Nalco Chemical Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 21, 1967

163 N.L.R.B. 68 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discriminatory discharge of an employee, Respondent had
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
specifically because of this Union, and the employee
membership in it, and where still other conduct might well
have been viewed as further evidence of union animus and
as equally unlawful conduct had it occurred within the
permissive statutory period.5 Accordingly, therefore, with
respect to the animus which I have already found, the
additional testimony of what occurred sometime after the
events in Erin, to wit the incidents at Woodbury in the
summer of 1964 and in November 1965, serves only to
confirm and fortify my finding of company animus.
Because of its make-weight nature, however, I am
disposed to withhold credibility determinations as to these
matters, leaving to the Trial Examiner in the Colonial
Corporation case the assessment of statements and
conduct introduced into the record in his case.
The extent and limitations of the union animus which I
found are evident. Thus it should be recalled that the
animus which formed the basis of the unlawful conduct
found by me was only disclosed after March 28, 1964. And
indeed among those incidents which I could not consider
because of age (supra, fn. 5), nothing that could have
qualified as misconduct or evidence of animus was shown
to have occurred prior to the interrogation of employee
Clark by Plant Manager Herlong on February 1, 1964;6
President Friedman's earlier speech to the employees on
January 31, having been found to contain no reference
whatever to the Union. Respondent's union animus has
been established, therefore, at a point of time after, but not
during or before, the period when the December 1963
decision to curtail work was made and being put into
effect, without evidence of intervening or a subsequent
economic improvement.
It must be recognized, that the most recently adduced
evidence of animus, after the fact though it may be, does
refer back specifically to Respondent's operations which I
have found, for lack of evidence to the contrary, to have
been economically motivated-the curtailment of
production. This is not to say, however, that what was said
in the summer of 1964 and November 1965 in Woodbury,
Tennessee, may now be used as the sole substitute for
contemporaneous evidence. There is nothing in any record
to suggest that in December 1963, or indeed at any time
before Herlong questioned Clark in February 1964,
Respondent or any of its officers had knowledge of the
Union, little less bore animus towards it. What I am asked
to do here is to accept as such a substitute for this void of
knowledge something that was said far removed from the
site of the dispute at a much later time, in a different
context for a different and possibly unlawful motive.
Colonial Corporation and its president, Friedman, or the
local merchants, may well have viewed a story about Erin,
be the story true or false, to be of assistance to them in
their Woodbury problems. And indeed whether the story
be true or false such statements about Erin, when made in
Woodbury, may well be found to constitute unlawful
conduct in the Woodbury context. That would be a matter
to be determined by the Trial Examiner hearing the
Woodbury case. But to take what was said in Woodbury
about something which occurred in a different context a
hundred miles away as long ago as a year and a half
5 Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of
Machinists , AFL-CIO (Bryan Mfg. Co) v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411.
6 TXD , section IV, D, 1.
earlier, and use it as the only proof of what did occur, or
the reason for the occurrence, streteches the processes of
reasoning to the breaking point. The proffered evidence of
what was said about Respondent's activities at Erin in the
instant case is after the fact in every respect. I accordingly
reject it as not material to the issue of this case which is
the credibly established economic determination made in
December 1963 by Respondent to curtail the work at its
Erin plant. Instead, I would conclude and find that the
testimony adduced before me constitutes, if believed, a
fortuitous use by Colonial Corporation, by Friedman, and
by the local merchants of a past event, taken out of
context, in a subsequent unrelated situation for a possibly
unlawful purpose.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon consideration of the entire record in this
case and those portions of the record in Case 26 -CA-2256,
included herein by stipulation , I reaffirm the
recommendations contained in my original Decision.
Nalco Chemical Company and International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. 564, AFL-CIO
Nalco Chemical Company and International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. 564, AFL-CIO. Cases 23-CA-2172 and
23-RC-2515.
February 21, 1967
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF
RESULTS OF ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On July 22, 1966, Trial Examiner Horace A.
Ruckel issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had not
engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint and recommending dismissal of the
complaint in its entirety, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. He also recommended
that Petitioner's Objection 1 to the election be
dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief,
and Respondent filed a brief in support of the Trial
Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and
163 NLRB No. 19
NALCO CHEMICAL CO.
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
69
2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein
called the Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted before me
on March 29, 30, and 31, 1966, at Angleton, Texas, at
which the parties were represented. At its conclusion the
parties waived oral argument and subsequently filed
briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that a majority of the
valid votes has not been cast for the International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 564,
AFL-CIO, and that the said labor organization is not
the exclusive representative of the employees in the
unit found appropriate, within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
' Petitioner's Objection 2 to the election of September 23, 1965,
which was not considered by the Regional Director in his Report
on Objections , was not referred to the Trial Examiner for heanng
by the Board 's Order of March 24, 1966 , consolidating Case
23-RC-2515 with Case 23-CA-2172. This objection pertains to
remarks allegedly made by Plant Manager Limbach to employee
Bly concerning letters sent to the homes of its employees by
Respondent The record discloses that Objection 2 was fully
litigated at the heanng, and we find it to be without ment
Accordingly, as we overrule the objections and as the tally of
ballots shows that Petitioner has not received a majority of the
valid votes cast , we shall certify the results of the election
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HORACE A. RuCKEL , Trial Examiner : This case comes
before me upon an unfair labor practice complaint dated
December 14, 1965, issued by the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board,
acting through its Regional Director for Region 23
(Houston , Texas ), against Nalco Chemical Company,
herein called Respondent . The complaint is based upon a
charge filed on September 24, 1965, by International
Union of Operating Engineers , Local No. 564, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union . Consolidated with the complaint
for purposes of hearing are issues raised by the Union's
Objection 1 to an election conducted among Respondent's
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit on
September 23, 1965.'
The complaint , as amended at the hearing, alleges in
substance that Respondent , by its supervisors,
interrogated its employees concerning their support of the
Union ; threatened to deprive them of existing privileges if
they supported the Union and promised them benefits if
they did not ; during the pendency of the election
announced additional benefits in the form of holiday and
vacation pay; and refused to recognize and bargain with
the Union as the representative of its employees in an
appropriate unit , in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and
' The Board 's Order Directing Heanng on this objection was
dated March 24, 1966. The Regional Director ' s Report on
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a Delaware corporation having its
principal office at Chicago, Illinois, and operating a plant
at Freeport, Texas, the only plant involved in this
proceeding, where it is engaged in the manufacture of
chemical products. During the year previous to the
issuance of the complaint, a representative period,
Respondent sold and shipped from its Freeport plant
directly to points outside the State of Texas chemical
goods and products valued at more than $50,000.
The complaint alleges, and Respondent's answer
admits, that Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. 564, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting
employees of Respondent to membership.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In April 1965, the Union began the organization of
Respondent's employees, and by August 12 had obtained
the signed authorization cards of 21 of them. On that date
the Union wrote Respondent as follows:
Please be advised that Local 564, I.U.O.E., has signed
authorization cards for representation by a majority of
your hourly operator employees in your plant at
Freeport, Texas.
Local 564, I.U.O.E., is prepared and willing to submit
such cards to the Honorable Mayor of the City of
Freeport, Texas, for confirmation that we do
represent a majority of these employees.
We are also prepared to begin discussion for a
collective bargaining agreement concerning these
employees on Thursday, August 19, 1965 at
10:00 a.m.
Please contact me at BE 3-5283 by 5:00 p.m. on
Wednesday, August 18, 1965, if the company is
willing to recognize a card check as stated above and
proceed with orderly negotiations.
On August 22, cards were filed in the Board's Regional
Office in Houston in support of the Union's petition for a
Objections sustaining the Union's Objection 1 to the election was
issued on December 8, 1965.
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representation election.2 On September 3, Respondent
executed a stipulation for a consent election which was
held on September 23.3 On September 27, the Union filed
timely objections to the election. On December 8, the
Regional Director issued a report in which he found a part
of the Union's Objection 1 to have merit. It is this
objection to the Regional Director's Report which forms
the subject matter of the proceeding, together with the
unfair labor practice complaint.
B. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The request for recognition
Respondent posted the Union's letter of August 12
requesting recognition on the plant bulletin board,
together with a notice to the employees as follows:
The attached letter which was received this morning
states that the "Union" has cards from the majority of
you people. The way the letter is written it wants to
make us believe that they actually do have these
cards and that all who signed these cards want to be
represented by this "Union."
