Nadav Helfman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 21, 2021

2019006447 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/929,188 06/27/2013 Nadav Binyamin Helfman 22135-0323001/130043US01 5817
32864 7590 04/21/2021
FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. (SAP)
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
MAHMUD, GOLAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2458
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/21/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte NADAV BINYAMIN HELFMAN, CHAIM BENDELAC,
STEFAN BAEUERLE, and ERAN BEN DROR
Appeal 2019-006447
Application 13/929,188
Technology Center 2400
Before MARC S. HOFF, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–27. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed June 27, 2013; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action,
mailed July 24, 2018; “Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed January 28,
2019; and “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed June 11, 2019. Appellant
elected not to file a reply brief.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is SAP
SE. Br. 4.
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BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
“enabling multi-tenant virtual servers in a cloud system and, more
particularly, allowing cloud systems to provide software-as-a-service (SaaS)
and platform-as-a-service (PaaS) functionality using processes developed
around infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) offerings.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A computer-implemented method for performing
actions on an application on a virtual server in a cloud system
using an infrastructure protocol, the method executed by one or
more processors, the method comprising:
receiving a request at the virtual server according to the
infrastructure protocol, the infrastructure protocol configured to
perform actions on virtual server resources, the request
indicating a requested resource;
determining an application associated with the request;
transforming at least a portion of the request to indicate a
tenant-specific version of the requested resource that is specific
to a particular tenant that is a customer using the cloud system,
wherein transforming at least the portion of the request
includes incorporating at least a portion of a tenant name of the
particular tenant into a name of the requested resource, and
wherein the transforming is performed according to at least one
application mapping that specifies, based on the application
associated with the request, one or more application-specific
transformations to apply to the request; and
based on the transformed request, performing one or
more actions using the tenant-specific version of the requested
resource that is associated with the application.
Br. 20 (Claims App.) (emphases added).
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REJECTION
Claims 1–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Warshavsky (US 2011/0218958 A1, published September 8, 2011), Leafe
(US 2012/0233668 A1, published September 13, 2012), Banatwala
(US 9,325,632 B2, filed March 15, 2013, issued April 26, 2016), and Wang
(US 2013/0080509 A1, published March 28, 2013). Final Act. 3–9.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1–27
Appellant argues claims 1–27 as a group (see Br. 12, 18), so we limit
our discussion to independent claim 1 (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)). In
relevant part, this claim recites:
transforming at least a portion of the request to indicate a
tenant-specific version of the requested resource that is specific
to a particular tenant that is a customer using the cloud system,
wherein transforming at least the portion of the request
includes incorporating at least a portion of a tenant name of the
particular tenant into a name of the requested resource, and
wherein the transforming is performed according to at least one
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application mapping that specifies, based on the application
associated with the request, one or more application-specific
transformations to apply to the request.
Br. 20 (Claims App.) (referred to as “the disputed limitation”) (emphases
added to “the name limitation” and “the application limitation,”
respectively).3
For the disputed limitation, the Examiner relies on the combination of
Warshavsky, Banatwala, and Wang. Final Act. 3–6; see also Ans. 3–5. The
Examiner first points to Warshavsky’s disclosure of code that alters (e.g.,
rewrites) portions of a URL to create a custom URL that is more descriptive.
Final Act. 3 (citing Warshavsky ¶ 29); see also Warshavsky ¶¶ 27, 31. The
Examiner finds that Warshavsky discloses transforming part of the URL “to
indicate a tenant-specific version of the requested resource,” as required,
because the code is created by and for a particular customer (or tenant) and
because “the result of the transformation is a modified URL more specific to
obtain the correct resource managed by the entity.” Final Act. 3 (citing
Warshavsky ¶¶ 29, 66, 76); Ans. 4 (citing Warshavsky ¶¶ 25, 51). Appellant
does not contest this particular finding. See generally Br. 12–14.
Regarding the name limitation, the Examiner points to Warshavsky
and Banatwala. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4. Specifically, the Examiner finds

