01985915
09-10-1999
Nancy Snead, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Nancy Snead v. United States Postal Service
01985915
September 10, 1999
Nancy Snead, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01985915
) Agency No. 4D-210-1219-95
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final agency
decision concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC
Order No. 960, as amended.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency breached the settlement
agreement, dated May 19, 1997.
BACKGROUND
Appellant filed an appeal with the Office of Federal Operations on July
21, 1998 alleging that the settlement agreement, effective May 19, 1997,
reached by her and the agency was breached when the agency did not hire
her, on three separate occasions, to vacant Mail Processor or Flat Sorter
Machine Operation positions.
In its statement on appeal<1>, the agency argues that there was no breach
because, per the settlement agreement, appellant was given preferential
consideration for the applicable vacancy for which she qualified.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Settlement agreements are contracts between appellant and the agency,
and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See O, Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). Essentially,
this rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous
on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of
the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature.
See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377
(5th Cir. 1984).
In the present case, the portion of the settlement agreement that is at
issue here reads:
[Appellant] will be provided preferential consideration for either the
next Mail Processor or Flat Sorting Machine Operator position when one
becomes available within the Baltimore Performance Cluster, Baltimore
Metro area.
It is not clear from reading appellant's notice to the agency's EEO
Director regarding compliance with the settlement agreement whether or
not she believes that she should receive preferential treatment for every
Mail Processor or Flat Sorting Machine Operator position which becomes
available. What is clear, however, is that, per the agreement, appellant
was only entitled to priority consideration for one of two positions,
not both. It is also clear that the agency was not required to give
preference on a first-available basis. In its appeal statement, the
agency contends that, on May 13, 1998, appellant was given preferential
consideration for the position of Flat Sorter. Appellant's June 4, 1998
letter to the EEO Director corroborates this contention. In the letter,
appellant states that she was informed by the agency of the Flat Sorter
position in May of 1998. Based on the foregoing, we find that there
was no breach.
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Sept. 10, 1999
____________________________________
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 In this case, the agency did not issue a final decision. Therefore,
for our purposes, we deem the agency's statement on appeal to constitute
the agency's final decision in this matter.