We do not believe that the majority of you people wish
to transfer your rights to this Union. But most
important, we do not believe that we can, in good
conscience, "sell you down the river" to this "Union"
without giving you your legal right to an NLRB
certified election such as was held here last year.
Nalco does not want a Union, the Union cannot help
you, and we will resist a Union with every legal
means.
On August 18, Respondent replied to the Union's letter
stating that it would not accede to its request for
recognition because a year had not expired since the
previous representation election and because it had a
"good faith doubt" that the Union represented a majority
of the employees. The letter concluded by stating that if
the Union was certified as bargaining representative
Respondent would bargain with it.
2. Respondent's liberalization of its vacation and holiday
benefits
The appropriate unit as alleged in the complaint is: "All
operators and janitors employed by Respondent at its
Freeport, Texas, plant, but excluding laboratory
technicians, office clerical employees, guards and
watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act." The 34
employees in this unit are hourly paid and are part of a
total of 302 hourly paid employees employed in the United
States, principally in plants in and around Chicago,
Illinois, where Respondent has its principal office and
place of business.' As against these 302 hourly paid
employees, Respondent employs about 1,000 salaried
employees of whom 700 are chemists, engineers, and other
technically trained college graduates. In July 1965, after
the beginning of the organizing campaign at the Freeport
2 Case 23-RC-2515
3 Of 34 ballots cast , only 12 were for the Union
4 Only hourly paid employees at Respondent 's plant in
Sugarland , Texas, are represented by a union
plant, but a month prior to the Union's request for
recognition, Respondent's officers in Chicago began
consideration of changes in its vacation and holiday
benefits. The then-existing vacation program included,
among other vacation provisions, a provision for a 3-week
vacation after 10 years of employment. This was
applicable to substantially all nonsupervisory employees,
salaried and hourly paid alike. On September 1, 1965,
after a period of study, Respondent changed this part of its
vacation program to provide for 3 weeks' vacation after
only 5 years' employment. At the same time it decided to
add one additional holiday, termed a "floating" holiday
since the date of its observance was to be announced later.
On September 9, 1965, Respondent, over the signature
of President Braithwaite, from its Chicago office directed
letters to all its employees in the United States, including
the 34 hourly paid employees in the Freeport plant who are
involved in this proceeding, advising them of this
liberalization of its vacation program. The announcement
of this change, made a month after the Union's request for
recognition, after the filing of the election petition on
August 20, and only 2 weeks before the election, is alleged
to constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, as well as a valid objection to the
election.
As I have stated, the change in the vacation program
affected, or would affect when it became operative, all
Respondent's employees throughout the country, and not
just the 34 hourly paid employees in the Freeport, Texas,
plant. The change, however, though decided upon and
announced in September 1965, was not to apply until the
vacation period in 1966, a matter of several months after
the election at the Freeport plant. Moreover, although it
would beneficially affect all employees who in 1966 would
have been in Respondent's employ 5 years, it would not
affect any employee in the Freeport plant, either salaried
or hourly paid, in the appropriate unit or not,5 for another 2
years. This is because the Freeport plant is comparatively
new and it is not in dispute that any employee will have
had 5 years' employment until that time. Since the
enjoyment of this benefit was postponed for this period of
time, the effect on the employees of its announcement on
September 4, would, in my opinion, be minimal.
Respondent stood committed to the effectuation of this
policy, and it was not made contingent upon the defeat of
the Union in the election at the Freeport plant.
As to the reason for the change in the vacation program,
almost all salaried employees, and hence the great
majority of all employees, are college graduates who are
recruited on college campuses by Respondent's
representatives between the beginning of the normal
college year in September and its end the following June.
Respondent competes for these graduates with tither
chemical companies, including DuPont and Monsanto.
The credited testimony of Robert Powers, Respondent's
executive vice president, is that the liberalization of the
vacation plan was decided upon to bring Respondent into a
better competitive position vas-a-vis these companies. The
improved program, as was true of previous improvements,
was advertised in brochures composed for the information
of prospective recruits.