3 In this Decision, we use three terms to refer to specific claim language:
the disputed limitation refers to all of the quoted claim language; the name
limitation refers to the portion reciting “transforming at least the portion of
the request includes incorporating at least a portion of a tenant name of the
particular tenant into a name of the requested resource”; and the application
limitation refers to the portion reciting “the transforming is performed
according to at least one application mapping that specifies, based on the
application associated with the request, one or more application-specific
transformations to apply to the request.”
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that Warshavsky states the custom URLs “can include entity/tenant names.”
Ans. 4 (citing Warshavsky ¶¶ 25, 29, 31); see Warshavsky ¶ 31 (“[T]he
custom URLs may include descriptive language associated with the data
pointed to by the URL (e.g., a name of an entity, an object, a page, etc.).”).
The Examiner further finds that Banatwala teaches use of unique name
spaces in a multi-tenant environment to forward requests to tenant-specific
resources. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Banatwala 4:38–52); Ans. 4 (citing
Banatwala 5:10–15). The Examiner states that, in light of Banatwala’s
disclosure, it would have been obvious to modify Warshavsky “to ensure the
modified URL includes tenant names (like the bankXYZ) to allow
namespaces and entity specific rules to help manage the URL requests.”
Ans. 4; see also Final Act. 5 (articulating rationale to combine references).
Appellant argues that neither Warshavsky nor Banatwala teaches or
suggests the name limitation. Br. 13–14 (addressing Warshavsky), 15
(addressing Banatwala). As for Warshavsky, Appellant argues that
Warshavsky’s reference to “entity” in paragraph 31 refers to a data entity
(i.e., an “object” or a “table”), not a customer or tenant. Id. at 13–14 (citing
Warshavsky ¶ 78). From this, Appellant contends that Warshavsky does not
teach or suggest the name limitation. Appellant also argues that Banatwala
does not teach or suggest the name limitation because “Banatwala’s system
does not transform, and indeed does not need to transform[,] the request.”
Id. at 15 (citing Banatwala 4:53–57).
These arguments fail to persuade us of Examiner error. Initially, we
disagree with Appellant’s interpretation of Warshavsky. In each of the two
paragraphs preceding the reference to an “entity” in paragraph 31,
Warshavsky refers to “an entity (e.g., an individual, an administrator, a
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customer, etc.)” who created the code responsible for rewriting the URL.
Warshavsky ¶¶ 29–30. Moreover, Warshavsky’s reference to “an entity, an
object, a page, etc.” indicates that an object is different than an entity. Id.
¶ 31; see id. ¶ 78 (using the terms “object” and “table” interchangeably). As
a result, we agree with the Examiner that “name of an entity” (id. ¶ 31)
refers to a name of a customer (e.g., a tenant) or another organization or
person. See Ans. 4 (citing Warshavsky ¶¶ 25, 29, 31); see also Warshavsky
¶ 25 (noting that customers of a multi-tenant database system include the
“tenants”). This finding is further supported by Warshavsky’s explanation
that rewriting URLs allows users to “control what they want the URL to
look like.” Warshavsky ¶ 31; see also id. ¶ 51 (providing example). Thus,
we also agree with the Examiner that Warshavsky at least suggests rewriting
a URL to include the tenant’s name.
Further, Appellant’s arguments regarding Banatwala are not
persuasive because they fail to respond to the rejection as articulated. The
Examiner relies on Warshavsky, not Banatwala, to teach “transforming at
least a portion of the request,” as recited by claim 1 (see Final Act. 3–5;
Ans. 4), and Appellant does not explain why the rejection is undermined by
Banatwala’s failure to also teach this limitation. In addition, Appellant does
not respond to the Examiner’s finding that Banatwala teaches the remainder
of the name limitation,4 or to the Examiner’s rationale to combine
Banatwala’s disclosure with Warshavsky. Consequently, Appellant’s
arguments fail to show error in the Examiner’s finding that Warshavsky and
Banatwala, in combination, teach or suggest the name limitation.

4 We note that Appellant elected not to submit a reply brief responding to
the findings and explanation provided in the Examiner’s Answer.
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Regarding the application limitation, the Examiner points to
Warshavsky and Wang. Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 4–5. The Examiner finds that
Warshavsky’s URL transformation is performed based on an “application
associated with the request,” namely, the tenant-specific code for modifying
the URL. Ans. 5 (citing Warshavsky ¶¶ 27, 29, 34). The Examiner also
finds, “The transforms are application-specific transformations because the
code and rules applied by the code are unique to that code customized by the
administrator or entity[,] and [the code] is applied to transform the portion of
the URL within the request.” Id. Also, the Examiner finds that Wang
teaches transformation of a request to conform to a particular cloud
provider’s interface definition, and that, from this disclosure, it would have
been obvious to modify Warshavsky “to ensure the modified URL includes
application mapping (like the action performed by a code or application) to
allow mapping code in an efficient and convenient manner.” Id. (citing
Wang ¶ 76); see Final Act. 5–6.
Appellant argues that neither Warshavsky nor Wang teaches or
suggests the application limitation. See Br. 14 (addressing Warshavsky), 17
(addressing Wang). Appellant asserts that Warshavsky’s URL modifications
do not specify an application-specific transformation and are not based on an
application associated with the request. Id. at 14 (citing Warshavsky ¶ 29).
As for Wang, Appellant contends that Wang’s translation is not based on an
application associated with the request, but rather is based on the selected
cloud provider. Id. at 17 (citing Wang ¶¶ 33, 34, 56, 76).
We are not persuaded. Appellant does not respond to the Examiner’s
finding that Warshavsky’s code teaches the claimed “application associated
with the request,” and so we are not persuaded by Appellant’s insufficiently
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explained assertions that Warshavsky fails to disclose this aspect of the
claim. Appellant’s arguments regarding Wang are also unpersuasive. Even
if we were to agree with Appellant that Wang’s translation is based on the
selected cloud provider, this does not show that Wang’s translation is not
based on an application associated with the request. Further, Appellant does
not address the Examiner’s other findings or the Examiner’s rationale to
combine Warshavsky and Wang. Consequently, Appellant’s arguments fail
to show error in the Examiner’s finding that Warshavsky and Wang, in
combination, teach or suggest the application limitation.
We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments, but are not
persuaded of error. Appellant appears to contend that none of the references
alone teach or suggest all aspects of the disputed limitation. See Br. 12–18.
This is not persuasive because it attacks the references individually, where
the Examiner relied on a combination of the references. See In re Merck &
Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be
established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references.”) (citing In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“[T]he test [for obviousness] is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”)).
Moreover, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that fail to
address the rejection as articulated. See Br. 15–17. For example, Appellant
argues that Banatwala fails to teach or suggest the application limitation (id.
at 15–16); however, the Examiner found that these claimed aspects are
instead found in the combination of Warshavsky and Wang (Final Act. 3, 5–
6; Ans. 4–5). Also, Appellant argues that Wang fails to teach or suggest the
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name limitation (Br. 16–17), but the Examiner instead relied on the
combination of Warshavsky and Banatwala (Final Act. 3–5; Ans. 3–4).
Because these arguments fail to respond to the Examiner’s actual findings
and rationale, they also do not show Examiner error.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we
find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1. Consequently, we also sustain the obviousness
rejection of grouped claims 2–27, which are not argued separately.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–27 103 Warshavsky, Leafe,
Banatwala, Wang
1–27
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED