Natera, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 11, 2020

IPR2019-01201 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2020)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 54
571-272-7822 Date: December 11, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

ILLUMINA, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

NATERA, INC.,
Patent Owner.
____________

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Before GRACE KARAFFA OBERMANN, SUSAN L. C. MITCHELL, and
CYNTHIA M. HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

JUDGMENT
Final Written Decision
Determining No Challenged Claims Unpatentable
35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
Denying Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
37 C.F.R. § 42.64

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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a Final Written Decision in an inter partes review challenging
the patentability of claims 1–27 of U.S. Patent No. 8,682,592 B2 (“the
’592 Patent,” Ex. 1001). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
Petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged
claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018).
Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, for the
reasons discussed below, we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–27 are unpatentable.
Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, we deny Petitioner’s Motion
to Exclude (Paper 48).
Procedural History
Illumina, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for an inter partes review
of claims 1–27 of the ’592 Patent. Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Natera, Inc. (“Patent
Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 7 (“Prelim.
Resp.”). The parties further submitted an authorized Reply and Sur-reply to
the Preliminary Response. Papers 13, 18.
In view of the then-available preliminary record, we concluded that
Petitioner satisfied the burden, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), to show that there
was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we instituted an inter
partes review of all the challenged claims, on all of the asserted grounds.
Paper 19 (“Inst. Dec.”).
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After institution, Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 27 (“PO
Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 35 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a
Sur-reply. Paper 43 (“Sur-reply”).
Petitioner filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence. Paper 48. Patent
Owner opposed that motion. Paper 49. Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 50.
On September 16, 2020, we held an oral hearing, the transcript of
which is of record. Paper 53 (“Tr.”).
Real Parties-in-Interest
Petitioner and Patent Owner each identify themselves as the real
parties-in-interest. Pet. 69; Paper 6 (Patent Owner’s Updated Mandatory
Notices), 1.
Related Matters
The parties identify Illumina, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 18-cv-01662,
as a related matter. Pet. 69; Paper 6, 1.
The ’592 Patent and Relevant Background
The ’592 Patent, entitled “System and Method for Cleaning Noisy
Genetic Data from Target Individuals Using Genetic Data from Genetically
Related Individuals,” generally relates to
acquiring, manipulating and using genetic data for medically
predictive purposes, and specifically to a system in which
imperfectly measured genetic data is made more precise by
using known genetic data of genetically related individuals,
thereby allowing more effective identification of genetic
irregularities that could result in various phenotypic outcomes.
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Ex. 1001, 1:23–29, code (54). According to the Specification, “to make
accurate phenotypic predictions[,] high quality genetic data is critical.” Id.
at 8:15–17. Yet, in the case of prenatal or pre-implantation genetic
diagnoses, “a complicating factor is the relative paucity of genetic material
available.” Id. at 8:17–19. The ’592 Patent discloses methods that
make use of imperfect knowledge of the genetic data of the
mother and the father, together with the knowledge of the
mechanism of meiosis and the imperfect measurement of the
embryonic DNA, in order to reconstruct, in silico, the
embryonic DNA at the location of key SNPs [single nucleotide
polymorphisms] with a high degree of confidence.
Id. at 8:45–50.
In one embodiment, after fetal or embryonic genetic data has been
measured, it “can be used to detect if the cell is aneuploid, that is, if fewer or
more than two of a particular chromosome is present in a cell.” Id. at 8:67–
9:2. “A common example of this condition is trisomy-21, which gives rise
to Down syndrome.” Id. at 9:2–4. The Specification states that aneuploidy
is detected “by creating a set of hypotheses about the potential states of the
DNA, and testing to see which one has the highest probability of being true
given the measured data.” Id. at 9:7–10.
Illustrative Claim
Claim 1, the only independent claim of the ’592 Patent, is illustrative
and is reproduced below:
1. An ex vivo method for determining a number of copies of a
chromosome or chromosome segment of interest in the genome
of an individual, the method comprising:
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using a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)
genotyping array or high throughput DNA
sequencing to measure genetic material and produce
genetic data for some or all possible alleles at a
plurality of at least 100 loci on the chromosome or
chromosome segment of interest in the individual,
wherein the genetic data is noisy due to a small
amount of genetic material from the individual; and
wherein the small amount of genetic material from
the individual is from fifty or fewer of the
individual’s cells, 0.3 ng or less of the individual’s
DNA, extracellular DNA from the individual found
in maternal blood, or combinations thereof;
creating a set of one or more hypotheses specifying the
number of copies of the chromosome or chromosome
segment of interest in the genome of the individual;
determining, on a computer, the probability of each of
the hypotheses given the produced genetic data; and
using the probabilities associated with each hypothesis
to determine the most likely number of copies of the
chromosome or chromosome segment of interest in
the genome of the individual.
Ex. 1001, 62:39–62.
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Prior Art and Instituted Grounds of Unpatentability
We instituted trial based on the following grounds of unpatentability:
Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1–12, 15–17, 19–23, 27 103(a)1 Dhallan2
18 103(a) Dhallan, Bianchi3
24–26 103(a) Dhallan, Sham4
1–27 103(a) Rabinowitz5
Inst. Dec. 52; Pet. 9.
In support of its patentability challenges, Petitioner relies on two
declarations from David Peters, Ph.D., among other evidence. See Ex. 1004
(“Peters Decl.”); Ex. 1059 (“Peters Second Decl.”). Patent Owner relies on

1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (“AIA”), included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective
after the filing of the application that led to the ’592 Patent. Therefore, we
apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
2 Dhallan, US 2004/0137470 A1, published July 15, 2004 (Ex. 1002).
3 Bianchi, Fetal Cells in the Maternal Circulation: Feasibility for Prenatal
Diagnosis, 105(3) Br. J. Haematol. 574–83 (1999) (Ex. 1034).
4 Sham et al., DNA Pooling: A Tool for Large-Scale Association Studies,
3(11) Nat. Rev. Genet. 862–71 (2002) (Ex. 1021).
5 Rabinowitz et al., US 2007/0184467 A1, published Aug. 9, 2007
(Ex. 1003).
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a declaration from John Quackenbush, Ph.D., among other evidence.
Ex. 2012 (“Quackenbush Decl.”).
II. ANALYSIS
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), a patent claim is unpatentable if the
differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness
is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including:
(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the
claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the
art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness determination requires
finding “a motivation to combine accompanied by a reasonable expectation
of achieving what is claimed in the patent-at-issue.” Intelligent Bio-Sys.,
Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the
relevant date would have
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been a member of a team of scientists developing genetic
techniques to collect and analyze genetic data. The POSA
[person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had an M.D. or
master’s or Ph.D. in molecular biology, genetics,
bioinformatics, or a related field, and, through either education
or work experience, 2-3 years of experience with nucleic acid
sequencing, sample preparation, and prenatal diagnostics.
Pet. 6; see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 23 (addressing level of ordinary
skill in the art). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner neither
comments on this proposal, nor proposes an alternative level of ordinary
skill in the art.6

6 For completeness, we note that Dr. Quackenbush’s declaration includes the
opinion that
a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a member
of a team of scientists developing techniques to obtain and
analyze genetic data. Such a person would have (1) a masters
and/or PhD degree in Molecular Biology, or Genetics, or a
related discipline, with a working knowledge on the use of
Bioinformatics; or (2) a masters and/or PhD degree in
Bioinformatics, Computational Biology, or Biostatistics, or a
related discipline, with a working knowledge of Molecular
Biology/Genetics. At least one member of that team, but not
necessarily every member of that team, would have had,
through either education or work experience, 2-3 years of
experience with molecular biology techniques relevant in the
field of prenatal diagnostics.
Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 45. Dr. Quackenbush states, however, that
his opinions would not change if he were to apply Dr. Peters’ proposed level
of ordinary skill in the art. Id. ¶ 47.
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Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the cited
prior art, we apply it for purposes of this Decision.7 In our view, moreover,
the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the
invention. See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not
required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need
for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid
State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
Claim Construction
The Board interprets a claim using the same claim construction
standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under
35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we
construe a claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of
such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the
prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.
Petitioner argues that “[n]o term requires express construction in this
proceeding.” Pet. 5. Petitioner notes, however, that the district court
construed two claim terms, and states that “[t]he Court’s constructions are

7 We would reach the same ultimate conclusions under Dr. Quackenbush’s
proposal. See Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 45, 47 (Dr. Quackenbush, proposing a somewhat
different definition, but indicating that the selection of one definition over
the other would not change the ultimate result).
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applied in this Petition.”8 Id. at 6; see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 27
(Dr. Peters, indicating that he used the District Court’s claim constructions
in his analysis). Although Patent Owner does not address claim construction
in its briefing, we note that Dr. Quackenbush indicated that he “applied the
district court’s constructions in [his] analysis.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush
Decl.) ¶ 69.
Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc.
v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). On this
record, neither party requests claim construction, and we determine that, for
purposes of our decision, no claim term requires express construction.
Obviousness of Claims 1–12, 15–17, 19–23, and 27 Over Dhallan
Petitioner argues that claims 1–12, 15–17, 19–23, and 27 are
unpatentable as obvious over Dhallan. Pet. 11. Below, we provide an
overview of Dhallan. We then address claim 1, followed by dependent
claim 5, and finally, the remainder of the dependent claims Petitioner
challenges as obvious over Dhallan (claims 2–4, 6–12, 15–17, 19–23,
and 27).

8 The District Court construed (i) the term “genetic data for some or all
possible alleles” as meaning “genetic data for some or all possible base pairs
at a given locus;” and (ii) the term “at least 100 loci on the chromosome or
chromosome segment of interest in the individual” as meaning “at least 100
loci on the chromosome or chromosome segment of interest from only the
individual.” Ex. 1008, 12, 15; Pet. 5.
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1. Overview of Dhallan (Exhibit 1002)
Dhallan, entitled “Methods for Detection of Genetic Disorders,”
discloses “a rapid, non-invasive method” that is “useful for detection of
chromosomal abnormalities,” including “monosomies, trisomies, and other
aneuploidies.” Ex. 1002, code (54), ¶ 3. Dhallan discloses that in one
embodiment, the method comprises “quantitating the relative amount of the
alleles at a heterozygous locus of interest, . . . wherein said relative amount
is expressed as a ratio, and wherein said ratio indicates the presence or
absence of a chromosomal abnormality.” Id. ¶ 42. Specifically, Dhallan
explains that
[t]he ratio of alleles at a heterozygous site is expected to be
about 1:1 (one A allele and one G allele). However, if an extra
chromosome is present the ratio is expected to be about 1:2
(one A allele and 2 G alleles or 2 A alleles and 1 G allele).
Id. ¶ 826.
Dhallan’s Example 14 reports an experiment that was designed to
“recapitulate the in vivo scenario of blood from a pregnant female.” Id.
¶ 2157. Dhallan teaches that maternal DNA was mixed with DNA isolated
from her child, who previously had been diagnosed with trisomy 21, in
various ratios to represent varying percentages of fetal DNA. Id. In
particular, samples containing 100% Down syndrome DNA and mixtures of
maternal blood and 75% Down syndrome DNA, 50% Down syndrome
DNA, and 40% Down syndrome DNA were created and tested. Id. ¶ 2200.
In each of the samples, a total of 768 SNPs on chromosome 13 and
768 SNPs on chromosome 21 were genotyped. Id. ¶¶ 2166–83, 2196–97.
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SNPs homozygous for the maternal DNA and heterozygous for the child
DNA were further analyzed to create the allele ratios. Id. ¶¶ 2198–200. The
allele ratio at each heterozygous SNP was calculated by dividing the value
obtained for allele 1 by the value obtained for allele 2, e.g., “if SNP X can
either be adenine (A) or guanine (G), the ratio at SNP X was calculated by
dividing the value obtained for adenine by the value obtained for guanine.”
Id. ¶ 2201.
Dhallan notes that for the sample containing 100% Down syndrome
DNA, 62 SNPs on chromosome 13 and 49 SNPs on chromosome 21 were
analyzed. Id. ¶¶ 2202–06. The average ratio of allele 1 to allele 2 on
chromosome 13 was approximately 1.0, whereas the average ratio for
chromosome 21 was 0.531, in line with expectations. Id. Dhallan
concluded that “[s]tatistical analysis revealed a confidence value of 99.9%
that the ratios obtained on chromosome 13 and on chromosome 21
represented true differences, rather than random numerical fluctuations in
value.” Id. ¶ 2206. Dhallan notes that the ratios obtained upon analysis of
the 75% Down syndrome DNA, 50% Down syndrome DNA, and 40%
Down syndrome DNA mixtures similarly matched the expected ratios. Id.
¶¶ 2207–23.
Dhallan discloses that template DNA for use in the disclosed methods
can be obtained from various sources, including from a single cell of an
embryo, or from fetal DNA obtained from maternal blood. Id. ¶¶ 167–69.
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Dhallan also teaches use of commercially available SNP genotyping arrays
for producing the genetic data for use in the method. Id. ¶ 43.
2. Analysis of Claim 19
a) Overview of the Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner argues that Dhallan is directed to a non-invasive method of
detecting chromosomal abnormalities, which includes “determining alleles
at a locus of interest and quantitating a ratio for the alleles at the locus,
where the ratio indicates the presence or absence of a chromosomal
abnormality.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002, Abstract). According to Petitioner,
Dhallan hypothesizes that an individual with a normal number of
chromosomes will have a balanced ratio of alleles, indicating an equal
number of copies of maternal and paternal chromosomes. Id. In the case of

9 Claim 1 recites that the “small amount of genetic data” can be from
“[i] fifty or fewer of the individual’s cells, [ii] 0.3 ng or less of the
individual’s DNA, [iii] extracellular DNA from the individual found in
maternal blood, or [iv] combinations thereof.” Ex. 1001, 62:49–53
(bracketed numbers added for ease of reference). Petitioner’s
unpatentability arguments for claim 1 focus on option [i], with Petitioner
arguing that it would have been obvious to use DNA from a single fetal cell
in the claimed method. See generally Pet. 14–33; Tr. 15:8–10 (Petitioner’s
counsel stating: “I don't think there’s any dispute between Illumina and
Natera that for claim 1, we were talking about a single cell from an embryo
or a single cell from maternal blood.”). To the extent Petitioner also argued
unpatentability under options [ii] and [iii] in connection with claim 1, it did
so by cross-referencing its arguments for claims 4, 5, and 17. See, e.g., Pet.
20, 29, 33. As such, we address Petitioner’s arguments under options [ii]
and [iii] in connection with our analysis of claims 4, 5, and 17.
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trisomy 21, however, Dhallan hypothesizes that the individual will have an
imbalanced ratio of alleles, reflecting an extra copy of the chromosome. Id.
at 11–13.
According to Petitioner, Dhallan’s Example 14 is a “proof-of-
principle experiment for detecting chromosome 21 trisomy in different
samples.” Id. at 12. Following “[t]esting the DNA of a Down syndrome
individual, Dhallan determined the average ratio for heterozygous SNPs
measured on chromosome 21 as 0.531, consistent with the hypothesis that
there is an extra copy of chromosome 21 in that individual.” Id. at 13 (citing
Ex. 1002 ¶ 2204). Petitioner further argues that “Dhallan determined the
probability (confidence interval) that this hypothesis represents a true
aneuploidy, as opposed to ‘random numerical fluctuations in value,’” and
“concluded that the method accurately identified trisomy 21.” Id. (quoting
Ex. 1002 ¶ 2206).
Against that backdrop, Petitioner argues that Dhallan teaches each
limitation of independent claim 1. Id. at 14–27. For example, Petitioner
argues that Dhallan teaches use of genetic data that is “noisy,” i.e.,
“incomplete,” because various experimental errors can occur (such as poor
PCR amplification), and because “[t]he ’592 patent concedes that analysis of
a single cell would inherently result in noisy data.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex.
1001, 62:25–26 (defining “noisy” data as “incomplete”)), 21 (citing
Ex. 1001, 8:19–23 (referencing “the inherently noisy nature of the measured
genetic data in cases where limited genetic material is used for
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genotyping”)); Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 105. Petitioner relies on Dhallan’s
calculation of confidence intervals10 as satisfying the “determining . . . the
probability” claim limitation, and argues that these confidence intervals were
used to determine the probability that the calculated ratio accurately reports
an actual difference in the number of chromosomes, thus satisfying the
“using the probabilities . . . ” limitation. Id. at 24, 26–27.
As to motivation to combine, Petitioner argues that the extent it would
have been necessary to combine disparate teachings in Dhallan, a person of
ordinary skill would have been motivated to do so. See, e.g., id. at 28–29.
For example, although Dhallan reports that Example 14 used a SNP
genotyping technique with fluorescent labels rather than a SNP genotyping
array as claimed, Petitioner argues that “it would have been obvious to a
POSA to use the same method with genetic data generated by one of the
SNP genotyping arrays disclosed in Dhallan.” Id. at 12, 18; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97.
According to Petitioner, this is because Dhallan genotypes a large number of
SNPs, and teaches that commercially-available SNP genotyping arrays can
efficiently and reliably produce genetic data for many thousands of SNPs.
Pet. 16–17, 29. Additionally, although Dhallan’s Example 14 used DNA
from an already-born child, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill

10 Dhallan alternately refers to the “confidence interval” as a “confidence
value.” Compare Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 2206, 2211, 2215, and 2219 (disclosing
certain “confidence value[s]”) with id. ¶ 2221 (referring to the same
confidence values as “confidence interval[s]”).
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would have been motivated to use the method with DNA from a single fetal
cell, which qualifies as a “small amount of genetic material” as recited in
claim 1. Id. at 9–20. This is because, Petitioner argues, Dhallan discloses
use of a single cell as a preferred embodiment, and testing a single embryo
cell was standard in connection with in vitro fertilization. Id. at 29.
Finally, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill would have
had a reasonable expectation of success in using a single cell in Dhallan’s
methodology because “[t]he preimplantation analysis of one embryo cell,
including steps of amplification and hybridization, to screen for genetic
conditions including aneuploidy was well-known.” Id. at 31. Petitioner also
argues that a person of ordinary skill “would have expected that the
techniques disclosed in Dhallan would successfully generate sufficient DNA
from a single cell to carry out genotyping with a SNP array.” Id. at 32.
Patent Owner argues that “Dhallan does not teach at least two
elements of claim 1, namely ‘determining the probability of each of the
hypotheses’ . . . and using the ‘noisy’ genetic data ‘to determine the
probability of each hypothesis.’” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner additionally
argues that Petitioner “has failed to show motivation to use a single fetal cell
in Dhallan’s Example 14,” because Example 14 is designed to “distinguish
between maternal and child DNA when both exist in maternal blood,” not to
test “pre-isolated fetal DNA.” Id. at 33.
Patent Owner also argues that when using DNA from a single cell, a
person of ordinary skill would not have would not have had a reasonable
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expectation of success in arriving at the claimed subject matter by carrying
out Dhallan’s method because: (1) amplification bias “would have changed
the ratio of one DNA sequence to another” (id. at 38); (2) “very low amounts
of DNA could not be reliably used for SNP genotyping arrays (even with
intervening amplification)” (id. at 47); and (3) a person of ordinary skill
“would not have expected to be reasonably successful in isolating a single
fetal cell from maternal blood” (id. at 50).
b) Analysis of Claim 1
We find, on the full trial record, that Petitioner has not carried its
burden of demonstrating the unpatentability of claim 1 over Dhallan,
because it has not demonstrated a reasonable expectation of success in
arriving at the claimed method using Dhallan’s methodology with a SNP
genotyping array and DNA from a single fetal cell. In particular, we agree
with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that at the relevant
time, very low amounts of DNA could be reliably used, even after
intervening amplification, with a SNP genotyping array to determine the
number of copies of a chromosome according to Dhallan’s methodology.
As will be discussed, Patent Owner cites evidence demonstrating that at the
relevant time, “various researchers had determined that very low amounts of
DNA could not be reliably used for SNP genotyping arrays (even with
intervening amplification)” (PO Resp. 47), which is particularly important
because Petitioner argues that in Dhallan’s method, a person of ordinary
skill would have genotyped hundreds or thousands of SNPs to determine the
most likely number of chromosome copies in the individual’s genome. See,
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e.g., Pet. 25 (“In practice, Dhallan’s analysis genotypes hundreds of SNP
loci.”); see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 87 (noting that in Dhallan’s
method, “The alleles of hundreds or thousands of SNPs . . . are
determined.”).
We begin by analyzing the arguments and evidence in the Petition.
Petitioner argues a reasonable expectation of success in using one embryonic
cell in Dhallan’s method because “[t]he preimplantation analysis of one
embryo cell, including steps of amplification and hybridization, to screen for
genetic conditions including aneuploidy was well-known.” Pet. 31. In
support, Petitioner cites three articles: Hartwell (Ex. 1010), Hellani (Ex.
1023), and Munné (Ex. 1038). Id.; see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 131
(addressing Hartwell, Hellani, and Munné).
Petitioner’s cited articles persuasively demonstrate that DNA from
single cells was routinely used to screen for genetic conditions, including
aneuploidy. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 131 (opining that “by 2004
it was routine to carry out genetic testing on one cell from an embryo”).
This evidence does not, however, persuade us of a reasonable expectation of
success, because as Dr. Quackenbush persuasively establishes (and
Petitioner does not dispute), the genetic screening methods employed in
these articles did not involve using a SNP genotyping array as recited in
claim 1. Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 177, 179; PO Resp. 44–45.
Rather, Hartwell uses hybridization probes to detect the presence or absence
of a specific allele related to cystic fibrosis. Ex. 1010, 371–73; Ex. 2012
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(Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 179. As Dr. Quackenbush persuasively establishes,
techniques testing for the presence or absence of particular mutations use
“comparatively small amounts of starting materials,” because “one is simply
testing for the presence or absence of a particular mutation.” Ex. 2012
(Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 188. Techniques that test for the presence or absence
of a mutation “stand in stark contrast to aneuploidy detection such as that
described by Dhallan where the absolute amount of each allele (or the
relative amount as a ratio) must be accurately determined.” Id. ¶ 189.
Both Hellani and Munné use high-level techniques that permit
detecting chromosomal aberrations, but do not involve producing genetic
data for alleles at “at least 100 loci” using a SNP genotyping array, as recited
in claim 1. Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 175–79; Sur-reply 16. Hellani
discloses amplifying DNA from a single cell by multiple displacement
amplification (“MDA”), then analyzing the amplification product via a
comparative genomic hybridization (“CGH”) microarray to detect
trisomy 21. Ex. 1023, 850–51; Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 177.
Munné uses fluorescent in situ hybridization (“FISH”) to perform
preimplantation genetic diagnoses using DNA from a single cell. Ex. 1038,
93; Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 179. Petitioner has not adequately
demonstrated that the amount of DNA needed to perform the FISH and
CGH analyses reported in Hellani and Munné is comparable to that needed
to carry out the claimed method using Dhallan’s aneuploidy analysis.
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Petitioner additionally argues that a person of ordinary skill “would
have expected that the techniques disclosed in Dhallan would successfully
generate sufficient DNA from a single cell to carry out genotyping with a
SNP array.” Pet. 32. Petitioner points to Dhallan’s teaching that “a minimal
amount of template DNA is not limiting for the number of loci that can be
detected,” because DNA can be amplified. Id. at 31 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 270
and citing id. ¶¶ 2334, 2380); see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶¶ 132–33
(addressing Dhallan’s teaching). Petitioner also points to Dhallan’s
disclosure of SNP genotyping array protocols. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002
¶¶ 2237–334 (HuSNP), 2346–90 (BeadArray)). But despite Dhallan’s
teachings, Dr. Quackenbush persuasively establishes (and Petitioner does
not dispute) that “Dhallan provides no actual examples in which a ‘minimal
amount of template DNA’ is used to generate genetic data for chromosomal
analysis,” and “never uses data from a SNP array to make any chromosomal
determinations based upon a small amount of genetic material.” Ex. 2012
(Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 183, 197. While a lack of a working example is not
dispositive, it is important here, in view of Patent Owner’s affirmative
evidence (discussed below) that very low amounts of DNA could not be
reliably used for SNP genotyping arrays, even with intervening
amplification.
Petitioner also relies on articles that elaborate on the DNA
amplification techniques taught in Dhallan. See Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.)
¶ 133 (discussing Hellani (Ex. 1023), Zhang (Ex. 1030), Dietmaier
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(Ex. 1035), and Hu (Ex. 1036)). While these references demonstrate that
techniques were known to amplify DNA from a single cell, we are not
persuaded that they support a reasonable expectation of success, because the
record does not speak to whether such amplification produces enough DNA
to achieve the claimed subject matter using Dhallan’s method with a SNP
genotyping array. Both Hellani and Hu use the amplification product in a
CGH analysis. Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 177, 179. Zhang
discusses amplification of DNA from sperm cells, and Dietmaier addresses
amplification of DNA from tumor cells. Id. at ¶¶ 180, 181. These
references neither use the amplification product in a SNP array, nor
“measure genetic material and produce genetic data for some or all possible
alleles at a plurality of at least 100 loci on the chromosome or chromosome
segment,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at ¶¶ 177 (Hellani), 179 (Hu), 182
(Zhang, Dietmaier); PO Resp. 44–45.
Petitioner next argues that commercial SNP genotyping arrays were
used with amplified DNA to detect DNA copy number changes and
chromosomal copy number abnormalities. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1032 (Zhao)
and Ex. 1037 (Wong)). We agree with Petitioner that Zhao and Wong
amplified DNA and used SNP genotyping arrays to detect DNA copy
number changes. Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 135 (citing Ex. 1032, 3060; Ex.
1037, 1). However, as Dr. Quackenbush persuasively establishes (and
Petitioner does not dispute), Zhao and Wong “do not use DNA generated
from a single cell (or generally, from a small amount of genetic material).”
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Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 195; PO Resp. 48. Indeed, Zhao amplified
250 ng of template DNA, and Wong amplified 10 ng of template DNA. Ex.
1032, 3061; Ex. 1037, 2. Both amounts are far more than the “minute
amounts” of DNA found in a single human diploid cell, which is about 7
picograms. Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 57; Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.)
¶ 143.
Petitioner also relies on Jenkins (Ex. 1011), which teaches that
commercial SNP genotyping platforms can deliver over 100,000 genotypes
per day with an accuracy of >99%. Pet. 32; Ex. 1011, Abstract; Ex. 1004
(Peters Decl.) ¶ 135. Jenkins, however, does not address accuracy of the
platforms when using DNA from a small amount of genetic material, and as
Dr. Quackenbush persuasively establishes, “a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have expected genotyping performance to be significantly reduced
when using DNA amplified from a single cell.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush
Decl.) ¶ 196; PO Resp. 48–49. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
Jenkins establishes a reasonable expectation of success, particularly in view
of additional evidence raised by Patent Owner and discussed below.
In sum, Petitioner’s evidence in the Petition establishes that single
cells were used for genetic analysis, amplification techniques were known,
and SNP arrays could be used to analyze chromosome imbalances.
Petitioner’s evidence, however, does not persuasively address the interplay
between the amount of DNA in a single cell and the amount of DNA or
amplified DNA needed to carry out the claimed method using a SNP
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genotyping array and Dhallan’s aneuploidy analysis. This is important
because Patent Owner cites evidence demonstrating that at the relevant time,
“various researchers had determined that very low amounts of DNA could
not be reliably used for SNP genotyping arrays (even with intervening
amplification).” PO Resp. 47.
For example, Patent Owner cites Lovmar (Ex. 2017), which teaches
that following amplification (MDA), genotyping even tens of SNPs was not
possible when using more DNA than is found in a single cell. Ex. 2012
(Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 190. Lovmar amplified “3, 0.3, 0.03 or 0.003 ng
genomic DNA to select the optimal amount for further use.” Ex. 2017, 2.
Lovmar found that with “0.03 ng of genomic DNA (~10 genome
equivalents), measurable signals were obtained for 22 out of 32 SNP
genotyping reactions, but the signal intensity ratios varied so much between
the parallel assays that assignment of the SNP genotypes would have been
difficult.” Id. at 8. Lovmar concluded that “[t]he major determinant for
successful genotyping is the amount of DNA subjected to MDA,” and that
“about 1000 genome equivalents (3 ng) of DNA should be used.” Id. at 9;
see also Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 190 (addressing Lovmar). Thus,
according to Lovmar, the minimum amount of template (input) DNA needed
to be amplified for successful SNP genotyping is 3 ng, which is far more
than the “minute amounts” of DNA found in a single human diploid cell,
i.e., about 7 pg (i.e., about 0.007 ng). Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 57
(“[A] single human diploid cell contains minute amounts of DNA,
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recognized to be about 7 pg.”); Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 143 (noting that the
amount of DNA in a single cell is “approximately 7 pg”).
Patent Owner cites other references that likewise demonstrate the
interplay between input DNA amount and reliable SNP genotyping array
performance. PO Resp. 47. For example, Bergen (Ex. 2033) teaches that
compared to using higher input DNA amounts, “we observed significantly
reduced SNP genotyping performance when using 1 ng of gDNA or
wgaDNA in TaqMan® SNP genotyping assays with respect to completion
rate, due to a significant increase in the undetermined genotype rate (Table
4).” Ex. 2033, 4; see also Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 191 (discussing
Bergen). Park (Ex. 2035) teaches that, for sources other than whole blood,
minimum input DNA to obtain “sufficient and reliable amplified product for
a run of BeadArray genotyping” was 0.5 ng (i.e., 500 pg), and that
genotyping performance decreased with amplification.11 Ex. 2035, 1521;
see also PO Resp. 47–48; Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 192 (discussing
Park). This amount of DNA (0.5 ng) is significantly more than the
approximately 7 pg (0.007 ng) of DNA found in a single human diploid cell.
Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 57; Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 143; see also
Ex. 1001, 29:53–55 (noting that 0.3 ng of DNA is the amount found in
approximately 50 human diploid cells).

11 BeadArray is the same commercial genotyping array taught in Dhallan’s
Example 18. Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 192 n.7; Ex. 1002 ¶ 2346.

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Thus, we are persuaded by Dr. Quackenbush’s opinion that, “in view
of reports such as these, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
reasonably expected to obtain reliable [quantitative] genotyping results from
DNA amplified from a single cell,” but instead would have expected “that
significantly more DNA than a single cell would be needed to reliably
determine embryonic or fetal genotype, even when using MDA to amplify
the DNA.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 193. This issue is particularly
critical given Petitioner’s argument that to produce an accurate aneuploidy
determination using Dhallan’s methodology, many hundreds or thousands of
SNPs need to be genotyped. See, e.g., Pet. 17 (“Dhallan measures genetic
material (DNA) to produce genetic data for the alleles at 768 SNP loci on
chromosome 21.”); id. at 25 (“In practice, Dhallan’s analysis genotypes
hundreds of SNP loci.”); see also Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 87 (“The alleles
of hundreds or thousands of SNPs . . . are determined.”); id. ¶ 92 (arguing
that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to apply Dhallan’s
teachings to many thousands of SNPs in order to increase accuracy of the
method); id. ¶ 134 (“[A]s taught by Dhallan, commercial genotyping arrays
are able to genotype the number of SNPs needed to produce an accurate
aneuploidy determination (more than 700 SNP loci or more, if needed, as
taught by Example 14).”); see also Ex. 1059 (Peters Second Decl.) ¶ 19 (“As
Dhallan teaches, many hundreds or thousands of SNP should be analyzed,
particularly when the amount of DNA is lower.”).
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Petitioner’s Reply does not persuasively respond to this issue.
Petitioner does not specifically comment on Bergen (Ex. 2033) or Park (Ex.
2035) in the Reply.12 See generally Reply. Petitioner mentions Lovmar, but
only to argue that “subsequent prior art articles demonstrate that—
notwithstanding Lovmar’s disclosure—artisans successfully used DNA
amplified from a single cell for aneuploidy analysis, including in
conjunction with microarrays.” Reply 18–19. As support, Petitioner cites
Hellani, arguing that Hellani acknowledges Lovmar and concludes that
“MDA of single cells was suitable for use with ‘microarrays’ due to its ‘very
high amplification efficiency and a constant ADO [allele drop out].’” Id. at
19 (citing Ex. 1023, 851, 852; Ex. 1059 (Peters Second Decl.) ¶ 36).
Petitioner, however, does not elaborate on how Hellani purportedly
overcame the issues raised in Lovmar. Like Lovmar, Hellani discloses
amplifying DNA from a single cell using MDA. Ex. 2017, 8 (discussing
MDA reactions); Ex. 1023, 847. Hellani then analyzes the MDA
amplification product via a CGH microarray to detect trisomy 21. Ex. 1023,
850–51; Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 177. But as discussed above,

12 Dr. Peters does address Park (Ex. 2035), but only to argue that it teaches
using “roughly five human cells worth of DNA” to “yield a reliable
amplified product for use in microarray genotyping experiments.” Ex. 1059
(Peters Second Decl.) ¶ 37. As will be discussed below, however, we do not
consider this argument, because it represents an impermissible shift in theory
from that presented in the Petition. The Petition exclusively focused on a
reasonable expectation of success in carrying out claim 1 using DNA from a
single cell.
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Petitioner has not persuasively rebutted Dr. Quackenbush’s testimony that
CGH does not involve “generating genetic data for some or all possible
alleles at specific loci.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 176; Sur-reply 16.
Petitioner also has not addressed the relative amounts of input DNA needed
for CGH microarrays versus SNP genotyping microarrays, let alone
persuasively established that the successful use of an MDA amplification
product in a CGH array as reported in Hellani would have translated to a
reasonable expectation of success in using an MDA amplification product in
a SNP genotyping array to carry out claim 1 using Dhallan’s methodology.13
Petitioner also cites Wang (Ex. 1070) and Wilton (Ex. 1071), but does
not substantively discuss these references in the Reply brief. Reply 19.
Instead, the Reply merely cites Dr. Peters’ discussion of these references.
Id. (citing Ex. 1059 (Peters Second Decl.) ¶ 36). Our rules, however,
prohibit incorporating arguments by reference from one document into
another document. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Thus, we do not consider Wang
and Wilton. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454,
Paper 12, at 10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative) (“[W]e will not
consider arguments that are not made in the Petition, but are instead
incorporated by reference to the cited paragraphs” of an expert declaration.).

13 Dr. Peters states that the MDA (amplification) process in Hellani
generated 35 µg of DNA. Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 133. Petitioner,
however, has neither specifically addressed whether this amount of DNA is
sufficient to practice the method of claim 1 using Dhallan’s methodology,
nor quantified the amount of DNA needed to do so.
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However, even if we were to consider these references, we agree with Patent
Owner that neither “is focused on producing the quantitively [sic] accurate
data that would be necessary for Dhallan’s method.” Sur-reply 16; see also
Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 188–89 (distinguishing prior art that uses
comparatively small amounts of input DNA for genetic analysis from
Dhallan’s analysis, where the relative amount of each allele must be
accurately quantitated).
In the Reply, Petitioner also argues that the claims are obvious
because the ’592 Patent “relies on well-known PCR-based amplification
techniques and commercial arrays to perform the claimed method,” and thus
“the claimed invention adds nothing beyond the teachings of [the prior art].”
Reply 19 (quoting Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d
1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (alteration in original); see also id. (arguing
that Patent Owner’s witnesses testified (in other proceedings) that
genotyping arrays were known). Petitioner, however, has not established
that the claimed embodiments disclosed in the ’592 Patent necessarily
require quantifying the ratio of hundreds or thousands of alleles in the same
manner required by Dhallan’s methodology.14 See, e.g., Tr. 12:15–24

14 To the extent Petitioner is suggesting that the challenged claims suffer a
defect under 35 U.S.C. § 112, Petitioner is not permitted to request
cancellation of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in a petition for inter partes
review. See 35 U.S.C § 311(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2); see also Reply 14
(arguing that “If a specialized amplification process was necessary to
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(conceding that the methods in the ’592 Patent are not quantitated methods
like those in Dhallan).
Petitioner also argues that Dhallan, which encourages use of its
methodology with a single cell, is “presumed enabled.” Reply 12 (citing
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354–55 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)). This argument is beside the point, because Patent Owner is not
arguing that Dhallan lacks enablement, but rather, that Petitioner has failed
to establish a reasonable expectation of success. PO Resp. 46–50.
Enablement and reasonable expectation of success are different legal
requirements governed by different legal standards, and a presumption of
enablement does not compel a finding of reasonable expectation of success.
See UCB, Inc. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 890 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (disagreeing that a “presumption [of enablement] establishes a
reasonable expectation of success as a matter of law” and noting appellants’
lack of identification of authority for the proposition that the presumption of
enablement precluded a finding of lack of reasonable expectation of
success). Moreover, as discussed above, Patent Owner has presented
rebuttal evidence and argument that persuasively shows that those of
ordinary skill would not have expected to practice claim 1 using Dhallan’s
method and DNA from a single cell in a SNP genotyping array, as Petitioner
proposed.

perform the claims, Natera would have been obligated to disclose it in its
specification. 35 U.S.C. §112(1) (pre-AIA).”).
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Petitioner additionally argues that Patent Owner’s expectation of
success arguments focus solely on Dhallan’s single cell disclosure, while
“ignor[ing] Dhallan’s disclosure that its methodology can be performed
using 2–32 cells, which also falls within the claims.” Reply 18 (citing, e.g.,
Pet. 13–14). Patent Owner responds that this is an improper attempt to
change the thrust of the obviousness theory presented in the Petition. Sur-
reply 16–17. We agree with Patent Owner.
Although the Petition references portions of Dhallan that address
using sources of DNA other than a single cell (see, e.g., Pet. 13–14, citing
Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44, 74), this is by way of background only, falling within a
section titled “Introduction to Dhallan.” See Pet. 11. Petitioner’s detailed
obviousness arguments for claim 1 are limited to use of DNA from a single
cell, and do not extend to DNA from multiple cells.15 See, e.g., id. at 19–20
(arguing that, because Dhallan’s preferred embodiment is one embryo cell,
Dhallan teaches the claimed limitation reciting “wherein the small amount of
genetic material from the individual is from fifty or fewer of the individual’s

15 As noted above, claim 1 recites several possible sources for the claimed
“small amount of genetic data.” See supra n.9. Here we focus on
Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments based on option [i], but note that
Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under options [ii] and [iii] also did not
extend to use of DNA from multiple cells. See, e.g., Pet. 20 (cross-
referencing arguments for claims 4, 5, and 17); id. at 34 (for claim 4, arguing
option [ii] based on “a single human cell”); id. at 35 (for claim 5, arguing
option [iii] based on “extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood”); id. at
42 (for claim 17, arguing option [iii] based on a “single fetal cell”).
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cells”); id. at 29 (“A POSA would have been motivated to use a single cell
as the source of genetic material . . . .”); id. at 31 (“A POSA would have
reasonably expected success in using Dhallan’s methodology, for example
as described in Example 14, on one embryonic cell.”). Accordingly, we
agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is impermissibly attempting to
change the thrust of its obviousness theory on reply. Sur-reply 16–17. We
will not consider Petitioner’s belated attempt to argue a reasonable
expectation of success in using more than a single cell in the claimed
method. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments
raised in the . . . patent owner response.”).
In short, Patent Owner has persuasively established that a minimal
amount of DNA can limit the number of loci that can be detected by a SNP
genotyping array. See, e.g., Sur-reply 13 (“[S]killed artisans had difficulty
even assigning genotypes (let alone quantitating alleles) when performing
even 32 genotyping reactions using more DNA than that available from a
single cell.”) (citing Ex. 2017, 8). Petitioner has not persuasively established
that a single cell would provide sufficient DNA, even after amplification, to
carry out the method of claim 1 when using Dhallan’s methodology and a
SNP genotyping array.
Accordingly, based on our consideration of the arguments and
evidence advanced by Petitioner and Patent Owner on this full trial record,
we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that claim 1 of the ’592 Patent would have been unpatentable over
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Dhallan. Because this issue is dispositive of whether Petitioner has met its
burden of proving unpatentability, we do not reach the parties’ other
arguments regarding claim 1. Cf. Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421,
1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that an administrative agency is at liberty to
reach a decision based on a single dispositive issue because doing so “can
not only save the parties, the [agency], and [the reviewing] court
unnecessary cost and effort,” but can “greatly ease the burden on [an
agency] faced with a . . . proceeding involving numerous complex issues and
required by statute to reach its conclusion within rigid time limits”).
3. Analysis of Dependent Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the small amount
of genetic material is from extracellular DNA from the individual found in
maternal blood.”16 Ex. 1001, 63:4–6. Petitioner argues that Dhallan
motivates use of extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood in the
disclosed methodology with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 35–
36. We note that Petitioner’s argument as presented in the Petition requires
isolation of a sample of 100% extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood
as a prerequisite to using the extracellular fetal DNA in Dhallan’s
methodology. For example, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill
“would have been motivated to use extracellular fetal DNA from maternal

16 Fetal extracellular DNA is also called cell-free fetal DNA, and “consists
of fragments of fetal DNA that circulate freely in the maternal blood.”
Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 59.
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blood in Dhallan’s analysis,” and Dr. Peters’ supporting testimony opines on
a motivation to apply Dhallan’s methodology “to extracellular fetal template
DNA purified from maternal blood.” Id. at 36 (emphasis added); Ex. 1004
(Peters Decl.) ¶ 147 (emphasis added). Indeed, at the oral hearing,
Petitioner’s counsel affirmed that “Illumina’s entire petition was based for
claim 5 on an isolated amplified sample of cell-free fetal DNA.” Tr. 15:16–
18.
Based on the complete record, we find that Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate a credible motivation and reasonable expectation of success in
carrying out the method of claim 1 when using Dhallan’s methodology and
an isolated sample of extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood. As such,
Petitioner has not carried its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Dhallan renders claim 5 unpatentable as obvious.
We begin by assessing the arguments and evidence in the Petition
regarding motivation. We find that none of Petitioner’s cited evidence
supports a motivation to purify fetal template DNA from maternal blood.
First, Petitioner and Dr. Peters rely on portions of Dhallan. Pet. 35 (citing
Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169, 176, 2223, 40, 2152, 2157, 2273, 2346); Ex. 1004 (Peters
Decl.) ¶ 145.17 Dhallan paragraph 176 teaches that fetal and maternal DNA

17 Petitioner also cross-references Section VI.A of the Petition, which is
entitled “Introduction to Dhallan,” but contrary to our rules, it is not clear
precisely what evidence, if any, Petitioner intends to rely upon from this
section in connection with the alleged unpatentability of claim 5. Pet. 35;
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can be isolated from the plasma fraction of a maternal blood sample, but
does not address isolating fetal and maternal DNA from each other.
Ex. 1002 ¶ 176. Dhallan paragraph 40 teaches that extracellular fetal DNA
has been used to determine sex of the fetus and fetal rhesus D genotype.
Id. ¶ 40. This paragraph, however, does not expressly indicate that these
tests necessarily involved the physical isolation of extracellular fetal DNA
from maternal blood to perform the analyses.
The remainder of the cited paragraphs of Dhallan generically teach
use of extracellular fetal DNA in Dhallan’s method, but do not address
isolating extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood. See id. ¶¶ 169, 2152,
2157, 2223, 2273, 2346. Dr. Peters opines that Dhallan paragraphs 2273 and
2346, which respectively relate to Examples 16 and 18, teach that “fetal
DNA from isolated maternal plasma can be analyzed using SNP genotyping
arrays.” Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 145. These paragraphs, however, state
that isolated maternal plasma “contains both maternal template DNA and
fetal template DNA.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 2273, 2346 (emphasis added). Petitioner
does not point us to further statements indicating that the fetal template
DNA is isolated from the maternal template DNA prior to analysis, which
suggests that the experiments in Examples 16 and 18 are carried out on a
mixed sample of maternal and fetal DNA.

see 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) (A petitioner must identify with particularity in
the petition “the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge.”).
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Petitioner additionally relies on two articles, Bianchi (Ex. 1034) and
Lo 1997 (Ex. 1049), to support the proposition that “[m]aternal blood as a
source of fetal DNA was known in the art to be a safer and more desirable
sample source relative to in utero sources such as amniocentesis.” Pet. 35.
This argument does not address the relevant issue, namely, whether the
articles support a motivation to isolate or purify the fetal DNA from the
maternal blood.
In short, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated that Dhallan
motivates use of fetal DNA found in maternal blood in the disclosed method
(see, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 169), but has not persuasively shown that a person of
ordinary skill would have been led to first isolate the extracellular fetal DNA
from maternal blood before using it in Dhallan’s method.
Turning to Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in isolating
extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood for use in the claimed method,
Petitioner relies on Dr. Peters’ testimony and two additional pieces of
evidence—Dhallan, and the ’592 Patent itself. See Pet. 36. We address each
piece of evidence in turn.
First, Petitioner argues that “Dhallan cites prior art references that
successfully used such extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood in
genomic analyses.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 39–40). The cited portion of
Dhallan (paragraphs 39 and 40), in turn, cites three prior art references: Lo
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1997 (Ex. 1049), Lo 1998 (Ex. 2027), and Pertl.18 Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 39–40. The
Petition, however, does not expressly address the teachings of these
references in connection with a reasonable expectation of success.19 See
generally Pet. 31–33. Although the Petition focuses on the prior art
references cited in Dhallan paragraphs 39 and 40 rather than the content of
these paragraphs themselves, for completeness we note that these paragraphs
also do not expressly address physical isolation of fetal DNA from maternal
blood. Rather, paragraph 39 indicates that “[f]etal DNA has been detected
and quantitated in maternal plasma and serum.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 39 (emphasis
added). Nothing in this statement indicates that the extracellular fetal DNA
detected in the maternal sample was physically isolated from that sample.
Paragraph 40 indicates that extracellular fetal DNA has been used to
determine sex of the fetus and fetal rhesus D genotype. Id. ¶ 40. As noted
above, this paragraph does not expressly indicate that these tests involved
the physical isolation of extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood.
Petitioner’s second piece of evidence cited to support a reasonable
expectation of success is the ’592 Patent itself. Pet. 36. Petitioner argues

18 Pertl and Bianchi, 98 Obstetrics and Gynecology 483–90 (2001).
19 Lo 1998 (Ex. 2027) was first made of record as part of Patent Owner’s
Response—after filing of the Petition. Pertl is not of record. The Petition
and Dr. Peters address Lo 1997, but only in connection with arguing
motivation. Pet. 35; Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶¶ 61, 146. Neither the Petition
nor Dr. Peters identifies any teachings in Lo 1997 relating to physical
isolation of fetal extracellular DNA from maternal blood.
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that “[t]he ’592 patent admits that prior art techniques had been
demonstrated to isolate and amplify extracellular fetal DNA from maternal
blood.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:1). The cited portion of the ’592 Patent
in turn states: “Fetal DNA isolation has been demonstrated using PCR
amplification using primers with fetal-specific DNA sequences.” Ex. 1001,
1:66–2:1.
We determine that Petitioner’s reliance on the cited sentence of
the ’592 Patent is not sufficient to carry Petitioner’s burden on reasonable
expectation of success. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the sentence
itself does not refer to “prior art” techniques. Pet. 36. To be sure, the
sentence uses the past tense (“has been demonstrated”), but it does not
indicate who performed the work. Cf. Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones &
Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (indicating that while a
reference can become prior art by admission, that doctrine is inapplicable
when the subject matter at issue is the inventor’s own work). Nor does this
brief statement cite any contemporaneous or supporting evidence relating to
isolating extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood.
Even if we were to take the cited sentence of the ’592 Patent as an
admission that physically isolating extracellular fetal DNA from maternal
blood was known in the prior art, we find that the next sentence of
the ’592 Patent undercuts any reasonable expectation of success in creating a
sample of isolated fetal DNA for use in the claimed method using Dhallan’s
methodology and a SNP genotyping array. The next sentence states: “Since
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only tens of molecules of each embryonic SNP are available through these
techniques, the genotyping of the fetal tissue with high fidelity is not
currently possible.” Ex. 1001, 2:1–4. This calls into question whether a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to isolate enough
extracellular fetal DNA (even with subsequent amplification) to carry out
claim 1 using Dhallan’s method, because, as discussed above, Petitioner
argues that the artisan would have genotyped many hundreds or thousands of
SNPs in carrying out Dhallan’s method.20
Petitioner also cites various paragraphs of Dr. Peters’ declaration in
support of arguing a reasonable expectation of success for claim 5. Pet. 36
(citing Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶¶ 125–28, 134–35, 146–47). In
paragraphs 125–28 and 134–35, Dr. Peters discusses using SNP genotyping
arrays, but does not specifically address isolating extracellular fetal DNA
from maternal blood. Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶¶ 125–28, 134–35. In
paragraph 146, Dr. Peters discusses maternal blood as a source of fetal
DNA, and indicates that a person of ordinary skill would have been
motivated to apply Dhallan’s methodology to “extracellular fetal template
DNA purified from maternal blood,” but does not cite any reference

20 At the oral hearing, Petitioner argued that if a person of ordinary skill
“can’t get a sample of extracellular fetal DNA, then this claim has an
enablement problem.” Tr. 40:7–9. We reiterate that Petitioner may not
request (nor may we decide) the cancellation of claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 in a petition for inter partes review. See supra n.14.
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addressing purification of extracellular fetal template DNA from maternal
blood. Id. ¶ 146.
In paragraph 147, Dr. Peters cites paragraphs 39 and 40 of Dhallan,
and the same portion of the ’592 Patent cited in the Petition (Ex. 1001, 1:66–
2:1), but does not add any analysis beyond that presented in the Petition.
Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 147. Dr. Peters also cites additional paragraphs of
Dhallan, which we already addressed above in connection with motivation.
Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 169, 176, 2152, 2157, 2223, 2273, 2346). Finally,
Dr. Peters cross-references paragraphs 87–97, 125–28, and 134–37 of his
declaration, but these paragraphs also do not address isolating extracellular
fetal DNA from maternal blood. Id.
We acknowledge Petitioner’s position, articulated at the oral hearing,
that Patent Owner raised “a completely new argument” in its demonstratives
that “there’s no way to get 100 percent sample of isolated cell-free fetal
DNA,” which argument should be stricken for being raised too late.
Tr. 16:8–17:8. This argument was actually first raised in Patent Owner’s
Sur-reply (see Sur-reply 22–23), but even then, it comes too late, given that
Petitioner argued (in the Petition) that a person of ordinary skill would have
been motivated to use “extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood,” or, as
Dr. Peters phrases it in the supporting citation, “extracellular fetal template
DNA purified from maternal blood.”21 Pet. 35 (emphasis added); Ex. 1004

21 During the oral hearing, Petitioner asserted that the argument it presented
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(Peters Decl.) ¶ 146 (emphasis added). Thus, although we do not credit
Patent Owner’s belated argument, it is Petitioner’s “burden to demonstrate
both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the
teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and
that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in
doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d at 1367–68 (quoting Kinetic
Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2012)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“[T]he petitioner shall have the burden
of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.”). “To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner
cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead

in the Petition for claim 5 was necessarily based on an isolated sample of
cell-free fetal DNA, because Petitioner employed the District Court’s claim
construction, which Petitioner characterizes as requiring an isolated sample
of cell-free fetal DNA. See, e.g., Tr. 14:24–16:7. Patent Owner disputes
both whether the District Court’s claim construction applies here, and
whether the construction is limited to an isolated sample of cell-free fetal
DNA. See, e.g., id. at 32:6–33:10; but see Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.)
¶ 69 (Patent Owner’s expert indicating that he applied the District Court’s
constructions). As discussed above, neither party requested claim
construction in this case, and we reiterate that no claim term requires express
construction. Instead, we find that the Petition and evidence cited therein
clearly signal that Petitioner is arguing use of a 100% sample of cell-free
fetal DNA isolated or purified from maternal blood in Dhallan’s method.
See, e.g., Pet. 35; Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 146 (opining on extracellular
fetal DNA “purified from a maternal blood sample”).
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articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829
F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, we find that Petitioner fails to
articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.22
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has carried
its burden of establishing that claim 5 is unpatentable as obvious over
Dhallan. Because this issue is dispositive of whether Petitioner has met its
burden of proving unpatentability of claim 5, we do not reach the parties’
other arguments regarding claim 5. Cf. Beloit Corp., 742 F.2d at 1423.
4. Analysis of Remaining Dependent Claims Challenged as Obvious
Over Dhallan
a) Claims 2–4, 17, and 20
Dependent claims 2–4, 17, and 20 each recite limitations related to the
amount of genetic material used in the claimed method.