5 At the Freeport plant, as at the other plants, the salaried
technical employees outnumbered the hourly paid nontechnical
employees
NALCO CHEMICAL CO.
I do not believe that Respondent undertook the time and
expense involved in formulating and effectuating a change
in its vacation policy, which affected its approximately
1,000 employees in the United States (at least those who
should remain in its employ for 5 years) for the purpose of
influencing the election among the 34 hourly paid
employees at its Freeport plant. The timing of
Respondent's letter announcing the additional benefit
perhaps raises a question. The record shows that over the
last several years changes in Respondent's employee
benefits, to go into effect the following year, were
consistently announced by letter in the month of
December. The suspicion arises that Respondent moved
up the announcement in 1965 by 2 months to a date 2
weeks prior to the election at the Freeport plant, with the
purpose of affecting its result. When questioned, Powers
gave in explanation only that competition for college
graduates was becoming keener every year, a fact which
Respondent came to appreciate more fully in the fall of
1965 than in previous years. While not wholly convinced
by an explanation somewhat lacking in circumstantiality, I
am nevertheless disposed to accept it as true. While
Respondent knew of the organizing activities of the Union
at the Freeport plant, and was opposed to them, I do not
find that the announcement of September 9 was made for
the purpose of defeating the Union, and hence was not in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I make the same
finding with respect to the adoption of an additional
holiday, and for the same reasons.
3. The speeches to the employees
On September 17 and 21, a few days before the election,
Plant Manager James Laubach addressed several shift
meetings of employees on the subject of the Union, in
American Tube Bending vein.6 In addition to making it
clear that management was opposed to the Union,
Laubach, according to three witnesses, further said that
without the Union Respondent sometimes extended
benefits, such as sick leave, to employees on an individual
basis, but that if the Union came in this might not be the
case. Laubach's own testimony is that he said, in effect,
that in the event of a union contract Respondent might be
restricted by its terms and might be unable to make
concessions in individual cases. I accept Laubach's
version as the more accurate.
These witnesses further testified that Laubach said that
Respondent was expanding abroad, resulting in
supervisory opportunities open to employees, and that if
the Union did not come in some employees might get to go
abroad. Laubach, according to his own testimony, said
about the same thing in different words, but meaning only
that Respondent's future program might not be possible of
achievement. The further testimony of employee Fisher
was that at one of the meetings he asked Laubach if he felt
that the employees would "lose benefits" if the Union
came in, to which Laubach replied, "Yes, sir, I do,"
without elaboration.
There is uncontradicted testimony that Supervisor
Cook, pursuant to the request of his superior, questioned
five employees as to whether they favored the Union, and
that four said they did not and one that he did. This was
reported to Laubach who told Cook to cease such
inquiries, and he did. Laubach testified that he originally
6N L R.B v American Tube Bending Co, Inc, 134 F.2d 993
(C A 2), setting aside 44 NLRB 121, cert . denied 320 U S. 768
71
instructed the foremen to keep their ears open to
discussions of the Union because Respondent, particularly
in view of an election at the plant less than a year
previously, which the Union lost, believed that it did not
represent a majority of the employees, and that some of
them had signed cards only to obtain an election . Laubach
put an end to inquiries, such as those of Cook, giving as his
reason that he was afraid that other supervisors might
emulate Cook and not be able to question employees
without appearing to coerce them. I do not find Cook's
questioning of these five employees to have been coercive,
in the context described. I do find that Respondent did
have a bona fide doubt that the Union had a majority, as it
had asserted in its letter to Respondent of August 12, 1965.
I do not find that Respondent, by reason of the activities
described immediately above, engaged in interference,
restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
C. The Objections to the Election
The Union's Objection 1 to the election is based upon
(a) the announcement on September 9 of certain additional
vacation and holiday benefits, and (b) repeated warnings
by Respondent that if the Union came into the plant the
employees would be called out on strike. I have found, as
to (a), that the vacation benefit announced would not
benefit the employees at the Freeport plant for 2 years or
more, and that neither it nor the announcement of an
additional holiday constituted interference, restraint, or
coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
By the same token, neither can stand as a valid objection
to the election.
