restraint and coercion
within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) of the Act.
The third element-an object, etc.-requires a little more detailed discussion.
Counsel for Respondent contends in his brief that the picketing was purely informa-
tional and solely for a lawful objective. Thus, counsel argues in his. brief that "the
MEBA picketing of the Maximus effectively prevented cargo operations on that vessel
and constituted a definite threat to the jobs and economic security of the NMU men
employed on the ships," that Respondent believed that "the rank and file of MEBA
members did not support this course of conduct" and "would oppose it," and that in
order to protect the jobs of its members Respondent "sought to appeal directly to the
MEBA rank and file and to the public in general to advise them of the true nature
of the dispute in the hope that. their own consciences and self-respect as trade
unionists and responsible citizens might lead them to withdraw all support from the
illegal picketing of the Maximus and to prevail upon the MEBA leadership to stop
the picketing."
The Board, in a recent supplemental decision,13 had occasion to point out that
picketing or a strike "may have a number of objects"; that "some may be ultimate,
others alternative, conditional, or immediate"; that, "however denominated-ultimate,
alternative, conditional or immediate-if the object is proscribed by statute, a strike
[or picketing] to achieve it is unlawful"; that there may be both lawful and unlawful
objectives in the same case; and that if the immediate objective is to cause a cessation
of business between two dmployers as a means of exercising pressure to achieve the
ultimate lawful object, then the picketing or strike is unlawful. This is so because,
the Board further pointed -out, the Supreme. Court has noted that Section 8(b) (4)
forbids certain conduct which has "an" object that is proscribed.14
In the instant case, Respondent's ultimate object was to get the MEBA rank-and-file
members to prevail upon the MEBA leadership to stop the picketing of the Maximus
and thereby protect the jobs of Respondent's members on that ship. This. is a lawful
object, not proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)., However, Respondent's further conten-
tion that it sought to accomplish this object solely by appealing directly to MEBA
rank-and-file members and to the public is not borne out by the record. Although the
standard used for choosing the picketing site was the presence of a MEBA crew aboard
a vessel at a particular pier, the picket signs were not addressed to MEBA members.
On the contrary, the leaflets passed, out by the pickets were addressed "To all union
men." No request was ever made to board the. ships to talk to the MEBA members.
There was no picketing of MEBA headquarters in Philadelphia. Nor were there any
attempts to inform the public through any of the other mass media or in any other
locations. On the other hand, the record clearly establishes that one of Respondent's
objects'was to cause a work stoppage in the port in connection with vessels which had
MEBA crewmen. This is readily apparent from the timing and location of the
pickets at the entrances to pier 27, the refusals of Port Agent Parisi and Picket Captain
Jardine to comply with employer requests to move the picket line so that union em-
ployees could enter the pier without crossing the line to perform work for the MEBA
berthed vessels, the George S. Long and the Portmar, and the extension of the picket-
ing to the south side of pier 27 when no vessel was berthed there so that union em-
ployees would not work on the receiving of 'cargo for the George S. Long, all as
previously found. Upon consideration of all the foregoing and the entire record
as a whole, I am convinced and find that Respondent's immediate objective was to
cause a cessation of work in the port of Philadelphia in connection with any vessel
which had a MEBA crew as a means of exerting pressure upon the MEBA members
of these vessels to achieve Respondent's ultimate lawful objective, Thus, Respond-
ent's immediate objective of causing neutral persons to cease doing business with them-
selves or with any other person in connection with work to be performed for the
George S, Long and the Portmar on pier, 27 is "an" object proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B).
Respondent contends that the absence of any primary dispute with. an employer
is fatal to the General Counsel's case. I do not agree. Consistent with the broad
purposes of the statute, the thrust of Section 8(b)(4) has been to prevent the dis-
ruption of business between neutrals and the absence of a primary dispute has been
13 Retail Clerics Union, Local 770, et at. (Food Employers Council, Inc.), 145 NLRB 307.
14 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et at., 341 U.S.
675, 689.
1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
held to be immaterial in such a situation 15 As the Board pointed out in adopting
the Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner Leff in United Marine Division, Local
333, et al. (New York Shipping Association), 107 NLRB 686, at 711:
[T]hough it is plain that primary action is to be excepted from the scope of
Section 8(b) (4) (A) [now 8(b) (4) (B) ], there is nothing in the legislative his-
tory to warrant a conclusion that where secondary action is involved, Congress
intended to draw a distinction between different kinds, so as to include some
but not others. There is evidence, on the other hand, that Congress, with the
purpose of confining the area of economic conflict in labor disputes to direct
disputants, intended Section 8(b) (4) (A) to condemn all action directed against
or which has the effect of injuring the business of third persons not involved in
the basic disagreement giving rise to the conflict.
To hold otherwise would undermine the entire thrust of Section 8(b) (4) (B).16
I find that by picketing the entrances to pier 27 where vessels of Weyerhaeuser
and Calmar were moored and by the conduct of Respondent's agents, Louis Parisi
and Francisco Jardine, all as previously detailed, Respondent has induced and en-
couraged individuals employed by Weyerhaeuser, Calmar, Nacirema, and Hinkins to
engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to perform services
for their respective employers, and has restrained and coerced the aforenamed em-
ployers, in each case with an object of forcing or requiring the aforenamed em-
ployers or persons to cease doing business with each other or with any other person
on pier 27 in the port of Philadelphia. By such conduct Respondent has violated
Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of the Companies set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I will
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the polices of the Act17
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
15 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' District Council, et al.
(Sound Shingle Co.), 211 F. 2d 149 (C.A.'9), holding that an object is prohibited whether
or not the union has a dispute with any other producer, processor, or manufacturer. In
fact, the court pointed out that "if the object Is sought not because of any dispute but
merely because the union dislikes the other producer for any reason or no reason, the
conduct would appear even more reprehensible." See also, Local 11, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners of America; AFL, et al. (Gener [ Millwork Corporation), 113
NLRB 1084, 1086, enfd. 242 F. 2d 932 (C.A. 6).
10 There is no merit to Respondent's further contention that the complaint should be
dismissed as moot because the picketing ceased on June 20, 1963, and has never been
resumed. An order is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act and to bar the re-
sumption of such and similar conduct.
17 Complaints have also been issued against Respondent in two additional cases arising
out of the Mawimus dispute. In one (Houston Maritime Association, Inc., Cases Nos.
23-CC-125, 23-CC-126, and 23-CC-127 [147 NLRB 1243]), a decision was issued on
December 23, 1963, by Trial Examiner Sidney D. Goldberg, who found that Respondent
violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act by its picketing of the ports of
Houston and Galveston, Texas. The second case (Delta Steamship, ;Cases Nos. 15-CC-189
and 15-CC-190 [147 NLRB 1328] ), was heard in New Orleans, Louisiana, by Trial
Examiner John Funke. When all three cases are considered by the Board, it will then be
in a position to determine whether the geographic scope of the Recommended Order
should be broadened in the instant case.
NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO 1327
2. Weyerhaeuser Lines, a division of the Weyerhaeuser Company, Calmar Steam-
ship Corporation, Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., and Hinkins Steamship Agency are
each engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning
of Sections 2(6) and (7) and 8(b) (4) of the Act.
3. Louis Parisi, Respondent's port agent at the port of Philadelphia, and Fran-
cisco Jardine, Respondent's patrolman and picket captain of the picketing at pier 27
in that port, are agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
4. By picketing the, entrances to the pier where vessels of Weyerhaeuser and
Calmar were moored and by the conduct of Respondent's agents, Louis Parisi and
Francisco Jardine, as set forth in section III, C and D, supra, Respondent has induced
and encouraged individuals employed by Weyerhaeuser, Calmar, Nacirema, and
Hinkins to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to
perform services for their respective employers, and has restrained and coerced
the aforenamed employers, in each case with an object of forcing or requiring the
aforenamed employers or persons to cease doing business with each other or with
any other person at pier 27 in the port of Philadelphia.
5. By the conduct set forth in the preceding paragraph, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the entire record in the ease, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby recommend that the
Respondent, National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,
representatives, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from picketing any entrance to a pier in the port of Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, where vessels of Weyerhaeuser Lines, a division of the Weyer-
haeuser Company, and Calmar Steamship Corporation are docked or moored, or in
any other manner inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Weyer-
haeuser, Calmar, Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., or Hinkins Steamship Agency, or
by any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to
engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities, or to perform any services, or threatening, coercing, or restrain-
ing any of the aforenamed employers or any other person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, where, in either case, an object thereof is to force
or require any of the aforementioned employers or any other person to cease doing
business with any other person.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places in Respondent's business offices, meeting halls,
and all places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix A." 18 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Fourth Region, shall, after being duly signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the Regional Director for
the Fourth Region for posting by each of the Employers named in the preceding
paragraph, who are willing, at all places where notices to their respective employees
are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply herewith.18
Is In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."