22 We note that “institution of an IPR does not by itself translate to a
conclusion of unpatentability.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1376 n.1.
Although we found Petitioner’s arguments for claim 5 sufficient for
institution (see Inst. Dec. 27–28), “the Board is not bound by any findings
made in its Institution Decision,” and “there is a significant difference
between a petitioner’s burden to establish a ‘reasonable likelihood of
success’ at institution, and actually proving invalidity by a preponderance of
the evidence at trial.” TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1068
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012)).
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Claims 2 and 4 each depend from claim 1, and recite that “the small
amount of genetic material” is “from twenty or fewer of the individual’s
cells,” and “from 0.3 ng or less of the individual’s DNA,” respectively.
Ex. 1001, 62:63–65, 63:1–3. Although these claims permit use of DNA
from more than one cell, Petitioner limited its unpatentability arguments for
these claims to the use of DNA from a single cell. See Pet. 34 (for claim 2,
arguing that a person of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to use
Dhallan’s method to analyze genetic material from one cell from an
individual with a reasonable expectation of success,” and for claim 4,
arguing that “it would have been obvious to apply Dhallan’s method to
analyze a single cell”) (emphases added).
Claim 3 depends from claim 2, and recites that “the small amount of
genetic material is from one of the individual’s cells.” Ex. 1001, 62:66–67.
Petitioner’s arguments with respect to unpatentability of claim 3 are also
limited to use of genetic material from a single cell. See Pet. 34.
Claim 17 depends from claim 1 and recites in relevant part: “wherein
the sample is a maternal blood sample comprising DNA from the fetus and
DNA from the mother of the fetus.” Ex. 1001, 63:40–43. Claim 20 depends
from claim 1 and recites in relevant part that the genetic material is found in
“cells from the individual found in maternal blood, [and] genetic material
known to have originated from the individual.” Id. at 64:9–25. Petitioner’s
unpatentability arguments for claims 17 and 20 are also limited to arguing
use of genetic material from a single cell. See Pet. 42 (with respect to claim
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17, arguing that “A POSA would have been motivated to apply Dhallan’s
method, as exemplified in Example 14, to analyze DNA isolated from a
single fetal cell . . . .”), 44 (with respect to claim 20, arguing that
“Dhallan . . . discloses that the genetic material is preferably taken from one
embryonic cell (i.e., DNA known to have originated from the individual), or
fetal cell from maternal blood.”) (emphases added).
For the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, we
determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that claims 2–4, 17, or 20 of the ’592 Patent are unpatentable as obvious
over Dhallan. In particular, on this record, Petitioner has not persuasively
established that a single cell would provide sufficient DNA, even after
amplification, to carry out the method of these claims to accurately
determine a number of copies of a chromosome of interest when using
Dhallan’s methodology and a SNP genotyping array.
b) Claims 6–12, 15, 16, 19, 21–23, and 27
Claims 6–12, 15, 16, 19, 21–23, and 27 depend directly or indirectly
from claim 1. Petitioner’s arguments for these claims do not address the
deficiency discussed above regarding Petitioner’s arguments for claim 1.
See Pet. 36–40 (claims 6–12), 40–42 (claims 16, 17), 43–44 (claim 19), 45–
46 (claims 21–23 and 27). Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed
above with respect to claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has not shown,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 6–12, 15, 16, 19, 21–23, and
27 are unpatentable as obvious over Dhallan.
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Obviousness of Claim 18 Over Dhallan and Bianchi
Claim 18 depends from claim 1 and recites in relevant part that “the
method further comprises performing amniocentesis or chorion villus
biopsy.” Ex. 1001, 63:44–46. Petitioner argues that claim 18 is
unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Dhallan and Bianchi
(Ex. 1034). Pet. 46–47.
Bianchi is a review article that discusses prenatal screening for
chromosome abnormalities such as trisomy 21. Ex. 1034, 574. Bianchi
explains that pregnant women are routinely screened for Down syndrome
risk via serum screening, and women found to have a fetus at high risk are
offered amniocentesis. Id. Petitioner argues that, per Bianchi, it was well
known to use amniocentesis or chorion villus biopsy to confirm a Down
syndrome diagnosis following a suspect result from a non-invasive
screening. Pet. 46–47.
Petitioner’s arguments for claim 18 do not address the deficiencies
discussed above for claim 1. See id. Accordingly, for the same reasons
discussed above for claim 1, we find that Petitioner has not shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claim 18 is unpatentable over Dhallan
and Bianchi.
Obviousness of Claims 24–26 Over Dhallan and Sham
Petitioner argues that claims 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over
Dhallan and Sham (Ex. 1021). Pet. 47–51. Claim 24 depends from claim 1
and recites “normalizing the genetic data for differences in measurement
efficiency between the loci.” Ex. 1001, 64:38–40. Claim 25 depends from
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claim 1 and recites “amplifying the genetic material of the target individual;
and normalizing the genetic data for differences in amplification and/or
measurement efficiency between the loci.” Id. at 64:41–45. Claim 26
depends from claim 1 and recites “amplifying the genetic material of the
target individual; and normalizing the genetic data for differences in
amplification and/or measurement efficiency between the loci, chromosome
segments, or chromosomes.” Id. at 64:46–51.
Sham is a review article that addresses “developments in quantitative
genotyping assays and in the design and analysis of pooling studies.”
Ex. 1021, Abstract. Sham indicates that, in genotyping data, “many SNPs
show differential amplification during PCR,” which “causes the signal that
represents the more efficiently amplified allele to be higher than expected
from its true frequency in a pooled sample.” Id. at 865. Sham teaches that
“[t]o obtain unbiased estimates of allele frequencies, the strength of allele-
specific signals should be corrected by a factor that is obtained from
reference samples of known allele frequencies.” Id. Petitioner argues that,
per Sham, “it was common practice to normalize genetic data from a[] SNP
genotyping array” to improve the quality of the data. Pet. 48–50 (citing,
e.g., Ex. 1021, 865; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 699, 812, 826, 1054, 1062–63, 2316).
Petitioner’s arguments for claims 24–26 do not address do not address
the deficiencies discussed above for claim 1. See id. at 48–50. Accordingly,
for the same reasons discussed above for claim 1, we find that Petitioner has
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not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 24–26 are
unpatentable over Dhallan and Sham.
Obviousness of Claims 1–27 Over Rabinowitz
Petitioner challenges claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Rabinowitz (Ex. 1003). Pet. 51. A threshold question is whether
Rabinowitz qualifies as prior art to the challenged claims. As such, we
begin by setting forth the priority chain for the ’592 Patent.
The ’592 Patent issued from Application Ser. No. 13/793,186 (the
“’186 application”), filed on March 11, 2013, which is a continuation of
Application Ser. No. 11/603,406 (the “’406 application”), filed on
November 22, 2006. The ’592 Patent claims priority to a number of
provisional applications, with Provisional Application No. 60/817,741 (the
“’741 provisional”), filed Jun. 30, 2006, being relevant here.
Petitioner argues that Rabinowitz qualifies as prior art because claim 1
of the ’592 Patent (the only independent claim) lacks written description
support for the limitation “high throughput DNA sequencing.” Pet. 51–52.
As such, Petitioner argues that the challenged claims are entitled to an
effective filing date no earlier than March 11, 2013 (i.e., the filing date of
the ’186 application). Id. Given this alleged effective filing date, Petitioner
argues that Rabinowitz, which was published on August 9, 2007, qualifies as
prior art. See Ex. 1003, code (43); Pet. 51.
A patent application is entitled to claim priority to the filing date of a
prior application only “for an invention disclosed [in the prior application] in
the manner provided by [35 U.S.C. §] 112(a).” 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018). In
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other words, “[f]or claims to be entitled to a priority date of an earlier-filed
application, the application must provide adequate written description
support for the later-claimed limitations.” Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,
881 F.3d 894, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The test for adequate written
description is whether the disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in
the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of
the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). This “requires an objective inquiry into the four
corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill
in the art.” Id.
Petitioner argues that “[h]igh throughput DNA sequencing is not
disclosed in the specification, nor is it described in any of the priority
applications.” Pet. 4. Rather, Petitioner argues, the sole disclosed
sequencing technique is pyrosequencing, but the application expressly states
that pyrosequencing “is not currently conducive to high-throughput
parallel analysis.” Id. at 53–54 (citing Ex. 1026 (’406 application), 6:27–
30). Petitioner thus argues that Rabinowitz “makes clear that the named
inventors did not consider any DNA sequencing method to be suitable for
high-throughput analysis.” Id. at 54. Petitioner further argues that, “[t]o
the extent sequencing is mentioned in the provisional applications, those
applications also teach that the then-available sequencing methods were not
conducive to high-throughput applications.” Id. at 55.
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Patent Owner disagrees, arguing that the Specification must be read in
conjunction with the discussion of pyrosequencing in the ’741 provisional,
which states:
Pyrosequencing. For a review of the method, see
http://www.pyrosequencing.com/. The main advantages to
pyrosequencing include an extremely fast turnaround and
unambiguous SNP calls, since you actually produce a
sequence. The disadvantage of pyrosequencing, as with
Taqman, is that the assay is not necessarily conducive to high-
throughput analysis (unless $1 million machines are
purchased). This may change as technology evolves.
Ex. 1039, 32 (emphasis added); PO Resp. 69–70. Patent Owner argues that
this disclosure in the ’741 provisional “clearly teaches that pyrosequencing
is conducive to high-throughput analysis if $1 million machines are
purchased.” PO Resp. 70. Patent Owner thus concludes that a person of
ordinary skill in the art reading these disclosures together23 “would
understand that the inventors believed that pyrosequencing was a high-
throughput method of DNA sequencing . . . that could be used to practice the
claimed methods, but that it would be expensive to do so.” Id. at 71; see
also Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 280 (supporting Patent Owner’s
argument).
On this record, we agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Quackenbush that
the ’406 application and ’741 provisional together demonstrate to persons of

23 The ’741 provisional is incorporated by reference into the
’406 application. Ex. 1026, 1:5–13.
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ordinary skill that the inventors understood pyrosequencing could be used
for high-throughput sequencing, if expensive machines were purchased. In
other words, the ’741 provisional gives context to the statement in
the ’406 application, and we agree with Dr. Quackenbush that
“‘[s]uitability’, as the provisional makes clear to a person of ordinary skill in
the art, is a cost issue, rather than a technical one.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush
Decl.) ¶ 277; see also id. ¶¶ 276–80 (opining on disclosures in
the ’741 provisional).
Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Peters, asserts that the ’741 provisional lacks
“evidence that the inventors believed a high-throughput sequencing
approach could be used in conjunction with the claimed methodology.”
Ex. 1004 (Peters Decl.) ¶ 227. We are not persuaded by this testimony,
because Dr. Peters neither specifically addresses the language cited above
from the ’741 provisional, nor controverts Dr. Quackenbush’s opinion that a
person of ordinary skill would have understood that language to indicate that
pyrosequencing could be used in high-throughput applications, if expensive
machines were purchased. See Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶¶ 276–77,
280, 283, 284.
Although Petitioner argues that the cited passage in the ’741
provisional is “equivocal” and “disparaging,” it does not explain in detail
why this is so. Reply 26. Petitioner additionally argues that the cited
passage “does not state that pyrosequencing is useful for high-throughput
analysis using a ‘small amount of genetic material’ that generates ‘noisy
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genetic data’ as claimed in the ’592 patent, and therefore fails to support the
challenged claims.” Id. Petitioner, however, has not alleged, much less
persuasively established, that pyrosequencing could not be used in the
claimed method.
Considering the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that
the ’406 application and ’741 provisional provide adequate written
description support for the “high throughput DNA sequencing” limitation
because together, they reasonably convey to those of ordinary skill in the art
that pyrosequencing could be used for high throughput DNA sequencing (if
expensive machines were purchased). Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.)
¶¶ 276–80, 284.
In our Institution Decision, we invited the parties to address whether
the disclosure of pyrosequencing sufficiently supports the claimed genus of
“high throughput DNA sequencing” recited in claim 1. Inst. Dec. 46; see
also Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (“Sufficient description of a
genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species
falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the
members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or
recognize’ the members of the genus.”). On the full trial record, neither
party addresses this issue.
Petitioner, however, bears the ultimate burden of proving
unpatentability of the challenged claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC,
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800 F.3d at 1378. Once Patent Owner came forward with arguments and
evidence in support of its entitlement to the claimed priority date, the burden
shifted back to Petitioner to convince the Board that Patent Owner is not
entitled to the benefit of that date.24 See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek,
Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Despite having had the
opportunity to address the issue in its Reply, Petitioner has not alleged, let
alone persuaded us, that the disclosure of pyrosequencing is insufficient to
support the claimed genus. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated
Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”) 73 (November 2019) (noting that in its reply
brief, petitioner may address issues discussed in the institution decision).25
“Failure to prove the matter as required by the applicable standard means
that the party with the burden of persuasion loses on that point—thus, if the

24 Citing PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), Petitioner states that Patent Owner has the burden to establish
entitlement to an earlier priority date. Pet. 51. To the extent Petitioner is
arguing that Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion on this issue, we
disagree. The Federal Circuit has explained that PowerOasis addressed the
burden of production, not the burden of persuasion. See Tech. Licensing
Corp., 545 F.3d at 1328–29 (“That ultimate burden [of persuasion on
invalidity] never shifts, however much the burden of going forward may
jump from one party to another as the issues in the case are raised and
developed. Correctly understood, PowerOasis is fully consistent with this
understanding . . . .”).
25 The TPG is available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuide
Consolidated.
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fact trier of the issue is left uncertain, the party with the burden loses.”
Tech. Licensing Corp., 545 F.3d at 1327.
In sum, on this record, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the ’592 Patent lacks adequate written
description support for the “high throughput DNA sequencing” limitation
recited in claim 1, and thus has not demonstrated that Rabinowitz is prior art
to the challenged claims. For these reasons, Petitioner’s obviousness
challenge based on Rabinowitz fails on this record.
III. OBJECTIONS TO DEMONSTRATIVES
Prior to the oral argument, Patent Owner submitted objections to
certain of Petitioner’s demonstratives. See Ex. 3002 (email submitting
Patent Owner’s objections). These objections generally allege that certain
demonstratives improperly contain new theories and arguments. See id.
Demonstratives are not evidence. See TPG 84 (“Demonstrative
exhibits used at the final hearing are aids to oral argument and not
evidence . . . .”). In this Final Written Decision, we rely on the arguments
properly presented in the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record, not on
the demonstratives. Therefore, we overrule Patent Owner’s objections.
IV. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
Petitioner moves to exclude the entirety of Dr. Quackenbush’s
Declaration (Exhibit 2012) under Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 702,
401, and/or 403. Paper 48, 1. Patent Owner opposes. Paper 49. Petitioner,
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as the moving party, bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to the
requested relief. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a).
Petitioner argues that Dr. Quackenbush’s declaration should be
excluded because “he has no experience in fetal diagnostics,” and could not
opine on cross-examination about the accuracy of noninvasive prenatal
diagnostic testing in the 2005–06 timeframe. Paper 48, 1 (citing Ex. 1058
(Quackenbush deposition), 27:21–22, 28:3–4, 203:23–204:9, 205:15–23).
Petitioner argues that, “[w]ithout relevant experience in fetal diagnostics,
and without understanding the state of the art or benchmarks for testing at
the time, Dr. Quackenbush lacks the ‘scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge’ required by FRE 702.” Id. at 2. Petitioner also
points to “[e]xemplary paragraphs that should be excluded” under FRE 702,
401, and 403 because they purportedly contradict, are inconsistent with other
evidence of record, apply incorrect legal standards, or are misleading and
confusing. Id.; see also id. at 2–15 (addressing “exemplary paragraphs”).
Patent Owner responds by summarizing Dr. Quackenbush’s
qualifications and experience and arguing that he has sufficient
“‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education’ of a ‘specialized
nature’ in the techniques of the ’592 patent and prior art (e.g. amplification,
genotyping, and analysis of genetic data) for his testimony to be helpful to
the Board.” Paper 49, 1–2 (quoting SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Patent Owner also argues that
Petitioner’s Motion “raises a host of new arguments in what amounts to an
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unauthorized sur-sur reply.” Id. at 5. Patent Owner also argues that Dr.
Quackenbush’s testimony is correct in view of the evidence of record and is
not misleading. Id. at 5–15.
We have considered the parties’ arguments and evidence and, as
explained below, we deny Petitioner’s motion to exclude.
As an initial matter, to the extent Petitioner employs its motion as a
vehicle to clarify or bolster arguments made in its briefs (Paper 48, 2–15),
we reject that endeavor as inappropriate. We limit our analysis of the issues
raised in the substantive briefs to the information properly and timely raised
by the parties in those briefs.
As to Dr. Quackenbush’s qualifications, although Petitioner
characterizes his expertise as relating to statistics, the record reflects that he
also has adequate experience in the fields of genetics and biotechnology.
For example, he is Professor of Computational Biology and Bioinformatics,
the Chair of the Department of Biostatistics, and the Director of the Health
Data Science Center at the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. Ex.
2013, 1. He has almost three decades of experience in research and teaching
in the fields of genetics and biotechnology (id. at 1–8, 12), has published
hundreds of articles in these fields (id. at 13–52), was the Editor-in-Chief of
the journal Genomics for over a decade (id. at 8), and has served as a peer
reviewer, or on the editorial board, of a dozen other publications relating to
genetics and biotechnology (id. at 7–8). Paper 49, 2. Given that experience
in genetics and biotechnology, we find that Dr. Quackenbush has sufficient
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specialized knowledge, experience, and education in the techniques of the
’592 Patent and prior art, such as DNA amplification, genotyping, and
analysis of genetic data, for his testimony to be helpful to us. Moreover,
even if Dr. Quackenbush did not personally work in fetal diagnostics at the
relevant time, there is no requirement that a declarant must actually be a
person of ordinary skill in the art to present testimony as to what such a
person would have understood at the time of the invention. See, e.g., SEB
S.A., 594 F.3d at 1373 (stating there is no requirement of a perfect match
between an expert’s experience and the field of the art in question, provided
the expert has “sufficient relevant technical experience” to testify).
The remaining arguments raised in Petitioner’s motion relate to the
sufficiency, rather than admissibility, of evidence. Such arguments are
improperly advanced in a motion to exclude. See TPG 79 (stating that a
motion to exclude may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove a particular fact); see also Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets
B.V., IPR2013-00053, Paper 66 at 19 (PTAB May 1, 2014) (“[T]he Board,
sitting as a non-jury tribunal, is well-positioned to determine and assign
appropriate weight to the evidence presented in this trial.”). Moreover,
“there is a strong public policy for making all information filed in an
administrative proceeding available to the public.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00010, Paper 59 at 40 (PTAB
February 24, 2014). Rather than excluding evidence that is allegedly
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confusing, misleading, or incorrect, we simply give it the appropriate weight
in our analysis.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we deny Petitioner’s
motion to exclude Dr. Quackenbush’s declaration.
V. OTHER
Patent Owner “objects to the appointment of APJs by the Office as
unconstitutional under Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” PO Resp. 72.
We decline to consider Patent Owner’s constitutional challenge,
because the issue has been addressed by the Federal Circuit. Arthrex, 941
F.3d at 1328.
VI. CONCLUSION26
Based on the information presented, we conclude that on this record,
Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–
27 of the ’592 Patent are unpatentable for obviousness.

26 Should Patent Owner wish to pursue amendment of the challenged claims
in a reissue or reexamination proceeding subsequent to the issuance of this
decision, we draw Patent Owner’s attention to the April 2019 Notice
Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or
Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding. See 84 Fed. Reg.
16,654 (Apr. 22, 2019). If Patent Owner chooses to file a reissue application
or a request for reexamination of the challenged patent, we remind Patent
Owner of its continuing obligation to notify the Board of any such related
matters in updated mandatory notices. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3), (b)(2).
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Claims 35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis
Claims
Shown
Unpatentable
Claims Not
Shown
Unpatentable
1–12, 15–
17, 19–
23, 27
103(a) Dhallan 1–12, 15–17,
19–23, 27
18 103(a) Dhallan, Bianchi 18
24–26 103(a) Dhallan, Sham 24–26
1–27 103(a) Rabinowitz 1–27
Overall
Outcome
1–27

VII. ORDER
It is hereby
ORDERED that claims 1–27 of U.S. Patent No. 8,682,592 B2 have
not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be unpatentable;
FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is
denied; and
FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a final written decision,
parties to this proceeding seeking judicial review of our Decision must
comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.
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PETITIONER:

Kerry S. Taylor
Michael L. Fuller
Nathanael R. Luman
Sheila N. Swaroop
Jeremiah S. Helm
William R. Zimmerman
KNOBBE, MARTENS, OLSON & BEAR, LLP
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Edward R. Reines
WEIL, GOTSHALL & MANGES LLP
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Matthew A. Smith
Andrew S. Baluch
Elizabeth Laughton
SMITH BALUCH LLP
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