As to (b), it appears that on September 19, 4 days before
the election, Respondent sent a letter to the employees as
'follows:
A "Union" has one and only one force to apply
pressure to management. This one force is a strike.
The unfortunate among you have gone through
strikes. Ask them if it was worth it.
Our record for dealing with you demonstrates
conclusively that there is nothing a "Union" can get
for you that is worth striking for.
The attached strike cost tabulation shows you what a
strike could cost you.
The attached tabulation outlined the amount of money
an employee could lose in the event of a strike , depending
upon his pay and the length of the strike.
The possibility of a strike if the Union came into the
plant was also adverted to in the several talks Plant
Manager Laubach made to groups of employees . He told
them that the threat of a strike would always be present,
that a strike would result in a loss of pay, and that
Respondent could probably operate during the strike with
the help of employees from its Chicago plant.
The Regional Director in his Report on Objections cites
Ideal Baking Company of Tennessee , Inc.,7 in support of
his conclusion that repeated reference to a strike is in
itself a sufficient ground for setting aside the result of an
election. The cited case reveals a much more exaggerated
143 NLRB 546,552
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
and "unremitting" effort to show what would happen to
employees if a strike should take place. Not only was a
strike portrayed as inevitable, but so also was strike
violence and physical harm to employees. A motion
picture was shown to illustrate the point. Also, the
employer, it was said, would hire permanent replacements
for the strikers. The employer himself would so conduct
any negotiations with the Union that a strike would result.
The Board characterized this campaign as "not an attempt
to influence the employees by reason, but an appeal to
fear." I do not find that to be so in the instant case, and
find Respondent's reference to the possibility of a strike
not to be sufficient grounds for setting aside the election of
September 23.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law , and upon the entire record in this case,
it is recommended that the complaint in Case 23-CA-2172
be dismissed . It is further recommended that Petitioner's
Objection 1 to the election conducted on September 23,
1965, be dismissed.
Rotax Metals, Inc. and Frederick Douglas
Paige, an Individual . Case 29-CA-513.
February 21, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On September 27, 1966, Trial Examiner James V.
Constantine issued his Decision in the above-
entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, and the General Counsel filed a supporting
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions,
the General Counsel's exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in this case,[ and hereby adopts the
findings,2 conclusions,3 and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, Rotax Metals, Inc., New
York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
i Because , in our opinion , the record and the exceptions and
briefs adequately set forth the issues and positions of the parties,
the Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied
2 The Trial Examiner states that for an employee's claim
against his employer pursuant to the terms of a bargaining
agreement to be within the protection of the Act, the claim must
be colorable , even though it may ultimately fail. The General
Counsel contends that the proper test is whether or not the claim
is made in good faith As the facts of this case show that the claim
of employee Paige was both colorable and made in good faith, we
need not pass on this issue . The presence of both factors clearly
brought Paige's claims within the area of concerted activities
protected by the Act.
' The General Counsel has excepted to the Trial Examiner's
failure to find that Respondent 's discharge of Paige violated
Section 8(a)(3) as well as Section 8(axl). We find it unnecessary to
rule on this exception , since a remedial order based upon a
finding of 8(a)(3) would not materially enlarge upon the remedial
order herein based upon our finding of an 8(a)(1) violation
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner: This is an
unfair labor practice case initiated by a complaint issued
on May 31, 1966, pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b). It is based
on a charge filed on February 10, 1966, by Frederick
Douglas Paige against Rotax Metals, Inc., the Respondent
herein. In essence the complaint alleges that Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and that such conduct
affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the
Act. Respondent has answered, admitting some facts but
putting in issue the commission of any unlawful act.
Pursuant to due notice this cause came on to be heard
and was tried before me on July 13, 1966,' at Brooklyn,
New York. All parties were present or represented at the
hearing and were granted full opportunity to introduce
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, offer oral
argument, and present briefs. The General Counsel has
submitted a brief. At the close of the hearing Respondent
and the General Counsel argued orally.
The issues in this case are:
(a) Whether the Charging Party, Frederick Douglas
Paige, was discriminatorily discharged, or whether his
employment was terminated for lawful cause; and
i All dates mentioned hereafter refer to 1966, except where
otherwise specified
163 NLRB No. 21